Ortona

[Honza]

That looks a lot better in my humble opinion

Agreed.....

 

[andrea pagni]

I add a consideration


I think that in the map there should be only 1 "mayor" road traversing the city lengthwise, with possibly 2 more going along the edges. near the medieval walls. there should be 2 Mayor roads traversing it by its wide side (i.e the short). one in the middle and one leading to the cathedral. AFV movement would be restricted to those ones. all the other small road /bypass would be NA to them.. they were simply too large to negotiate the very narrow and tortuous streets. This should really set the right limitation to AFV in such an environment.

also found this interesting site

http://www.canadaatwar.ca/page44.html

and even a recon photo

View attachment 49153

ciao

 

[Michael R]

I believe I found all of the Canadian web sites about Ortona. I even found sites containing the battle diaries for the LER and SHC.

 

[HansK]

Some more Ortona information:

http://www.seaforthhighlanders.ca/museum/?p=100

 

[HansK]

In this link there is a note at the very end, mentioning cellars that had passages below the street, connecting several buildings:

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ortona/

(this website has many small unit tactics articles)

 

[Michael R]

Some more Ortona information:

http://www.seaforthhighlanders.ca/museum/?p=100

I already obtained the SHC battle diary there. Good site.

 

[Michael R]

In this link there is a note at the very end, mentioning cellars that had passages below the street, connecting several buildings:

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ortona/

(this website has many small unit tactics articles)

Thanks.

 

[andrea pagni]

this is what it looks like a AFV in the normal road in one of those medieval cities

ciao

View attachment 49606

 

[HansK]

Most certainly no tank country...

 

[Paul M. Weir]

this is what it looks like a AFV in the normal road in one of those medieval cities

ciao

View attachment 49606

Nice photo of a Churchill IV NA 75, the version with the gun from wrecked Shermans.

 

[Kevin Kenneally]

After looking at many of the aerial photos of Ortona, I have some questions that some might be able to answer.

What was the purpose of clearing out Ortona?

Were the lives lost worth the victory?

Could the 8th Army bypass Ortona and leave it surrounded; like the US Army did to some French ports?

My questions are not meant to "enflame" responses, but I know little about the Italian Campaign and want to be educated correctly about this battle.

I definitely intend on getting this HASL (because I loved Mr. MacLeod as a brother). So please help me to know.

Thanks in advance.

Kevin

 

[HansK]

I think it was the port of Ortona that the Allies needed.

 

[Michael R]

After looking at many of the aerial photos of Ortona, I have some questions that some might be able to answer.

What was the purpose of clearing out Ortona?

Were the lives lost worth the victory?

Could the 8th Army bypass Ortona and leave it surrounded; like the US Army did to some French ports?

My questions are not meant to "enflame" responses, but I know little about the Italian Campaign and want to be educated correctly about this battle.

I definitely intend on getting this HASL (because I loved Mr. MacLeod as a brother). So please help me to know.

Thanks in advance.

Kevin

A better question might be why did the Germans hold Ortona as long as they did. In many areas of Italy, they would fight for a limited time and then retreat to another line. The Allies expected them to do the same in Ortona.

 

[Kevin Kenneally]

A better question might be why did the Germans hold Ortona as long as they did. In many areas of Italy, they would fight for a limited time and then retreat to another line. The Allies expected them to do the same in Ortona.

Ok, I can understand this.

 

[ZenRiver]

A better question might be why did the Germans hold Ortona as long as they did. In many areas of Italy, they would fight for a limited time and then retreat to another line. The Allies expected them to do the same in Ortona.

From what I read the Germans wanted to retain the port for the same reasons, as well as to deny use of it by the allies. To that end Hitler ordered that it be held to the end, which was a pointless plan as Hitler's orders often were. Hence why the Germans eventually fled the town (strategic retreat) as they released it was not really that important to die to the last man for.

The Battle at Ortona has gotten a lot of press, especially in Canadian history, because it was one of the battles popularized by the propaganda machine back in the day.

 

[Michael R]

The Germans denied the Allies use of the port by demolishing it in November, so no need to hold Ortona for that reason. The propaganda machine got involved after a couple of days of fighting. It certainly caused the battle to change.

 

[samwat]

After looking at many of the aerial photos of Ortona, I have some questions that some might be able to answer.

What was the purpose of clearing out Ortona?

Were the lives lost worth the victory?

Could the 8th Army bypass Ortona and leave it surrounded; like the US Army did to some French ports?

Often hard to bypass towns and cities: road networks are valuable, and it takes troops to mask them. In France, the Allies could use Free French, local maquis, and US units newly arrived in theater. Free Italian troops probably weren't up to masking German paras at that point.

But in WWII as a whole, think about how often attackers did _not_ mask and isolate, either to isolate the operational area against reinforcement and resupply, or to bypass it altogether. Island-hopping in the PTO is often spoken of as a brilliant strategy of isolate and bypass, and that was true, and a great victory, re Rabaul--but we didn't do that with Pelelieu, or with Iwo Jima (which is debated, despite the saving aircrews argument--which is itself debated)--and above all with the Philippines themselves. Or the Marshalls or Tarawa: not islands that could sustain lots of Japanese aircraft--could probably have been contained by some escort carriers and drive-by attack carrier raids--at least until the Japanese went kamikaze. (But even then, hard for Japan to replenish their a/c at Tarawa or the Marshalls once those kamikazes were destroyed.) Hurtgen Forest another example: division after division went hey diddle diddle straight up the middle, in comparison to Aachen or Metz, where after trying the forts to the west the Allies turned to envelopment, isolation, and only then into the city (which then fell with relatively few casualties).

US and British ground commanders were usually very keen on keeping their flanks secure, at every level from platoon to field army. Can't leave too many enemy forces masked if that's your priority. For the Western Allies, despite all the motorization, the strategy, character, and conduct of the war was ultimately about attrition, not maneuver within theaters.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Landmarks are noted on the map at my website: http://canadiansoldiers.com/history/battlehonours/italiancampaign/ortona.htm

The battle occurred in December, the week of Christmas. I think the map colours may be too green - I understand things keep growing in the Mediterranean (photos taken during the battle support this) but might be more evocative if the palette was muted a bit.

Sorting of mail for personnel of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment near Ortona, Italy, 21 December 1943.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Often hard to bypass towns and cities: road networks are valuable, and it takes troops to mask them. In France, the Allies could use Free French, local maquis, and US units newly arrived in theater. Free Italian troops probably weren't up to masking German paras at that point.

But in WWII as a whole, think about how often attackers did _not_ mask and isolate, either to isolate the operational area against reinforcement and resupply, or to bypass it altogether. Island-hopping in the PTO is often spoken of as a brilliant strategy of isolate and bypass, and that was true, and a great victory, re Rabaul--but we didn't do that with Pelelieu, or with Iwo Jima (which is debated, despite the saving aircrews argument--which is itself debated)--and above all with the Philippines themselves. Or the Marshalls or Tarawa: not islands that could sustain lots of Japanese aircraft--could probably have been contained by some escort carriers and drive-by attack carrier raids--at least until the Japanese went kamikaze. (But even then, hard for Japan to replenish their a/c at Tarawa or the Marshalls once those kamikazes were destroyed.) Hurtgen Forest another example: division after division went hey diddle diddle straight up the middle, in comparison to Aachen or Metz, where after trying the forts to the west the Allies turned to envelopment, isolation, and only then into the city (which then fell with relatively few casualties).

US and British ground commanders were usually very keen on keeping their flanks secure, at every level from platoon to field army. Can't leave too many enemy forces masked if that's your priority. For the Western Allies, despite all the motorization, the strategy, character, and conduct of the war was ultimately about attrition, not maneuver within theaters.

If you look at the way the Moro campaign developed, you can see that it was possible to "pinch off" the city. In fact, the Allies fully expected the Germans to withdraw. Because of the presence of civilians in the area, the usefullness of the port, and the desire to turn Ortona into a leave centre, there was no major Allied bombardment of the city. This all contributed to the difficulty in taking it (though of course, the Germans had no compunctions with blowing streets and buildings, and cleaving the church clean in half.) I would not say doing so was "easy" given the German resistance but there was certainly criticism afterwards of the divisional commander.

The Canadian divisional commander was also roundly criticized for the costly frontal assaults mounted in the other fighting around Ortona, though it should be noted this was the first major divisional level battle of the war for the Canadians. The 1st Division had fought on Sicily, but in a series of small, brigade-level actions. Vokes was later moved to Northwest Europe to command the 4th Armoured Division, I believe when a typographical error moved him from Italy. Charles Foulkes had been intended for the transfer. Vokes presided over Canada's best documented war crime, when he ordered the razing of Friesoythe after the C.O. of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was killed. Originally it was thought a civilian killed him, it was found later a German soldier had shot him. It mattered not to Vokes, he ordered the town burned as a reprisal, quite contrary to the rules of war. The point being that Vokes' judgement can be seriously questioned throughout the war. He was a bluff, blustery, crusty old Permanent Force army regular, and it is said he was the inspiration for a saying that if the words 'f**k' and 'frontal' were removed from the English language, the Canadian Army would have been left both speechless and unable to attack.

 

[Tooz]

Great stuff! keep it coming. I have the book: Ortona by Mark Zuehlke. I won't get to it until I read the many books that are already in a queue.