How exited are you about the Korean War module?

[bendizoid]

i'll keep a open mind. I need Maneuver.

 

[witchbottles]

The 7-4-7's range of 4 may also be the creator's desire to historically force the necessity of these troops to conserve their ammo. When dropped behind enemy lines they usually experienced scattered supplies, so it's reasonable they would avoid long range fire to maximize the effectiveness of what ammo reserves they did have.

another corollary there might be the enforcement of fire discipline overall, which does not seem to bode well with most AARs by most American units in WW2 overall. The general trend was profligate use of "recon by fire", in an attempt to draw the enemy return fire or to saturate possible concentration points in the enemy line with ammunition. The 101st was trucked into Bastogne, ( not airdropped) ; highly disciplined and full of combat veteran troopers and veteran NCOs / officers by December of 1944, yet when surrounded for less than 10 days in action, their ammunition stocks fell so drastically that strict fire discipline had to be force-impressed upon them by their command elements. This is not atypical of any US unit in the war period 1941-1945. While some notable exceptions occur ( the lost T-Patcher battalion that the 442nd relieved in the Vosges comes immediately to mind, as do the Bataan defenses), the overall trend in American units was for the vast expenditure of stocks of supplies/ ammunition / vehicles, in order to minimize the overall casualties to their fighting units by overwhelming the enemy in all three categories at any point the enemy chose to defend.

I do think perhaps there is another area one might consider exploring with the 7-4-7 in mind ( and the 6-4-8 as well) - that of depletion of unit strength in the drop itself. the American paras most famous action was Normandy, with a horrible drop leading to vast issues and understrength units, much like Sicily before. Even for the Brits, poor drops in Normandy, and don't forget the one major reason Col Frost was never reinforced on the first day of Market-Garden was Maj Gough's LRDG-inspired jeeps never arrived in Holland, so they could not race ahead on the river road to arrive with or shortly after Frost himself with their badly needed MMGs and manpower from that detachment. The only reinforcement Frost got was the last 2nd Bn company returning form a failed attempt at the Dreil ferry and a small detachment from Brigade HQ , both arriving late the first night on foot, from the river road. Some American units at Normandy never grew beyond 50% manpower strength before being committed to action, certainly this is the case at almost any time on the 6-7 June, 1944. Even then, many instances of "borrowed" manpower occur as well, so how well does the stranger from the 101 fit into the fire team of men who are down to 3 effectives, all from the 82nd?

just my thoughts and observations.



KRL, Jon H

 

[Philippe D.]

another corollary there might be the enforcement of fire discipline overall, which does not seem to bode well with most AARs by most American units in WW2 overall. The general trend was profligate use of "recon by fire", in an attempt to draw the enemy return fire or to saturate possible concentration points in the enemy line with ammunition. The 101st was trucked into Bastogne, ( not airdropped) ; highly disciplined and full of combat veteran troopers and veteran NCOs / officers by December of 1944, yet when surrounded for less than 10 days in action, their ammunition stocks fell so drastically that strict fire discipline had to be force-impressed upon them by their command elements. This is not atypical of any US unit in the war period 1941-1945. While some notable exceptions occur ( the lost T-Patcher battalion that the 442nd relieved in the Vosges comes immediately to mind, as do the Bataan defenses), the overall trend in American units was for the vast expenditure of stocks of supplies/ ammunition / vehicles, in order to minimize the overall casualties to their fighting units by overwhelming the enemy in all three categories at any point the enemy chose to defend.

(Warning: my knowledge level of real WWII military matters is close to none. Er, to be completely honest, my knowledge level of real military matters, any era, is close to none.)

If this tendency of a generous use of ammo is specific to the US troops, is there a rules mechanism that can be considered to be designed to simulate this in some way?

Also, on the matter of units not being full strength, or relying on more or less ad hoc replacements - one might want to simulate this through a lowered ELR (i.e., the squad remains a coherent unit, but is more "brittle" than it should be), but then, US paratroops in the game have underlined Morale, and I don't know of any scenarios where US Paratroops are SSRed to be subject to ELR replacement (which, for them, would be a particularly severe quality drop, comparable to that of SS 658 down to 2nd line 447).

 

[Tuomo]

If this tendency of a generous use of ammo is specific to the US troops, is there a rules mechanism that can be considered to be designed to simulate this in some way?

If an American unit Cowers, the attack is resolved on the original FP column. All other Cowering penalties apply. Brilliant!

 

[Misterhawk]

I tried looking the subject on Google and came across an article Michael Dorosh wrote for View from the Trenches. Haven't read it yet but thought I would post for anyone who was interested. It begins on page 10 ...

http://www.vftt.co.uk/vfttpdf/vftt85.pdf

 

[wrongway149]

FP 7: Skill as you said but has the side effect of giving a CC advantage (defensive at least if not always offensive) against all except German 838 (OK also late USMC in a bar fight ). That means that as commander you might have the inclination to get into a knife fight, regardless of printed range. You can even look at the SS with a gleeful glint in your eye.

SS: probably a greater willingness to engage and eliminate the 'untermenschen'. FP/range are not merely capability, but desire for all in the squad to utilize it to maximum effect.

Range 4: It means that you don't have the ability to sit back and pound if the tactical situation demands. A 6 does.

Agreed - possibly a reflection of an ammunition situation. (not so much low ammo in the tactical sense, but no idea when re-supply will be available so a desire to make every bullet count. ) Something beyond the scope of the game for the player's sake, so must be factored in to the design so as to make play more historically accurate. Its more holistic than linear.

ML 7: I'm NOT, I repeat NOT getting into that and honestly I am quite a bit torn between 7 and 8, so will meekly accept the current 7.

I am OK with 7 ML front, 8 back . The difference can be made up with more/better leaders. If they were designed as 7-4-8/8, I would be OK with that, too, as I would just dial back the leadership.

As we know it's not only the Soviets that have 1 units with 4 range like the Finn, Jap, AxMi, Ital and Hung. Those seem more reasonable as these nations lacked many of training, good NCOs (the non Leaders), motivation or decent equipment. The Finns 4 is partly a reflection of a bigger percentage of SMG and some deficit in pre-war training/more pacific society. The Japanese had dreadful LMG (pretty well tied with the Italians at bottom of the MG league) and allied with an overly long and heavy rifle (compared to the then smallish Japanese) which almost always had a bayonet attached making accurate rifle fire problematic. The fact that they worshipped hand to hand is almost beside the point, they simply could not outreach a decently trained and equipped enemy regardless of preference.

Given that the PPSH41 was the best mass-produced SMG of the war (especially when considering range), the Russian 6-2-8 is probably the most extreme example of training/motivation/tactical preference trumping weapon capability. If I could change any one squad, I would probably drop these to 5-3-7s.

I suspect that we will have to accept disagreement over the matter as we likely have different approaches and mindsets.

I think you lean more heavily on the 'science' side, whereas I am more comfortable with the 'art' of it all. Design for Effect requires a bit of both with a lot of wiggle room in the middle.

Of course there is the German 838 and that is a facepalm for another day.

Thought about putting some in the 'Slaughter at Ponyri' scenarios, but over time have come to feel more strongly that they really a Stalingrad thing (at least in the Heer)

 

[witchbottles]

If an American unit Cowers, the attack is resolved on the original FP column. All other Cowering penalties apply. Brilliant!

OBA draw piles seem to be the most employed (ie already a good draw pile to begin with by the National capabilities chart, then plentiful ammo and / or battalion mortars and / or OBA with Smoke / WP / HE capabilities - all seem readily employed. The sheer fact of a 6 FP E/1 MMC, a 7 FP boxed E MMC, a 5 FP 2/G MMCs, and all HS get 3 FP regardless of unit type / ELR . all this is already incorporated into the game, giving the American a FP advantage over his enemies in every theatre , MMC to MMC.

Further, you get more AFVs, more vehicles period, than your opponent in combined arms scenario OBs. You get a crapload of LATW in almost every scenario imaginable. All this alreasy exists and continues to exist in the designs.

Finally, darn near every MMC has a WP grenade capability, on top of regular smoke grenades. Same for most of your AFVs and onboard guns. No other nationality gives you SFCP to work your NOBA, either ( dedicated MMC frees up a leader for other duties).

There is a plethora of rules and design features already simulating this in most cases. If a designer felt a need to expand it to cover a particular event, such a thing as Tom is suggesting here is quite a usable SSR. (or any similar tinkering with the IFT). Or you can also go the route of KGP I and II, BR:T and others in the HASL category and give Americans pre-game bombardments with no immune hexes that function like REALLY BIG OBA ffe's, for free or for a quite inexpensive CPP cost.

KRL, Jon H

 

[witchbottles]

If this tendency of a generous use of ammo is specific to the US troops,

It is specific to inexperienced troops with a proliferation of supplies led by inexperienced and poorly trained NCOs and officers. We Americans still face this issue of fire discipline in the 21st century. It takes a firm hand to teach and lead men, that sustained firing is not going to accomplish enemy casualties in any built up area or series of fortifications. All it does is deplete ammunition and decrease accuracy. If you can't lay an effective base of fire, don't fire at all. Call in an airstrike or arty to do that for you while you maneuver to a point where an effective fire can be laid down.

Also, on the matter of units not being full strength, or relying on more or less ad hoc replacements - one might want to simulate this through a lowered ELR (i.e., the squad remains a coherent unit, but is more "brittle" than it should be), but then, US paratroops in the game have underlined Morale, and I don't know of any scenarios where US Paratroops are SSRed to be subject to ELR replacement (which, for them, would be a particularly severe quality drop, comparable to that of SS 658 down to 2nd line 447).

You could go the rout of a 7-4-7 ELR to a 5-4-6 still has a 7 ML at the first reduction , then to a 5-3-6 if ELRs again so it goes
7-4-7 /8 (broken morale) ---> 5-4-6 /7---> 5-3-6/6. Still reflects a unit with a tendency towards dumping rounds at the enemy ( FP factors high, ranges not quite so.) - but a deteriorating unit as casualties increase, nonetheless. Really a simple SSR if preferred. Overall, with the 7-4-7, one needs to consider what they represent. They are paratroopers, not assault engineers ( who are better represented by the 6-6-7/8 MMC.) As such, they are trained to act aggressively even if alone. so a underlined ML ELR effect is typically the correct application, for a really beat up unit, give them the underline ELR benefit of 2 broken HS but make them SSRd at a 4 ELR or even a 3 ELR if preferred.


KRL, Jon H

 

[Ganjulama]

 

[wrongway149]

You could go the rout of a 7-4-7 ELR to a 5-4-6 still has a 7 ML at the first reduction , then to a 5-3-6 if ELRs again so it goes
7-4-7 /8 (broken morale) ---> 5-4-6 /7---> 5-3-6/6. Still reflects a unit with a tendency towards dumping rounds at the enemy ( FP factors high, ranges not quite so.) - but a deteriorating unit as casualties increase, nonetheless. Really a simple SSR if preferred. Overall, with the 7-4-7, one needs to consider what they represent.

KRL, Jon H

I don't remember exactly, (NSCH) but I did something like this for both "It don't Come Easy" and "Hubba Hubba One More Time"-- both representing a battle worn Easy co of the 101st, bringing up leg replacements from the repple-depple in January 1945.

 

[Pitman]

Just remember that whenever you try to come up with a squad's values other than impressionistically, you are fucking it up.

 

[wrongway149]

Just remember that whenever you try to come up with a squad's values other than impressionistically, you are fucking it up.

Well it's a sliding scale with art on one side and science on the other.

 

[witchbottles]

Well it's a sliding scale with art on one side and science on the other.

art and experience I'd grant, I don't see much in the way of science

 

[Jeffrey D Myers]

It's a social science....

 

[wrongway149]

It's a social science....

How do people perform when the ship hits the sand?