Agree with the service rivalries comment. My personal opinion was that the Central pacific thrust was more productive, but could be argued either way. Without the Mariana's, you don't have land based bombers able to target Japanese industries in a meaningful way. We flew some out of China, but not without a crap load of supply issues.
IDK Blackcloud: Its not like Homma's Army was tasked to go anywhere else - they were pretty much just slated to occupy the Phillipines. As you say - air and naval superiority were established pretty quickly: Bataan and Corregidor were just a pocket of resistance. I don't think it threw the time table off by much - Horii and the South Seas detachment were operating indepently of Homma and they hit the Bismarcks/New Guinea/Solomons pretty quickly - by spring 1942. I don't think the Phillipines campaign really held up much of the Southwest Strategy - and that was Japan's path to victory.
The navy felt they would have been able to do attack the Japanese homeland from carriers and the AAF strategic bombing may have been unnecessary. They were conducting significant raids near the end of the war. Now that may be post-war posturing for resources. However, I think the real reason for taking the Marianas was to base the nuclear bombers. But the Marianas could have been taken without the central Pacific Campaign anyhow,
What it probably did was tie up resources like fuel, ammunition and food... and importantly, the transports to get it there. Japans entire Pacific war was fought on a weak logistical shoestring. They never had enough oil (the reason many Japanese battleships did not sortie to the Solomons was due to not enough oil.)
Yes, the Japanese were defeated by the end Solomons but the Japanese could not come to grips with that. It may not have entered their minds because of hubris.
Really well thought out. I agree - logistics eluded the IJA and doomed them in a lot of ways.
In the end, winning the war not each battle is what mattered/matters....just ask Jackson would he rather he'd won battles...or the war. Washington did what few other leaders throughout history have done, he took on a superpower knowing he would lose most of the individual battles...and yet he formulated a strategy that would bring ultimate victory.
"Success" on the battlefield, tactically is not always easy to define. And it is largely immaterial if you win the war. This is something Washington, and Giap understood well.
I'm not sure I'd use "great" and "Patton" in the same sentance. Although I must concede that given massive logistical support, overwhelming air superiority, and an enemy in full retreat, I can't think of a better commander.
Actually, Arnold was a pretty decent battlefield commander. He is an object lesson in what happens when one lets ego and vanity get in the way of what would otherwise be a distinguished career.
It still was a distinguished career, from certain points of view
What do you think of his idea for use of Airborne troops on/before D-day?
