Stalingrad was not the turning point of the war, nor Kursk

['Ol Fezziwig]

...If you are going to be strict to your definition then the 1939 Khalkin Gol battles are the only ones that spring immediately to mind.

Just out of print, alas

...though a continuation of the same theme...

and something to compare and contrast...


Food for thought, game for leisure...

 

[Ed Caswell]

Actually the real definition of socialism is "using the poor as an excuse to increase government power and control"...which, historically, has never actually helped the poor...witness that after all the socialist/communist efforts to date...we still have almost the exact same percentage of poor as we ever have.

Excellent comment. I would add that today there are other excuses in play besides the poor. There are many who believe the govt is the solution to all problems. I personally find govt to generally be the problem; not the solution. Saw an interesting Bumper Sticker today, "Legalize the Constitution".

Ed Caswell

 

['Ol Fezziwig]

Excellent comment. I would add that today there are other excuses in play besides the poor. There are many who believe the govt is the solution to all problems. I personally find govt to generally be the problem; not the solution. Saw an interesting Bumper Sticker today, "Legalize the Constitution".

Ed Caswell

(thanks to BitterPill for the imaging)

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Really, you try waaaay too hard...

I'll ask again - which of the concepts are you talking about? Combined arms? Aerial artillery? The encirclement battle? The battle of annihilation? The breakthrough battle? All of the above? These have all been linked to "blitzkrieg" - Bookmarktpa is simply using the most recent definition by John Keegan as the defiinition of blitzkrieg he is framing his discussion with, but it certainly isn't universal, and as the quote I provided shows, your post isn't even relevant, as "deep operations" have about as much to do with blitzkrieg as pancake breakfasts do to fine dining. They're sort of related, but developed differently, from different sources, and in the end really don't occupy the same space.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Well the point I was trying to make is that you can clearly see genesis of the Blitzkreig concept here - only the technology is lacking.

I think the next person that spells it incorrectly should be purged.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I think we know what is meant, broadly, by the term Blitzkrieg and I think you're trying to be a bit too clever.

My point is that everyone throwing around a word they are confident they know the meaning to only ensures that the conversation that follows will result in confusion. That you stopped to clarify your definition helped - much appreciated. Keegan's definition is helpful, but beware that his definition isn't universally used and the word very often gets bandied about by others who use it in different ways than Keegan, or you, use the term.

To what extent it was used, and what success it had, whether early, or mid-war, are open to interpretation.There were plenty of examples of successful usage of the Blitzkrieg doctrine early war.

I'm telling you that those examples are post-war apologia. Which historians are you reading? Cooper's reassessment in 1976 pretty much knocked the socks off a lot of that older pap, and other historians like Ellis have come to agree with him.

The Tanks in France were timid?? How so?? The mechanised charge through the Ardennes (by Von Kleist ???) and the breakthrough at Sedan (with air support) was timid how Michael ?? They only reached the English Channel !!!!! The fact the German high command panicked when the Matildas got into the action doesn't make the original attack 'timid'.

No disrespect intended, I don't see what good it does to throw out names of campaigns off the top of your head. Cooper talks about this in his book The German Army as well. So the Germans used tanks in France. What matters is how they used them. You said one of the necessary ingredients was a willingness to throw caution to the wind and be unmindful of flanks. Yes, one panzer group made a run for the coast. But there were many cases of opportunities lost by the Germans in France. Look at the attacks near Arras where XIX Corps recorded in its war diary that "for reasons unknown...the attack on Boulogne was only authorized by group at 12:40pm on the 22nd. For about five hours 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions were standing inactive on the Amaches." Guderian managed to get things rolling a little earlier, but XIX Corps noted on the 23rd that "it would have been opportune and possible to carry out its three tasks quickly and decisively, if, on the 22nd, its (three divisions) had advanced northward from the Somme area in one united surprise strike." Those tasks were the Aa Canal, Calais and Dunkirk.

A memo on 22 May 1940 by Keitel noted that, with British armies streaming back to Dunkirk, panzer divisions were engaged in "flank protection" operations. The reaction?

Certainly, the Führer wanted fast, powerful advances by armoured spearheads, but then so did the majority of Germany's generals; what he, in common with most of the senior officers, believed were also necessary were properly constructed, secure flanks.

Emphasis added. Cooper continues:

In simple terms, the form of offensive envisaged by the Supreme Commander, and also by the senior generals, was a series of moves in which the mechanized units punched their way through enemy territory and one by one fell out of the advance in order to form a continuous, secure flank extending back from the point unit to the rear of the whole army group.

This need to secure their flanks was a drawback; Guderian's XIX Corps was stationary for 100 of the 700 hours it spent in the field, as a result of decisions by higher headquarters. Cooper again:

The fears expressed by Hitler and von Runstedt of enemy threats on the flanks were at no time proved to be justified...(b)ut the Germans proved incapable of exploiting the priceless opportunity then presented to them; consequently the events from 21 May to 4 June were for them a significant failure. The only obstacle to total victory (at Dunkirk) lay not in the Allied opposition, which was, at first, negligible, or in the nature of the ground to be covered, which before the rains, was quite adequate for any unopposed advance; it lay in the minds of the German commanders. Tradition had stifled revolution, and had ensured failure.

There was no "blitzkrieg" on Dunkirk. Just steady, methodical mechanized operations, with units rotating from point to flank protection. Guderian's tanks sat idle waiting for orders while commanders - convinced of a non-existent need to protect flanks - refused to release them. This is all obviously said in hindsight and is not a criticism - just stated in support of the assertion that there was no "blitzkrieg" in 1940 - just traditional operations. The Germans looked really good in France only because the Allies proved to be pathetically, ineptly bad at what they were tasked to do. Sucks to be a democracy and more concerned with building refrigerators and selling newspapers and producing movies and music recordings than buying guns and bombs.

 

['Ol Fezziwig]

I'll ask again - which of the concepts are you talking about? Combined arms? Aerial artillery? The encirclement battle? The battle of annihilation? The breakthrough battle? All of the above? These have all been linked to "blitzkrieg"

I'm not defending a dissertation.

Bookmarktpa is simply using the most recent definition by John Keegan as the defiinition of blitzkrieg he is framing his discussion with, but it certainly isn't universal,

I think the definition most are comfortable and familiar works well enough in the framework of a conversation, not the rabid zealousness you seem to need to bring to the table in order to frame the conversation as you'd like it.

and as the quote I provided shows, your post isn't even relevant, as "deep operations" have about as much to do with blitzkrieg as pancake breakfasts do to fine dining.

What? The quote that conflates 'tactical' and 'operational' in the same sentence? Why don't you for once try to be a "normal guy" and just ******** instead of trying to be the little kid trying to sneak into an adult conversation?

 

[Ed Caswell]

(thanks to BitterPill for the imaging)

Thanks. Made my day.

Ed

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I'm not defending a dissertation.

I think the definition most are comfortable and familiar works well enough in the framework of a conversation, not the rabid zealousness you seem to need to bring to the table in order to frame the conversation as you'd like it.

Why don't you for once try to be a "normal guy" and just ******** instead of trying to be the little kid trying to sneak into an adult conversation?

Just trying to clarify what it is you are saying, and why. You entered the thread by talking about Soviet operational art, specifically:

The concepts that came to be known as "blitzkrieg" originated with Soviet "Deep Battle" operational theory espoused by Frunze and Tuckachevskii. It was only the Soviet failure to successfully implement these theories (due, in part to the Purges and lack of sophistication of the rank and file) that the world came know 'blitzkrieg' rather than its Russian counterpart.

Yet one source points out that:

The concept created by Soviet theorists, Soviet deep operations does not share much more than a vague similarity to German tactical methods. It was not a copy of "Blitzkrieg", but a proper military strategy based on "real operational content".

This implies the Blitkrieg was either not "proper military strategy", or perhaps not "real operational content".

But there is no "conflation" here - the competing definitions of "blitzkrieg" often refer to the tactics involved, which is why I'm asking you which concepts in particular you feel are relevant to the discussion.

Chas added this:

Some would call comparing the Soviet deep op doctrine to the Germans is blasphemy. the argument there is that the Germans never realized Operational level of war in their doctrine. Note that Clausewitz thought that recognzing this level presented a hazard of adding something complex to something already complex. Of course we Americans think that all we Americans are stupid. We did not put the operational level of war into our docrtrine until the 1980s and had never thought of it before.

Note that Chas suggests the Germans never reached the operational level, suggesting that all Blitkrieg could ever be was a tactical strategy, or perhaps "grand-tactical".

Two different sources have suggested that Soviet operational art has little to do with "blitzkrieg" which takes place on a different plane if not a lower level - but to be fair, we would need to know why you think they are the same, or at the least what your definition of blitzkrieg really is. Which is why we've done you the courtesy of asking - three times now - what exactly you are referring to when you use the term and why you think that the stuff that Bookmartpa is referring to is comparable to deep operational stuff, which Chas suggests the Germans never did - a criticism that is widely made, incidentally, and rightly so.

Put another way, then, are you arguing that German and Russian operations should not be stratified on different levels?

I'm just trying to figure out what it is you're saying, and why.

 

[iamspamus]

The concepts that came to be known as "blitzkrieg" originated with Soviet "Deep Battle" operational theory espoused by Frunze and Tuckachevskii. It was only the Soviet failure to successfully implement these theories (due, in part to the Purges and lack of sophistication of the rank and file) that the world came know 'blitzkrieg' rather than its Russian counterpart.

I've read that too. But I mean blitzkrieg is SOOOO much cooler sounding than:

"F"-backwards "R" - backwards N with is actually an "I" - that weird spider looking letter - B which is a V or something - C which means "U" ... I mean who could even pronounce a word like that?

 

[iamspamus]

Dont confuse the outcome and technology with doctrine.

German doctrine if you will was conceptually the same in 1939 as it was in 1914, 1870, Moltke Sr., etc. the Germans sought the decisive battle of annihilation. The only difference really between Moltke Sr and early WWII was the equipment. the penetrations became deeper and faster (easy now Psycho.

I refuse to drink the Naveh cool-aid. Too much credit is given to the Russians. Some would call comparing the Soviet deep op doctrine to the Germans is blasphemy. the argument there is that the Germans never realized Operational level of war in their doctrine. Note that Clausewitz thought that recognzing this level presented a hazard of adding something complex to something already complex. Of course we Americans think that all we Americans are stupid. We did not put the operational level of war into our docrtrine until the 1980s and had never thought of it before.

If there is interest, will elaborate a little when I have more time.

Chas

Don't know if the Russian origins are true or not, but they're interesting to read. Also, don't forget that the Germans were doing their tank training in Russia during the interwar years. You know, they weren't allowed to have them or ships or planes or an army... That was a major allied oversight, huh?

 

[Chas]

Guys,

Here is a review of some things. There is academic disagreement, so just trying to lay some things out.


The US Army's "intellectual awakening" happend in the late '70s. We were using defense delay tactics as doctrine for potential European conflict. ie, studied how the Germans defended against the Russians. The Arab-Isr wars was an eye opener. Conflict quick, brutal, deep, etc. Part of this awakening was to then study the Soviets. Guys like Glantz, Naveh, etc, thought the Russkies had it right. Arguments were that the Soviets did deep operations, operational level of war, and 'systems thinking'. Part of this was because of a theorist who wrote that something had to be conceptualized to link strategy to tactics. (Understand that most people misuse the term strategy).

The arguments were that the Germans did not link strategy to tactics, nor did they think in terms of operational warfare. Additionally, we as Americans were much the same. Arguments for the Soviets and against us were that we didnt do deep ops like them, nor did we do systems thinking, etc.

I believe what the Russians did but have several arguments completely against this line of thinking.

-The Germans did not put operations in doctrine, but clearly thought about it. Yes, I have a man-crush on Manstein, but if you read his book these things clearly come out. Unfortunately the arguments tend to be well, the Germans lost so the didnt do it. Rather than recognize that maybe if the strategy was bad.......

-Most arguments against the Germans fail to recognize culture or the German way of war. Blitzkrieg was the German way of war for many years. Doesnt mean it was good or bad, just is what it is.

-Because some Russkie wrote it down doesnt mean it was Soviet doctrine. Many German officers described the Russians late in the war as doing exactly what the Germans had done previously.
-Soviet deep ops. Does not fit the American way of war. The casualties suffered were astronomical. And contrary to most Soviet love, the Germans escaped many of the encirclement.
-Statements that the US never did deep ops like the Russians fails to recognize reality on the ground. Once the Russians reached territory that was more ‘European’, there penetrations were on the scale and depth of what the Americans were doing. Ie, one thing to do it on the open plains, another to do it with numerous rivers, cities, etc.

-The US did have a similar intellectual awakening as the Russians in the late 1920s. Never got into doctrine but was taught at the staff colleges and was 2 years at that time. Also, the schools were joint at the time as well. Throughout the 30s these were the guys that were then the Generals in WWII.
My monograph discussed some of this and analyzed the Marianas Campaign using modern doctrine. Ie, the Americans did execute, even though not in doctrine. Deep ops, what about 1300 miles into enemy territory?
YMMV on this. As stated, scholars disagree on who was what and when. The intellectual awaking in the late 70s was necessary. I am very curious as to why those guys did not study the US in WWII and rather focused on the soviets. Something for me to study later.

Chas

 

[A/CSM Bird]

Chas, the awakening you speak of did it result in the "Air-Land Battle 2000" doctrine?

 

[Dr Zaius]

Those are good points, Chas. It's one thing for the Russians to fight on the open plains of their home turf, it's quite another for them to attempt the same type of deep encirclement operations further into Western Europe.

 

[Kevin Kenneally]

Some think Barbarossa was the turning point of the war. Once he invaded Russia it was only a matter of time.

Actually,

I think the cancellation of Sea Lion in August 1940 set the Germans up for failure.

The Russians at that time were Germany's ally and the Russians had no interests in the West as of that time. They were looking south into Persia for conquests.

 

[Kevin Kenneally]

Guys,

Here is a review of some things. There is academic disagreement, so just trying to lay some things out.


The US Army's "intellectual awakening" happend in the late '70s. We were using defense delay tactics as doctrine for potential European conflict. ie, studied how the Germans defended against the Russians. The Arab-Isr wars was an eye opener. Conflict quick, brutal, deep, etc. Part of this awakening was to then study the Soviets. Guys like Glantz, Naveh, etc, thought the Russkies had it right. Arguments were that the Soviets did deep operations, operational level of war, and 'systems thinking'. Part of this was because of a theorist who wrote that something had to be conceptualized to link strategy to tactics. (Understand that most people misuse the term strategy).

The arguments were that the Germans did not link strategy to tactics, nor did they think in terms of operational warfare. Additionally, we as Americans were much the same. Arguments for the Soviets and against us were that we didnt do deep ops like them, nor did we do systems thinking, etc.

I believe what the Russians did but have several arguments completely against this line of thinking.

-The Germans did not put operations in doctrine, but clearly thought about it. Yes, I have a man-crush on Manstein, but if you read his book these things clearly come out. Unfortunately the arguments tend to be well, the Germans lost so the didnt do it. Rather than recognize that maybe if the strategy was bad.......

-Most arguments against the Germans fail to recognize culture or the German way of war. Blitzkrieg was the German way of war for many years. Doesnt mean it was good or bad, just is what it is.

-Because some Russkie wrote it down doesnt mean it was Soviet doctrine. Many German officers described the Russians late in the war as doing exactly what the Germans had done previously.
-Soviet deep ops. Does not fit the American way of war. The casualties suffered were astronomical. And contrary to most Soviet love, the Germans escaped many of the encirclement.
-Statements that the US never did deep ops like the Russians fails to recognize reality on the ground. Once the Russians reached territory that was more ‘European’, there penetrations were on the scale and depth of what the Americans were doing. Ie, one thing to do it on the open plains, another to do it with numerous rivers, cities, etc.

-The US did have a similar intellectual awakening as the Russians in the late 1920s. Never got into doctrine but was taught at the staff colleges and was 2 years at that time. Also, the schools were joint at the time as well. Throughout the 30s these were the guys that were then the Generals in WWII.
My monograph discussed some of this and analyzed the Marianas Campaign using modern doctrine. Ie, the Americans did execute, even though not in doctrine. Deep ops, what about 1300 miles into enemy territory?
YMMV on this. As stated, scholars disagree on who was what and when. The intellectual awaking in the late 70s was necessary. I am very curious as to why those guys did not study the US in WWII and rather focused on the soviets. Something for me to study later.

Chas

Good points Chas.

 

[Psycho]

Actually,

I think the cancellation of Sea Lion in August 1940 set the Germans up for failure.

The Russians at that time were Germany's ally and the Russians had no interests in the West as of that time. They were looking south into Persia for conquests.

Actually it was Barbarossa, dumbass! :angry: Once he started fighting on two fronts he was done. Somebody once said "don't start a land war in Asia" or something along those lines.

 

[Kevin Kenneally]

Actually it was Barbarossa, dumbass! :angry: Once he started fighting on two fronts he was done. Somebody once said "don't start a land war in Asia" or something along those lines.

Land war?

You mean to say that WWII was NOT a simulation?

It was NOT a game invented by the "elders"?

 

[Hovned31]

Actually it was Barbarossa, dumbass! :angry: Once he started fighting on two fronts he was done. Somebody once said "don't start a land war in Asia" or something along those lines.

The invasion of Denmark was the turning point of the war. To argue otherwise is sheer folly!

 

[Ranger B]

I vaguely recall Keitel or Halder opined that they felt the war was lost once it became a two front war. Regardless of how much luck (or bad luck as it were) played into Halder/Keitel's comment bearing fruit, I suppose there's some merit to the statement that a defeatist attitude helps foster defeat. If that sentiment was shared by the OKW/OKH staff, it could certainly be noted it was 'just another nail in the coffin'.

What I am gathering from all the discussion, is that finding a 'silver bullet' or exact moment in time is not really manifesting itself; a lot of the arguments carry good merit and cannot be discarded; instead it seems more like a series of events, failures and blunders that culminated in a "cascade failure".

As an aside, "Somebody once said "don't start a land war in Asia" or something along those lines." Does this quote also pertain to Ghengis Khan and Alexander or is there an arbitrary date enforced on when this is applicable?