I have few dogs in this discussion, as (1) I've already pointed out the way to get unhidden field works to preserve some fog of war (provide more than needed, so their presence does not indicate an occupied position), and because (2) fog of war foxholes are still possible and would cover much of what is required beyond the workaround in (1).
But I do have quibbles with some of the points made in passing about firepower vs. field fortifications and what spotted enemy does and doesn't imply, the level of battlefield recon one can expect in Normandy conditions, the effect it had on allied firepower arms, etc. And a related issue that is important for this concerns purely protective infantry shelters ("dugouts"), as distinct from exposed fighting positions. Which ties in with previous discussions about log bunkers etc.
I return to the example position in front of St. Lo. If you bother to actually count them, you will find the defending battalion position has a little more than 350 dugouts indicated in the scheme, along with a little under 350 separate rifle pits, and a dozen or so heavier weapon pits. The dugouts are not just foxholes. Rifle pits are, those are exposed from above and meant as fighting positions. Some of the dugouts have MG fire indicators, those are effectively log bunkers. But many, the majority, do not, and they are protective positions with their own associated rifle pits or other fighting positions (along a hedgerow, a sunken lane, etc).
Why do they have both? Because the dugouts are proof against 105mm artillery from above. I've explained the standard all armies used to protect infantry against 105mm artillery since WW I. It works, men in cover that prepared can ride out a shelling by 105mm artillery (or 81mm mortars etc), without suffering any appreciable casualties. At worst, an occasional position will be buried and require assistance from friends to dig out of. Such positions are *not* proof against a *direct hit* by *155mm* or large shells. But operationally, that is of no consequence. I will demonstrate why shortly.
The defenders can be in one of two basic postures. They are either manning their rifle pits, with at least 1 man each, or they are in their dugouts, with typically 2 men in each.
How exposed are they in either case, to enemy artillery fire falling on the position?
First, we can dispense immediately with the notion that exact location of an specific dugout or rifle pit matters in the slightest. The size of barrage beaten areas the attackers are going to use are 200 by 200 meters minimum, with 400 by 400 meters much more common. The entire position is 1000 meters by 1250 meters. The field fortifications systematically avoid field interiors and the shells cannot do so. Very large portions of the shells fired are going to fall in open areas and do nothing, whether the attackers know where the defenders are, or not.
Suppose the attackers toss 155mm shells into the entire 1000 x 1250 area at random, while men are in their dugouts. Assume the vulnerable footprint of a single dugout is 6 square meters (3 by 2) for a direct hit. Then the chance of an individual 155 shell hitting any dugout directly is 1 out of 625. The attackers might have the support of a single 155mm howitzer battalion, which might fire 500 shells a day. But be generous and double both figures (2 battalions, 1000 per day each), and then fire for 2 days, as well. They will hit 6 or 7 dugouts and kill 12-14 men. Competely inconsequential losses to a full infantry battalion, entirely incommensurate with the ammo expenditure, not anything the attackers will voluntarily repeat, etc.
If the attackers are also supported by 4 battalion equivalents of 105 (div arty and cannon companies of 2 regiments) each firing much more often, 2500 rounds a day, it won't raise the losses at all really, since the men are by hypothesis in 105mm proof cover. Maybe a handful of additional losses, 20-25 men, for a huge firepower expenditure.
Now instead suppose the men are in their fighting positions. Supposed that they are somewhat exposed through time, such that any 105mm round landing within 5 meters of their specific hole has a 50% chance of causing a casualty. Then the portion of 105mm shells close enough will be 1 in 45 fired, and the losses half of that. Even without the 155mm support, the 105mm support postulated above will be enough to inflict 110 casualties per day, 220 over the two day period. The defending battalion will bleed to death on the position, its morale likely breaking in days and certainly bled to ineffectiveness within a week. Being no further located than in the right grid-square.
Moral of the analysis - 105mm proof dugout cover is not foxhole cover. 105mm proof dugout cover *defeats* firepower-only attacks. Trumps them cold.
But located and manned fighting positions can be bled white on a time scale of days using firepower based attacks.
Moral - the purpose of combined arms attacks by infantry are to force the enemy to man his actual fighting positions and get out of his bomb-proof dugouts.
Note that the defender can achieve the same relationship by simply denuding his front line of more than a token 10th of his force at once, in any region not pressed. If his rear area positions are completely unlocated they don't even need to be shell proof. But cellars and such will generally be both unlocated and shell proof, if far enough from the front line. Again the threat of attack by maneuver arms is required to force the enemy to expose himself enough, that firepower arms have anything to "bite" on.
For these tactical relationships to hold in a game, the following are essential.
(1) artillery needs to be a blunt intrument, hitting wide areas not individual point targets.
(2) shell proof forms of cover must exist. They need not be positions one can fight from, for more than a few heavy weapons bunkers. But positions that protect ordinary squad infantry from 105mm caliber artillery, *totally*, need to exist. (Cellars, bunkers, dugouts, caves, call them whatever).
(3) It is *not* necessary that all forms of cover be unspotted by the attacker. He has to *not know* whether any given cover type that *is* vulnerable to artillery, is actually *manned* or not, or not know where it is. This can be accomplished by giving the defender more than enough of such forms of cover, or by making them hidden, or any mix of the two.
Artillery *could* destroy concentrated defenders on an entire grid-square, without muss or fuss, *if* and *only if* those defenders lacked overhead cover against a 105mm round.
In practice, German defensive schemes in Normandy worked and kept allied firepower arms to about 1/3rd of their war-long average effectiveness, by employed thinned schemes from side to side across the frontage. What do I mean by a thinned scheme? I mean real positions interspersed with dummy positions and obstacles.
Sector A has a position like the nose depicted in the diagram. Sector B is just mined and has mortars registered over it. Sector C is flooded. Sector D is mined and has a less extensive infantry position behind it. Sector E is empty on the same depth, but has a minefield a half-kilometer further south. Sector F parallels E but with a full infantry position again. Etc.
If the Americans try to use artillery ahead of infantry across all sectors, half of it will be utterly wasted on sectors with no infantry defenders present, to speak of. If they advance broad front on all sectors with infantry, they will be chopped to pieces on a third of the frontage where they hit full positions, breaking up inter-unit coordination. They will only be delayed and annoyed on the other portions, but will at best lap around extra sides of the full position "blocks". Meanwhile another such staggered positions of reals and dummy will be built 1-2 km further south, and the whole game repeated on a time scale of 2-5 days.
That sort of thing needs to be possible. But can probably be accomplished by (1) hidden foxholes plus (2) some form of dugout-cellar-log bunker cover allowed plus (3) when trenches are present, giving the Germans way more of them than needed to hold their manpower.
Fog of war was implemented decently with just dummy counters before computer double-blind was practical. Extra field fortifications can do the same.
But, big but, there needs to be some way to put an infantry squad in something that will let it utterly ignore a wide 105mm barrage, and emerge unscathed from it, to hit infantry following the barrage.
For what it is worth.
