If 21st AG doctrine was good and the Germans were so inept what happened to the great Allied Victory in the 21st AG AO?
The Allied offensive doctrine in Normandy was just as bad as the German defensive one.
Except that it wasn't. I keep getting accused of conflating tactics and strategy, but I don't think I'm the one at fault.
In February 1944, Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds, the commander of 2nd Canadian Corps, gave a detailed series of tactical notes to commanders preparing for the invasion of Europe, based on his battle experience in Italy as commander of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The notes are remarkable for their clarity and in describing so well the course of tactical battles to come in Normandy, the breakout across northern France and Belgium, the fighting in the Netherlands, the Rhineland, the Rhine crossings, and the final battles in Germany.
* For attacks on prepared positions, adequate reconnaissance was emphasized, with assaults to take place on a limited front with "all available" artillery so that "really heavy support may be given." A Commonwealth division of nine infantry battalions had three field regiments of 25-pounder guns (24 guns in each), while each infantry battalion had six 3-inch mortars of its own. The divisional support battalion had a company of 4.2-inch mortars. The corps artillery had additional fire support available in 4.5”, 5.5” and 7.2” gun regiments, and for large scale operations, tactical air support was available ranging from fighter-bombers to medium and even four-engine heavy bomber support. Naval gunfire was also used while in Normandy.
* Initial objectives had to penetrate to beyond the normal range of German mortars, or else those mortars had to be dislodged by counter-battery fire (difficult to do owing to the ease with which they could be deployed in cover and concealment).
* Consideration was to be given in large-scale operations as to when to move friendly artillery forward, and when to schedule friendly air power, possibly as a substitute.
* Simonds also impressed on his commanders the value of friendly tanks and anti-tank guns being forward with the infantry, as well as the use of artillery against enemy tanks, directed by Forward Observation Officers of field artillery batteries travelling with the leading infantry.
* Anti-tank obstacles and thick minefields were common and initial attacks were to be made by the infantry to secure gaps or breach obstacles
These tactical points were raised in reaction to German defensive battle doctrine, which stressed the following:
* Forward positions were defended lightly, thinly held with small groups of men strong in automatic weapons.
* Stronger infantry forces were held in reserve, ready to counter-attack where necessary.
* Forward positions were strongly supported by mortars, usually located 3,000 to 4,000 yards to the rear, capable of firing ahead of or anywhere within the defended zone. The Germans pre-registered their own positions and immediately and heavily shelled and mortared them once they were known to be lost.
* Tanks and self-propelled guns were held in reserve and when enemy infantry had broken into friendly positions, would move in and deliver direct fire at very close range.
Terry Copp had this to say about it in 'The Brigade':
In theory there was nothing wrong with Simonds' version of Allied battle experience but in practice the thinly armoured, undergunned Sherman tanks were seldom able to accompany the infantry onto the objective, and almost never able to stay to help meet the counterattacks. The self-propelled anti-tank guns stayed well to the rear and it usually took some time to get the towed six-pounder and seventeen-pounder anti-tank guns into position. All too often the infantry had only the artillery to (rely) upon, not only to "shoot" them onto the objective but also to break up the counterattacks with well-directed concentrations. More than one infantry company commander has described his role in North-West Europe as "escorting the artillery Forward Observation Officer (FOO) across France."
The intense concentrations of German tanks before Falaise was unusual, but even then, massed firepower in escalating amounts was orchestrated to move things forward - including heavy bombers. There were obviously kinks, including a lot of short-bombing incidents, both American and RAF (COBRA, TOTALIZE, etc.) But the basic concepts were sound, even if certain types of equipment (i.e. medium tanks) were not equal to the task. After Normandy, tank-to-tank battles were increasingly rare, particularly for the British/Canadians.
Basically, a Canadian or British infantry battalion in an infantry division in a deliberate attack relied on the artillery to shoot it onto an objective, generally in concert with a divisional fire plan and with support from divisional and corps assets, including armour from independent armoured brigades. The Germans, on the other hand, generally defended their territory with a light screen of outposts, pre-registered their front, and their own front line, with mortars, and kept a reserve of infantry, and where available, assault guns or tanks to counter-attack. The fatal flaw for the Commonwealth in this set up was the weak armour of their tanks and the vulnerability of their infantry to the ever-present mortars which were difficult to do counter-mortar fire on - they could be dug in anywhere and almost impossible to spot. For the Germans, the disadvantages were that the counter-attacks were generally costly and once the Commonwealth gained their objectives, were very often difficult to throw back out because their artillery was so well organized and able to concentrate massed fires so quickly using the Parham system. A single code word could call down divisional, corps or even army level assets onto a German counter-attack in matters of minutes.
