The Purist
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True but both panzer divisions had almost no tanks (about 16 in total, iirc). They were more like motorised infantry regiments with some heavy equipment. The panzer divisions gained some major firepower when KG Knaust was sent to Arnhem with the better part of 30 Pz V and and about 6-8 Pz VIb (iirc).
The big question raised by more recent research (than the Ryan book) is what would have happened if Guards Armoured was able to exploit over the Nijmegen bridge on the 19th when there was not much more than motor infantry with a few halftracks and armoured cars south of Arnhem and the British paras still held the north side of the bridge.
It should be noted that 43rd Wessex Infantry was already moving north behind Guards Armoured and (historically) sent troops northwest of Nijmegen to link with the Polish paras on the south bank and assist with the evacuation. The Nijmegen bridgehead was initially consolidated by infantry once the battle wound down and Guards was withdrawn.
I don't see a Rhine bridgehead as being viable in Sep 44 for a strike east and southeast, the allied supply lines were just too stretched and really needed Antwerp to go anywhere in depth. Whatever bridgehead that might have been gained at Arnhem may have led to an earlier liberation of the rest of the The Netherlands and avoided the civilian starvation of the Dutch in the winter of 44/45 but little else.
The big question raised by more recent research (than the Ryan book) is what would have happened if Guards Armoured was able to exploit over the Nijmegen bridge on the 19th when there was not much more than motor infantry with a few halftracks and armoured cars south of Arnhem and the British paras still held the north side of the bridge.
It should be noted that 43rd Wessex Infantry was already moving north behind Guards Armoured and (historically) sent troops northwest of Nijmegen to link with the Polish paras on the south bank and assist with the evacuation. The Nijmegen bridgehead was initially consolidated by infantry once the battle wound down and Guards was withdrawn.
I don't see a Rhine bridgehead as being viable in Sep 44 for a strike east and southeast, the allied supply lines were just too stretched and really needed Antwerp to go anywhere in depth. Whatever bridgehead that might have been gained at Arnhem may have led to an earlier liberation of the rest of the The Netherlands and avoided the civilian starvation of the Dutch in the winter of 44/45 but little else.
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