Downsides Of Distant Guns

[Double Whisky]

Conway's says Ibuki was laid down 22 May 07, launched "less than six months later" on 21 Nov 07, and completed 1 Nov 09.

Probably You are right, Sir :salute:
Anyway, not very big mistake for my statistics

 

[Yang]

Hi Double Whisky, what you are doing here is basically what BH always does in a discussion. You two explain how things (should) work in reality, but you are drifting away from the main subject of the discussion. And that is how Distant Guns works aka how Distant Guns simulates Reality.

We know so little about the actual mechanics and SES has never been clear how things work, so we can only assume how certain things are handled in the Game. One example of that is that slowing a ship down, having it drop out of the battle-line and ceasing fire is supposed to increase its survivabilty chances. But we don´t know for sure. (Maybe you can have a look at that?)

So here is my take at the gameplay mechanics and what would be the ideal ship in DG. As i see it, SES has incorporated some simplifications in the Gameplay mechanics. For example Crew Ratings are fixed values and don´t matter therefore. ROF is a fixed value. Turrets don´t rotate. Hit probability is the same for guns (except that the A.I. seems to get a bonus - again one of the big mysteries we are riddled with)and is not influenced by things like the ship turning or the gun being in a fixed installation on land. Many things that are dynamic in reality are static in the game. Since there are values for Crew ratings included we can assume that it was planned to assign different ratings to Japanese and Russian vessels. But obviously at one point during development it was decided to drop Crew Ratings because the the mechanics behind the Ratings weren´t finished. The Crew rating could have influenced things like better rated crews doing a better job at Damage Control, can maintaining a high ROF longer under pressure, finding better firing solutions for Torpedoes and so on. Worse crew ratings for the Russian 2nd Pac could have meant that the Tsushima Battle could have played out the way it did. It would also have allowed for "what-ifs" like "What would have happened if the crew ratings were the same for Russians and Japanese in the Tsushima Scenario?". Many of those things are static in the Game and we can assume SES tailored many of the gameplay mechanics specifically towards the RJW period with their interpretation how things should work out. One of my big hopes for Jutland are that the Game engine becomes more dynamic and incorporates many of the things that were intended for DG but were somehow discarded during development (or set back for Jutland).

Now back to the most important question at hand. What happens when a ship is hit in DG? To answer it we have to take a closer look at how ballistics work in DG. This is my speculative approach on how things work in DG:

1. Player orders to open fire.

2. Gun turns immediatly and fires a round.

3. Now we can observe the shell in the graphical layer. I´d suspect that the ballistics are similar for all guns with a notable exception for PA´s land based howitzers. The formula behind those ballistics seems to be hardcoded in a sense that it flys from A to B in the same manner again and again only to be influenced by a random number so that shells are dispersed near the target. (Take the random number away and it will probably always hit the same spot of the target... or where the target was when the shell was fired. Common problem you see in games where ballistics matter.)

4. Now we will either have a splash or a hit. The only interesting thing to look at is the hit and the question what happens when the graphical layer registers a hit? It seems you expect the game now to calculate the corresponding damage based on shell weight, angle the shell hit the armor, penetration value and so on. Personally i don´t think so. Here is my assumption on what the game does:

• Graphical layer sends a hit back to the game engine.
• Game generates a random number to determine whether it was a critical hit (Probably only enabled for big guns).

For example Mikasa might have a 500 assigned to her so if she is hit by a 305mm the game registers a critical hit when the random number generated from the 0-500 range is also a 500. The Game then takes fixed shell values (+ fixed random values connected shell size) and adds those to the Fire level and Flood level of the corresponding ship. Now i think the only effect armor has is that a fixed value from the Damage Value is substracted based on Armor Type. Again to show you what i mean, lets use the Mikasa example again:

• Mikasa hit by 305;
• Game checks for critical hit - No Critical hit;
• Game calculates 300(fixed damage based on shell)+73(Random)-200(dmg reduction based on armor type)=173 Damage points of Fire Damage;
• Game adds 173 points to her fire levels;
• Game calculates 150(fixed damage based on shell)+57(Random)-200(dmg reduction based on armor type)=7 Damage points of Floatation Damage;
• Game adds 7 points to her starboard floatation levels;
  (Similar checks probably apply to Torpedoes with an increase on their effects on floatation damage)

5. Game keeps track of Flooding and Fire levels by periodically calculating the collected damage amounts and comparing them to the Damage Control Rating of the Vessel. It then decreases the number of available Crew so that the DC capabilities are reduced for the next Check.

CONCLUSION:

Damage control in DG seems to entirly depend on Displacement*Unknown Value/Crew (or Combat Value/Crew? Again Combat Value sees to be mainly dependant on displacement) . Therefore to increase Survivability of a Ship we have to reduce Displacement and increase its Crew size. The result would be a vessel that has such a high DC capacity that it can take all kinds of hits and immediatly reduce their effects to nil. With that in mind in my opinion the best thing to do in DG is to leave your BB/AC in port, and transfer their Crews on the DD/Torpedo boats. Since they are now able to take ridiculous punishment because of their increased DC capacity, your DD/TB can engange the enemy at will and live to see another day. This thesis could be easily checked if the game was moddable, but if developers decide to hardwire things and specifically tailor game mechanics to work in a specific way (generally by simplifying, which is ok) they tend to prefer things hidden.

Again, DG is a great game and i´m glad that someone created such a game. As i said before, i think in Jutland we will see many of the things that were simplified in DG to be worked out to full extend.

 

[PepsiCan]

Dear Sirs,

in our long, and happily mostly friendly, discussion two schools emerged:

It has been and that is how it should be. Credit to the people posting in this thread!

One I will call The Jeune Ecole – as the way of thinking of this part of members, led boldly by Bullethead, and relentlessly seconded by PepsiCan, resembles the analysis of those French innovators.

Second I will call The Dreadnoughts, as we (have the honour to be on this side in the discussion) along with vs18, Rhetor and some others (see other posts, not only in this thread) believe rather that thicker armour and heavier guns are to win over weaker armour and lighter guns – at least if the make of the armour and construction of the guns are roughly comparable.
There is one more reason for this name and it will be selfexplained therefore.

Our discussion cover two different areas: the game reality, and the historical reality. Of course they have a lot of interference in our discussion, but for the sake of clarity I will try to address them separately, as far as possible at least.

Hmmm...I understand what you want and where you want to go, but I wouldn't share myself under Jeune Ecole. I'd rather state my position as that of an empericalist. I want evidence, preferably quantitative. If there is a theory, then it needs to be supported by fact. I would also not classify you as Dreadnought, but more a theorist. Let me try and explain where I am coming from.

Distant Guns is a game that attempts to (at least partially) emulate reality. So, what is reality in this case? It is using the actual observed and recorded results of the Russo-Japanese war, and using these as basis to extrapolate from. The extrapolation needs to be there to cover instances that never really occured in the war, and are therefore not recorded, but that could have occured and can therefore also occur in the game. For example, the quoted instance of a AC vs BB battle.

The RJW is therefore a unique event. No conflict before it or after it offers you the same mixture of technology and ability and there was no other naval conflict going on at the same time to draw information from to record and research what the actual behaviour was of men and matériel during that war. Go 5 years back in time and almost no ships had Krupp armour and 12 inch guns. Go 5 years into the future and the major navies are rapidly introducing dreadnought type ships and submarines into their operational squadrons. Take it one year further still and the US armed forces have their first airplane. In the light of gathering statistics and observing what happened, the RJW is unique. There was only one of it in that time period and there is no comparable conflict fought during the same time span with comparable technology.

Regarding history:

The Jeune Ecole declares that SES made a thorough research of this historical period and up to this research:

1. The RJW was short and unique moment of history, when all common rules for rating the combat value of the ships, like area, thickness and overall weight of the armour, number, caliber and ballistic characteristics of main guns and the mass of the shells, were not valid any longer.
2. During the RJW the armour on capital ships was not so important as AP shells were unable to penetrate even relatively thin armour.
3. Anyway the armour of Japanese ships was superior to the armour of Russian ships, and Russian ships were generally obsolete.
4. The AP shells on both sides were faulty, but Russian shells were ill-faulty, and Japanese shells were well-faulty.
5. Taking to the account the rate of fire it was no difference in battle effectivness between 12 inch, 10 inch, 8 inch and 6 inch guns. Each gun from 6 inch up was in the matter of fact of the same battle worth.
6. The effectiveness of smaller guns was enhanced because of very short distances of the fight during RJW battles
7. The big ships were largely immune to penetrating their hulls by shells, and the sinking of the ships was caused by accumulated effect of fires resulted from multiple hits of guns of all calibers, but mainly of light and medium caliber guns, as they were mounted on the fighting ships in much greater numbers and were quicker firing.
8. Because of all the reasons above all the Japanese armoured cruisers were more effective fighting units that Russian battleships of Borodino, Peresvyet, Tsesarevitch and Retvizan classes (this problem was the cause of all discussion).
9. It is even quite possible that for the time of RJW the most effective warship for the main body of the fleet would be the very large cruiser, with modest armour protection, and armed with a large number of medium caliber guns – something of a kind of French „Melinite croiseur”.

As just explained, from a research point of view, the RJW *IS* a unique event in history. I challenge you to find another naval conflict that happened within 2 years of the war breaking out or ending. Any later or earlier and the speed of technological developments will invalidate the statistics.

The quality of the armour piercing shells, or rather the lack of them, is a well documentated fact. Unless you can point me to a source that proves otherwise this fact is not debatable. SES have quoted their sources (http://home.austin.rr.com/normkoger/RJW.html).

Neither I nor Bullethead of claimed that Japanese armour was superior. What we have said, is that Japanese ACs, on the whole, were newer than the Russian BBs and therefore posessed the latest in armour development. If you would take a Japanese ship and a Russian ship build and launched around the same time, then the difference will fairly minimal.

Nope, both shells were faulty. However, by sheer luck it turned out to be that Japanese shells were more incindiary. They caused fire more easily.

When we say that fighting took place at short distance we mean well under 9km. As a matter of fact, Togo made it a deliberate tactic to come as close as 5.5 km during Tsushima so he could exploit his advantage of having more quick firing 6 inch guns. If he would have fought at distance, he would have been outgunned by the Russian heavy guns. On a personal note, the game probably does something wrong here as the AI does still seem to want to close as much as possible, even closer than at which the fights were actually fought.

If you look at the number of burned out ships after Tsushima, it can be reasonably assumed that fires and completely ruined superstructures were the cause of the Russian navy surrendering. As you stated yourself, only three Russian BBs sank at Tsushima. The rest was set alight and then towed to Japanese harbours, restored and put into service with the Japanese navy. Unfortunately I don't have the URL but someone posted pictures of postcard celebrating Tsushima. It shows some of the Russian ships and how battered they were.

With respect to the Japanese ACs, there is no evidence that they would beat a Russian BB in a one-on-one. There is no evidence they would lose either! The facts are that such an encounter never occurred. The only events that come close to such an encounter are the occasions when the Russian BBs sortied and they were met by the combination of Japanese BBs and ACs. However, what we also know is that in none of these engagements, the Russians won. And in arguably the decisive one, Tsushima, even though the Russians had more heavy guns, two things occurred:

- The Russians lost like no navy had lost before in the last 100 years
- The Japanese ACs held up their own and none of them were severely damaged.

If you argue that the Japanese ACs were inferior to Russian BBs, then the decisive difference in that battle must have been made by those 4 incredibly superior Japanese BBs. Or alternatively, the ACs were not so inferior and helped annihilating the Russian fleet. No matter how you look at the matter, you cannot walk away from the fact that the Russians lost the war at sea. And that cannot be explained by bad luck and inferior commanders alone.

The point about ACs being in practise the most useful ship in a navy during the period the RJW was fought may very well be true, if the facts bear it out. I very much sympathize with your point of view that IN THEORY any AC should be trounced by a decent BB. Unfortunately, there is that bloody thing called 'reality & fact'. That fact is that the AP shells on neither side worked well, that many Russian BBs were annihilated while the ACs survived.

The Dreadnoughts insist on the follow:

1. The RJW was by no mean special or unique period – it was completely normal stage of continous evolution of ships, armour, guns, shells and generally all naval warfare.
2. The armour on capital ships was of great importance, as all shells could penetrate unarmoured parts of ships, and only thick armour could withstand heavy shells.
3. Russian ships in question (namely battleships of Borodino, Peresvyet, Tsesarevitch and Retvizan classes) had uniform armour of Harvey type (Peresvyet class) or of Krupp type (other three classes) while Japanese ships sported mixed armours (of primary Harvey and secondary common nickel steel armour, or primary Krupp and secondary Harvey armour). Areas covered and thicknesses on Russian ships were on low side when compared to the Japanese battleships, but on high side when compared to the Japanese armoured cruisers.
4. The general inferiority of Russians shells is debatable. One of great sea battles (Yellow Sea) didn’t prove this. In second great battle, the Tsushima, superiority of Japanese artillery can be attributed rather to the hurried installement of British tlescopic sights. This disparity was valid for this and only this battle.
5. The big guns had a much more devastating effect, as they could penetrate at least secondary armour. Guns of 8 inch and lesser caliber couldn’t do it at the historical ranges of fight.
6. Historical distances of fight during the both big battles of RJW were much longer than expected pre-war and suggested in DG-RJW manual, battle scenarios of DG-RJW and some posts on the forum. The real distances for Yellow Sea battle were between 4.500 and 8.000 matres, for Tsushima between 4.500 and 6.500 metres (mainly 5.500 – 6.500). It means that both battles were fought on distances exceeding the possibility of penetrating even the weakest three inch Krupp platings on Russian battleships by the Japanese 8 inch shell, with the exception of very unprobable ideal 90 degree hit, and exceeding any possibility of penetrating such platings by six inch shells.
7. Generally big ships were really quite immune to the shellfire, and this was the reason that only three capitals ships felt victim to shellfire during the war, all in Tsushima battle. All were Russian battleships. But the reason of sinking was the water flooding mainly, not the fires. All the Russian battleships of Second and Third Pacific Squadrons entered the battle very heavily overloaded by coal, spare ammunition, provisions, water and other materials. The overloads were enormous, amounted to 10 or even 15 % of normal displacement. It resulted in additional draft of 60 – 80 centimeters and practically complete immersion of main armour belt, and thinner armour belts on bow and rear parts of the ships. The Russian battleships in Tsushima battle presented to Japanese gunners only thinner, upper belts amidship, and unprotected bow and astern waterline. Of course, there were fires on Russian ships, but they were not the reason of sinking. To sink big warship by fires takes a very long time, rather days than hours and it is very high probability that a burnt out wreck will be drifting around, not sinking. It were the 12 inch big guns of Japanese battleships, which did the job. The 8 inch guns of armoured cruisers were not powerful enough to sink even overloaded and overimmersed Russian battleships. Without overload Russian battleships could withstand a lot of punishment. Retvizan in Yellow Sea battle was battered almost as – and taking into account the displacement may be even more than – Seydlitz in the battle of Jutland and survived. Also Slava (of Borodino class) withstood quite a lot of battering by German shells during WWI.
8. The direct and sole confrontation between Russian battleships and Japanese armoured cruisers never occured during the RJW. Admiral Togo was very careful in using his battleships as main battlewagons against Russian capital ships. The armoured cruisers in Japanese battleline played important, but only secondary role of supporting their battleships. Even the firing order of Japanese fleet was subordinate to this principle. Concentration of fire on enemy flagships allowed for any current target to by engaged by own battleship/battleships, supported by armoured cruisers. The unevitable in the course of war exchanges of fire between the Russian battleships and Japanese armoured cruisers for limited time happened in both great battles and led to the results more devastating for Japanese cruisers rather. In the case of hypothetical paralell duel between the Russian battleship and the Japanese armoured cruiser, the chances of the last winning were rather minor, at least against the battleship not overloaded „Tsushima-style”.
9. Happily for them none of opposing navies had any ships similar to "Melinite croiseur" in service. This kind of cruiser was regarded as obsolete even prewar. If used in RJW such a ships could easily confirm their nickname of „Ten Minute Cruisers”.

I just showed you that the RJW *is* unique. It is the only source of data we have to base Distant Guns on. So, the outcomes of that war should be the basis of it all. No other war can deliver reliable input.

That's theory. You ignore the fact that out of thousands of shells fired, only a few hundred hit their target and of those only 2 or 3 actually managed to penetrate armour. And they didn't even penetrate the heaviest armour. Furthermore, you ignore the fact that armour does not apply to the whole ship. Look at the plans for the armour belts of ships of that era on Wikipedia and you will see that large areas of the hull, the superstructure and the decks were left unprotected because the ships couldn't carry more weight. You can't get to the main battery, but you can get to other vital parts of the ships, like the bridge, the signaling mast, etc. You don't need a 12 inch for that. So, although in theory armour is indeed important, the facts do not bear out that armour = survival.

Agreed, the 8 inch certainly had no chance of penetrating Russian armour belts. But why would they need to when the whole superstructure and everyone in it has been shot to pieces and was burned down to the decks? That BB has become an armoured barge!

We never stated that Russian shells were inferior. Just that Japanese shells, by sheer coincidence, seemed to cause fires more often. Alternatively, you could also argue that Russians burned better.

Fully agree on distance and lack of armour piercing. Please also add that the same was true for 12 inch shells. No armour penetration by either side was recorded during Tsushima I believe. The second item to add is that large parts of BBs were not armoured at all. Shoot at the superstructure with an 8 inch and a lot of people die, maybe even the commanders. This is what happened during the Russian attempt to leave Port Arthur.

So, three Russian BBs sank because of flooding. One way to interpret this is that fires had destroyed her crew and her pumping ability. Another way to interpret this was that the Russian armour belt didn't cover the hull end-to-end, leaving parts exposed that lower caliber guns could get at. Either way, the evidence you present does not inconclusively proof that the damage was caused by 12 inch shells only. Other factors could certainly have contributed. It is not only the end-point that determines what is fact. It is also how it got there.

I agree that that conflict never occured. And therefore we have this debate. All I am saying is that what the game does (that ACs can beat Russian BBs) is certainly not inconceivable, based on the facts. One test that actually never ran was to test what the results are when a Russian AC goes up against the Japanese BBs and ACs. Maybe the AC wins then as well.

Dear Members of The Jeune Ecole.
I didn’t find Your theories as prevailing in the literature. Most prominent source confirming them as coherent system is probably the known to You manual of the computer game – „Distant Guns. The Russo – Japanese War at Sea, 1904 – 1905”.
But for the sake of the discussion let’s assume You are completely right and The Dreadnoughts are completely wrong.
During the war all naval powers kept in touch with happenings, and shortly after war the detailed analysis and reports were delivered.
Each big naval war, and sometime even the single battle has an enormous impact on ship design, new orders, composition of the fleets. Each navy make its best to capitalise on the events and their results. Such was for example the impact of Battle of Lissa, after which all navies for quite a long time included ramming bows in the design of most – if not all – capital ships.
So, the period after the RJW – if You were right – should be, at least for a time, a heyday of armoured cruisers. If the armoured cruisers were not less effective in battle that battleships themselves, it made an armoured cruiser a very best cost-effective naval weapon system of the era. All navies should lay down as much armoured cruisers as possible, yards should work day and night building them.
And there are the data for main navies:

Sources that SES has used, amongst others, can be found on the website I put up earlier. You still have to quote your sources. As far as the next heyday was concerned, the RJW learned the British and the Japanese one thing that was far more important than the performance of ACs. Single caliber armament should improve gunnery and you want to hit the enemy with all you have at the furthest distance possible. So, why bother carrying a mixture of medium and heavy guns? Hence, dreadnought and Satsuma (although that was not completed as a all big-gun ship).

Great Britain

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 35
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – none

Not correct. The all big-gun version of the AC was named battlecruiser. And the Royal Navy designed and build Battlecruisers until after WW1. I believe Hood was (one of) the last

Germany

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 8
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – 1

The Germans started a long tradition of big-gun ACs with Von Der Tann.

France

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 24
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – 1

United States

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 10
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – none

Aircraft carriers Saratoga and Lexington were initially laid down as battlecruisers. And that was in the early 1920s. So, even after Jutland people still believed in the concept of the AC.

Italy

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 9
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – 1

Russia

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 11
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – 1 (just few days after the war)


Japan

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 12
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – none

Battlecruiser Akagi was later changed into a carrier. But the Kongos were initially laid down as Battlecruisers and later rebuild to battleships.

Totally for abovementioned seven navies

Armoured cruisers laid down before the end of RJW – 109
Armoured cruisers laid down after the end of RJW – 4


The period after RJW was not a heyday of armoured cruiser – it was its demise in an instant.

Nope, it wasn't. Just like the BB it got reinvented in a new all big-gun shape. And even if it was the demise, it still doesn't change the facts that the Russian BBs were sunk and the Japanese ACs lived to sail another day. What happened after the RJW is irrelevant for what happens during the event itself. It is that, and that only that the game needs to model and simulate.

The reason for this was, that following were the lessons learned from RJW by all navies:

1. The battleship is the measure of the power of any fleet.
2. Only biggest guns are powerful enough to destroy enemy capital ships.
3. The guns other than the largest play not any, or almost any role in the fleet battle, and are effective only against destroyers and small cruisers.
4. The fighting distance in the battle was twice as long as expected and can be easily growing.
5. The battleship should be armed only with main caliber guns and antidestroyer guns – all intermediate guns are useless.
6. It will be good to have some faster units to work as vanguard and in anticruiser role, but they should be armed alongside the principles for the battleships.
7. It will be necessary to have small, fast, lightly armed cruisers for screening and scouting work.
8. The armoured cruisers are already obsolete class of ships.

And so the „Dreadnought” emerged...

Of course the BB was still the measure of any fleet. The concept of a BB hadn't been disproven. Let's not forget that the Japanese had a very modern and competent fleet of BBs.

False, medium guns definetely played a role in Tsushima. See my earler comment on Togo's tactic with respect to setting the range. The big gun only became so dominant after the invention of good fire control.

Sure, but because of crap optics and fire control, a 12 inch gun couldn't fire further than an 8 inch gun. The limited possibility to elevate the gun wouldn't allow it and fire control couldn't make out whether the salvo straddled, fell short or was long, regardles of what caliber it was.

Wrong, the battlecruiser was supposed to have inferior armour in order to have a higher speed. This was what the British intended with their BCs. And even Hood, despite Jutland, still suffered to some extend from inferior armour. Outgun everything that is smaller and outrun everything that is larger was the tactic for a battlecruiser. Therefore an Battlecruiser is nothing more than a turbine driven, all big-gun Armoured Cruiser. Just like a Dreadnought is a turbine driven all big-gun battleship.

Nope, ACs were not obsolete. They were just reinvented like what happened with the BB. BB to Dreadnought, AC to Battlecruiser. In fact, the tasks envisioned for the British battlecruisers was exactly how Togo used his: to hunt down enemy cruisers and commerce raiders and to serve as ships of the line in the decisive battle. Of course, for the British the results were different because in WW1, the British were the only side with faulty AP shells. The Germans did some more thorough testing I guess.

Interesting is also, that McCully’s report, prepared for American Navy after RJW and confirming the domination of big guns on the battlescene allowed for continuing the – previously suspended – design of USS South Carolina (BB26) and USS Michigan (BB27), world’s first designed all-big-guns battleships.


Regarding the game:

In this aspect I will present my own opinions, as there is not enough materials posted to assume the position of the majority of The Dreadnoughts.

1. Overvaluation of the Japanese armoured cruiser I consider to be a downside of the game, as making the game ahistorical to some extent, and allowing for a historical tactical use of these units, as main, not supporting, members of the battleline. Impact of this is apparent mostly in Ullung scenario (by its own ahistorical, but interesting speculation), Tsushima scenario and campaign game.
2. Undervaluation of Russian battleships can be – to some extent only – attributed to their overload in Tsuschima Battle. As such, this undervaluation should be present only in the Tsushima scenario. In my opinion – nevertheless – the player is a Commanding Admiral in the game, and it is the right of Commanding Admiral to dump this bloody overload to the sea before entering Tsushima strait. So, in my opinion, the undervaluation of Russian battleship is the downside of the game.
3. Overvaluation of fires on the ships (it is not only my opinion) exists in the game. This overvaluation (and this is my sole opinion) is not the downside of the game. For me, as long the general survivability of the ship under the enemy fire is historical - there is not problem. The flames on the ships are surely the eye-candy of the game, and for me it is important that ship can withstood some historically average level of battering and after this level is sinking – not important if I see a flames or a flooding on the screen (easier to show flames, and DG RJW is the first game of the series).
4. The tendency of AI to fight on – historically – too short distances is really the thing which bothers me most. The result is that battle action tends to deteriorate into melee, which was really not the case in any of the battles of the RJW. (Tell us Bullethead, if You please – is it not a problem delaying the release of Jutland, may be?). Paradoxally it makes good for Russians in Tsushima scenario. This tendency, when exploited, is somewhat compensating in Tsushima Battle for undervaluation of Russian ships and overvaluation of Japanese ships, as Russians can exchange their last valuable assets for more valuable Japanese assets – the melee situation gives the opportunity for mutual destruction. This „close-the-distance-go-for-melee” tendency just spoils the game, is the obvious downside and should be excluded in Jutland and remedied in RJW without any doubt.

You speak of over- and under valuation for ships but nowhere do you quote sources that the facts are not as they are. Maybe some fine tuning is in order, but I think it is, based on fact, a fair assumption that a modern Japanese AC could defeat an older Russian BB based on better speed and better rate of fire. I agree though that the AI could still be improved. Or maybe, as the AI will not be able to emulate a human player anyway, we should focus on online multi-player instead?

I think, that three abovementioned problems should be remedied. It will give us even more interesting game, may be a little more difficult to play as IJN side, but being the more of tribute to Admiral Togo who really won the command of the sea in situation something more difficult than in the game.

By the way, „Distant Guns. The Russo – Japanese War, 1904 – 1905” is really fantastic game. And still can be a little better :joy: .

Always!

 

[Double Whisky]

Hmmm...I understand what you want and where you want to go, but I wouldn't share myself under Jeune Ecole.

Hello, Pepsican :salute:

Sorry, I can not address Your post for the moment, but im on bussiness travelling now and just have no time to spare. I will be back

For the moment let me only tell, that of course calling You and Bullethead Jeune Ecole, and others The Dreadnoughts was only matter of humour.
Think that posts on forum shouldn't be deadly serious

By the way I have a lot of regard for Jeune Ecole. They could prove wrong in almost every aspect, nevertheless their speculations and theories were interesting, innovative and gave important impulse to "wake up" the theorists of the time. Especially their attitude to the importance of actions against enemy communication lanes was really valuable.

With my very best regards

Double Whisky

 

[PepsiCan]

Hello, Pepsican :salute:

Sorry, I can not address Your post for the moment, but im on bussiness travelling now and just have no time to spare. I will be back

I'm counting on it! :laugh:

For the moment let me only tell, that of course calling You and Bullethead Jeune Ecole, and others The Dreadnoughts was only matter of humour.
Think that posts on forum shouldn't be deadly serious

I understand that and I appreciate it. In the same way, my carve up of theorist vs practisioners is creating a stereo type.

By the way I have a lot of regard for Jeune Ecole. They could prove wrong in almost every aspect, nevertheless their speculations and theories were interesting, innovative and gave important impulse to "wake up" the theorists of the time. Especially their attitude to the importance of actions against enemy communication lanes was really valuable.

With my very best regards

Double Whisky

Have a good trip. And for what it is worth, since Bullethead is involved with this thread as well, I hope some of the insights here do lead to fine tuning of both Distant Guns and Jutland. And some of the testing performed and discussed here certainly offers insight into how things work.

 

[Bullethead]

We know so little about the actual mechanics and SES has never been clear how things work, so we can only assume how certain things are handled in the Game. One example of that is that slowing a ship down, having it drop out of the battle-line and ceasing fire is supposed to increase its survivabilty chances. But we don´t know for sure. (Maybe you can have a look at that?)

Actually, IIRC the manual states this.

Now back to the most important question at hand. What happens when a ship is hit in DG? To answer it we have to take a closer look at how ballistics work in DG. This is my speculative approach on how things work in DG:

1. Player orders to open fire.

2. Gun turns immediatly and fires a round.

3. Now we can observe the shell in the graphical layer. I´d suspect that the ballistics are similar for all guns with a notable exception for PA´s land based howitzers. The formula behind those ballistics seems to be hardcoded in a sense that it flys from A to B in the same manner again and again only to be influenced by a random number so that shells are dispersed near the target. (Take the random number away and it will probably always hit the same spot of the target... or where the target was when the shell was fired. Common problem you see in games where ballistics matter.)

Your speculation is incorrect. Each shells follows its own ballistic path from gun to impact. Each gun's trajectory is determined by its own ballistic properties, such as muzzle velocity, shell weight, elevation, etc. Thus, slower shells have more arc in their trajectories than faster shells. Each shell is also subject to dispersion off the desired flightpath based on some complicated formulae derived from actual test firings. You can see all this happen if you turn on the shell-following camera mode and watch the shells fly from gun to impact.

4. Now we will either have a splash or a hit. The only interesting thing to look at is the hit and the question what happens when the graphical layer registers a hit? It seems you expect the game now to calculate the corresponding damage based on shell weight, angle the shell hit the armor, penetration value and so on. Personally i don´t think so.

Again, your speculation is incorrect. It really works like this:

• The shell flies to target according to the trajectory as described above.
• If the little shell you see flying hits the ship model, you get a hit. Otherwise, you get a splash.
• The location of the hit on the model determines what the shell hits in the data structure, and the amount of armor (if any) at that location, plus whether the armor is horizontal or vertical.
• The horizontal and vertical angles of the hit on the model determine the angle used for penetration purposes, and also the subsequent path of the shell, if any. For example, a shell could penetrate the side at a downwards angle, then glance off the deck further into the ship, before exploding. Or it might go completely through the ship without encountering any armor.
• As it goes through the ship (or even just bursts on the outside), the shell can damage various components of the ship (weapons, systems, flooding) along its path and within its blast radius. These effects also depend on any armor that might protect these components.
• Critical hits are part of the overall damage process. The type(s) of critical hit(s), if any, is determined by what the shell can potentially damage, based on hit location.

5. Game keeps track of Flooding and Fire levels by periodically calculating the collected damage amounts and comparing them to the Damage Control Rating of the Vessel. It then decreases the number of available Crew so that the DC capabilities are reduced for the next Check.

Um, no... Damage control is a continuous process of competing rates. The crew is continuously fighting the fire, removing flooding, fixing systems damage, etc. Fire is continuously trying to grow, kill crew, and inflict systems damage. Subsequent hits are killing crew, inflicting systems damage, and starting more fires. As the crew size decreases, it becomes less effective at controlling fires and fixing damage, meaning that the rate at which these fixes happen decreases. If this rate drops below the rate at which the fire is growing, then the crew won't be able to put it out. You can see how continuous the damage control process is by watching the game run while you have the Ship Information Screen open.

AFAIK, the Damage Control Rating (DCR) itself it's used any any calculations. It's just a measure of the current level of efficiency of the crew in controlling damage. DCR is based on many factors, most of which are constant for a particular ship, but it includes crew size, which is variable. Therefore, as crew size decreases, the DCR also decreases.

 

[TBR]

Fire is continuously trying to grow, kill crew, and inflict systems damage.

And here is the only point in which I criticize DG's damage model, fire kills the crew much too fast. But we've already discussed this.

 

[rgreat]

And here is the only point in which I criticize DG's damage model, fire kills the crew much too fast. But we've already discussed this.

I second that.

 

[Double Whisky]

Seeing it spelled, my natural inclination would be to pronounce it "Bliska Wicka". Any English-speaker with a liking for drink, such as your typical RN sailor, would automatically transliterate this as "Blissful Whisky". However, given that the 2 parts of the name nearly rhyme, and given the Brit penchant for rhyming slang, I can easily see this becoming "Whisky Whisky" and thus, "Double Whisky", which itself is a common order at bars. In case Poles never ask for "doubles", that tells the barkeep to put twice as much whisky as normal into 1 glass. And that's another thing sailors like.



Shooting or not doesn't matter. The battle should continue as long as opposing ships can see each other.

If you still have a game_log.txt for this battle, send it in to support and state why you think the battle ended prematurely. If you don't have a game_log.txt for that battle, run it again until you think it ends prematurely, then send in that log. (The game_log.txt file overwrites each time you run the game, so if you've run the game since you had this happen, you don't have the log for it anymore.)

Hi, Bullethead. I've just sent such a log
Played at the evening on laptop, and game ended, when nearest IJN ships were some 12.000 m from RIN ships, and just after spotting advancing Togo

BR

Double W

 

[PepsiCan]

Double

You may also want to raise an official support request with SES. I believe their mail address can be found on their website. That way it gets officially registered.

 

[Double Whisky]

Double

You may also want to raise an official support request with SES. I believe their mail address can be found on their website. That way it gets officially registered.

Hi PepsiCan

I sent it to SES support addres, informing about "post - forum - correspondence" with Bullethead. Hope the guys in support will look at this :hmmm:

Regards

Double W.

 

[Double Whisky]

I'm counting on it! :laugh:

Dear PepsiCan

I read all the books cited on the site You quoted except one (must read it as soon as possible) . Of course, I can add some positions to the list, as for example:

Brook, P. “Armoured Cruiser versus Armoured Cruiser: Ulsan, 14 August 1904.” Warship 2000 - 2001. London: Conway Maritime Press, 2000.

Brown, D. “The Russo-Japanese War. Technical lessons as perceived by the Royal Navy.” Warship 1996. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1996.

Campbell, N.J.M. “The Battle of Tsu-Shima.” Warship Volume II. London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd., 1978.

Dyskant, J., Michalek, A. „Port Artur – Cuszima 1904 – 1905”. Warszawa 2005

Evans, D., Peattie M. “Kaigun Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887- 1941”. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1997.

Kosiarz, E. “Bitwy morskie”. Gdansk 1973

Kriestianinow B. “Tsusimskoye srazyenye 14 – 15 maya 1905”. St. Petersburg 2003

Novikoff-Priboy, A. “Tsushima”. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1936.

Siemionow W. “Die Schlacht bei Tsuschima”, Berlin 1907.

Sulig S. “Korably russko – japonskoy woyny”, Moscow 1993.

Watts A., Gordon B. “The Imperial Japanese Navy”. London 1971

Wieczorkiewicz P. “Historia wojen morskich. Wiek pary”. Londyn 1995

But In the matter of fact it will not change a lot. The problem here are probably not a sources themselves but their interpretation.
The problem is - I nowhere in the sources found the statement that any gun of six inch and over was the same effective in the battle against armoured opponent. Only DG RJW manual supported it.
I nowhere found the information that during the RJW any ship sunk due to fires only, without having waterline holed and water coming in.
I nowhere found an information that the ships with weaker and less thorough armour were the same prone to the enemy gunfire like ships well and thoroughly armoured.
May be I'm wrong and did ommit something - if so, let me know.
I completely agree with You that it was teoretically possible for single IJN AC to sink single Russian BB of old vintage. But a disscussion regards potential confrontation between MODERN Russian BB and one of Japanese ACs.

ASAMA and TOKIWA were placed in service in 1899
IDZUMO, IWATE, YAKUMO and ADZUMA were placed in service in 1900
NISHIN and KASUGA were placed in service in 1902

RETVIZAN was placed in service in 1900
PERESVYET, OSLYABYA and POBYEDA were placed in service in 1901
TSESAREVITCH was placed in service in 1903
BORODINO, IMPIERATOR ALEKSANDR III, KNYAZ SUVOROV and ORYEL
were placed in service in 1904
Even PETROPAVLOVSK, POLTAVA and SEVASTOPOL were placed in service in 1899.

In the matter of fact ASAMA, TOKIWA, PERESVYET, OSLYABYA, POBYEDA
PETROPAVLOVSK, POLTAVA and SEVASTOPOL were the ships of somewhat older vintage, with Harvey armour, and other six Japanese and six Russians ships were built with Krupp armour. On the other hand with some 20 % difference between protection given for Harvey and Krupp armour, and considering thicknesses invloved (nine inch main belt for PERESVYETs, and fourteen inch main belt for PETROPAVLOSKs for example) the differences in the make of main armour were not so crucial.
But let's stick to the really modern ships on both sides. I don't want to repeat now and here my post # 59 above in this thread (somehow not addressed by anyone), where I made the direct and quite detailed comparisone between two of the ships in question. I can only repeat that superiority of armour of Russian modern BBs over the armour of modern japanese ACs is rather difficult to question, as is difficult to question that even the most modern Japanese armoured cruisers were not thoroughly armoured to withstand the shells of Russian 12 inch guns on most distances of fight.
Regarding to the rates of fire:
I do agree that Japanese 8 inch gun had higher ROF then Russian 12 inch gun.
But still Russian 12 inch gun was able to deliver in the given time the same or higer weight of the shells than Japanese 8 inch gun.
And still, we are talking of technical ROF, depending on construction of the gun, ammunition supply and so on. In this era another two important factors were influencing a battle ROF. First was actual wave pattern. The guns were not stabilised, so to fire them it was necessary to wait for a moment, when the ship was on the level, just not to fire to the blue sky. Second was waiting for the splashes from one salvo before firing another in order to asses the aiming.
Both were in practice slowing the ROF, and were more influential for smaller guns, allowing that average time necessary to wait to fire the loaded gun was the same.
I think, that You found somewhat amusing the assumption, that main work at Tsushima was made by the guns of just four Japanese battleships.
But it was such a case. During the battle Japanese battleships fired from their main guns shells of the overall weight of 172.156 kg, while the Japanese armoured cruisers fired from their main armament shells of the overall weight of 126.791,2 kg. 58 % af all the weight of heavy shells fired by IJN in the battle came from Japanese battleships, and four Japanese battleships delivered 36 % more of the weight of the shells then eight Japanese armoured cruisers, while fighting in one formation - in the same single battleline.
To sink the ship You need to make a hole under or near to the waterline to allow for the water ingress. Lack of ability of pumping out the water is not the problem when water is not coming in. When You check the armour schemes for Russian BBs You will find that it was really nearly impossible to make such a hole, except for point - blank ranges, by the Japanese 8 inch gun. Without holing the hull yhe ship will not sunk, even if it will be reduced to the burning barge, as You pointed out. But in the DG RJW Russian battleships sink easily under the fire of Japanese armoured cruisers. So I can ask who is so kind and is making some neat holes in Russian BBs waterlines for the benefit of Japanese armoured cruisers? May be it is something wrong with relative values for armour and armament in the game, may be with damage assesment model - I don't know. But something is wrong here for sure.
Some words about the ships being so prone to fires. The fires were undisputable the great threat to the ships of the era. But there were some differencies between the two great battles of the war. As You probably well know at Port Artur all the wood was thorouhgly removed from the ships of 1st Pacific Squadron. Even the linings and falseworks from cabins were taken off. It made the ships much less vulnerable, and probably this was the reason of ASKOLD's surviving the confontation with the YAKUMO during the battle. The fires were suppressed quickly and effectively. Other ships, even the well battered Retvizan, avoided the bigger fires also.
The situation was completely reversed at Tsushima. The wooden parts were not removed from the ships of 2nd Pacific Squadron, and - still worse - the ships entered the battle with heavy overweight. Most of the overweight was caused by the spare coal, which - up to survivors which eyewitnessed it - was stowed in sacks almost everywhere on the ships. Adding other materiel on board - often flammable - it made not only for lower armour belts of the battleships completely ar almost completely immersed, and presenting the japanese gunners with the unique in the war opportunity to penatrate the Russian BBs waterlines, by also made of Russian ships something like the great torches waiting for ignition.
I don't really know, why the Russian admiral proceeded like this.
May be he wanted to conserve spare coal and other materiel for possible retreat?
May be he looked at the incoming battle as at the battle for honour of Russia only, being sure of defeat and just didn't care?
Whatever were the reasons, the result was disastrous.
Frankly speaking I rather believe that damage model in DG RJW is very proper - but only for Russian ships and only for the Tsushima battle... Japanese ships at all, and Russian ships in other battles proved to be much more survavible in my opinion that is the case of the game. This has probably something to do with the interesting statistics, vs18 and rgreat gave us in the thread Firefighting Distant Guns vs Jutland .
Anyway - the overall overloading of the ships, the wrong manouevring, complete lack of any plan of the battle, wrong formation, complete lack of training, lack of acceptable level of communication, cotrol and command - everythinh added up to the most humiliating defeat in modern naval history.
And one thing for ending this post. I'm of corse aware that early battlecruisers were classified as armoured cruisers. But there was one big difference between them and the Acs of RJW vintage - main artillery. Almost all big cruisers built after the RJW had an armament comprising 11 or 12 inch guns. After the RJW nobody tried or gave a serious thought to built a capital ships with lesser main guns, even remembering that some guns of 210 mm - 254 mm available to the navies had very good ballistic performance, mainly were able to shoot at the really long ranges. It was just somehow accepted - and accepted just after RJW, that uniform battery of 11 - 12 inchers is simply necessary for the ships intended to be included in main body of the fleets. It noway confirmes the theory of smaller caliber quickfirers superiority.

Thank You in advance for Your patience

With my very best regards

Double W.

 

[Double Whisky]

Just played Yellow Sea scenario.
Yakumo by second or third salvo scored lucky hit on Poltava. Could happen.
Distance > 7000 m.
Aft turret on Poltava destroyed. Not damaged - DESTROYED !!!
Turrets on Poltava were of 10 inch Krupp plating with 2 inch coupolas also of Krupp.
At given distance 8 inch gun of Yakumo could penetrate some 80 mm of Krupp plating, if hitting at 90 degrees.
BULL****!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :freak:

 

[Bullethead]

At given distance 8 inch gun of Yakumo could penetrate some 80 mm of Krupp plating, if hitting at 90 degrees.
BULL****!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :freak:

DW, I'm beginning to think you keep bumping this thread just so its negative title stays up near the top of the forum.

Did it ever occur to you, for instance, that perhaps the ship data structure models the varying armor levels of the whole turret/barbette assembly, but the ship info screen only shows the max value of the turret? And that perhaps the shell might have hit one of the thinner parts? Or the fact that even if the shell doesn't penetrate the armor, it might still knock fragments off on the inside, or bend in the plate, so that the turret is jammed beyond anything the crew can do during the battle, thus "destroying" the turret (as in it can't be fixed during the battle)?

These things go on under the hood. As I've said many times, there are a huge number of variables in the damage model, to give the full range of outcomes that are documented to have happened in real life. It's not a cookie-cutter, simplistic outcome system, as you seem to be expecting here.

 

[Rhetor]

DW, I'm beginning to think you keep bumping this thread just so its negative title stays up near the top of the forum.

I disagree. Double Whisky has raised some important points about the artillery and damage model; especially convincing for me is his argument that no navy in the world seems to have learned from the Russo-Japanese war that a fast-firing medium gun has more combat value than slow-firing heavy gun - which seems to be the cornerstone of the firing and damage model as shown in Distant Guns.

Maybe the title of the topic is not palatable for SES; if so, I don't see any reason for not beginning it anew under a different title.

 

[PepsiCan]

I opened a new thread with a more neutral title.

Please do not post in this thread any longer.

Use Copy/paste if you want to respond to a post using quotes.

 

[Double Whisky]

DW, I'm beginning to think you keep bumping this thread just so its negative title stays up near the top of the forum.

Did it ever occur to you, for instance, that perhaps the ship data structure models the varying armor levels of the whole turret/barbette assembly, but the ship info screen only shows the max value of the turret?

For the last time at this place Bullethead - I don't want to move it to new thread.

May be I went a little too upset - sorry.
I'm not taking data for armour from the ship info screen (is there the turrets data BTW?). Just by chance I'm completely aware of the whole turret/barbette construction and armour placement on Poltava - so it's not the case.
Incidentally the hit happened when Poltava was turned completely (at 90 degrees) bowside to Yakumo, and rear turret was destroyed. Opposite I would not get annoyed, as it is always a possibility of "lucky hit" just at the gun opening. O.K. it's just a game.

Relating to my intentions - You are a little unfair about it. The thread was put to the top by my precious post, being an answer to PepsiCan post, which I promised to address after coming back from journey. I just like to keep promises.

Best regards

Double W.

 

[vs18]

Just played Yellow Sea scenario.
Yakumo by second or third salvo scored lucky hit on Poltava. Could happen.
Distance > 7000 m.
Aft turret on Poltava destroyed. Not damaged - DESTROYED !!!
Turrets on Poltava were of 10 inch Krupp plating with 2 inch coupolas also of Krupp.
At given distance 8 inch gun of Yakumo could penetrate some 80 mm of Krupp plating, if hitting at 90 degrees.
BULL****!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :freak:

Double Whisky, don't take it so personal

During the Yellow Sea battle Poltava was hit by 12" shell from the distance of 80 cables, which is almost 15 kilometers; hit was aft 4.5 inches below water line, shell did not explode, steering compartment was flooded, no casualties. (memoirs of S. Lutonin, second-in-command on Poltava, available here (in Russian))

During the same battle fore 10" on Peresvet was damaged by the splinters entering the turret through gun embrasure causing fire and killing or wounding all personnel, left gun was damaged and turret itself jammed. (memoirs of V. Cherkasov, gunnery officer of rear-admiral Ukhtomsky stuff on Peresvet, available here (in Russian))

As you can see both hits on extreme distance and turret damage without armor penetration took place during RJW.

 

[rgreat]

there are a huge number of variables in the damage model, to give the full range of outcomes that are documented to have happened in real life.

Like random number generator?

Well. In fact it is ok. As it seems carefully finetuned.
Damage model don't seems too weird or broken as it is now.
(Except for insta-burning out crew)

 

[vs18]

SOMETHING HERE IS WRONG FOR SURE :upset:

According to my tests the reason is abnormal 8" accuracy for Japanese armored cruisers - at the distances between 30 and 40 cables (5500 - 7400 meters) average hit ratio is 15 - 7% comparing to 8 - 3% for Russian 10"... No reason to test distances below 5500 meters since Russian ship receiving more than one heavy shell hit per minute and in 20 minutes can not respond to fire (guns damaged), in 30 minutes has fire level > damage control capacity and in 40 minutes is doomed.