Good comments Mr VonHutier.Having played two of the three scenarios now, I'm thinking it's indeed weighted in favour of the Australians.
Japanese can't.
- Australian route to Victory hexes is much shorter than that of the Japanese, and easier to traverse. Hence, the Australian forces can soon form a defensive perimeter while the Japanese reinforcements take time to arrive and accumulate.
- Large numbers of negative modifier leaders on the Australian OB - Japanese have same numbers but are mostly 0 or + modifiers.
- AFVs. Australian OB have carriers, Japanese nothing similar. Carriers aren't great, but their maneuverability and ability to sleaze freeze cause problems for the Japanese - the B carriers are 6FP mobile wooden buildings.There are AFVs for the Japanese in scenario 3 but there are also Australian 40Ls...
- No Japanese HIP - but Australian OB can purchase it, along with fortifications in scenario 1 and 2 when they're defending.
It could be I'm just not a very good player, and all of this is subject to dice variables of course, but these are my thoughts, I'd like to hear others if anyone has played this....
It might be not surprising that us Aussies have designed something a little pro-Aussie. It appears to be leaning that way. I find it tough to playtest scenarios involving Japanese in light terrain that does not involve static positions (ie. pillboxes, caves). That said, I suspect most scenarios should provide opportunities for both sides to win.The differential in the path to the victory hexes was a reflection of the geography and the greater organisational support enjoyed by the Australian, as opposed to the airdropped Japanese.
The Japanese leader were very poor and drawn from Naval officers with no combat experience, hence the leadership DRM differential.
As to the carriers, the MMG one is very useful and the other good for 'smash-and-grab' raids on Japanese huts held in the rear areas; but their ability to deploy on the main line of resistance is limited because of the impact a carrier will have on sequential CC
The Australians had spent some time on the island preparing the defences and were more of the mindset of establishing defensive positions. In contrast, the Japanese naval paratroopers were very aggressive and constantly determined to remain on the move. Hence the Aussies get a bonus in this area.
Thank you for taking the time to reply, much appreciated...are you an Australian then ?Good comments Mr VonHutier.
It might be not surprising that us Aussies have designed something a little pro-Aussie. It appears to be leaning that way. I find it tough to playtest scenarios involving Japanese in light terrain that does not involve static positions (ie. pillboxes, caves). That said, I suspect most scenarios should provide opportunities for both sides to win.
Andy
Thanks - that's something new I've learned...Look at country below his name, on the poster ID.
Fair comments PJ ... Two reasons for this SSR and the thinking is not a 'slam dunk' but somewhat a personal preference. Firstly, the limited information on the carrier use in Timor indicated they fought as a separate unit providing overwatch. They did not peel-off their weaponry and hand it to the infantry. Secondly, there is a broader problem with the way ASL handles LMGs. Technically, each squad has an LMG. ASL has abstracted this concept. When deciding how many 'LMGs' are in the OB (whether organic or acquired via 'AFV stripping') it is mostly a decision around play balance. Leaving aside the small historical information, I was a bit reluctant to enable the Australian infantry the ability to 'acquire' additional LMGs through the SW removal process.I still think it's pretty poor that the carrier crews are SSR'd not to be able to remove their MGs and ATRs.
No 'nerfing' or 'smurfing' the Japanese intended ... Elements of the historical justifications (or back-story) to these SSRs (I count just three) are covered in Journal 14 (pp31-32). If someone has better historical reference material, please send it to be via a message. By way of observation, the rationale for the traditional SSRs for the Japanese in the rule book is not overly detailed but we have just gotten used to it.And even as I like the scens and the cg, I do feel that the Japs has been nerfed out of many of their capabilities w/o rationale. Why no HIPs, no DCs, just two THH etc..
Haha yeah. Hence the routine of drive in fast, dismount with your firepower and cause problems in the rear. I remember when first using carriers "realistically" with overwatch I was accused of trying to annoy my opponent by not trying to win and dragging out the game. No, I just don't know what I'm doing.Fair comments PJ ... Two reasons for this SSR and the thinking is not a 'slam dunk' but somewhat a personal preference. Firstly, the limited information on the carrier use in Timor indicated they fought as a separate unit providing overwatch. They did not peel-off their weaponry and hand it to the infantry. Secondly, there is a broader problem with the way ASL handles LMGs. Technically, each squad has an LMG. ASL has abstracted this concept. When deciding how many 'LMGs' are in the OB (whether organic or acquired via 'AFV stripping') it is mostly a decision around play balance. Leaving aside the small historical information, I was a bit reluctant to enable the Australian infantry the ability to 'acquire' additional LMGs through the SW removal process.
Thanks for the answer, which satisfied my curiousity.No 'nerfing' or 'smurfing' the Japanese intended ... Elements of the historical justifications (or back-story) to these SSRs (I count just three) are covered in Journal 14 (pp31-32). If someone has better historical reference material, please send it to be via a message. By way of observation, the rationale for the traditional SSRs for the Japanese in the rule book is not overly detailed but we have just gotten used to it.
The good thing about HASLs is that you can make adjustments to 'traditional' SSRs. In short, the Japanese paratroopers were drawn from naval bases and their leadership from naval officers. There is no evidence of any combat experience. The limited training was partially consumed by becoming 'jump qualified'. They did not appear to possess DCs during their airdrops. In terms of tactics they performed poorly. The naval paratroopers were overly aggressive, with their main focus on achieving their objective. Defensive activity ('tactical flexibility') did not appear a primary consideration.