Jutland capital ship balance?
- Thread starter Vossie
- Start date
Btw, my question is still not answered:
Why didn't the British adopt the German propellant? We've only read assumptions on why they didn't. And we know that they studied the German propellant to make their own more stable. But why didn't they just adopt the German formula?
Why didn't the British adopt the German propellant? We've only read assumptions on why they didn't. And we know that they studied the German propellant to make their own more stable. But why didn't they just adopt the German formula?
Could it be a lack of manufacturing capability? Sometimes, knowing how to do something is not quite enough.
JD
richardcooke
Recruit
They did not always draw the right conclusions from tests they did, so maybe their top people had problems with seeing what now seems to be blindingly obvious.
For example circa 1910 after discovering that their APC shells tended to break up when they hit at angles greater than 20deg, the conclusion was that at long ranges 4-6 in thick armor would be good enough to protect the ship. So they recommended that more of the ships should covered with thin armor. That is the opposite of all or nothing, and it did not seem to occur to them that the APC shell should be strengthened.
When circa 1920 they found that heavier shells tended to break up on impact more than light ones, similar muddled thinking resulted in the Nelsons getting guns with light shells and high muzzle velocity. The idea that the shells should be strengthened did not seem to be an option. Maybe the same guys were responsible for both strange decisions
Last edited:
Well its generally accepted that the German chemical industry was the best in the world prior to 1914, especially with regards to organic chemistry. I have read that in some areas the Germans were possibly a decade or more advanced than the British chemical industry.
I suppose it is conceivable that the British simply could not replicate the German propellant, or to do so would require too much capital investment. In the immediate postwar period, Britain along with most of Europe was experiencing significant economic problems (hence Britain leaving the gold standard). I guess with money being tight and defence budgets under threat it would have been difficult to justify the spending. Also remember that the British after 1919 were operating on the assumption that there would be no war for 10 year (see 10 year rule), so complacency may have also played a role.
Last edited:
richardcooke
Recruit
Do we know that they actually tested the German propellant? The German ships that were interned at Scapa Flow came there without any ammunition on board. Since WWI did not end in an occupation of Germany the Brits would not have been able to examine everything, including documentation as they did at the end WWII.
..... If I'm not mistaken, the Entente powers did in fact occupy Germany after the end of the war in much the same manner as post-WW2, with technical missions travelling here and there inspecting German military and industrial sites, seizing archives, etc.
B
saddletank
Forum Conscript
I think the issue is down to many factors; inertia, expense, complacency, and possibly simply not realising German propellant was more stable and did not burn explosively.
At Dogger Bank the Germans lost Blucher. At Jutland three British BCs were lost versus Lutzow and Pommern. The German fleet never again during WWI seriously challenged British sea power. Three capital ships versus three in battle, Britain held command of the seas in respect of surface ship warfare and they won the war.
In these circumstances, even if they did find that German propellant was superior, why change? They won... and in 1919 the RN was vast and required thousands and thousands of tons of munitions and propellant, of which no doubt many thousands of tons was already manufactured and in store. This was supported by a vast industry. To change the chemical compound or manufacturing process, even slightly, may have been prohibitively expensive, and besides the nation was now facing a long peace, politicians wanted to look away from the arms race, and financial constraints would have been severe.
Given those factors and that culture I do not find it at all strange that the British navy retained it's unstable propellant.
And all that on top of the fact they may not have even realised the German cordite was different.
At Dogger Bank the Germans lost Blucher. At Jutland three British BCs were lost versus Lutzow and Pommern. The German fleet never again during WWI seriously challenged British sea power. Three capital ships versus three in battle, Britain held command of the seas in respect of surface ship warfare and they won the war.
In these circumstances, even if they did find that German propellant was superior, why change? They won... and in 1919 the RN was vast and required thousands and thousands of tons of munitions and propellant, of which no doubt many thousands of tons was already manufactured and in store. This was supported by a vast industry. To change the chemical compound or manufacturing process, even slightly, may have been prohibitively expensive, and besides the nation was now facing a long peace, politicians wanted to look away from the arms race, and financial constraints would have been severe.
Given those factors and that culture I do not find it at all strange that the British navy retained it's unstable propellant.
And all that on top of the fact they may not have even realised the German cordite was different.
Well post-WW1 it was not a proper occupation. The British and French did briefly occupy some parts of the Rhineland after the Armistice in November 1918, but left after the conclusion of Versaille in 1919. It was not a WW2-type occupation in the sense that the German civil authorities (police, civil service etc) were still in command. The allied forces were there purely to ensure that the German military presence had left. So basically there would have been no going through documents or seizure of industrial plant that typically happens in a normal occupation. In this respect the lack of occupation after the conclusion of WW1 led to the post-war German assertion - used by Hitler extensively to undermine the Weimar republic - that they had never been defeated.
Later in January 1923 the French did occupy the Ruhr to seize coal and steel over the continuing dispute about the non-payment of reparations by the Weimar government. So again propellant forumula was not really in their minds they were just seizing material in lieu of monetary reparations. I'd throughly reccomend Zara Steiner's 'The Lights that Failed', which I'm currently working my way through now. It is a pretty indepth account of interwar diplomatic history.
Last edited:
Von der Tann
Schlachtkreuzer
Objection: French and Belgian troops stayed in the Rhineland for rather longer than 1919, which is why they could seize the Ruhr area so easily in 1923. At this point, post-war Germany was still pretty unstable, which events like the Hitler putsch showed quite clearly. One factor in this was that until the very end the German propaganda had sustained the impression that victory was just around the corner - and then everything fell apart, which made the "backstab" myth easy to believe. If you add the humiliating armistice which took away everything Germany had been proud of, blamed it for the war exclusively and expected it to pay all the damage, it was no miracle that the new government that had to accept it was less than popular. The real miracle is not so much that Hitler eventually seized power, but that the first German democracy actually managed to gain a foothold for a few years.
Anyway, the French and Belgian (and American) presence in the Rhineland lasted until 1929 in some places... I grew up in one of those.
Anyway, the French and Belgian (and American) presence in the Rhineland lasted until 1929 in some places... I grew up in one of those.
Yes we do. I found on wikipedia a history of British cordite a while back. After WW1 the British extensively studied the German propellant and used the result to greatly improve the formula for their own cordite. So, they knew about the German propellant's formula etc etc.
So, why did they not opt to simply manufacture the German propellant? They knew that even their updated formula was much more prone to exploding than the German formula. Yet, they didn't go further.
Based on this, I believe we can reject any speculation when it comes to the Brits not knowing about the formula. So, that leaves us with for example the idea that the propellant wasn't suited for British guns. But if that is the case, what is the exact relationship then between propellant and guns?
And why did the British make the investment of coming up with a new cordite formula? That means money/production resources wasn't the issue I think. Complacency also can't be it because the British did invest into finding and producing an improved formula.
..... Hi Kadett. Your reply inspired me to do a bit of homework. You are correct in saying that the post-WW1 Entente occupation of Germany did not occur to the same degree as that conducted after WW2, either in scope or length. But there was established an organization named the "Inter-Allied Military Mission of Control" which had free rein and access over the entire nation of Germany to oversee the disarmament process. This organization remained in operation through 1927 and did not actually wind up all activities within Germany until 1931. Archival data was indeed seized, as I have seen copies of secret WW1 German documents marked with post WW1 British Admiralty stamps.
I think the difference goes back to shell weight, Nelson's apart British guns fired a heavier shell and out of a shorter tube. The Brit 15" being 200lbs heavier than its counterpart. I think Brit cordite needed that bit more kick.
If its not that it is simply its properties for storage in all climates
If its not that it is simply its properties for storage in all climates
You can know a formula, but still not know exactly how to make something. You have to have the processing steps down very accurately. You have to know timings and how raw materials are stored, as well as environmental conditions. In the end, the forumulas for most "secret" formulas are well known, but its the processing that can't be reversed engineered.
Everyone pretty much knows how to make an atomic bomb, but few have the equipment or raw material to actually do it.
I bet if the brits took the forumla and then tried to process it blindly, they may have come to the conclusion it wasn't any good.
Everyone pretty much knows how to make an atomic bomb, but few have the equipment or raw material to actually do it.
I bet if the brits took the forumla and then tried to process it blindly, they may have come to the conclusion it wasn't any good.
Think I have found the reason In fact I'm pretty certain. It seems the 15" on the Baden was a QF seems the Germans liked QF shells instead of the BL the RN used. The QF shells could only be fired with tubular cordite that is the type the Germans used whilst the small firing chamber was usuitable for solid cord propellant like the British used. The German castings were generally better for their BL guns so enabling a smaller firing chamber also.
So there you have it. The British felt that the tubular cordite was too difficult to manufacture to accurate dimensions so accuracy in the German guns (in relation to propellant) was not quite as good. It was also felt although wear was less on barrels it took fewer rounds for the tubular cordite to cause a drop off in MV
German guns (on the Baden) could not be relined and were just replaced unlike in the RN
The report states on the differences between cordite
"It is, however, one of the many things that requires further investigation before we can be in a position to decide finally what to adopt in the future. It is quite certain that we shall be able to improve on cordite M.D"
Not to flog a dead horse
"On 26 July 1929, one of these guns on HMS Devonshire suffered a catastrophic breech failure at the first salvo during a practice firing. One shell and a number of cordite bags were ignited, blowing off the roof of "X" turret and killing one officer and seventeen crewmen."
So it seems they did. resulting in Cordite SC
So there you have it. The British felt that the tubular cordite was too difficult to manufacture to accurate dimensions so accuracy in the German guns (in relation to propellant) was not quite as good. It was also felt although wear was less on barrels it took fewer rounds for the tubular cordite to cause a drop off in MV
German guns (on the Baden) could not be relined and were just replaced unlike in the RN
The report states on the differences between cordite
"It is, however, one of the many things that requires further investigation before we can be in a position to decide finally what to adopt in the future. It is quite certain that we shall be able to improve on cordite M.D"
Not to flog a dead horse
"On 26 July 1929, one of these guns on HMS Devonshire suffered a catastrophic breech failure at the first salvo during a practice firing. One shell and a number of cordite bags were ignited, blowing off the roof of "X" turret and killing one officer and seventeen crewmen."
So it seems they did. resulting in Cordite SC
Last edited:
"Both Mark I and MD were in use during World War I, and both had poor storage characteristics with their stability degrading over time. A study performed after World War I found that MD tended to form highly unstable micro-sized dust particles consisting of nitrocellulose and iron pyrites. These unfortunate traits led to several ships suffering magazine explosions during World War I, both in action and in harbor.
By April 1917 considerable improvements had been made in the manufacture of cordite by changing to the use of clean carded sliver cotton, substituting cracked mineral jelly for petroleum jelly, using guncotton which had been nitrated for a minimum of 2.5 hours and in using inspectors for quality control at all stages of the process. This improved propellant was known as MC (for Modified Cracked) and the substitution of cracked mineral jelly in place of petroleum jelly was in a bid to improve stability. With this exception, MC cordite was chemically similar to MD cordite. Plans were put in place during the spring of 1917 to replace some 6,000 tons (6,100 mt) of old cordite with MC cordite as soon as production permitted. However, after the battleship Vanguard exploded in harbor in July 1917, this program was expedited and the exchange was completed in ships of the Grand Fleet by March 1918 and in all ships by September 1918. MC cordite was a fairly satisfactory propellant if properly and carefully made and it was still in use during World War II, primarily as an alternative propellant for certain guns.
In 1927, following a study of the German RP C/12 solventless propellant (see below) used during World War I, British chemists developed a more stable version of cordite called SC (solventless cordite, also known as solventless carbamite). This was used to replace the older propellants as rapidly as possible and remained in service until well after World War II. SC was primarily manufactured in cords (strings) but some was also made in tubular form. The nomenclature was changed such that the cord die hole diameter was now given in 0.001 inch (0.0254 mm) increments. SC consisted of 49.5% nitrocellulose (12.2% N), 41.5% nitroglycerine and 9% centralite (also known as "carbamite"), which was used as a stabilizer. Centralite not only improved the stabilization of SC cordite, it did not have to be removed during the manufacturing process, which gave it better dimensional stability as well. This also permitted the use of larger diameter cords, with the largest being SC500 which was used for the 14-inch Mark VII guns at Dover for cross-channel firings. However, SC was a stiff material to extrude and needed much higher pressures than did the Cordite MD type."
By April 1917 considerable improvements had been made in the manufacture of cordite by changing to the use of clean carded sliver cotton, substituting cracked mineral jelly for petroleum jelly, using guncotton which had been nitrated for a minimum of 2.5 hours and in using inspectors for quality control at all stages of the process. This improved propellant was known as MC (for Modified Cracked) and the substitution of cracked mineral jelly in place of petroleum jelly was in a bid to improve stability. With this exception, MC cordite was chemically similar to MD cordite. Plans were put in place during the spring of 1917 to replace some 6,000 tons (6,100 mt) of old cordite with MC cordite as soon as production permitted. However, after the battleship Vanguard exploded in harbor in July 1917, this program was expedited and the exchange was completed in ships of the Grand Fleet by March 1918 and in all ships by September 1918. MC cordite was a fairly satisfactory propellant if properly and carefully made and it was still in use during World War II, primarily as an alternative propellant for certain guns.
In 1927, following a study of the German RP C/12 solventless propellant (see below) used during World War I, British chemists developed a more stable version of cordite called SC (solventless cordite, also known as solventless carbamite). This was used to replace the older propellants as rapidly as possible and remained in service until well after World War II. SC was primarily manufactured in cords (strings) but some was also made in tubular form. The nomenclature was changed such that the cord die hole diameter was now given in 0.001 inch (0.0254 mm) increments. SC consisted of 49.5% nitrocellulose (12.2% N), 41.5% nitroglycerine and 9% centralite (also known as "carbamite"), which was used as a stabilizer. Centralite not only improved the stabilization of SC cordite, it did not have to be removed during the manufacturing process, which gave it better dimensional stability as well. This also permitted the use of larger diameter cords, with the largest being SC500 which was used for the 14-inch Mark VII guns at Dover for cross-channel firings. However, SC was a stiff material to extrude and needed much higher pressures than did the Cordite MD type."
Interesting, I guess we will have to agree to disagree regarding your position about the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission having any real power. IMHO even present day UN weapons inspectors have significantly more inspection authority and enforcement powers than the IMCC did. In that sense any documents shown to the IMCC during the 20's would be ones the Germans allowed to be seen. So sadly what occured in the interwar period was not an occupation in any conventional sense at all. The Weimar government was equally commited to using the interwar period to prepare for war and undermine European peace by circumventing its disarmament obligations under the terms of Versaille.
AFAIK the IMCC were not given the authority to force their way into German installations or archives. If the German authorities denied access, there was little the IMCC officials could do other than report back to their home governments, who, short of declaring war, could do very little. As it was, the IMCC ultimately left Germany without having achieved disarmanent as the Weimar republic had already clandestinely violated most of the disarmament process as mapped out by Versaille, even by 1924 the Reichswehr was covertly training and equipping with Soviet assistance, carrying out poison gas experiments in the USSR and training tank troops at Kazan. Even inside Germany, the growth of 'flying clubs' and development of heavy industry that made peculiarly heavy agricultural 'tractors', despite lack of agricultural demand :hmmm: was apparent to officials of the IMCC even at this early stage. Indeed by the mid-1920s the IMCC was in practice little more than a joke. Without effective inspection and enforcement mechanisms the IMCC ended up spending most of its time simply reporting German violations by 1925.
Clearly this aspect of things is decidedly off-topic for the thread, but I'm afraid you'll both have to excuse me that I don't buy into the mythology that 'innocent' Germany was being crushed by an "unjust" Versaille settlement and reparations. In other words a "Carthaginian peace", as John Maynard Keynes described at the time. More recent scholarship disputes most of his conclusions. Compared to the terms Germany would have imposed if they had won the First World War - see Brest-Litovsk as a model of German 'peace' - Versaille was actually a joke in many respects.
Finally, as an aside AFAIK American troops (which were a token presence in any case!) left the Rhineland in 1924 at the latest.
Last edited:
..... Kadett, I'm not arguing anything so grand or expansive. All I'm saying is that the allies, presumably through the activities of the IMCC, collected a body of German military records.