What's in the Pipeline at LCP

[dlazov]

Thank you George.

 

[Psycho]

At present, No

How about in the future?

 

[George Kelln]

Unknown :whist:

 

[samwat]

Normally a Sherman, with its Normal Ground Pressure, Bogs on a 11 or more when crossing Bocage; the SSR +2 makes it a 9. The I believe reflects a high enough risk to warrant the invention of other methods and tactics.

Historically, _could_ a Sherman cross a hedgerow w/o a Cullin device w/o bogging? Did they try? If they simply didn't try (after the first few attempts), then ASL shouldn't let us do it.

 

[samwat]

Hey Paul,

Other than that Ozerekya Breakout, each of the current LCP TM Packs were only one day in duration; in the historical research material, there was little more than four or so opportunities from which to design a scenario from.

Future project could possibly have 1-2 more scenarios in them, bringing the total number to 5-6 scenarios, but again this number will be dependent on the availability of material, playability of the scenarios, and the scenario's size - I don't believe players want a scenario consisting of a handful of counters in total.

However, a scenario pack comprised of a half-dozen non-related, non-CG scenarios, using the LCP maps could be a possibility in the future.

Cheers

George

I like both those options. And as you note, please no CH scenarios with two platoons fighting each other in a 10-hex by 10-hex 10 percent of a historical map (their Santa Maria Infante module is full of those).

I love your choice of battles, and how you represent them. I've been to Purple Heart Draw--after I got your module, and took it with me (but forgot to take a picture)--and Buron.

 

[BattleSchool]

Historically, _could_ a Sherman cross a hedgerow w/o a Cullin device w/o bogging? Did they try? If they simply didn't try (after the first few attempts), then ASL shouldn't let us do it.

I think the fear of underbelly hits was another factor in the adoption of the Culin device, which suggests that Shermans were capable of driving over a hedgerow. The Culin device allowed Shermans to "plow" through hedgerows instead.

I suspect that steep slopes (in the case of hedgerows lining sunken lanes) were more problematic.

 

[samwat]

I think the fear of underbelly hits was another factor in the adoption of the Culin device, which suggests that Shermans were capable of driving over a hedgerow. The Culin device allowed Shermans to "plow" through hedgerows instead.

I suspect that steep slopes (in the case of hedgerows lining sunken lanes) were more problematic.

So my question is how often did tankers drive over them in real life? Not trying to get into the whole realism pit, but if they virtually never did it, should we have it as an option? I've read a lot of Normandy memoirs, unit histories, and engagement histories, and never got a sense that tankers were trying it (even though PFs seem to have been much less common in Normandy than on the Eastern Front or in the Siegfried Line campaign).

Thanks for the new BattleDice, BTW--just arrived. Niiiiccce! I'm going to water the maple tree out front of my house to thank you and George for your service to ASL.

 

[BattleSchool]

So my question is how often did tankers drive over them in real life? Not trying to get into the whole realism pit, but if they virtually never did it, should we have it as an option? I've read a lot of Normandy memoirs, unit histories, and engagement histories, and never got a sense that tankers were trying it (even though PFs seem to have been much less common in Normandy than on the Eastern Front or in the Siegfried Line campaign).

Fair question.

I read somewhere that more than half of the American M4 tanks that took part in Op Cobra were equipped with Culin devices. I think that many M3 light tanks were equipped with these too.

Edit: Zaloga, Operation Cobra 1944 (Osprey: 2001): 26 Zaloga states that 500 Culin devices were fitted to the tanks of Bradley's Fisrt Army in preparation for Op Cobra. Tank losses had been four times greater than anticipated due to the restrictive nature of bocage country, and the vulnerability of tanks to enemy AT fire on narrow roads and when crossing bocage. Zaloga does not mention any extraordinary difficulties in crossing a hedgerow per se, only the vulnerability to underbelly hits. (Others have also pointed out the inability of a tank to bring its weapons to bear while crossing a hedgerow.)

If true, then perhaps more ASL scenarios set during this period should have a Culin SSR.

Thanks for the new BattleDice, BTW--just arrived. Niiiiccce! I'm going to water the maple tree out front of my house to thank you and George for your service to ASL.

Water an oak tree too. The dice were crafted in the US heartland.

 

[George Kelln]

I believe the Americans must have had enough problems crossing bocage to invention the Culin's hedgerow device.

In ASL, a Sherman Bogs going over a Bocage on an DR > 11; not really a reason to go through all the work of hauling obstacles off the beaches, cutting them up, and then welding them on to the front 500 or so tanks.

In PHD, there is a Special +2 DRM, which has a Sherman Bogging on a DR > 9; significant enough make it somewhat risky, but not enough to make it impossible.

In addition, the Americans can breach with DC hedgerows, which they did before the Culin's were introduced.

 

[samwat]

I believe the Americans must have had enough problems crossing bocage to invention the Culin's hedgerow device.

In ASL, a Sherman Bogs going over a Bocage on an DR > 11; not really a reason to go through all the work of hauling obstacles off the beaches, cutting them up, and then welding them on to the front 500 or so tanks.

In PHD, there is a Special +2 DRM, which has a Sherman Bogging on a DR > 9; significant enough make it somewhat risky, but not enough to make it impossible.

In addition, the Americans can breach with DC hedgerows, which they did before the Culin's were introduced.

Yes, that's my impression--that short of emergencies they waited to blow gaps with DCs, or even to bulldoze, rather than do the ASL cardboard heroes move. US and British tankers were notorious among their infantry for resisting risking their tanks, especially in close terrain. They'd run up to the hedgerow, fire through or over it, but not chance crossing it. So, in a way, the frequency with which one gets PFs in ASL, which I think exaggerates what they actually had in Normandy, may still have the effect of discouraging us from using our cardboard tanks as aggressively and unrealistically as we might, since we'll so often be at 2-hex range--maybe it balances out.

 

[BattleSchool]

Yes, that's my impression--that short of emergencies they waited to blow gaps with DCs, or even to bulldoze, rather than do the ASL cardboard heroes move. US and British tankers were notorious among their infantry for resisting risking their tanks, especially in close terrain. They'd run up to the hedgerow, fire through or over it, but not chance crossing it. So, in a way, the frequency with which one gets PFs in ASL, which I think exaggerates what they actually had in Normandy, may still have the effect of discouraging us from using our cardboard tanks as aggressively and unrealistically as we might, since we'll so often be at 2-hex range--maybe it balances out.

Agreed. Doctrinal issues rather than technical limitations warrant placing restrictions on the ability of Allied tanks/TDs to cross bocage.

I wonder if German tankers/artillerymen were more or less averse to crossing bocage.

 

[MAS01]

George:

Any possibility of doing any desert scenarios/TMs?

Regards,


Mark

 

[George Kelln]

Mark,

I've being reading, and by reading I mean; I pick up a book start reading it and then put it down and start laying out boards and pulling counters (be they real or VASL); a couple Desert War books. But while I am interested, I have 6-7 other projects on the stove. Not to say a desert TM or scenario pack could move to the front burner.

Cheers

George

 

[samwat]

Agreed. Doctrinal issues rather than technical limitations warrant placing restrictions on the ability of Allied tanks/TDs to cross bocage.

I wonder if German tankers/artillerymen were more or less averse to crossing bocage.

But then they were usually on the defensive, and could position their AFVs beforehand.

 

[BattleSchool]

But then they were usually on the defensive, and could position their AFVs beforehand.

True. But German defensive doctrine did put much emphasis on the counterattack.

That said, I suspect that German armour was less intimidated by bocage than by Allied airpower.

 

[von Marwitz]

That said, I suspect that German armour was less intimidated by bocage than by Allied airpower.

This was absolutely the case.

Regarding the German stress on counterattack and this being a very successful tactic:
The conterattacks were often local in scale and they were conducted mostly only a short time after an enemy attack.

What usually happens shortly after an attack is done with is that the soldiers involved feel very exhausted (not only physically but mentally, too) and tired, sometimes to the point of temporary lethargy. If the counterattack hits at this very stage and time conducted by reserves not committed in the original defence, what can be achieved is often seemingly out of all proportion with regard to the strength of forces used for this counterattack.

I am not sure if the Germans learned this from experience or if they there was then scientific evidence for this phenomenon available and known to them. Whatever the case, the Germans had a knack of finding just the right timing for many of their counterattacks.

von Marwitz

 

[BattleSchool]

This was absolutely the case.

Regarding the German stress on counterattack and this being a very successful tactic:
The conterattacks were often local in scale and they were conducted mostly only a short time after an enemy attack.

What usually happens shortly after an attack is done with is that the soldiers involved feel very exhausted (not only physically but mentally, too) and tired, sometimes to the point of temporary lethargy. If the counterattack hits at this very stage and time conducted by reserves not committed in the original defence, what can be achieved is often seemingly out of all proportion with regard to the strength of forces used for this counterattack.

I am not sure if the Germans learned this from experience or if they there was then scientific evidence for this phenomenon available and known to them. Whatever the case, the Germans had a knack of finding just the right timing for many of their counterattacks.

von Marwitz

The Germans had some success with this doctrine, especially during the first half of the war, when facing less-disciplined/well-trained forces. The Germans employed a similar doctrine during WW1. The elastic defence absorbed the attacker's momentum. An aggressive counterattack--launched with whatever forces were available--often succeeded in restoring the situation. (And as you correctly point out, the numbers involved were frequently quite small in proportion to the attacking force.) This worked for a number of reasons: the enemy was tired, overextended, low on ammunition (and in the process of resdistributing what ammo remained), disorganized (individuals mixed with those of other sub-units, the appointment of interim leaders due to casualties, etc.), busy treating and evacuating wounded, and so forth.

However, the inevitable German counterattack also became predictable. Once the Allies recognized the pattern, they were able to put countermeasures in place, to devastating effect. One typical countermeasure was to have mortars and artillery on call immediately following an attack (or to put in place a box barrage that "sealed" off the area under attack). The express purpose of this on-call fire was to break up counterattacks either as they formed, or while they were in motion. (In the desert, the Allies would bring ATG forward with the attacking elements in order to be in position to blunt the inevitable armoured counterattack--not that the Germans didn't do the same.)

So while the doctrine had much success in early encounters, it had less success later. The effectiveness of these local counterattacks also waned due to attrition. With fewer experienced and aggressive junior leaders to direct their local counterattacks, the Germans became less imaginative, and even more predictable wrt their counterattacks.

 

[dlazov]

The Germans had some success with this doctrine, especially during the first half of the war, when facing less-disciplined/well-trained forces.

So while the doctrine had much success in early encounters, it had less success later. The effectiveness of these local counterattacks also waned due to attrition. With fewer experienced and aggressive junior leaders to direct their local counterattacks, the Germans became less imaginative, and even more predictable wrt their counterattacks.

Correct and on the Eastern Front by August - December 1943, the Russians were slowly grinding down the German counterattacks making them less effective and by March 1944 these counterattacks were even less effective as the Germans were attributed away and the Russians kept grinding inexorable forward towards Berlin, the Russian "Deep Battle" tactics countered and were more effective in the long run against the Germans destroying hundreds of Axis units in the process.

 

[samwat]

True. But German defensive doctrine did put much emphasis on the counterattack.

That said, I suspect that German armour was less intimidated by bocage than by Allied airpower.

Agreed. When I get home I'll check Mark Reardon's book on Mortain, and the Greenbook re the Panzer Lehr attack c. 11 July, which were counteroffensives rather than immediate counter attacks. Maybe they say something re bocage.

 

[samwat]

Fair question.

I read somewhere that more than half of the American M4 tanks that took part in Op Cobra were equipped with Culin devices. I think that many M3 light tanks were equipped with these too.

Edit: Zaloga, Operation Cobra 1944 (Osprey: 2001): 26 Zaloga states that 500 Culin devices were fitted to the tanks of Bradley's Fisrt Army in preparation for Op Cobra. Tank losses had been four times greater than anticipated due to the restrictive nature of bocage country, and the vulnerability of tanks to enemy AT fire on narrow roads and when crossing bocage. Zaloga does not mention any extraordinary difficulties in crossing a hedgerow per se, only the vulnerability to underbelly hits. (Others have also pointed out the inability of a tank to bring its weapons to bear while crossing a hedgerow.)

If true, then perhaps more ASL scenarios set during this period should have a Culin SSR.



Water an oak tree too. The dice were crafted in the US heartland.

Cool. Last year one of our options for the cadets' paper on Normandy was 3rd Can Div on 6-8 June (or through the 11th if they wanted to do Le Mesnil Patry). They read a bunch of battalion war diaries that one of our faculty collected back in the 90s. I bought a mass of Canadian cap badges on eBay and took them into class, and had a slideshow of pictures I took from Juno Beach in to Carpiquet. As we toast at our dining-ins, "to our gallant allies!"