What if the HSF had challenged the GF in early 1915???

[rgreat]

Did not mean to offend you mate, 25.8 on trails was the top speed that was over a measured mile, the load would be optimal and the stokers fresh. One thing people tend to forget in this era is coal fired ships were dependant on the stamina of the stokers. These high speeds you hear about like the Lion doing 28 knts at Dogger could only be maintained for a limited period

There was quite a few incidents where ships go in fact faster in combat compared even to top trial speed.

Put a strain on a machinery - of cause, but it was possible if ship was in good condition.

If you really want to live you can really break records..

 

[saddletank]

Generally in combat the ship squadrons of this era were not hammered into the dirt, speed wise. It makes for a lot of smoke, a lot of vibration (which can upset delicate optics) and makes it hard for a formation to maintain station. Consequently flag officers tend to order formation speeds a knot or two below the slowest ships maximum.

You only have to fight a game of Jutland or RJW with your squadrons steaming at maximum speed to see how soon formations beome ragged and one ship lags enough to become either a tail end target or to be too distant from the sharp end of the engagement to contribute useful firepower.

I know that at Dogger Bank Beatty thrashed his ship(s) to catch up but I have read accounts at Jutland where the respective battle cruisers were only making around 23 or 24 knots.

I think at Dogger Bank Blucher began the action making over 24 knots but it would seem that she slowed down a knot or so as time went on, (before she was damaged) whether due to exhausted stokers, poor coal or clagged grates or some other cause isn't known.

 

[Bullethead]

I think at Dogger Bank Blucher began the action making over 24 knots but it would seem that she slowed down a knot or so as time went on, (before she was damaged) whether due to exhausted stokers, poor coal or clagged grates or some other cause isn't known.

I don't recall Hipper saying Blucher slowed him down or had trouble keeping up...

 

[Coypus]

I don't recall Hipper saying Blucher slowed him down or had trouble keeping up...

23 knots was the speed he was travelling. He was heading SE and the wind was from the NE and by every acount the Destroyers and Torpedo boats had difficulty maintaining speed. Later in the action the BCF reduced speed to 24 knots which largely maintained the range with 1SG allowing the slower boats to catch up. By this stage of course the Blucher was lagging well behind 1SG

 

[saddletank]

The accounts I have read all state Blucher lagged behind before she was damaged. Blucher did not slow Hipper down, no, he just left her astern. He had little choice.

I must confess I cannot cite teh page number of any particular authors. This 'fact' seems to be generally stated most places. I wonder if is in fact a myth and she did keep up?

Anyone got a copy of the official histories or other primary document?

But nevertheless, the fact Hipper was doing (around) 24 knots and Blucher still lagged behind does not necessarily imply her top speed was under 24 knots, far from it for the reasons I gave in my previous post.

 

[Coypus]

The Blucher turned early in the action before the BC's opened fire to open more guns up on some RN destroyers that had been sent in by Beatty. This would probably suggest she never made up the ground lost by that course alteration on her squadron mates.

Whatever speed was her top speed in service and operationally it was only called into action once it certainly was not the best speed she achieved on her trials.

 

[Blutarski]

On the subject of German destroyer flotillas - According to F C Dreyer [The Sea Heritage], Ingenhohl took eight flotillas in the December 1914 bombardment/mining operation against the British North Sea ports: 2 flotillas with 1SG and 6 with the HSF.

 

[Tom Hunter]

We know the Germans took Blucher out in 1915, and she was a bit too slow to survive.

Should we add York, Roon and Prinz Heinrich to the German mix? Did the Grand fleet have all the armored cruisers available or were some of the better ones still scattered around the globe on other missions?

One of the things that strikes me about WWI is how often things were done for reasons that make social sense but not military sense. Bringing the pre-dreadnoughts along is one example, the live bait squadron, Cradoc's attack on Spee, none of them make good sense on a military basis but they all make sense in social context.

Anyone able to post a speculative order of battle, with at least a nod to the social context?

 

[Coypus]

I'm sure of its social order but not sure of the truth. It is said Edward VII who was mad keen on yachting and carousing got drunk with the great and the good of Royal Ulster Yacht club and had such a good time, that while under the influence that he promised a Kings/Queens ship would attend its regatta every year. To this day a ship from the Royal Navy attends. Off course today it is only a Minesweeper or fishery protection vessel now but in days gone by it was the like of the Warspite or Repulse or some equally stately ship though he was long dead it seems the tradition was kept.

 

[Blutarski]

The accounts I have read all state Blucher lagged behind before she was damaged. Blucher did not slow Hipper down, no, he just left her astern. He had little choice.

I must confess I cannot cite teh page number of any particular authors. This 'fact' seems to be generally stated most places. I wonder if is in fact a myth and she did keep up?

Anyone got a copy of the official histories or other primary document?

But nevertheless, the fact Hipper was doing (around) 24 knots and Blucher still lagged behind does not necessarily imply her top speed was under 24 knots, far from it for the reasons I gave in my previous post.

..... For what it's worth, Goldrick [The King's Ships were at Sea, pg 258] wrote -

"With the BLUCHER attached, the First Scouting Group could not exceed 23 knots..."


B

 

[Blutarski]

Further information about the situation confronting the destroyers assigned to the Grand Fleet. This data for July 1917:

Out of 100 destroyers plus 9 flotilla leaders assigned to the Grand Fleet:

38 engaged on trade protection in the North Sea and off the Irish Coast.
2 minelaying against U-boats.
6 patrolling outside bases.
17 refitting in dockyards
12 cleaning boilers or underging local refits.



B

 

[Coypus]

On the 23rd of April 1918 the GF sailed to intercept the HSF with 85 destroyers

At Jutland which was in 1916 the RN had 78 destroyers

After Dogger in 1915 the Lion was escorted home by 67 destroyers

I think your point is could the HSF have created a disparity of destroyers and torpedo boats that would have brought decision in 1915.

There are a couple of considerations before looking at technical detail but the main one is purely one of numbers with only 88 boats available it would hard to obtain the disparity required to bring decision even in the most favourable circumstances of operationality when just talking destroyers.

 

[Blutarski]

On the 23rd of April 1918 the GF sailed to intercept the HSF with 85 destroyers

At Jutland which was in 1916 the RN had 78 destroyers

After Dogger in 1915 the Lion was escorted home by 67 destroyers

I think your point is could the HSF have created a disparity of destroyers and torpedo boats that would have brought decision in 1915.

There are a couple of considerations before looking at technical detail but the main one is purely one of numbers with only 88 boats available it would hard to obtain the disparity required to bring decision even in the most favourable circumstances of operationality when just talking destroyers.

..... My point was to illustrate the extreme degree to which operational and maintenance demands could influence the availability of destroyers for the GF on any given day. Even Beatty, during his tenure as CiC/GF, complained constantly about shortages of DDs. As I've mentioned before, it's not simply a question of numbers, but also of timing. And the obligation of commander extends to planning against worst case contingencies as well as the nominal balance of forces.

BTW, those 67 destroyers that escorted LION back from Dogger Bank were drawn not only from Beatty's own force, but also Harwich Force, plus 35 destroyers detached from the GF. They represented most of the RN's front line strength in that type [according to Goldrick].


B

 

[saddletank]

Surely it is the relative strengths of capital ships in 1914-15 that is the issue? Its what wargamers are interested in, more so that historians (who consider the politics and strategic issues more fully).

 

[Coypus]

..... My point was to illustrate the extreme degree to which operational and maintenance demands could influence the availability of destroyers for the GF on any given day. Even Beatty, during his tenure as CiC/GF, complained constantly about shortages of DDs. As I've mentioned before, it's not simply a question of numbers, but also of timing. And the obligation of commander extends to planning against worst case contingencies as well as the nominal balance of forces.

BTW, those 67 destroyers that escorted LION back from Dogger Bank were drawn not only from Beatty's own force, but also Harwich Force, plus 35 destroyers detached from the GF. They represented most of the RN's front line strength in that type [according to Goldrick].


B

Yup Beatty did complain and I'm sure he used that good old Panzer division tactic of fabricating operational strenght to avoid losing more stuff to other theatres. In 1917 the Germans had opened up the U boat war which was draining RN destroyers, but was this a factor in 1914/15?

For timing you have to have good intelegence which is what the Germans simply did not have. The only other way to find the weakness was by continual probing which inturn would lead to the servicability going down. So you could have too choices 1/ Go in with high servicabilty no inteligence and little practice and hope the RN was having a understrength day or 2/ Continually probe and if the response seems weaker than usual hit them with your fleet but have a lower sevicabilty. Both have a certain amount of risk.

Yup I know they were from Harwich but Im sure Jellicoe kept a couple of destroyers with him to escort his deradnoughts home.

 

[Coypus]

Surely it is the relative strengths of capital ships in 1914-15 that is the issue? Its what wargamers are interested in, more so that historians (who consider the politics and strategic issues more fully).

Well I go for the Mahan doctrine To operate far from your on coast ie the east coast of the UK you need the battle fleet. especially when there is a Cruiser disparity. I don't believe the Nassau's and Hegolands have the qualitive advantage to take on two RN dreadnoughts and I think that the Iron Dukes can hold their own one on one for long enough to make numbers tell. The RN also has a speed advantage.

In Battlecruisers the odds are the best for the RN than at any stage I can think of. Damage to the Seydlitz at Dogger proves that although not critical like in a RN ship at Jutland it is still enough to totally degrade it as a fighting unit.

 

[Blutarski]

Yup Beatty did complain and I'm sure he used that good old Panzer division tactic of fabricating operational strenght to avoid losing more stuff to other theatres. In 1917 the Germans had opened up the U boat war which was draining RN destroyers, but was this a factor in 1914/15?

..... There is an interesting book, "Keeping the Seas" by Captain E R G R Evans, who commanded 6th DD Flotilla out of Dover from 1914. Evan writes that due to the submarine threat as early as October 1914 "orders came down from the Admiralty that no vessel except for a destroyer, or a scout at full speed was to cross the Channel during daylight hours. <snip> the patrolling cruisers were withdrawn, and the destroyers had to be organized to patrol the areas which has been formerly watched over by the four light cruisers or scouts ofthe ATTENTIVE class; it meant more patrolling than ever." Evans mentions further that any submarine sighting caused the despatch of a division of DDs to hunt it, a practice which was no doubt pursued elsewhere along the North Sea coast as well.

A close reading of Jellicoe's "The Grand Fleet" supports this surmise, as he mentions destroyer divisions forever being sent off here and there to patrol for submarines or in reaction to any submarine sightings. In Jauary 1915, the GF officially possessed 40 destroyers attached in two flotillas [2nd and 4th] of 20 boats each; of those 40 boats, 10 were re-fitting and 8 were on detached service in the Irish Sea, leaving only 22 boats for fleet duty.

Probably the most telling point with respect to the demand for destroyers for patrol and light force interdiction duties was the size of the Harwich Force [30+ DDs] and the fact that they had first call on the most modern destroyers.

For timing you have to have good intelegence which is what the Germans simply did not have. The only other way to find the weakness was by continual probing which inturn would lead to the servicability going down. So you could have too choices 1/ Go in with high servicabilty no inteligence and little practice and hope the RN was having a understrength day or 2/ Continually probe and if the response seems weaker than usual hit them with your fleet but have a lower sevicabilty. Both have a certain amount of risk.

..... I think that approaches the matter with a bit too much hindsight. Jellicoe had no way of knowing the quality of German intelligence at the time and it was his obligation as the responsible person to plan for worst case contingencies.

Yup I know they were from Harwich but Im sure Jellicoe kept a couple of destroyers with him to escort his deradnoughts home.

..... IIRC, Jellicoe had four flotillas with him at the time and surrendered two to escort LION.

 

[Coypus]

Okay digging about for discussion purposes we can say the most ships the HSF went to sea with was Scarborough. So I think it would be fair to say the maximum effort early in the war would reflect this operation

14 Dreadnoughts
4 Battlecruisers
8 PDs
1 Blucher
2 Armoured cruisers
11 Light Cruisers
72 Torpedo Boats/Destroyers

 

[Firestorm]

Okay digging about for discussion purposes we can say the most ships the HSF went to sea with was Scarborough. So I think it would be fair to say the maximum effort early in the war would reflect this operation

14 Dreadnoughts
4 Battlecruisers
8 PDs
1 Blucher
2 Armoured cruisers
11 Light Cruisers
72 Torpedo Boats/Destroyers

The Scarborough Raid is actually my favorite "what if". If Ingenohl had more of a back bone he could have a had chance of engaging and possibly sinking the 6 Drednoughts of the Second Battle Squadron. Those 6 DN's were the margin between the Grand Fleet and the HSF at the time. They also could have engaged Beatty and his 4 BC's if he was his normal hard charging self and decided to take on the HSF.

 

[kotori87]

I've considered a number of "what-if" scenarios based on the Scarborough Raid. I won't reveal any details because I'm slowly turning them into reality...