What if the HSF had challenged the GF in early 1915???

[Blutarski]

Here is an interesting topic for discussion/debate:

What if the HSF had challenged the GF to battle in early 1915 - before the British had been able to train up their new ships, before director control gear had been fitted to the GF on a widespread basis, before the British had built up such a great numerical superiority, before the 15-in ships had been able to reach the fleet?

 

[TBR]

Knowing what we do now and following the interpretation SES chose for the game, namely the dangers of British cordite and to a lesser extent the defects in British AP shells I'd expect either a rather adverse outcome for the Grand Fleet or an even more inconclusive outcome than the original Jutland.

The overriding variable in technological development IMO is the range of fleet combat, which the RN would, despite the presence of their predreads, still have been able to decide. I assume fighting ranges would have been either significantly lower since the RN would have striven for them due to the absence of director control or the ranges would have "remained" "long", absence of fire control and lower training level in the Grand Fleet creating an imbalance between German and RN hit rates but keeping both overall so low that no "true" deciding battle would take place, mostly due to ammunition constraints. In this case any battle would be an "early" repeat of Jutland where I'd expect a great variability of results whose statistic mean would be slightly slanted in the German favour but overall less bloody in comparison to Jutland (Of course this is pure specualtion as we don't know the "statistic variability" of possible Jutland outcomes, having only one). If one of the more extreme variants of possible outcomes took place (i.e. several RN battleships exploding/sinking with no or negilible German losses) the ensuing North sea campaign would have gained a far greater dynamic because of raised German confidence.

The "lower range" scenario sounds most interesting to me. Freed (not yet shackled to it) from the Dreyer constraints the RN ships would have been able to maneuvre more freely, though I think the faults of Grand Fleets doctrine of centralisation would haven been even more exposed in such more chaotic combat, especially in comparison to the more flexible German doctrine (for instance see how Mahrholz independent decision to deviate from fire division doctrine (Hippers signal "Feuer verteilen von links") led to the destruction of "Indefatigable", and him not even being "Von der Tann's" captain but her 1st gunnery officer, I can't imagine a Grand Fleet squadron CO, let alone a ships captain, act so independently and in seeming defiance to established doctrine and the signals of a superior). The higher hit rates and higher probability of penetration overall would have favoured the Germans as the probability for catastrophic explosions on RN ships would have risen accordingly, expiating any levelling effects the lower ranges would have had on the faulty British AP shells. Such a closer and more dynamic fleet combat would also strengthen the importance of the light forces and the torpedo armaments. I'd expect to see more torpedo hits and consequently more capital ship losses due to them and far more bloody duels between DD's and CL's. Generally I'd expect a more bloody battle than Jutland due to the closer balance of forces and the therefore somewhat less cautious German fleet leadership and especially due to the presence of far more vulnerable predreads in both battlelines than in 1916.

 

[Tom Hunter]

I think TBR does a good job of describing the problems faced by the British.

The Germans have problems of thier own. They have not worked up as much in 1915 either. The poor flash control that caused them big problems at Dogger Bank are not even known to them, because Dogger Bank has not happened. That is a big issue, the Germans learned a lot more by losing Dogger Bank than the British did by winning it.

The Germans still have to confront the moral issue. Their admirals were very cautious and had rules of engagment that work against a decisive result. That points us towards a less decisive Jutland type result.

In those circumstances I think the British are likely to lose more ships than the Germans, but I'll guess that the Germans would take more damage relative to the British in 1915 vs. 1916. The British are likely to learn more from the encounter, due to the ship losses.

Of course any time fleets meet it's always possible that they clash in a way that produces a decisive result. Jutland would have been very different if the battle fleets had met earlier in the day. The British advantages in numbers and speed make me think that if there is going to be a decisive result it's likely to be a decisive victory for the Brits. I gather the Germans were thinking along similar lines.

In 1915 it is very difficult for the Germans to trap the British and defeat them in detail. (unless they do something really dumb, like send out part of their fleet, which we know they did.) It gets even harder in 1916. On the other hand, if a combination of bad luck and poor flash control damages and slows German ships the British have the resources to chase them and catch them.

Of course that does not mean they will, or that the Germans could not get a decisive victory, but that is the reality that the Germans were working with.

 

[Coypus]

Where is this battle fought? What is the sea state and visibility? Or is it a straight 23 v 17 and 10 v 4 fight? I take it you are not counting the Queens but magically making the Konigs appear, though giving you the Geoben would be a total stretch of the imagination.

 

[saddletank]

I assumed whatever was afloat and assigned to the GF and HSF in the North Sea in January 1915, so Invincible and Inflexible would be en-route back from the Falklands or in dockyard hands and nothing not yet in the two fleets would be present. Goeben of course is a part of the Turkish navy by then.

Blucher is present.

Weather and location is irrelevant, its an exercise in fleet comparitive strengths.

 

[Blutarski]

According to "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916" [Jellicoe], there was a period in late October 1914 when the the strength of the GF was down to only 17 battleships and 5 battlecruisers [see note below] ready for battle versus 15 and 4 for the HSF. In addition, the HSF had available 88 destroyers versus only 42 for the GF.

Note: AUDACIOUS sunk, AJAX and IRON DUKE unserviceable due to condenser defects, ORION at Greenock seeing to an engine room defect, CONQUEROR refitting, NEW ZEALAND in dock at Cromarty, ERIN and AGINCOURT still working up.

I think it would make for a very interesting fight!

 

[Coypus]

I assumed whatever was afloat and assigned to the GF and HSF in the North Sea in January 1915, so Invincible and Inflexible would be en-route back from the Falklands or in dockyard hands and nothing not yet in the two fleets would be present. Goeben of course is a part of the Turkish navy by then.

Blucher is present.

Weather and location is irrelevant, its an exercise in fleet comparitive strengths.

If thats the case you lose 3 Konigs and Derflinger, RN lose Tiger and the two BC's in transit so its 23 v 14 and 7 v 3+ Blucher. The HSF would only have 10 LC's .

You are talking about the RN having double the amount of tubes when comparing broadsides and a roughly equal number of 13.5's as the HSF have total firing broadsides.

How bad are you going to make RN gunnery?

 

[Coypus]

According to "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916" [Jellicoe], there was a period in late October 1914 when the the strength of the GF was down to only 17 battleships and 5 battlecruisers [see note below] ready for battle versus 15 and 4 for the HSF. In addition, the HSF had available 88 destroyers versus only 42 for the GF.

Note: AUDACIOUS sunk, AJAX and IRON DUKE unserviceable due to condenser defects, ORION at Greenock seeing to an engine room defect, CONQUEROR refitting, NEW ZEALAND in dock at Cromarty, ERIN and AGINCOURT still working up.

I think it would make for a very interesting fight!

Off course the Geman fleet was at continual full operational capacity:laugh:

 

[Seleucus24]

Germans got to choose when to come out, so naturally they would come out when nothing was in drydock. The British had to come out whenever the Germans felt like it, no matter what was ready.


Any time in between Konigs coming online and before the QE's being ready would make for a fairly close fight numerically.


Copyus you sound like Lord Fisher in counting weight of shell.

 

[Tom Hunter]

Though the Germans do get to choose the day they leave port, I don't think it's wise to assume that:

The British must respond.

The Germans will choose to come out with everything.

It's too much like saying who would win Jutland if I were there and I could shoot cruise missiles out my ass.

Grand fleet had days with only 42 destroyers, but Harwich force was still there, and so was channel fleet. The Germans have a theoretical maximum of 88 DDs but I bet you could count the number of days when they were all ready to go on one hand.

In 1915 the Germans did come out. They lost Blucher. Sedlitz came home looking kind of funny. Lion did not explode inspite of a serious pounding.

I think the question is good, and grounds for an interesting what if. But please, if your scenario design includes one side being optimal and the other side being realistic, go find the "what if I could shoot missiles from my ass" forum and post over there.

Sorry for being crude, but I strongly favor discussion based on some understanding of what was actually going on at the time.

 

[Blutarski]

Though the Germans do get to choose the day they leave port, I don't think it's wise to assume that:

The British must respond.

The Germans will choose to come out with everything.

It's too much like saying who would win Jutland if I were there and I could shoot cruise missiles out my ass.

Grand fleet had days with only 42 destroyers, but Harwich force was still there, and so was channel fleet. The Germans have a theoretical maximum of 88 DDs but I bet you could count the number of days when they were all ready to go on one hand.

In 1915 the Germans did come out. They lost Blucher. Sedlitz came home looking kind of funny. Lion did not explode inspite of a serious pounding.

I think the question is good, and grounds for an interesting what if. But please, if your scenario design includes one side being optimal and the other side being realistic, go find the "what if I could shoot missiles from my ass" forum and post over there.

Sorry for being crude, but I strongly favor discussion based on some understanding of what was actually going on at the time.

..... What I wrote was taken directly out of Jellicoe's book, "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916". It was Jellicoe's job to worry about such things during the war and it apparently weighed on his mind enough back then for him to have mentioned it in his book.

There were no destroyers attached to either 5BS (Channel pre-dreadnoughts at that time) or 6BS (older pre-dreadnoughts at the Nore). As far as reliable ocean-going DD's were concerned, here is what Dittmar & Colledge credit as having been available to the Grand Fleet in January 1915 for North Sea operations.

1st DD Flotilla:
FEARLESS + METEOR + 20 I Class DD's

2nd DD Flotilla:
ACTIVE + GALATEA + BROKE + 21 H Class DD's (short-legged)

3rd DD Flotilla (Harwich):
UNDAUNTED + 30 L/M Class DD's

4th DD Flotilla:
CAROLINE + FAULKNOR + SWIFT + 22 K Class DD's

Of these, one division in five could always reliably be assumed to be re-fitting at any given point in time. And more often than not, one division out of every flotilla was off on one assignment or another and unavailable for the moment. Also, the utility of the Harwich DD's in any fleet engagement is not by any means a given. They had their own obligations [there was a reason why the newest and best DD's were given to Tyrwhitt in Harwich instead of the GF] and did not in fact take part in the Battle of Jutland. Jellicoe was not a stupid fellow; he knew what the calculus was and could potentially be.

Unlike the British, who had forces scattered all along the coastline, the entire German fleet was concentrated in a single complex of bases.

- - -

The rest of the British DD's were clapped-out old-timers [except perhaps for 12 F Class DD's of 6DF] assigned to local patrol flotillas up and down the coast [6DF at Dover, 7DF at the Humber, 8DF at the Forth, 9DF at the Tyne].

 

[saddletank]

In addition to which I recall several times when Scheer considered the moment favourable to leave the Jade but declined to do so if one of his BCs was unfit for service.

The HSF 1918 sortie against the Norwegian convoys was cancelled when Moltke developed engine trouble.

So, yes, in that respect while Sheer didn't exactly have cruise missiles up his rear end he could very much choose his optimum moment or decline to sail when he didn't have a full force of major vessels at his disposal.

With 42 vs 88 destroyers and an assumed percentage of each force unavailable for use due to other duties or refitting, it is still a like percentage of 42 vs 88.

If the HSF came out, Jellicoe was obliged to respond, *regardless* of what he had serviceable.

 

[Coypus]

Germans got to choose when to come out, so naturally they would come out when nothing was in drydock. The British had to come out whenever the Germans felt like it, no matter what was ready.


Any time in between Konigs coming online and before the QE's being ready would make for a fairly close fight numerically.


Copyus you sound like Lord Fisher in counting weight of shell.

Nope I'm just pointing out that however good German gunnery or bad RN gunnery is percieved to be here both suffered when it was under heavy fire and improved when it was unmolested.

 

[Coypus]

Love the 88 Torpedo boat figure, what did Scheer take with him at Jutland for a pre planned operation; 60 was it? How many of the RN's 30 modern light cruisers are available for this to compete with the 10 mainly obselete ships of the HSF available?

Of course it would have to be perfect weather because for those German Destroyers sorry torpedo boats,

Your best keeping your fantasy to maximum possible available ships

 

[Coypus]

With 42 vs 88 destroyers and an assumed percentage of each force unavailable for use due to other duties or refitting, it is still a like percentage of 42 vs 88.

.

He was quoting Jellicoe who was stating there were somedays only 42 destroyers were available. In other words that was the absolute minimum wheras the 88 figure is the ablsolute maximum on paper.

So like I said a year and a half later Scheer could only manage 61 boats, I think 88 in January 1915 is slightly optimistic

 

[Blutarski]

Love the 88 Torpedo boat figure, what did Scheer take with him at Jutland for a pre planned operation; 60 was it? How many of the RN's 30 modern light cruisers are available for this to compete with the 10 mainly obselete ships of the HSF available?

Of course it would have to be perfect weather because for those German Destroyers sorry torpedo boats,

Your best keeping your fantasy to maximum possible available ships

..... Take it up with Admiral Jellicoe.

 

[Bullethead]

The Germans have problems of thier own. They have not worked up as much in 1915 either. The poor flash control that caused them big problems at Dogger Bank are not even known to them, because Dogger Bank has not happened. That is a big issue, the Germans learned a lot more by losing Dogger Bank than the British did by winning it.

I don't agree. Here's what Campbell says about this issue (his words, not mine, so don't think I'm being harsh):

It is an often repeated error to state that as a result of {Seydlitz's Dogger Bank} fire the Germans introduced flash precautions before Jutland. Actually, the principal step taken was drastically to limit the number of charges out of their magazine cases or in opened cases, though too many were still present at Jutland in the Derrflinger's two turrets in which fires occurred. As previously noted, some flash doors were fitted in the Lutzow, but this was not done in the Seydlitz or Derfflinger where flash reached the handling rooms, and the hinged flaps on the magazine scuttles were not flash tight in the British sense of the term. It may be noted that at the end of the war, the German 15in turrets were not flash tight by the then British standards.​

Campbell, Jutland, An Analysis of the Fighting, page 374

 

[saddletank]

Coypus, keep your hair on, it's just a mental exercise, a subject for discussion, no need to be rude.

 

[Coypus]

Coypus, keep your hair on, it's just a mental exercise, a subject for discussion, no need to be rude.

Not my intention to be rude. Just trying to point out there are a lot of important factors people tend to overlook.

 

[Tom Hunter]

I'm with Coypus on this, on the subject of DDs especially.

The argument that the Germans would have 88 dds ready (which they never seem to have had in the war) and the Brits cannot get Harwich force involved is a weak argument. The Germans have missions, responsibilities and refits and repairs for their DDs too.

Saying that the British would not involve Harwich Force because it was not involved at Jutland is also weak. The Grand fleet had more than 42 DDs at Jutland, and though Harwich Force was not there, it was involved in other fleet actions.

Bullethead, I understand your point about flash, I should have made myself clearer, or gone back and re-read Campbell. The Germans made changes in response to the turret fire on Seydlitz, as Campbell said, by reducing the number of charges available to fuel a fire. Net, after Dogger Bank they did things to make their ships safer. Reading Campbell closely we might infer that in 1915 many German ships would have too much cordite in the turrets. Maybe true maybe not, but we can be certain that a change is unlikely to occur until after a problem is identified.

Finally, Jellico does not have to come out. When he felt threatend by U-boats he went all the way to Lough Swilley (sp?) he clearly felt able to refuse combat on bad terms. He also seemed willing to accept it on bad terms at times or perhaps it would be better to say risk it.