The Purist
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Paulus's Surrender at Stalingrad
Well Worth Watching - Paulus's Surrender
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Michael Dorosh
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The French accent seems almost cartoony, and I almost stopped the video but it is replaced later on by a reader with an English accent as they go through the actual surrender and interrogations of Paulus, which I found quite interesting. I just finished reading Theodor Plievier's "Stalingrad" novel which was based on his own experiences in the last weeks of the fighting. It did not go into detail about the surrender - I wasn't aware that the Soviets had tried several times to the get Paulus to order the remainder of this command to surrender, and that he refused since technically he was a captive with no command authority.
Michael Dorosh
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Doubtful. He would probably have tried a breakout to the west (which is what SOMEBODY in Germany kept saying "Nein!" to) but in their weakened state, 6th Army would probably have lost just as many men either way.
The Purist
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Hmmmm,.... I wonder about Paulus taking the initiative in ordering a breakout.
Paulus was repeatedly reassured by Manstein that he would receive supplies and relief was on the way. The attempt did not even start until 12 December. Manstein refused to order the breakout on his own responsibility even though he was the highest ranked officer at the front who knew what the real situation was on the ground. He could judge the situation far better than Paulus.
It was, afterall, Manstein who was the sole voice of the Wehrmacht ground commanders who spoke against the immediate breakout of 6th Army. As Glantz notes, Manstein broke the otherwise solid front of generals who were against trying the airlift. Only Jeschonnek and Goering (both Luftwaffe) were in favour of the effort with von Richtofen (IV Air Fleet commander) against. As early as 26 Nov, Manstein is communicating to Paulus that he is to follow the orders to stand fast. He changes his tune just days later as he realizes the difficulty involved with the relief attempt and he begins to shift blame. After the war Manstein blames Paulus for not violating the same orders Manstein told him to obey.
The one chance 6th Army had was in late November, before the siege lines around Stalingrad became too developed (inner and outer cordon). By supporting the airlift and refusing to support Paulus' (repeated) requests to breakout Manstein's shares responsibility for the 6th Army's fate.
Yet, in mid December, when Paulus no longer had the fuel, ammunition or vehicles to breakout, and Manstein has been stopped 40 km away, Manstein then tries to blame Paulus for not taking matters into his own hands. He even goes so far as to claim that he issued the break out order (never happened), and then washes his hands of the fact that "Thunderclap" was not initiated.
I have some sympathy for Paulus, he was repeatedly told by his superiors that his army would be relieved. He was ready to breakout early but was told to hang on. When the penny dropped after 20 December, Paulus was faced with a true no win situation.
Paulus was repeatedly reassured by Manstein that he would receive supplies and relief was on the way. The attempt did not even start until 12 December. Manstein refused to order the breakout on his own responsibility even though he was the highest ranked officer at the front who knew what the real situation was on the ground. He could judge the situation far better than Paulus.
It was, afterall, Manstein who was the sole voice of the Wehrmacht ground commanders who spoke against the immediate breakout of 6th Army. As Glantz notes, Manstein broke the otherwise solid front of generals who were against trying the airlift. Only Jeschonnek and Goering (both Luftwaffe) were in favour of the effort with von Richtofen (IV Air Fleet commander) against. As early as 26 Nov, Manstein is communicating to Paulus that he is to follow the orders to stand fast. He changes his tune just days later as he realizes the difficulty involved with the relief attempt and he begins to shift blame. After the war Manstein blames Paulus for not violating the same orders Manstein told him to obey.
The one chance 6th Army had was in late November, before the siege lines around Stalingrad became too developed (inner and outer cordon). By supporting the airlift and refusing to support Paulus' (repeated) requests to breakout Manstein's shares responsibility for the 6th Army's fate.
Yet, in mid December, when Paulus no longer had the fuel, ammunition or vehicles to breakout, and Manstein has been stopped 40 km away, Manstein then tries to blame Paulus for not taking matters into his own hands. He even goes so far as to claim that he issued the break out order (never happened), and then washes his hands of the fact that "Thunderclap" was not initiated.
I have some sympathy for Paulus, he was repeatedly told by his superiors that his army would be relieved. He was ready to breakout early but was told to hang on. When the penny dropped after 20 December, Paulus was faced with a true no win situation.
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