The thing is, if we're talking about pre-war, I'm not sure it's fair to criticize the Japanese pilot training program. It produced aircrew who were, by most accounts, superior to the US and Commonwealth pilots they faced off against in 1941-42 and provided a sufficient number for the war they thought they'd be fighting. I'm just curious about whether, when the war got going and it became clear they weren't going to be fighting a short conflict with an abrupt and decisive resolution, they were limited more by their protocols or their resources in this area. It seems like, 'Samurai Spirit' or not, the Japanese were often quite willing to make tactical and production adjustments when they saw things weren't working but were hampered by their straightened circumstances.
Historical source information illustrates the Japanese were not inclined to adopting new or different tactics, nor production techniques. The much-belated attempts at obtaining anything resembling mass production assembly were quickly ended in 1944 with the B-29 air raids. ( They were not even begun until January of that year.) Ship production was pathetically slow, given the capability of their shipyards 1942-1944 (before massed B29 raids). Some of that can be attributed to a lack of iron and steel, copper and other needed metals for ship fabrication. Yet the IJN merchant fleet was not anywhere near decimated in 1942 or even well into 1943. USN unrestricted submarine warfare was not able to put the stranglehold on the IJN merchant shipping until mid 1943 and beyond, after the many issues with faulty torpedo exploders had been solved, and after mass production of the Balao, Gato and Tench class boats had really begun in earnest, with subs rolling off the ways at a rate of 1 every 40-or so days. (The best time I have heard from keel laying to launch on a Balao was 13 days, but they did that more to show Americans it could be done than as an effort at such a fast pace.)
Japanese did not change armor tactics at all until Iwo Jima in 1945, with turning them into dug in pillboxes. They did not change their long outdated human wave tactics until late 1944, with the invasion of Peleliu, and even then, only halfway through the battle did they change it. They never changed their tactical or operational ideas of a "mass battle" naval confrontation, even to surrender. They did not change their ideas on pilot training ever and did not change the primary employment method of attack aircraft until midway through the late 1944 Philippines battles with the adoption of Special Attack Units. They did not even attempt a coordinated convoy system change for their vital merchant shipping until mid-1944, well beyond the point of being too late. They never changed the tactical planning of basing naval forces in forward areas, where they were and remained cut off after being bypassed.
There is not really any evidence that the Imperial Japanese War Cabinet under Tojo ever considered changing or adopting any new tactics or production methods. They had the capability to mass produce updated weapons but never incorporated it. They had the capability to adjust tactics, but failed to do so time and again.
Pre-war Japanese pilot training was forged in the battles in China to a fighting edge. This really was the focal point of Japanese expansionism, and if the embargoes of 1940-1941 had never occurred, it is doubtful that even Pearl Harbor would have been attempted. The main "what if" becomes how America would have reacted if China looked so seriously threatened it might actually completely collapse and become entirely occupied by Japan. The historical records show how little of a priority the CBI theater was, even in light of a shooting war with Japan after Pearl Harbor. Japan would have been in a much better operational position had they conquered China first, then turned on America (but that does not mean that theUS would in any way have lost- the capability of American mass production of newer and better armaments meant they would still win the economic, and then the shooting, war.)
There is some evidence FDR was quite concerned with the US economy by Jan of 1945, but his failing health did not allow for any drastic changes beyond adding more and more "war bond drives", stricter rationing controls of vital resources, longer work hours without increased pay (voluntary excess of manpower hours in production lines). to be implemented before the war was finally won. I do agree that the US, if forced to maintain the levels of production required to win the two ocean war and its allies armies in the field, may have been severely strained to do so beyond December 1946.
, and turn it up to 11!