You might want to do some research before trotting out that old idea. I think you will find over extended supply lines and a counter attack by two panzer corps had a lot more to do with it than the word "lingered" implies.
I have to totally agree with that. The traditional view of Stalin letting the Germans having their wicked way with Warsaw was also a quite useful tale for the Cold War.
The reality was that the Soviets managed to go a fair bit further than expected with Operation Bagration (22-Jun to 19-Aug-44) and it's follow on operations. In about 60 days they advanced about 700 km (Mogilev to Warsaw 733 km by road), in the order of 12 km/day. Not only that they had to fight, defeat, pocket and mop up German forces, they had to supply their advance over increasing distances. Though the Soviet Army was quite lean in supply terms, they still had to supply ammunition, fuel and food, in that order. You can also imagine the destruction of roads and railways done by the Germans. By the time they hit the Vistula they run out of steam. Remember that the same happened at about the same time in France and the Soviet Army didn't have the motorised supply that the US and British Armies had. Like the German Army the Soviet Army relied mainly on rail and horse supply. The Germans punched back at the end of Bagration and the Soviets were fortunate not to be driven back from the Vistula.
In France, after the breakout had stalled the rest of the year was spent doing limited, local offensives with the intent of continuing the main offensive into Germany, but
not before 1945. The Soviets usually took a couple of months to prepare a further offensive in a particular area. The Soviets were simply incapable of taking Warsaw when the got near it. After a few weeks to a month they might have made made a better effort but they also had 4th SS Pz Kps to deal with who only retreated at the end of August.
Stalin was not particularly fond of the Poles, having been defeated by them in the Soviet-Polish war in the early 20s. However he was also unable to join up with the Slovak uprising which he was quite favourable to. So a combination of animus to the AK Poles and simple difficulty of assisting meant that he decided not to make a major effort. I have little doubt that if the Soviet Army could have taken Warsaw on the bounce and swept beyond it would have done so, but it simply wasn't able. A typical cynical Stalin approach of making the best of a bad situation by letting his enemies bleed each other.