Dwindham
Member
I've been reading "Lost in Translation Vietnam: A Combat Advisor's Story."
Martin Dockery's work is a startling reminder that the "Vietnam Experience" at least from the American perspective is different era via era.
The rules and parameters and who Martin had to operate with during his time in country [62-63] should be heavily considered when making rules about a SMC US advisor for the Vietnamese in a scenario. In addition, I would hazard to guess a advisor to special forces in with the montagnard's probably had a utterly different experience compared to those who worked with the basic [non-elite] infantry of the ARVN.
Some enlightening things Martin wrote.
Oh his Vietnamese counterpart captain Beng:
I was a unwanted burden for this man. He had to provide me with a jeep, driver, and bodyguard. He had to house and feed me and was responsible for my safety and well-being. Although we didn't share the command of the battalion, Captain Beng was expected to listen to my suggestions and consult with me prior to and during operations. He has twenty-five years of ...combat experience yet he was expected to listen to and occasionally take my advice."
Martin could also do things bring in US support where for the ARVN it would be a political liability. Martin notes: "I could call in air strikes and medevac helicopters through American Channels. I had access to my superiors and through them his superiors."
So
considering these complex factors of being an advisor in Vietnam for the ARVN what kind of rules [eerr maybe guidelines] should a SMC advisor follow: I would think these ideas might give a reasonable feel.
*US advisor must be present on map for:
* OBA
*Air Strikes
*Helicopter stirkes
If advisor is under DM ARVN will not have
*OBA
*Air Strike
*Helicopter Strikes
*US advisor can rally ARVN Squads but not ARVN SMC
*All SMC ARVN with 1st line/ conscript units must take MC per US OBA action and Air Strike.
I don't work with Ray but I thought share these thoughts on a couple message boards and hope it gets to him.
Martin Dockery's work is a startling reminder that the "Vietnam Experience" at least from the American perspective is different era via era.
The rules and parameters and who Martin had to operate with during his time in country [62-63] should be heavily considered when making rules about a SMC US advisor for the Vietnamese in a scenario. In addition, I would hazard to guess a advisor to special forces in with the montagnard's probably had a utterly different experience compared to those who worked with the basic [non-elite] infantry of the ARVN.
Some enlightening things Martin wrote.
Oh his Vietnamese counterpart captain Beng:
I was a unwanted burden for this man. He had to provide me with a jeep, driver, and bodyguard. He had to house and feed me and was responsible for my safety and well-being. Although we didn't share the command of the battalion, Captain Beng was expected to listen to my suggestions and consult with me prior to and during operations. He has twenty-five years of ...combat experience yet he was expected to listen to and occasionally take my advice."
Martin could also do things bring in US support where for the ARVN it would be a political liability. Martin notes: "I could call in air strikes and medevac helicopters through American Channels. I had access to my superiors and through them his superiors."
So
considering these complex factors of being an advisor in Vietnam for the ARVN what kind of rules [eerr maybe guidelines] should a SMC advisor follow: I would think these ideas might give a reasonable feel.
*US advisor must be present on map for:
* OBA
*Air Strikes
*Helicopter stirkes
If advisor is under DM ARVN will not have
*OBA
*Air Strike
*Helicopter Strikes
*US advisor can rally ARVN Squads but not ARVN SMC
*All SMC ARVN with 1st line/ conscript units must take MC per US OBA action and Air Strike.
I don't work with Ray but I thought share these thoughts on a couple message boards and hope it gets to him.
