The ongoing bad mouthing of Montogomery in the American film

[pmririshman]

Perhaps instead of bad mouthing Patton without giving any proof (again), you could instead explain how Patton's drive to capture Messina hindered the capture of the Axis forces. Messina was, in fact, the embarkation point for their escape so it was a legitmate objective, as a simple glance at a map of Sicily would make clear.

Additionally, any honest attempt to blame Patton would also have to explain decisions by British commanders that hindered the prosecution of the campaign. Such decisions include Montgomery's request, approved by Alexander, to change the boundary between Eighth and Seventh Armies that removed the threat posed to the German flank caused by the rapid advance of the American 45th Infantry Division, Tedder's refusal to seriously bomb either the embarkation points or the debarkation points, as well as Cunningham's refusal to use naval forces to interdict traffic between Italy and Sicily. Furthermore, an attempt to blame Patton would also have to explain Montgomery being "...genuinely impressed by Seventh Army's mobility, speed, and on its eastern flank, rugged determination and professionalism." (Hamiliton Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942-1944 p. 374)

I'm looking forward to a post free from sarcasm and insults which also actually cites some evidence, but I'm not holding my breath.

 

[Full Monty]

I'm looking forward to a post free from sarcasm and insults

Take it to the mods if you have a problem.

 

[Siberian HEAT]

Next installment of the article by Carlo D'Este covering Monty's campaigns in Sicily and Italy is posted on Armchair General. I learned some interesting things in this piece, and I think some of you will as well.

I invite you to check it out!

Monty: World War II's Most Misunderstood General, Part 2

 

[Full Monty]

Now I can tie up some loose ends.

Regarding Patton and Messina, had he swung right instead of charging into Messina there's a good chance he would have cut off at least part of the retreating German army. I would concede that he wasn't entirely to blame for the German 'escape', the Americans were not expected to perform as well as they did based on experiences in North Africa. 'Combined Arms' operations were still in their infancy as was inter-Allied military co-operation.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm

has an interesting summary of the campaign. It's an American site and so has that 'slant' to its account (as do all national military sites) but factor that in and it's a good read.

Tedder's refusal to seriously bomb either the embarkation points or the debarkation points, as well as Cunningham's refusal to use naval forces to interdict traffic between Italy and Sicily

This can largely be explained by the serious amount of Flak the Axis were able to put up. Pilots described it as 'heavier than the Ruhr' (John Terraine - 'The Right of the Line' - pp.579-80). Cunningham would certainly have baulked at putting large naval vessels into the narrow straits without adequate air cover.

Furthermore, an attempt to blame Patton would also have to explain Montgomery being "...genuinely impressed by Seventh Army's mobility, speed, and on its eastern flank, rugged determination and professionalism." (Hamiliton Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942-1944 p. 374)

Not really, because we're not discussing the quality of the US 7th Army, rather the command decisions of General Patton.

Now this part of the debate may continue but I'd rather it went and stayed at the 'Patton' thread in the 'Personalities' section. Don't want it to get caught up with the Monty slagging/praising

 

[Full Monty]

Now this may be more contentious.

Quote:

Ellis notes, "Once Montgomery actually reached the Elbe, on 20 April, he dawdled for so long in his preparations for a crossing that Eisenhower actually wrote to Brooke expressing his fears that the Russians might well get to Lubeck and the neck of the Danish peninsula first, and appealing to him to urge Montgomery forward."

Given Eisenhower's orders to other units to halt at the Elbe or not press forward into Czechoslovakia I'm surprised that he would actually write such a letter. If true, it smacks of hypocrisy (or political posturing - something Ike wasn't averse to )

Now my feeling at the time was that Eisenhower was not being particularly fair to Monty but I wasn't able to source any documents to back this up. However, now I can

I'm working from the diaries of Viscount Alanbrooke (CIGS) and so have constructed a timeline based on that.

28/3/45 - Montgomery signals CIGS that he has ordered 2nd British and 9th US Armies to head for the Elbe with all speed with every intention of heading for Berlin.

29/3/45 - Eisenhower telegraphs Stalin to tell him that the Western Allied forces would not be making for Berlin but would concentrate on the supposed 'National Redoubt' in Southern Germany and Austria.

1/4/45 - 9th US Army is removed from 21st AG command and is ordered to head for Leipzig, seriously disrupting Montgomerys plans since 1st Canadian Army is engaged in liberating the Netherlands leaving just 2nd British Army to press on to the Elbe. Eisenhower informs Chuchill that Montgomery can push on to the Lower Elbe. After that he would be reinforced to push on to Kiel and the other North German ports (emphasis mine)

So it would appear that if Montgomery 'dawdled' on the Elbe, it was because that was what Eisenhower wanted him to do!

Now, I can find no reference to any such letter from Eisenhower to Brooke in the diaries which leads me to the following possible conclusions.

1) Ellis, whether consciously or not, has taken the letter out of context and has seen it as a rebuke to Montgomery for his army's idleness rather than Ike informing Brooke that Ridgeways corps was being attached to 21st AG as the promised reinforcement.

2) Eisenhower realised that by diverting so much of his force southwards there was a real possibility that the Soviets would reach Kiel and even Denmark before his forces could. He therefore sent the letter in order that should that happen, the blame would fall on Montgomery rather than him.

3) Said letter was never actually sent but a draft copy made its way into the Eisenhower Papers.

Now there are examples of Montgomery being 'ponderous' and/or 'over-cautious' but from my reading, this isn't one of them.

 

[R.N. Armstrong]

That's interesting, and I like your reasoning. I'll look at Ellis's references to see if his sources are primary or secondary.

 

[pmririshman]

Montgomery had plenty of time to organize his plans to cross the Elbe. Eisenhower's orders to Montgomery were clear. In his letter sent to Montgomery on March 31, Eisenhower wrote that Montgomery had to push across the Elbe (see my post #221). This was weeks before Montgomery even reached the Elbe. Additionally, Eisenhower detached Ninth Army from control of 21st Army Group on March 28. (MacDonald The Last Offensive p. 341) Montgomery was trying to use forces that weren't his to use. As for lacking forces because the Canadians were containing enemy forces in the Netherlands, it should be noted 12th Army Group also was lacking forces since they had to reduce the Ruhr Pocket at the same time they started their drive across Germany.

As for Eisenhower's supposedly missing letter I would ask two questions, 1 minor and the other major. The minor one first. 1. What version of Brooke's diaries are you using? There are two: Bryant's two volume set and Alex Dancheev's published in 2002. Historians have problems with Bryant's version of the diary as he heavily edited them. (See Weinberg's comments on p. 928 in World At Arms: A Global History of World War II). 2. Do you think Brooke mentioned in his diaries every piece of correspondence he received? This isn't proof he didn't get the letter from Eisenhower.

Far from trying to cook the record as you imply, Eisenhower, in fact, did all he could to ease the job of historians working on the war. Forrest Pogue, author of the U.S. Army volume The Supreme Command, was often told by Eisenhower: "I would have hoped that I was smarter than to say such and such but if that is the way Dr. Pogue found it, let it stand." (quoted in D'este Decision in Normandy p. 494) Also, Pogue only allowed Eisenhower to preview the book to correct errors, but not for censorship. (ibid, p. 492) This is in sharp contrast to the treatment Pogue received from Montgomery, who refused even to be interviewed. (Murray Eisenhower versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate p. 102) Montgomery also wanted to preview the book, but when Pogue put the same stipulations on Montgomery as he did Eisenhower, Montgomery dropped his request. (D'este Decision in Normandy)

As for Patton and Sicily, his personal motivation to beat the British to Messina did not detract from its importance as a military objective. This is clear from the meeting between Patton, Montgomery, and Alexander that took place on 25 July. During that meeting they agreed to a plan for Eighth and Seventh Armies to drive on Messina. There was no mention of Patton turning right which would have meant driving into the flank of Eighth Army, not into the rear of the retreating Axis forces. (Blumenson Patton's Papers vol. 2. p. 301-302 and also discussed in D'este Bitter Victory p. 443-447) As for attacking into the flank of the Germans earlier, this was prevented by the boundary change. Far from encouraging aggresive moves by Seventh Army, Montgomery and Alexander wanted them to go into defensive positions to guard Eighth Army's flank.

 

[Full Monty]

Montgomery had plenty of time to organize his plans to cross the Elbe. Eisenhower's orders to Montgomery were clear. In his letter sent to Montgomery on March 31, Eisenhower wrote that Montgomery had to push across the Elbe (see my post #221). This was weeks before Montgomery even reached the Elbe. Additionally, Eisenhower detached Ninth Army from control of 21st Army Group on March 28. (MacDonald The Last Offensive p. 341) Montgomery was trying to use forces that weren't his to use. As for lacking forces because the Canadians were containing enemy forces in the Netherlands, it should be noted 12th Army Group also was lacking forces since they had to reduce the Ruhr Pocket at the same time they started their drive across Germany.

Well that's interesting. We have diffent sources which state different things. But the fact that American forces were detached to reduce the Ruhr Pocket is irrelevant since we're discussing Montgomery on, or approacing, the Lower Elbe. As regards stating 'Montgomery was trying to use forces that weren't his to use', that's preposterous. He made his plans to advance across Northern Germany whilst 9th Army was still part of 21st AG!

Do you think Brooke mentioned in his diaries every piece of correspondence he received? This isn't proof he didn't get the letter from Eisenhower.

Well, if Brooke did get the letter then failing to mention it suggests that he didn't regard it as being particularly important. This would support my conclusion (1) since if it was the stinging rebuke that Ellis suggests it was then he surely would have mentioned it.

Far from trying to cook the record as you imply, Eisenhower, in fact, did all he could to ease the job of historians working on the war. Forrest Pogue, author of the U.S. Army volume The Supreme Command, was often told by Eisenhower: "I would have hoped that I was smarter than to say such and such but if that is the way Dr. Pogue found it, let it stand." (quoted in D'este Decision in Normandy p. 494) Also, Pogue only allowed Eisenhower to preview the book to correct errors, but not for censorship. (ibid, p. 492).

How did I imply that Eisenhower tried to cook the books?! That's an absurd suggestion.

This is in sharp contrast to the treatment Pogue received from Montgomery, who refused even to be interviewed. (Murray Eisenhower versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate p. 102) Montgomery also wanted to preview the book, but when Pogue put the same stipulations on Montgomery as he did Eisenhower, Montgomery dropped his request. (D'este Decision in Normandy)

Why would Monty even wish to deal with Pogue?

As for Patton and Sicily

=> Patton thread if you wish to discuss this with me as I have already mentioned.

 

[R.N. Armstrong]

Ellis is using secondary (Bradley, von Mellentin, Gavin) and R. Lamb's Montgomery in Europe.

Ellis speaks to the Ninth Army, "On 27 April [remember Monty reached Elbe on 20 Apr], after being rebuked by Eisenhower for his tardiness, Montgomery actually had the gall to say that delays in crossing the river were due to his not having Ninth Army under command." On 27 April Eisenhower "prevailed upon the Field Marshal to accept General Matthew Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps, a formation which included an American armoured and infnatry division. ON the 30th, having been rushed forward from the Ruhr, the Corps crossed the Elbe and quickly showed how unnecessary had been Montgomery's elaborate preparations. Ridgway sped forward to Wismar, blocking the Russians, and en route accepted the surrender of 360,000 German troops. General Gavin wrote that Bradley later 'said there was much laughter in his 12 Army Group HQ when they heard of...[this]accomplishment...Montgomery had been complaining that the opposition was too great for him to cross the Elbe River. When the 82nd [Airborne Division] crossed it, it advanced thirty-six miles the first day and captured 100,000 prisoners."

 

[Full Monty]

Darn secondary sources

My Viking Atlas of WW2 has elements of 2nd Army over the Elbe north of Luneburg and east of Hamburg on the 19th. Unfortunately it gives no details of what units they were and I have nothing that backs that up. Delaforce reports 7th Armoured Division encountering heavy German resistance (including a fierce counter-attack by SS troops on 26th April) on the approaches to Hamburg. Whether British troops exaggerated the depth of resistance they were encountering and/or Montgomery believed he was facing far greater forces than he was I have no idea. Hastings says little other than Montgomery's orders being changed and him reaching Lubeck in the nick of time. I think we can agree that the main body of 2nd Army didn't cross the Elbe until US forces joined them, quite why seems to be open to dispute.

 

[R.N. Armstrong]

Darn secondary sources

My Viking Atlas of WW2 has elements of 2nd Army over the Elbe north of Luneburg and east of Hamburg on the 19th. Unfortunately it gives no details of what units they were and I have nothing that backs that up. Delaforce reports 7th Armoured Division encountering heavy German resistance (including a fierce counter-attack by SS troops on 26th April) on the approaches to Hamburg. Whether British troops exaggerated the depth of resistance they were encountering and/or Montgomery believed he was facing far greater forces than he was I have no idea. Hastings says little other than Montgomery's orders being changed and him reaching Lubeck in the nick of time. I think we can agree that the main body of 2nd Army didn't cross the Elbe until US forces joined them, quite why seems to be open to dispute.

Yes, and tertiary.

Upon reflection, the nature of the issues and actions could only be captured in memoirs, because if they had been put into official documentation, someone would have had to act, i.e., Eisenhower could complain to Brooke, but if he had put it in a direct order and Montgomery did not comply or accomplish as specified Eisenhower would have had to relieve, or British senior leadership would have to shift Montgomery.

 

[Siberian HEAT]

Part III of Armchair General's feature on Monty has been posted.

"Carlo D'Este continues his series of articles on Montgomery. This piece examines the race across France and the Battle of the Bulge."

Read here.

 

[Full Monty]

Strangely I was about to ask when the third part of that article was going to come out. Having read it I have to say that I didn't think that the final part is as good as the first two although it contained some information that I was previously unaware of. Still a good read though - Mr D'Este should be praised.

I wonder how many old disputes here that final part will re-invigorate?

 

[The Purist]

I wonder how many old disputes here that final part will re-invigorate?

ShhhhhhHHHHHHH!!! Let sleeping dogs lie.

...you're right, part III did seem a bit flat, but it did fill in some good bits about the reasons for reassigning 1st and 9th Armies to Monty.

 

[C.M. Ansley]

Mr D'Este should be praised.

Ditto.

On a side note: Mr D'Este cites our very own JD Morelock under further reading.

On another side note: I'm impressed you guys kept this thread going the whole time I was gone.

 

[Full Monty]

On another side note: I'm impressed you guys kept this thread going the whole time I was gone.

We're just a bunch of windbags really :laugh:

 

[C.M. Ansley]

I would just like to brag that I picked a free copy of D'Este's Eisenhower at the bookstore yesterday.

 

[Full Monty]

I would just like to brag that I picked a free copy of D'Este's Eisenhower at the bookstore yesterday.

Bootlicker :laugh:

 

[owen36]

:cheeky: :laugh: Lol you are my favorite guys Temujin, 17Poundr, the purist and FullMonty!!!


You don't give up!!!.

Haven't been around for 6 months or so and it's still alive and kicking..

:laugh:

 

[freightshaker]

The thread that wouldn't die!! AAAAAAAAAAAA!!!!!!!!!!