T-34 the best tank of the war?

[MAS01]

Unfotunately for you the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the war had already been signed. So the final whistle had gone and the battle dosen't count as a win...

Hmmm. I wonder what General Pakenham and Admiral Cochrane would say . . . . . . . .

 

[Vinnie]

Hmmm. I wonder what General Pakenham and Admiral Cochrane would say . . . . . . . .

Dig us up! Its kinda dark in here?

 

[Rock SgtDan]

...
McNair was seriously at fault in suppressing better vehicles and guns and the USAAF did the USA a service in short bombing him. The M4 could have been improved earlier or supplemented by something like the T-25 or M-26 which would have saved many US lives. A partial result of the fetish with exploitation and mobility meant that protection was inadequate and also the emphasis on the 75mm for far too long.
...The failure to adopt the British 17lbr was another high level piece of "not invented here" stupidity.

What stats might such a vehicle have? Were any of the T-20 series leading up to the Pershing good enough to actually risk putting into production? What's the earliest date that US doctrine might have been altered due to combat evidence? If a different doctrinal decision was made in early 1943, what was ready to go?

When might the latest date be? Would need to have the design finalized in time for re-tooling production lines and producing/stockpiling enough for use by D-Day. Tidworth Downs in early 1944 went with the Sherman. Would the Pershing fit into existing transport ships without displacing too much other capacity?

Is there anything about the Pershing that would have made it slower to produce than the Sherman? How much steel does it require, in terms of multiples of Shermans? Would that create a shortage? More gasoline per mile needed to operate?

Were 17pdr guns produced in the US or were they fitted in Britain?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M26_Pershing#Development
" The T20 tank reached a mock-up stage in May 1942, and was intended as an improved medium tank to follow the M4.[9]" --quoting Hunnicutt 1996

"The T25 and T26 lines of tanks came into being in the midst of a heated internal debate within the U.S. Army in the mid-1943 to early 1944 over the need for tanks with greater firepower and armor."

This paper summarizes about the issues: The Inferiority of American Tanks in World War II - George C ...
http://marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2016/04/fox_opt.pdf
He points out that no Tank Destroyer force has existed since 1946 -- a failed doctrine which Gen Devers predicted.
Also about Gen Barnes championing development of a T20 series. Both around Jan 1943.

He notes a 6 June 1945 report showing 60-90% of Shermans destroyed by burning. Which brings up the question of how much combat the wet-stowage vehicles actually saw. How many rounds fired at them vs dry stowage tanks?
Normandy attrition rates were double the expected (Italian campaign) rate. Of course, the strategic blunder of not noticing the Bocage is a whole nuther issue... Was deGaulle a complete idiot - did he fail to point it out?

Fischer Body told Barnes they were capable of T20 pilot production in Sept 1942 - but the M10 TD had priority. Not allowed to use a mere 55 tons of steel for a pair... not fixed until October.

And in Feb 1943 a Lt Col in charge of Tank Destroyers killed Barnes attempt to mount a 90mm turret the M10 Wolverine using all-stock, tested parts, saying the 3" was adequate... so the potential to show the usefulness of the 90mm on a T20 series was lost.

In Mar 1944 Barnes gave up; drafted a letter absolving Ordnance of responsibility for not having adequte tanks by late 1944. It took personal action by Marshall, in April, to finally get the authorization ball started by AGF, who suddenly ordered 6000 - but nevertheless specified 75 & 75mm guns !!!

More in the paper from the History Log T20 Series.

 

[witchbottles]

What stats might such a vehicle have? Were any of the T-20 series leading up to the Pershing good enough to actually risk putting into production? What's the earliest date that US doctrine might have been altered due to combat evidence? If a different doctrinal decision was made in early 1943, what was ready to go?

When might the latest date be? Would need to have the design finalized in time for re-tooling production lines and producing/stockpiling enough for use by D-Day. Tidworth Downs in early 1944 went with the Sherman. Would the Pershing fit into existing transport ships without displacing too much other capacity?

Is there anything about the Pershing that would have made it slower to produce than the Sherman? How much steel does it require, in terms of multiples of Shermans? Would that create a shortage? More gasoline per mile needed to operate?

Were 17pdr guns produced in the US or were they fitted in Britain?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M26_Pershing#Development
" The T20 tank reached a mock-up stage in May 1942, and was intended as an improved medium tank to follow the M4.[9]" --quoting Hunnicutt 1996

"The T25 and T26 lines of tanks came into being in the midst of a heated internal debate within the U.S. Army in the mid-1943 to early 1944 over the need for tanks with greater firepower and armor."

This paper summarizes about the issues: The Inferiority of American Tanks in World War II - George C ...
http://marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2016/04/fox_opt.pdf
He points out that no Tank Destroyer force has existed since 1946 -- a failed doctrine which Gen Devers predicted.
Also about Gen Barnes championing development of a T20 series. Both around Jan 1943.

He notes a 6 June 1945 report showing 60-90% of Shermans destroyed by burning. Which brings up the question of how much combat the wet-stowage vehicles actually saw. How many rounds fired at them vs dry stowage tanks?
Normandy attrition rates were double the expected (Italian campaign) rate. Of course, the strategic blunder of not noticing the Bocage is a whole nuther issue... Was deGaulle a complete idiot - did he fail to point it out?

Fischer Body told Barnes they were capable of T20 pilot production in Sept 1942 - but the M10 TD had priority. Not allowed to use a mere 55 tons of steel for a pair... not fixed until October.

And in Feb 1943 a Lt Col in charge of Tank Destroyers killed Barnes attempt to mount a 90mm turret the M10 Wolverine using all-stock, tested parts, saying the 3" was adequate... so the potential to show the usefulness of the 90mm on a T20 series was lost.

In Mar 1944 Barnes gave up; drafted a letter absolving Ordnance of responsibility for not having adequte tanks by late 1944. It took personal action by Marshall, in April, to finally get the authorization ball started by AGF, who suddenly ordered 6000 - but nevertheless specified 75 & 75mm guns !!!

More in the paper from the History Log T20 Series.

You do realize that quoting the Marshall foundation as a "resource" (much less wikipedia- anything) is comparable to quoting the Thomas Jefferson Foundation about whether or not Jefferson ever raped the 14 year old black slave chambermaid of his dying wife. (Sally Hemmings).

Yes, the facts may or may not be true - but your sources are horrible for making any case for your argument (which is in itself rather vague - are you making a case that McNair had nothing to do with stalling the development of tanks at a lightly armored and short 75 mm gunned tank? Or that the Pershing only came about because of direct interference by Marshall?. The student paper you submitted in the link is just that - perhaps you could have made a stronger case if you looked into the sources cited in his bibliography. The website offers a dearth of actual source materials. Try looking at the materials in pages 46 and 47 of the student paper you referenced- they likely offer a better support for whatever argument you are proposing here.

KRL, Jon H

 

[Rock SgtDan]

I'm not arguing either side. Just want to know what ASL stats a "less than Pershing" tank might have? The student paper is an intro to the sources which sparks an interest in reading them, since interesting questions are raised. The student seems to have read the primary source - History Log T20 Series from NARA. I don't see it online anywhere.

Did McNair leave any justifications for his decisions? Would a more survivable tank have cost more money? Used more steel? More gasoline? Been slower on the march? Tempted commanders & crews to deviate from doctrine by attacking enemy tanks? Did he have "big picture" reasons?

 

[witchbottles]

I'm not arguing either side. Just want to know what ASL stats a "less than Pershing" tank might have? The student paper is an intro to the sources which sparks an interest in reading them, since interesting questions are raised. The student seems to have read the primary source - History Log T20 Series from NARA. I don't see it online anywhere.

Did McNair leave any justifications for his decisions? Would a more survivable tank have cost more money? Used more steel? More gasoline? Been slower on the march? Tempted commanders & crews to deviate from doctrine by attacking enemy tanks? Did he have "big picture" reasons?

I'd think the "less than a pershing, upgunned tank" in ASL is already modeled well in the Sherman Jumbo, the Easy Eight, and the Firefly - all of which can be found in official countersets for the game. Add in the ToT / KE work on improvised armor to cover what those troops did frequently in the field, and you have the ASL versions front to back.

As for the real - life version - the issue arises from US tank development in total the M2 >M3 Grant / Lee > M4 Sherman process left little room for adjustments in things like production line upgrades. Upgrades came either in the field - improvised armor and the easy eight - or via logistical staging point, Firefly. Supply of 17 lbr guns in Britain was quite adequate by 1944 - enough to not only cover their own cromwell and comet production and ATG and TD requirements, but also to outfit so many shermans as Fireflys anyway.

By 1944 resources were not an issue to winning the war quickly - command decisions made in 1938-1942 were. The "holy trinity" of war winning =POL > Naval lines of shipping under firm control by seaborne forces,to transport it and the products it creates> combined arms supported by airpower to control both the POL production sites and to protect the naval forces controlling the shipping lanes--- was understood by the Allied powers by 1944. (albeit they did learn those lessons the hard way.)

If you know the title and author and estimated date of publication of a NARA document - you can relatively easily obtain a copy - several channels are open to do so. (and yes, digital librarians across America are working hard to get more content online every day for research use.) I'd recommend a visit to your local library with the info to begin with - see if a copy is "in system" that you can have transferred to your branch for your perusal, first.

KRL, Jon H

 

[Rock SgtDan]

Don't have the long OOP ToT/KE material... why the authors don't want it made available is a mystery.

Given the granularity of ASL stats, I suppose one might argue that any combination of stat numbers between the M3 and the Pershing stats are historically possible.

Details like what it would take to alter the production line are what I'd like to find out about. For example, I don't know what % of Shermans had the cast body; had to to with individual foundrys being capable of the job. I do recall that the USA was pretty unique in being able to manufacture a 69" turret ring. I suppose casting/cutting steel plates to a different size would not be a problem.

For a strategic what-if -- what % of the tanks could have been Pershings on D-Day? That requires not only production but crew familiarization. After D-Day maybe fewer produced per week, but surely offset by fewer non-repairable losses. I don't know what % of Sherman crew survived; but surely many more would have survived, in repairable Pershings vs burnt out Shermans. So would have had much more experienced crews by the Seigfried Line campaign.

Would the Pershing have made a strategic difference in the first 30-60 days, in the Bocage etc? Breaking into the Cotentin Peninsula?

Like to know if McNair was bull-headed on doctrine or had "big picture" concerns about raw material supply & manpower utilization. Even wrt supporting the Tank Destroyer doctrine - why resist putting a better gun on a TD?

 

[Rock SgtDan]

pay to play... but would have to read between the lines wrt the politics:
http://www.digitalhistoryarchive.com/wwii-allied-documents.html
Design, Development & Production of US Tanks in WWII
DVD with four documents from the US Army Office of the Chief of Ordnance that document the history and development of US light, medium, and heavy tanks: "The Design, Development & Production of US Tanks in World War II", 57 pages; "The Design, Development & Production of US Light Tanks" that describes the M2, M3, M5, M24, and M22 series tanks, 17 pages; "Development of the US Medium M3 & M4 Tanks", 8 pages; and "Heavy Tanks and Assault Tanks" that describes heavy tanks M6, M6A1 (T1E2, T1E3), M6A2E1, M26 (T26E1, T26E3), M26E, T1, T1E1, T1E4, T26, T1E1, T1E4, T26, T26E2, T26E4, T26E5, T28, T29, T30, T32, and Assault Tank T14, 143 pages. The documents include 54 photographs. $20

US Army Future Tank Designs 1943-46
DVD containing four documents from the US Army Office of the Chief of Ordnance that describe future tank designs: a 13-page document "Medium Tank T20 Series" dated 1943 that describes a replacement tank for the M4; a 22-page document "New Tanks for 1944" that briefly describes the T20, T23, T20E3, T22, T25, T26 medium tanks; a 24-page document "New Tanks and Gun Motor Carriages" dated 1946 that briefly describes the M24, M26, T26E4, T29, T30, T32, T34, T95 tanks and the M41, T84, T92, T93 self-propelled howitzers; and a file that describes the development and testing of the Bigley Gun Motor Carriage (Bigley Tank), which was an experimental, high-speed armored vehicle with a Christie suspension. The documents contain 36 full-page photographs and illustrations. $15

 

[bendizoid]

Yes, the T-34 is one of the best AFVs for its production cost especially the '85. I kinda like the Hetzer, however.

 

[witchbottles]

"best" is a shaky term. What is it a reviewer is rating under "best"? Kind of like the best US division of WW2 thread - certain qualifications are made by every reviewer, and these rarely are identical across more than 1 reviewer anyway. The O.P. was citing nothing more than one person's review of the T-34 itself - which seemed focused mainly on the ruggedness, manufactured quality and reliability of the design.

Although the blogger does address T-34 production numbers, he simply misses the valid point in that respect, concentration of overwhelming numbers of AFVs in a single location is the key to combined arms warfare success. Instead he focuses on a cost of unit vs unit for a single tank and its components and the associated crew training.

For battlefield purposes in its lifespan as to "best" or not, the T-34 should be graded on:

1. Ease of manufacture - how fast could a unit be produced. The more, the merrier.
2. Requirements for available resource materials. If you can make it with off the shelf parts or raw minerals available at the location of production - so much the better.
3. Battlefield employment - were commanders able to successfully deploy the AFV for its expected purpose.
4. Enemy reaction- what steps (if any) did the enemy choose to react to the battlefield appearance of a large number of that AFV type.
5. Ease of training crews - AFV crews are not worth too much in battle if untrained.
6. Ease of battlefield repair for damaged vehicles - returning a mission kill AFV to operational is far less difficult than manufacturing a new one and shipping it to the front.

 

[robh91]

I also think the "best tank" has to be assessed in the overall setting it was used. Point in case the Sherman. In Western Europe there was a total Allied domination of the air with the ability to interdict enemy armour. The Allies (obviously) also outnumbered the Germans. The Germans were short of fuel and transport infrastructure - which decreased mobility. In all honesty a tank of average speed, with good reliability, available in huge numbers, with good HE capabilities was all that was needed to "win the war" by this stage. The inferiority of armour and AP penetration was not really that significant. Conversely, although the Sherman may have been a "great tank" for the setting the Allies were in, it would not have been great for the outnumbered, defensive situation faced by the Germans in Western Europe. In this situation arguably the the StuG III was a very good fit. Low silhouette, decent armour, sufficient penetration, reliable, fits on regular railway flatcars, not too heavy (for bridges) and relatively cheap to make.

 

[Helmseye]

I think that as has been suggested depending on criteria "best tank" can be extremely varied

But arguments for the T34 and especially the T34/85 are very strong
However the important feature of this tank is also remembering that it's expected life was 6 weeks

So if you use the criteria of only needing something for such a short shelf life maybe other tanks would be "the best"

But wide tracks spaced far apart with sloping armour and a large gun sounds like a winner to me

 

[kcole4001]

Maybe not the 'best' tank.
In my opinion the Panther was the best tank (best combination of speed, mobility, protection, and firepower), but the T-34 certainly had a ton of potential to be the best.
If it was employed better.
If it had a better turret.
If they all had radios.
It still scared the pants off the Germans.

Shermans were the best at being field serviceable very quickly.
That's an important consideration, even more so if you can't out produce the enemy.
Designing a tank that's overly complex and labor intensive to service when you can't produce enough to start with is a very bad idea (Panther again).
The US should have built the Panther and the Germans should have built the Sherman, but I certainly wouldn't wish for that.

There are a lot of 'ifs' in history.
If Hitler hadn't believed that every idea that popped into his head was gold the Germans would have done better.

 

[Bryan Holtby]

Too many technical, logistic and manufacturing factors to come up with a 'best' tank answer. I like to dumb it right down to something simple.....Which tank would I rather be in and which tank would I hate to face. The answer to that is simple, a Panther.

Panther production in 44 was decent despite the bombing campaign. The Tiger was the huge resource sink at a rate of 2 per day whereas the Panther was coming off the line somewhere around 10 per day.

You are correct there are a lot of 'what ifs' in history, but 'what if' the Germans focused on the Panther and built an extra 7-8,000 tanks instead of the 12-1300 Tigers in 43/44, or even doubled production of the capable Mk4 from 10k ish to 20k ish in 43/44.

 

[witchbottles]

Too many technical, logistic and manufacturing factors to come up with a 'best' tank answer. I like to dumb it right down to something simple.....Which tank would I rather be in and which tank would I hate to face. The answer to that is simple, a Panther.

Panther production in 44 was decent despite the bombing campaign. The Tiger was the huge resource sink at a rate of 2 per day whereas the Panther was coming off the line somewhere around 10 per day.

You are correct there are a lot of 'what ifs' in history, but 'what if' the Germans focused on the Panther and built an extra 7-8,000 tanks instead of the 12-1300 Tigers in 43/44, or even doubled production of the capable Mk4 from 10k ish to 20k ish in 43/44.

Or - what if Nazi Germany had converted to full wartime production of the Pz IIIs and IVs in 1942, while they still held the technological capability and resource potential, along with industrial capacity being unused - to take advantage of their excellent field position?

 

[jrv]

Panther production in 44 was decent despite the bombing campaign. The Tiger was the huge resource sink at a rate of 2 per day whereas the Panther was coming off the line somewhere around 10 per day.

You are correct there are a lot of 'what ifs' in history, but 'what if' the Germans focused on the Panther and built an extra 7-8,000 tanks instead of the 12-1300 Tigers in 43/44, or even doubled production of the capable Mk4 from 10k ish to 20k ish in 43/44.

Are you assuming that because they produced them in a ratio of 5:1 that the production tradeoff was 5:1? A quick search suggests that the cost to produce a Tiger was about twice the cost to produce a Panther. If true, your trade of 1200-1300 Tigers gets you 2400-2600 Panthers, not 7-8000. Perhaps that's still a good trade, but it's not as obviously good as what you suggested.

JR

 

[Delirium]

From 1944, at least, I think Germany should have been making Jgpz IVs, Stugs and Hetzers, or even just one of the above. Tank destroyers, / spgs, not tanks.

 

[witchbottles]

From 1944, at least, I think Germany should have been making Jgpz IVs, Stugs and Hetzers, or even just one of the above. Tank destroyers, / spgs, not tanks.

just the sheer capability of their armaments industry- turned to wartime full production of StuG III /L42 models. Imagine hoe effective Case Blue would have been if they had begun such an effort in December of 1941. Add another 2000+ Assault guns with AT capability and maneuver speeds equal to the task for blitz operations to the drive in the Caucasus, another 500 or so added to stiffen the defenses north , in and south of S-grad,
I think Case Blue would still have failed in 1942- but the Wehrmacht would have had the tools to prevent the frontal collapse which historically occurred.

The StuG III paired with infantry was effective both on the attack and defense, and for far longer than any other combination. There was good reason that panzer and armored divisions had 2 regiments of infantry and only 1 of AFVs. Make those AFVs mass- produced, simple to manufacture, and with an effective gun against 99% + of enemy forces it may face, and there is no reason it would not stand up to battlefield conditions.

Russian tankers learned to fer the StuG - its low silhouette meant it could kill and run , relocated to kill again.

 

[Steven Pleva]

just the sheer capability of their armaments industry- turned to wartime full production of StuG III /L42 models. Imagine hoe effective Case Blue would have been if they had begun such an effort in December of 1941. Add another 2000+ Assault guns with AT capability and maneuver speeds equal to the task for blitz operations to the drive in the Caucasus, another 500 or so added to stiffen the defenses north , in and south of S-grad,
I think Case Blue would still have failed in 1942- but the Wehrmacht would have had the tools to prevent the frontal collapse which historically occurred.

The StuG III paired with infantry was effective both on the attack and defense, and for far longer than any other combination. There was good reason that panzer and armored divisions had 2 regiments of infantry and only 1 of AFVs. Make those AFVs mass- produced, simple to manufacture, and with an effective gun against 99% + of enemy forces it may face, and there is no reason it would not stand up to battlefield conditions.

Russian tankers learned to fer the StuG - its low silhouette meant it could kill and run , relocated to kill again.

I think you are overstating the StuG's capability on the attack. It loses its concealment advantage on the attack. Also, lack of MGs hurts its ability to suppress enemy infantry if they outstrip their infantry support...

 

[Rubrik]

Too many technical, logistic and manufacturing factors to come up with a 'best' tank answer. I like to dumb it right down to something simple.....Which tank would I rather be in and which tank would I hate to face. The answer to that is simple, a Panther.

Panther production in 44 was decent despite the bombing campaign. The Tiger was the huge resource sink at a rate of 2 per day whereas the Panther was coming off the line somewhere around 10 per day.

You are correct there are a lot of 'what ifs' in history, but 'what if' the Germans focused on the Panther and built an extra 7-8,000 tanks instead of the 12-1300 Tigers in 43/44, or even doubled production of the capable Mk4 from 10k ish to 20k ish in 43/44.

More specifically - the 'G' version (eventually with night sight)
Perhaps Kursk would have turned out a little different?

But I agree with Panther G.

Cost and reliability must go to the T34/85

The later Sherman's were reliable with a fair punch but too high, tracks too narrow.

And us poor Brits? It's kind of cheating to include the firefly...

Got to post something weird about J1