T-34 the best tank of the war?

[wrongway149]

. And were just talking trucks. What about the food aid? How important was that?

At what point do the Russsian people start to turn on Uncle Joe? I realize his control was more complete than even the Nazis, but wouldn't a coup or civil war be an increasing possibility? (Whereas, maybe in Germany, with fewer really disastrous defeats > the chances of coup get reduced a bit > Hitler is a little less paranoid> and thus makes better strategic and operational decisions later in the war.)

Lots of variables in these 'what-if' equations...

 

[witchbottles]

The Wikipedia numbers seemed to align with figures that I've seen in general histories so I didn't question them. If they're off significantly, I certainly welcome correction. The sites that seem more trustworthy to you express the figures in "long tons" instead of numbers of vehicles, aircraft, etc. so it's hard to compare. My initial impression is that they aren't that out of whack with the Wikipedia numbers but you have to make assumptions about how much an average vehicle weighs and so forth to get to an apples-to-apples comparison.

the base ( root) problem with research of historical data is the complacency that occurs when multiple "reference" sources use the same data and simply repeat it over and over. In this case, the repetition is coming from Gaust's seminal work on the subject, being regurgitated over and over. wikipedia lacks a verification of data - point of reference. In doing so they frequently ( as they did here) , either mis- cite , mis- quote, or simply omit important data and its references.

Its a great starting point for referencing historical information. Its best use is the last block ( bibliography) on each page.

There are significant and noticeable differences in the overall numbers between Zaloga and Gaust. ( but doubtful that they are significant enough to illustrate or refute the arguments being expressed here about the overall value of Lend- Lease.)


KRL, Jon H

 

[AdrianE]

At what point do the Russsian people start to turn on Uncle Joe? I realize his control was more complete than even the Nazis, but wouldn't a coup or civil war be an increasing possibility? .

Given the genocidal intent of the Nazis which became known to all in fall 1941, they don't. Russia's War by Overy makes it clear that every citizen of the Soviet Union knew the Nazis were coming to exterminate them. A coup was pretty much impossible given the political control of the military by the party. Collosus Reborn by Glantz has a section on it.

 

[AdrianE]

I'm not as sure that the war in Russia was decided by July 1, 1943.?

It was decided long before that. When the Red Army was still fighting in October 1941 it was decided. The only questions were how long and how much blood.

Halder told Hitler in November 1941 that he should conclude the war diplomatically because the Germans could no longer do it militarily.

 

[dlazov]

This is a great quote:

After a brief respite prompted by November rains and mud, Operation Typhoon
culminated in mid-November when the German High Command attempted to envelop
Soviet forces defending Moscow with dramatic armoured thrusts from the north and
south. However, in early December 1941, the cumulative effects of time and fate
combined to deny the German Army a triumphant end to its six months of near constant
victories. Weakened by months of heavy combat in a theatre of war they never really
understood, the vaunted Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe finally succumbed to the multiple foes
of harsh weather, alien terrain and a fiercely resistant enemy. Amassing its reserve armies,
in early December the Stavka halted the German drive within sight of the Moscow
Kremlin's spires and unleashed a counteroffensive of its own that inflicted unprecedented
defeat on Hitler's Wehrmacht.

Lacking Soviet sources and
perspectives, these historians have agonized over the paradox that the Wehrmacht's string of
brilliant offensive successes ended in abject defeat in December 1941.

and

In addition to shaking the concept of Blitzkrieg to its very foundations, the first 10
days of the Red Army's Moscow counteroffensive punctured forever the myth of
German military invincibility for both German and Russian alike. Moreover, it
thwarted Operation Barbarossa and placed the strategic initiative firmly in Soviet
hands.

But this maybe the the best one:

The effects of the Red Army's defeats in 1941 were appalling. In six months ofwar,
the Wehrmacht advanced up to 1,200km (720 miles) along a 1,000km (600-mile)
front. 9 The precipitous advance deprived the Soviet Union of up to 40 percent of its
population and 35 percent of its productive capacity and inflicted a minimum of 4.5
million military casualties, including over 3.1 million dead, captured, or missing. 10 At
the same time, the Red Army lost 20,500 tanks, 101,100 guns and mortars, 17,900
aircraft and 6,290,000 rifle weapons. 11 To the GKO's credit, its evacuation of industry
eastward and the extraordinary measures it took to continue production, combined
with Lend-Lease aid from its Allies, permitted the Red Army and Soviet State to
surVIve.

However this one is great too...

Finally, in the last analysis, the most significant factor in the Red Army's ability to
defeat Operation Barbarossa was its ability to raise and field strategic reserves, a fact
unknown to all those who postulated the 'what ifs' mentioned above. As slow and
cumbersome as it was and as poorly trained and ill equipped the forces it generated
were, the mobilization system produced a seemingly endless array of armies and
divisions. Furthermore, it served as the trigger mechanism for mobilizing the full
power of the massive multi-ethnic Soviet State. Inevitably, the dull bludgeon
representing the mobilized mass Soviet Army blunted the surgically precise, deadly,
but fragile rapier thrusts that the German Army relied on to power Blitzkrieg War. In
addition, unlike Hitler, Stalin realized that victory in a 'culture war' to the death
required complete and ruthless total mobilization of the countries' entire resources.
Stalin did so by December 1941; Hitler failed to do so until 1944. In these
circumstances the defeat of Barbarossa was utterly understandable and, perhaps, even
predictable.

From

Barbarossa: Hitlers Invasion of Russian 1941, Glantz.

 

[witchbottles]

This is a great quote:



{snipped}

Barbarossa: Hitlers Invasion of Russian 1941, Glantz.

Probably the most striking numbers there in regards to Lend Lease is the loss of a minimum of 30-35% of Russia's OVERALL productive capacity.

Imagine how many fewer aircraft there would have been in WW2 if the U.S. had a reduction in place of 35% of its productive capacity overall (i.e. across the board , from food for the pilots to plastics for the windscreens to copper wiring for the instrumentation to silk for the parachutes, to steel for the engines and armament, to gunpowder for the detonation devices of the armament, and so on... and all that ON TOP of a 35% reduction in the capacity of the assembly and production and forging lines to begin with.)

The arsenal of Democracy would have been a 1/3rd less effective across the board. The battle of the Atlantic may not have turned in time, England may have starved to the u-boat menace after all. Less tanks, I doubt the red ball express could have functioned with a 1/3rd less trucks, it barely managed as it was and THAT was only due to stopping 2 of the major thrusts to begin with.

interesting indeed.

Soviet Russia built a first rate combined arms mechanized force by late 1944. They could not have done so without the total Lend - Lease that they received in 1944, that is a rather undisputed argument. How effectively they used the force in 1945 is a different matter. Whether they could have ended the war by 1945 without it, depends as others said on a whole lot of "ifs".

KRL, Jon H

 

[witchbottles]

It was decided long before that. When the Red Army was still fighting in October 1941 it was decided. The only questions were how long and how much blood.

Halder told Hitler in November 1941 that he should conclude the war diplomatically because the Germans could no longer do it militarily.

Halder was correctly interpreting the many variables that the German High Command could not change, due to the structure of the Nazi German Government. His analysis was flawless. One wonders what would have happened if Nazi Germany had put forth a SERIOUS peace effort in 1941, a month before Pearl Harbor. but of course, the overriding drive of the Nazi government makes that a moot question. Soviet russia was always the main target of Nazi Germany in WW2.

 

[footsteps]

Halder was correctly interpreting the many variables that the German High Command could not change, due to the structure of the Nazi German Government. His analysis was flawless. One wonders what would have happened if Nazi Germany had put forth a SERIOUS peace effort in 1941, a month before Pearl Harbor. but of course, the overriding drive of the Nazi government makes that a moot question. Soviet russia was always the main target of Nazi Germany in WW2.

Since we have strayed into "what if" territory: what if the Germans had occupied Iceland? Airfields. U-boat pens. Harbours.

 

[dlazov]

For the 'what if's' I think Glantz says it best:

"
Finally, in the last analysis, the most significant factor in the Red Army's ability to defeat Operation Barbarossa was its ability to raise and field strategic reserves, a fact unknown to all those who postulated the 'what ifs' mentioned above. As slow and cumbersome as it was and as poorly trained and ill equipped the forces it generated were, the mobilization system produced a seemingly endless array of armies and divisions. Furthermore, it served as the trigger mechanism for mobilizing the full power of the massive multi-ethnic Soviet State. Inevitably, the dull bludgeon representing the mobilized mass Soviet Army blunted the surgically precise, deadly, but fragile rapier thrusts that the German Army relied on to power Blitzkrieg War. In addition, unlike Hitler, Stalin realized that victory in a 'culture war' to the death required complete and ruthless total mobilization of the countries' entire resources.

Stalin did so by December 1941; Hitler failed to do so until 1944. In these circumstances the defeat of Barbarossa was utterly understandable and, perhaps, even predictable.
"

 

[Vinnie]

Since we have strayed into "what if" territory: what if the Germans had occupied Iceland? Airfields. U-boat pens. Harbours.

They would have had a garrison out where they could not support it. The a royal Navy would have strangled it and reduced it in 1942-43.

 

[MatrimSaric]

Lets add another 'what if' - what if the japanese had attacked russia first instead of moving south realising that it needed Germany to succeed to fulfill its own war aims (or even a small thrust to 'assist')

 

[Vinnie]

Japanese defeat by 1944 little or no effect on the European war except for a delayed entry of the US.

 

[MatrimSaric]

I was under the impression that as Stalin had been told the Japanese would not attack him he was able to move several high quality siberian divisions from the East to face the germans in the west where they were instrumental in preventing the Germans seizing Moscow. That being the case if those divisions could not move then the Germans may have been able to take the city which would be unlikely to do anything further to unseat Stalin (unless a coup occurred) but may have allowed the Germans to either ride out the upcoming Russian counter offensive or possibly generate an earlier Stalingrad type situation. In the first case the German army would have been better placed to follow through the following year having lost less material and in the second possibly finished the war earlier.

Additionally if the Japanese had attacked Russian in strength (far less likely) then all the factories moved to the East would be write in the path of the Japanese further reducing Russia ability to produce material and taking more population out of the mix.

 

[Vinnie]

If the Japanese had present d in the East the forces there would have either comprehisively defeated them in 1941 or earlier. The Japanese army was not well prepared to fight a land war of maneuver against a western power.

The restriction of Siberian units would have delayed or maybe cancelled the winter counter attacks but that would not have allows the fall of Moscow (INHO).
The lack of a counter attack in 1941 might have benefitted the Soviets as they would not have lost the units so callously thrown away when they went overextended and encouraged the Wehrmacht to become even more so.

 

[MatrimSaric]

Even against a western power who was desperately throwing men and resources against a western power who was? Regardless of Japans ability to take Russia on on its own it is very different to attack them when they are almost on their knees and make them fight over two widely distant fronts.

 

[wrongway149]

I was under the impression that as Stalin had been told the Japanese would not attack him he was able to move several high quality siberian divisions from the East to face the germans in the west where they were instrumental in preventing the Germans seizing Moscow. .

Hey I heard there was a good Starter Kit scenario on just that topic. It's called 'Released from the East'

 

[Paul M. Weir]

Most of the 'Siberian' units were from the middle of Siberia. The forces that faced the Japanese were in what was called the "Soviet Far East". Stalin kept something in the order of 0.5-1m troops in the FE, just in case. Some of the better FE quality units were used in the west but only when new FE units had been raised. There was still a fair bit of armour kept there that was eventually used in August Storm (August '45), that is why some BT-7 and KV-1 were seen which had disappeared from the ETO order of battle 3 and 2 years before, respectively.

The Japanese got beaten in '38 and curb-stomped in '39 and had absolutely no wish to repeat that experience. The mineral, oil and gas treasures of Siberia were unknown at that time so the Japanese had no real reason other than 'honour' (IE revenge). The Asia mainland was the IJA's playground, SE Asia was the IJN's idea and SE Asia had what the Japanese lacked: oil, tin, rubber, etc. Exploiting China was Japan's economic Holy Grail and that turned out to be a poisoned chalice, consuming oil, steel and men that in turn triggered the Southern adventure.

Now I would not say that a Northern adventure was totally and utterly out of the question as the Japanese historically displayed suicidal national insanity in taking on the West, an act of utter strategic overreach and gross misreading of their opponents. However there was absolutely nothing to be gained from going North, so that would have been pointless, even in Japanese eyes. You can forget about "helping out Uncle Adolph" as the Germans and the Japanese, though allies, viewed each other as little more than useful barbarian monkeys, despite the officially enthusiastic words.

Japanese logistics were simply not up to the job of conquering the Soviet FE. The IJA was simply not capable of inflicting more than minor and local defeats on the Red Army. The IJN could have blockaded and shelled Vladivostok and shut down that route for lendlease, maybe even taken it, but that would have been the limit. Instead of a trail of starved corpses leading back from India, you would have had a long straggly picket fence of frozen Japanese marking the retreat from the Soviet FE. While Germany had some industrial leeway in mitigating Extreme Winter, after '41, the Japanese had much less production capacity and transport, so you would have EW in force every winter.

So overall, no reason, no capacity to succeed and would have been contained without much reduction of forces available against Hitler.

 

[MatrimSaric]

Nicely explained...

 

[Paul M. Weir]

To get an idea of the distances and size, the USSR had about the same area as the whole of North America (down to Panama). If one rotates the continent (and climate gradient), one then can imagine the Germans having conquered all of Central America, Southern Texas and Arizona. Assume that that CA+Tx+Az was originally the industrial core but a majority of the industry having being evacuated to California, Mid West, East Coast and Eastern Canada. There is some industry around Vancouver (Vladivostok).

The Japanese have had a clash with NA on the borders of Western Alaska (assume the Bering land bridge is still above water) and got their asses handed to them by Patton 2 years before. Their logistics are almost totally dependent upon rail for distances more than a few score of miles with horse, human and motor transport for anything beyond the railhead. They have less horses and trucks than the Alaskan National Guard. The NA forces started with 20+ divisions in Alaska, a half dozen of which were shipped to the Mexican front but new divisions were being raised and retained. Meanwhile the majority of the 1.5m odd Japanese armies in China (~40 divisions) is still stuck there and they can spare only a half to a third to attack NA, otherwise their China operation goes tits up fast, very fast. "Siberia" as a term covers an area about 40% bigger than the whole USA.

Here endeth the parable.

The Soviet evacuated industries were located in places like Chelyabinsk (Tankograd) and Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) which were just east of the Urals. Those were very roughly twice the distance to Vladivostok as to the '40 USSR Western Border. The Germans were much closer so the Japanese had no chance at disrupting Soviet war industries apart from that around Vladivostok. In terms of force is is like a cat attacking your steel toe capped boot whilst a pit bull is going after your face.

 

[dlazov]

Great parable Paul!

Rep gun is jammed for you.