Resilient units - higher standards

[ParaMarine]

Speaking about the ETO, the common cliche from memoirs and histories is how veterans (more like lucky survivors to hear them tell it) would ignore replacements because they didn’t want to get attached to someone who would soon be dead.

Having had kin who fought and died in the war long before I was born, I believe that the level of training for the army was subpar in those days. Knowing how important it is now and also knowing the roots of problems like this, it is especially unacceptable.

The question is: what are the exceptions? Aside from maybe a few outstanding sergeants who disobeyed orders or took initiative and actually trained their men, what are the big level units who imposed a higher standard? I’d like to know what anyone else has found because it isn’t easy to research - every division had different SOPs and most of the written material hasn’t survived or been distributed at all.

 

[Zajuts149]

I don't know of any specific units, but typically some elite units that would be taken off the line to retrain for big missions, like Paratroopers and early Commandos. The US Army suffered from this not only in WWII, but also Korea and Vietnam. David H. Hackworth writes about this in "About Face", and in more detail in "Steel my soldiers' hearts", about how he turned one of the worst infantry battalions(the 4/39th) of the Vietnam War into one of the best. As we know from ASL, leadership is key. He had only two leadership scores: Studs and Duds. Studs got a chance to prove themselves and be promoted. Duds got booted out. With no real NCO Corps anymore, he had to make leaders out of the drafted "Shake 'n bake" sergeants he had. Another thing he did was to specialise each of his 4 rifle companies in a single mission type each, so they could become proficient in that task, instead of muddling through a multiple of mission types.

 

[Eagle4ty]

I don't know of any specific units, but typically some elite units that would be taken off the line to retrain for big missions, like Paratroopers and early Commandos. The US Army suffered from this not only in WWII, but also Korea and Vietnam. David H. Hackworth writes about this in "About Face", and in more detail in "Steel my soldiers' hearts", about how he turned one of the worst infantry battalions(the 4/39th) of the Vietnam War into one of the best. As we know from ASL, leadership is key. He had only two leadership scores: Studs and Duds. Studs got a chance to prove themselves and be promoted. Duds got booted out. With no real NCO Corps anymore, he had to make leaders out of the drafted "Shake 'n bake" sergeants he had. Another thing he did was to specialise each of his 4 rifle companies in a single mission type each, so they could become proficient in that task, instead of muddling through a multiple of mission types.

All sides were quite bad at retaining specialized units for specialized tasks, some better, some worse. The U.S. for example terribly misused the Rangers in Italy as well as the Paratroopers (at least after Sicily). The 504th PIR for instance was kept as Infantry at Salerno way too long and were subsequently employed as standard infantry at Anzio as were the Rangers. Fortunately, SHAFE had use for the other regiments of the 82nd ABN and did send them to England to train up for Overlord. In Normandy and again after Operation Market Garden the airborne forces (especially U.S.) were kept in the line as standard infantry way too long before being pulled out to rest and refurbish. As for the Rangers (as well as the 1SSF after their all but disbandment) were simply kept in the line and used as special units or shock troops. It was even worse as the war progressed in 1944 as recovered wounded were often put back into repo-depots to be returned to the front in any unit that required replacements. There's a reason that so many returning airborne troops or Rangers had an AWOL remark in their files as they often just took off and reported back to their original units on their own.

The U.K. troops were a bit better, perhaps because of the Regimental system structure within their armies, but again were often times left at the front far too long for practical use. Always at a shortage for personnel, especially infantry, even the commandoes were often amalgamated into existing infantry units; though it should be said that usually they were as complete units and not as individual soldiers most of the time.

Of course, Theater had a big influence on things as the misuse of specialized assets as the PTO was probably better at handling these specialized types [EXC: USMC after Guadalcanal], though they tended to all but exhaust the units by mission parameters. IIRC there were only 2 to 4 individuals in the 5307th Composit considered fit for duty after the Battle for Myitkyina and Slim's people fared about the same. Though it must be said at least these were the missions that they had been intended for.

The Germans were hamstrung by conditions requiring almost every soldier they had to be at the front(s) for extended periods at least after the mid-war period '43-44, but by and large did employ their personnel in units roughly in tune with the tasks that they would need. Again, their Regimental system helped in this respect until it finally broke down in the late war.

The Japanese were the worst at least after the 1st year or so of the war. They attempted to use specialized units for specialized tasks but were most often stimmed or unable to regularly accomplish this because of the constraints put upon them by the Allied stranglehold of their routes of supply and redistribution.

 

[ParaMarine]

Ye, good points by both of yous.

I like also the note that using specialized troops in a conventional role because they’re just better (or whatever) is tarded. The worst was using Rangers in Hurtgen to assault impossible positions.

What the Marines did right in those days was actually to just join the special units into the regular ones. No more lords and peasants. Everyone has to carry their weight.

I agree that it’s mostly about command. David Hackworth was the Army’s Chesty and he should have had the biggest state funeral of the decade. I think About Face should be required reading.

 

[Zajuts149]

Ye, good points by both of yous.

I like also the note that using specialized troops in a conventional role because they’re just better (or whatever) is tarded. The worst was using Rangers in Hurtgen to assault impossible positions.

What the Marines did right in those days was actually to just join the special units into the regular ones. No more lords and peasants. Everyone has to carry their weight.

I agree that it’s mostly about command. David Hackworth was the Army’s Chesty and he should have had the biggest state funeral of the decade. I think About Face should be required reading.

I used to think that disbanding the Army Commandos after WWII was a mistake, but they were an emergency stopgap, and were often misunderstood and misused early in the war, as well as just being used as shock troops towards the end. They did have some promising offshoots, such as the Paras, the RM Commandos(which shouldn't have had to let the Army take up this role), and finally, the SAS, which are more strategic troops than the pure raiding forces the Commandos started as.

The 29th Infantry Division did set up a Ranger battalion that was later disbanded, with the men sent back to their units. I wonder if they let some of the spirit from the Commando training course rub off on the men in the units they returned to.

 

[ParaMarine]

It’s hard to find the details. Even within those divisions the surviving paperwork is sparse and is often falling apart. In those days, some better units even had an internal sniper program. I just don’t know where to find a list of units that even did things like this, so quality is even harder to guess at.