I have aways understood this remark to reflect the degree to which the RN learnt the lessons by the end of the war: RN flash protection was vastely better by then (and had to be due to the less stable propellant) than the HSF, which was just about good enough for the more stable Ge propellant
Of course not, but what it does indicate was that how 'flash tight' a turret was is not the primary indicator of how vulnerable a ship was to flash causing an explosion. i.e. the British root cause analysis had picked the wrong root cause. They had solved a 2nd order problem
Have to disagree with you there. The RN didn't have any opportunity to see whether their fix prevented explosions. They had solved the main problem caused by their combination of propellent, storage and handing (silk bags etc). They did not make their cordite stable. However the HSF also did not have enough battle experience to know whether their turrets were tight enough following Dogger Bank (only an example or two at Jutland). It is perfectly possible that magazine explosions would have favoured the RN in 1918.
I gotta disagree with that. German propellant could be set alight and would make a big fire, but it did not do so nearly as rapidly or with such explosive release of gas pressure as Brit propellant. This gas pressure is what tore the Brit ships apart, where a German ship with the same amount of propellant burning would just have a fire, due to an absence of such high pressure.
That was the conclusion of the boards of enquiry, but actually don't know for sure though examination of her wreck does nto contradict these conclusions. Here is a link to the best information I know of on the examination of her wreck and the immediate conclusions which can be drawn
Invincible, Defence, and Black Prince blew up from witnessed turret hits. Indefatigable's forward magazine blew from witnessed non-turret hits, but these could have done the barbette below the upper deck OR made it to the magazine directly. Nobody will ever know--the wreck's been scrapped completely--and nobody saw what caused her aft magazine to go off prior to that. Queen Mary's forward magazines apparently went off from a non-turret hit, which could have been on a lower barbette, or into either the main or 2ndary magazines directly. Again, nobody knows. Her Q magazine also exploded, aparently also from a hit somewhere down below and not on the turret (the survivors from the turret don't recall a penetration), and her X magazine went as the stern was rolling over, probably from a spark setting off one of the exposed black powder igniters on a charge. Note that Barham did the same thing when sunk in WW2.
OK, shells.... Most folks are familiar with the relative merits and deficiencies of the major-caliber APC on both sides, but nobody pays much attention to the smaller guns. What I find most interesting is that no gun on either side of 6"/15cm or smaller had any AP ammo at all. So we took that into account in Jutland.
Well that's - mm - interesting.
At this point in time, everybody outside the US had light belts going to the ends or close to them, precisely to prevent big HE from doing what it did to some Russians at Tsushima. The overall armoring schemes of Brit and German capital ships were very similar, in fact. The Germans just tended to have thicker armor over a larger area amidships, which they paid for by having smaller guns.
Yeah, all the important stuff was protected very well. All the big guns, the ammo, the skipper, (usually) the control systems, and the propulsive machinery, as well as (usually) enough buoyancy to keep the ship afloat, were behind the thickest armor on the ship. The unarmored areas weren't essential to the survival or functioning of the ship. So a 6" HE shell might go through the unarmored side above the belt and blow up 2 or 3 officers' cabins or some such, and do "severe damage to light structures", as Campbell would say, but this would have zero effect on the ability of the ship to float, move, or fight.
WW1 CLs were armored on a completely different theory than BBs. To be fast and light, they couldn't have much armor, and they were expecting to be hit by 3-6" HE most of the time anyway. So, they put about a 3" belt amidships to protect the machinery extended it to the ends at about 1.5" to protect the ends from splinters and small HE shells. Their main buoyancy protection at the ends was the old PC-style protective deck, because they expected most hits to be above the waterline. At the ends, this deck was usually about 2" thick, but was only 1" or less amidships in line with the thick part of the belt.
Maybe. We're definitely considering this but no promises yet.
So now we drift off into maybe a no-go area, but effectiveness of shells is via their interaction with armour and I am now curious how well you are modelling armour? Is it abstracted (this ship has 12" armour) or more precise. I would presume each function (propulsion, each gun, etc) is given an armour rating vs different angles of attack (key one deck vs side) how do you deal with a 'concept' like bouyancy which is actually a function many areas - some of which will be armoured extensively, some of which will not? I particularly am thinking of the loss of the Lutzow here. I will have to find my Cambell and refresh my memory. I have not read it isnce it first came out.
.This is also explained on page 141 of the RJW manual
.Sat down and skimmed the summary of "Jutland: An analysis of the fighting" this morning on the bus. (The whole book is a big too big to analyse in an hour or so). I did find the comment on p356 "There is no record of the total number of medium caliber hits on British Capital Ships, except that there were three on Tiger, and as far as is known, only one such hit, which disabled a 15" gun in the Warspite is of any importance".OK, shells.... Most folks are familiar with the relative merits and deficiencies of the major-caliber APC on both sides, but nobody pays much attention to the smaller guns. What I find most interesting is that no gun on either side of 6"/15cm or smaller had any AP ammo at all. So we took that into account in Jutland.
This makes for some noticeable changes compared to the RJW game. CLs aren't very likely to sink each other with gunfire alone, no matter how much topsides damage they do. BB 2ndary fire has basically no effect at all on another BB, even if they stumble upon each other in the dark at close range.
We were also able to put in some little details on this stuff. For instance, Canada's 6" BL Mk XVII, being a non-standard gun built for Chile, had non-standard ammo. It appears to have been unique amongst Brit 6" guns of 1916 in having SAP instead of HE ammo. Thus, its shells can get through thin armor sometimes.
Nothing on torps yet. Sorry
Very good book
. It's not the end-all and be-all, but it's very good.There's a lot of randomness built into the process to model especially good or bad results, so once in a blue moon you might see a 6" hit disable a BB turret. However, the odds of such a thing happening are extremely small, so from the POV of making decisions during a battle, it's best to assume it's pointless to shoot 6" at a battleship.
Brit CPC might penetrate a hair more than their HE, but it also was filled with black powder, which is a low explosive. Thus, their effects would seem to be pretty much indistinguishable.
The idea here was that they'd use nose-fuzed vs. oil-burning DDs and base-fuzed against coal-burners, in hopes of getting through the bunkers before the shell exploded. Campbell goes on to say that in practice, however, the Germans fired both types in alternate salvos at the same targets. Thus, one general system with a spread of results that covers both types works here.
Other sources indicate there was no AP for any Brit 6" gun.
