Kursk - could the outcome have been different?

[Yuri0352]

Meaning we would of rather of gone down fighting than subdue, and as I already mentioned, I think any attempt by Germany to actually land troops would of been a disaster of the highest magnitude, not many would of come back from that one.

Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent outcome of the entire Eastern Front campaign, would tend to indicate that Hitler and the OKW had either ignored or failed to have learned from Napoleon's experience in the previous century. Why would anyone expect these same individuals to have learned from the failure of the Spanish Armada? The points raised up-thread regarding the relative strengths of the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine, especially the German dependence on barges for cross channel transport and supply should indicate the futility of such an endeavour.

The recurring hypotheticals regarding a successful prosecution of Operation Sea lion are the mildly entertaining wet dream of game designers, arm chair historians and the Hitlerphiles waxing nostalgic for the Bavarian redoubt and the Luftwaffe bombing campaign against the eastern seaboard.
All of which ignores the reality that Sea Lion was cancelled due to Hitler having placed a higher priority on conquering and enslaving the Soviet Union.

 

[bendizoid]

Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent outcome of the entire Eastern Front campaign, would tend to indicate that Hitler and the OKW had either ignored or failed to have learned from Napoleon's experience in the previous century. Why would anyone expect these same individuals to have learned from the failure of the Spanish Armada? The points raised up-thread regarding the relative strengths of the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine, especially the German dependence on barges for cross channel transport and supply should indicate the futility of such an endeavour.

The recurring hypotheticals regarding a successful prosecution of Operation Sea lion are the mildly entertaining wet dream of game designers, arm chair historians and the Hitlerphiles waxing nostalgic for the Bavarian redoubt and the Luftwaffe bombing campaign against the eastern seaboard.
All of which ignores the reality that Sea Lion was cancelled due to Hitler having placed a higher priority on conquering and enslaving the Soviet Union.

Correct, he didn't want to fight Britain, he wanted to be buddies.

 

[Bob Walters]

Correct, he didn't want to fight Britain, he wanted to be buddies.

He had a real capacity for self delusion. That is often a trait of fascists.

 

[witchbottles]

There's a bunker and tunnels under 10 Downing: http://londonist.com/2015/02/the-secret-bunker-below-londons-secret-bunker. I don't think it would have been as easy as strolling up to the front door and announcing, "burglar, madam" and Bob's your uncle. You'd probably get the traditional English response, "Are you an invading Hun and/or encylopædia salesman?"

JR

I rather believe that Eben Emael was quite a bit more in depth as a fortification than the bunker below 10 Downing Street. Not to mention the requirement to awaken the political and head of government figures and get them there in a surprise airlanding assault. Finally, one should recall that Koch and the 22nd Luftlanders only missed Queen Wilhelmina by about 20 minutes in her quarters. (and she was awake, dressed and in full command of her senses when notified the Germans were coming for her.)

If Witzig's men could topple Eben Emael with just 100 engineers, there is no reason to doubt that they could take control of 10 Downing Street in a lightning raid, including any bunker complex beneath it. (Especially if a widespread panic and confusion was triggered to cover the operation - such as seaborne assaults on Portsmouth harbor, commando (Brandenburger) raids along the Sussex coastline from e-boats, Full airstrikes and air superiority to prevent any sign of the RAF overhead, commitment of the full strength of the 7th Flieger, 22nd Luftlande,and 5th Gebirgsjaeger divisions to the operation - no I think Churchill and the royals would have opted for an uneasy peace for now over suicidal attempts at self-sacrifice to "make a final stand".

Perhaps the best shield that the UK government had against a lightning raid to seize them was anonymity. Abwehr was unable to identify the normal locations of the government individuals outside their usual offices and residences. A solid performance by Special Branch did the job of keeping the Nazis in the dark as to where to nab the UK government until it was too late to try.

 

[Proff3RTR]

If Hong Kong, Singapore and Tobruk are any indication, I'd say British troops were just as capable of surrendering when beaten as anyone else.



About 20 years ago I got into a similar discussion and reminded someone that 1st Canadian Division was the only fully-equipped division in the UK following the thrashing on the continent. I was trying to talk up how good the Canadians were, but the fellow I was talking to grew up in the UK during the war, and reminded me in turn that a lot of their equipment was First World War vintage, or nominal, suffixing his comments with "I know, I saw them for myself."

I'd be interested to see an order of battle for UK forces in June 1940. I do know 1 Cdn Div was still short of all kinds of things, particularly support weapons. Saying they were the only division in a state approaching readiness may be over-stating the case (I've only read Canadian sources which are more likely to exaggerate the poor condition of the Brits). Would be interesting to read more if anyone has any suggestions. I do know the 1st Cdn Div was moved around a lot that summer, I believe because there really weren't a lot of other battle-ready formations ready.

The big difference being we would of been defending our own soil, that tends to give a man a certain edge and reason to fight ten times harder than for some where in a foreign land.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

The big difference being we would of been defending our own soil, that tends to give a man a certain edge and reason to fight ten times harder than for some where in a foreign land.

40,000 British nationals were on Jersey and Guernsey when the Germans arrived in 1940, and offered no resistance at all. The decision had been made not to fight for the islands by the government, as they were of "no strategic value". But no evidence at all that those that remained were so averse to the idea of German occupation that they would rather die than submit.

Sorry, but I just don't see any evidence that Britain would have gone down "fighting to the last man."

 

[Michael Dorosh]

The situation on June 22 (the date that France surrendered to Germany), according to the official history of the Canadian Army:

So far as the Army was concerned, it might have seemed that the situation on the day of the Franco-German armistice could not have been much worse. Equipment-or rather, lack of equipment-was the crux of it. The forces in the United Kingdom were "almost unarmed except for rifles"-and there was, indeed, a serious shortage even of them. "There were . . . hardly five hundred field guns of any sort and hardly two hundred medium or heavy tanks in the whole country". It would be long before British factories could replace even the material left in France. Canadian industrial capacity, of which the British Government had been unwilling to make large use before Dunkirk, suddenly became important in British eyes; but many months-even years-would have to pass before the orders for equipment now belatedly placed could produce results. Canada, we have seen, was ready to send what help she could from her reserve stores, but because her pre-war forces and preparations had been so small, she had little to send. Thanks to their low state of preparedness, indeed, "None of the British Dominions", as Sir Winston Churchill bluntly phrases it, "could send decisive aid". The United States had large reserves, and in the new state of mind which the crisis in Europe had produced the American government and people were quite willing to send these to Britain; but getting them there took time.

On 18 June, by which date nearly all British troops had been evacuated from France, there were in Great Britain and Northern Ireland a total of 28 field divisions plus 15 independent brigades of various sorts. These rather imposing figures, however, give a misleading impression. Almost all of the divisions were either recovering from Dunkirk or still incompletely trained; and almost all were without heavy equipment. Of the British divisions, the most advanced were the 3rd, which as already noted had been re-equipped with a view to being sent back to France, and the 43rd; but even these cannot have been in very efficient condition. The strength of the 3rd on 6 June, following its return from Dunkirk, had been recorded as only 4500 men; and the 43rd was reported, at the same period, as "rather backward" in training and equipment. The 52nd (Lowland) Division, we have seen, had got to France and had been withdrawn, but it had left a "considerable" part of its transport behind it. It was accordingly not in condition to move and fight.

No argument from me on the difficulties of getting German troops ashore, but if through some miracle they did manage to land, the British were severely disadvantaged, and other history being a guide, not outside the realm of possibility to think a puppet government could have been put in place. Anyway, all this is in reaction to the notion that a defeated England would today be "speaking German" in the astonishing event of a German victory. They wouldn't.

 

[Proff3RTR]

40,000 British nationals were on Jersey and Guernsey when the Germans arrived in 1940, and offered no resistance at all. The decision had been made not to fight for the islands by the government, as they were of "no strategic value". But no evidence at all that those that remained were so averse to the idea of German occupation that they would rather die than submit.

Sorry, but I just don't see any evidence that Britain would have gone down "fighting to the last man."

Then you underestimate how we are as a nation, channel bands were just not worth fighting for, the mainland I am sure would of been something else.

 

[Bob Walters]

Dunkirk is an important point given the failure of the German forces to prevent the massive evacuation. If that evacuation had been prevented it would have made an invasion more feasible. However, there would still be the problem of effecting the transfer of men and supplies to British soil. The big problem with Sea Lion with the total lack of preparation. Perhaps a couple less large capital ships and a hundred or more U-Boats it could have been accomplished. As the Germans did not need to control the channel just deny control of it to the British. It also would have helped to have better anti shipping weapons.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Then you underestimate how we are as a nation, channel bands were just not worth fighting for, the mainland I am sure would of been something else.

Do you have anything besides wishful thinking to back this up? Because everywhere else the British were overwhelmed, they either (sensibly) surrendered in droves or didn't fight at all.

The Home Guard didn't start recruiting until July 1940. The seeds of a resistance organization had already been sown, but this was predicated on the notion that the UK would do exactly what I suggested - surrender and submit to occupation. The Auxiliary Units were expected to survive about 14 days in action, and were never intended to be a long-term resistance. The Secret Intelligence Service was expected to organize effective long-term resistance, but couldn't do anything until Britain surrendered to German occupation. Special Duties intelligence gathering apparently didn't get off the ground until 1941, and even then the wireless system in place for passing information wasn't expected to survive more than a few days in action, according to Malcolm Atkin in Fighting Nazi Occupation: British Resistance 1939–1945.

General Brooke, who was in command of UK forces at the time, wrote the following:

... I considered the invasion a very real and probable threat and one for which the land forces at my disposal fell far short of what I felt was required to provide any degree of real confidence in our power to defend these shores. It should not be construed that I considered our position a helpless one in the case of an invasion. Far from it. We should certainly have a desperate struggle and the future might well have hung in the balance, but I certainly felt that given a fair share of the fortunes of war we should certainly succeed in finally defending these shores.

I read this as Brooke appealing to the notion of luck rather than the willingness of his troops to die to the last man.

Instructions distributed to civilians don't make reference to dying to the last man, either.

The Germans threaten to invade Great Britain. If they do so they will be driven out by our Navy, our Army and our Air Force. Yet the ordinary men and women of the civilian population will also have their part to play. Hitler's invasions of Poland, Holland and Belgium were greatly helped by the fact that the civilian population was taken by surprise. They did not know what to do when the moment came. You must not be taken by surprise. This leaflet tells you what general line you should take. More detailed instructions will be given you when the danger comes nearer. Meanwhile, read these instructions carefully and be prepared to carry them out.

The first published instruction talks about not clogging roads with refugees, not believing rumours, being wary of disguised Germans, and helping report on German troop movements. It talks about helping block roads and organizing resistance cells - again, all of this is predicated on the idea that population centres would willingly submit to German occupation, not die fighting.

 

[Brian W]

As the Germans did not need to control the channel just deny control of it to the British.

A German invasion would have failed without German control of the channel. Or were you talking about the British evacuation, which could have succeeded without British control of the channel (although more lives would have been lost)?

 

[Brian W]

but if through some miracle they did manage to land, the British were severely disadvantaged,

Just to restate your theory: if the Germans could have landed without heavy equipment the British would have been severely disadvantaged because the British were without heavy equipment. You see the problem with what you are suggesting? The Germans had no ability to lift heavy equipment in from France, so would have had even less than what the British had.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Just to restate your theory: if the Germans could have landed without heavy equipment the British would have been severely disadvantaged because the British were without heavy equipment. You see the problem with what you are suggesting? The Germans had no ability to lift heavy equipment in from France, so would have had even less than what the British had.

I really only wanted to suggest that the line about "we'd all be speaking German now" is silly, since if by some miracle the Germans managed to overcome their problems of naval inferiority, aerial inferiority, lack of landing craft, etc. etc. they still wouldn't have expelled the British population nor required them to learn German. This is an extrapolation of the situation in Vichy France. Perry then suggested that the British would have never surrendered and gone down fighting, which seems equally silly given everything we know about British resistance in other theatres, on the Channel Islands, and their preparations for the invasion, many of which were predicated on the idea that areas would indeed surrender.

So really, there isn't a single element of the last couple of pages that isn't heavily speculative or laden with glaring lapses of logic. The one in particular that you point out is as good as any of the others.

Put another way, it's not a theory, but rather consider it one of these:

http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/HandWave

 

[Proff3RTR]

Do you have anything besides wishful thinking to back this up? Because everywhere else the British were overwhelmed, they either (sensibly) surrendered in droves or didn't fight at all.

The Home Guard didn't start recruiting until July 1940. The seeds of a resistance organization had already been sown, but this was predicated on the notion that the UK would do exactly what I suggested - surrender and submit to occupation. The Auxiliary Units were expected to survive about 14 days in action, and were never intended to be a long-term resistance. The Secret Intelligence Service was expected to organize effective long-term resistance, but couldn't do anything until Britain surrendered to German occupation. Special Duties intelligence gathering apparently didn't get off the ground until 1941, and even then the wireless system in place for passing information wasn't expected to survive more than a few days in action, according to Malcolm Atkin in Fighting Nazi Occupation: British Resistance 1939–1945.

General Brooke, who was in command of UK forces at the time, wrote the following:

... I considered the invasion a very real and probable threat and one for which the land forces at my disposal fell far short of what I felt was required to provide any degree of real confidence in our power to defend these shores. It should not be construed that I considered our position a helpless one in the case of an invasion. Far from it. We should certainly have a desperate struggle and the future might well have hung in the balance, but I certainly felt that given a fair share of the fortunes of war we should certainly succeed in finally defending these shores.

I read this as Brooke appealing to the notion of luck rather than the willingness of his troops to die to the last man.

Instructions distributed to civilians don't make reference to dying to the last man, either.

The Germans threaten to invade Great Britain. If they do so they will be driven out by our Navy, our Army and our Air Force. Yet the ordinary men and women of the civilian population will also have their part to play. Hitler's invasions of Poland, Holland and Belgium were greatly helped by the fact that the civilian population was taken by surprise. They did not know what to do when the moment came. You must not be taken by surprise. This leaflet tells you what general line you should take. More detailed instructions will be given you when the danger comes nearer. Meanwhile, read these instructions carefully and be prepared to carry them out.

The first published instruction talks about not clogging roads with refugees, not believing rumours, being wary of disguised Germans, and helping report on German troop movements. It talks about helping block roads and organizing resistance cells - again, all of this is predicated on the idea that population centres would willingly submit to German occupation, not die fighting.

You miss my point entirely, but I will agree to disagree with you, you have your PoV and I have mine, neither of which will be Proven or Dis Proven, so who is right? not you, nor I, but I do still think that the Germans would not of pulled it off as we would of been defending our home turf regardless, (just ask yourself how hard you would fight for your home against an invader who you knew wanted nothing more than to end your way of life, I think I know the answer from my PoV), and you will have yours, so the merry go round continues.

 

[Bob Walters]

Then you underestimate how we are as a nation, channel bands were just not worth fighting for, the mainland I am sure would of been something else.

No offense, but I suspect the people of France would have said the same thing in 1939.

A German invasion would have failed without German control of the channel. Or were you talking about the British evacuation, which could have succeeded without British control of the channel (although more lives would have been lost)?

If the Germans could have denied the part of the channel they were using to the British they could have gotten across. Remember this presupposes several other items.
1. A massive increase in U-Boats so that they could be used to deny that part of the channel to the British
2. Total air superiority over Southern England
3. Failure of the Dunkirk Evacuation.
Now mind you I am only talking about the landings being successful not the invasion they would need to drastically increase they ability to move supplies for that to be successful.

No offense, but the mythical value of defending their home country did not help the French and they had more with which to work and had not already been defeated.

 

[Bob Walters]

Now if you want to talk about feasible invasions that might very well have succeeded there is always the invasion of Malta.

 

[AdrianE]

Anyone who thinks the Germans had a snowball's chance in hell of pulling off Sealion should read "Hitler's Armada" by Geoff Hewitt.

The Royal Navy had determined it could destroy any invasion with about 6 light cruisers and 30 destroyers. They had triple the required amount stationed in home waters (including Polish, Free French, Canadian and other commonwealth units).

A lot of the clueless think that the luftwaffe could have somehow prevented the RN from destroying the invasion but forget two things:
1) the luftwaffe in 1940 couldn't hit a moving target and was woeful against stationary targets that were firing back as demonstrated at Dunkirk
2) the luftwaffe doesn't fly at night but the Royal Navy sure as hell fights at night and its a 3 day trip across the channel

 

[von Marwitz]

No offense, but I suspect the people of France would have said the same thing in 1939.

Agreed.

There is no such thing as a people fighting to the last man.
There may be such a thing as a people being fought to the last man.

Even the Japanese did not fight to the last man as a people. And they were of a much different sort of mindset than the British with regard for determination in that line. On the other hand, history provides numerous examples for genocide.

von Marwitz

 

[Bob Walters]

Anyone who thinks the Germans had a snowball's chance in hell of pulling off Sealion should read "Hitler's Armada" by Geoff Hewitt.

The Royal Navy had determined it could destroy any invasion with about 6 light cruisers and 30 destroyers. They had triple the required amount stationed in home waters (including Polish, Free French, Canadian and other commonwealth units).

A lot of the clueless think that the luftwaffe could have somehow prevented the RN from destroying the invasion but forget two things:
1) the luftwaffe in 1940 couldn't hit a moving target and was woeful against stationary targets that were firing back as demonstrated at Dunkirk
2) the luftwaffe doesn't fly at night but the Royal Navy sure as hell fights at night and its a 3 day trip across the channel

I don't think that anyone thinks that Germany could have succeeded given the conditions that were presents at the time. BTW - Why would it take three days to cross the channel?

 

[AdrianE]

BTW - Why would it take three days to cross the channel?

Read the German plan. The barge trains would have been extremely slow. Look at the time between the planned landing of the first wave and the planned arrival of the second.