Sounds very cool. Thank you.
I guess my real concern is that it is being marketed as a "campaign" and it's not. It's a collection of very well thought out and designed scenarios which is fine but, it should not be sold as a "campaign".
The Gettysburg title is a true campaign and maybe in the future others will be too. You should not advertise "campaign" unless it is. A campaign IMHO is a series of choices by both sides that lead to different battles in different locations.
A suggestion for the for Fred and Chance might be to research all the historical figures options at the time. Could Pope have decided to go through Chance instead? If Burnside did not try Fred could Hooker later have tried there and had the pontoons in the proper position? Could the Union have tried Bull Run again with there new bigger army? You have the maps already done just replace the OOB.
According to Wiki
"Burnside, in response to prodding from Lincoln and General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, planned a late fall offensive; he communicated his plan to Halleck on November 9. The plan relied on quick movement and deceit. He would concentrate his army in a visible fashion near Warrenton, feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House, or Gordonsville. Then he would rapidly shift his army southeast and cross the Rappahannock River to Fredericksburg, hoping that Robert E. Lee would sit still, unclear as to Burnside's intentions, while the Union Army made a rapid movement against Richmond, south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad from Fredericksburg. Burnside selected this plan because he was concerned that if he were to move directly south from Warrenton, he would be exposed to a flanking attack from Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, whose corps was at that time in the Shenandoah Valley south of Winchester. He also believed that the Orange and Alexandria Railroad would be an inadequate supply line. While Burnside began assembling a supply base at Falmouth, near Fredericksburg, the Lincoln administration entertained a lengthy debate about the wisdom of his plan. Lincoln eventually approved but cautioned him to move with great speed, certainly doubting that Lee would cooperate as Burnside anticipated."
Here is another choice... Is this reflected in one of the scenarios?
"As Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner arrived, he strongly urged an immediate crossing of the river to scatter the token Confederate force of 500 men in the town and occupying the commanding heights to the west. Burnside began to panic, worried that the increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed. He squandered his initiative and ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth."
This one sounds cool too...
"The first pontoon bridges arrived at Falmouth on November 25, much too late to enable the Army of the Potomac to cross the river without opposition. Burnside still had an opportunity, however, because he was facing only half of Lee's army, not yet dug in, and if he acted quickly, he might be able to attack Longstreet and defeat him before Jackson arrived."
Is this one reflected by a scenario?
Could Burnside have seen the futility of Fred before he got too far committed and shifted to the Chance area?
But I guess that is what you are suggesting for what can happen after the OOBs and map editors are made public.
