Not too sure about that. After Kasserine, Fredendall was certainly a victim of some rather bad PR put forward by a guy in Eisenhower's staff that couldn't stand him, Omar Bradley, though there was also some degree of tension within the Corps as Fredendall was a bit acerbic and had an especially terse relationship with MG Ward CDR 1st Arm Div.... <snip>...
Just like you said about Patton about not being too hasty or rose colored glasses viewed in one's assessment of a commander, let's give Fredendall a fair shake as well. The pendulum swings to both extremes.
Good evening Eagle. Pardon the delay in responding but I wanted to review my sources regarding Fredenhall and the Kasserine battles before making any reply. I will try to address your points in order but some may be combined to save space. Happy to look at any sources you may offer as well.
While US II Corps was given the open right flank of the allied line I would submit that the problems faced by Fredenhall and the events that led to his dismissal were largely of his own making.
As you note, Fredenhall was known to be acerbic but he was also a micro manager and according to Atkinson (An Army at Dawn) and Kelly (Meeting the Fox) an Anglophobe. His headquarters fostered an ill-concealed dislike of the British to the point where he and his officers openly mocked British accents. Further, Fredenhall was contemptuous of the French and even when their infantry died in their positions or French gunners stood by their pieces to the bitter end in support of US troops he gave them no credit.
Fredenhall also looked down on Eisenhower, Bradley, Truscott and others who were promoted over him as the US Army expanded and Marshall began appointing "his men". This is of particular note as Fredenhall was also a Marshall pick and despite his initial misgivings, Eisenhower accepted Fredenhall for command of II Corps. Initially satisfied, Fredenhall would almost immediately start eroding the faith of Eisenhower and the senior American staff officers.
Fredenhall's reported inability to delegate authority meant that he often went over the heads of his subordinate commanders directly to regimental commanders (as an example). Kelly (Meeting the Fox) notes two situations in the January fighting in the French sector where US troops were sent to back up ill-equipped French forces in the Eastern Dorsale range. When Robinett's CCB requested more infantry support, two battalions from the 1st Infantry Division were dispatched but they were not placed under Robinett's command. Instead they remained independent and subject Fredenhall's orders despite II Corps HQ being more than 70 miles (~130 kilometers) to the rear. To make matters worse, even though CCB was technically under command of the French Corps, Fredenhall kept his fingers in the pot, causing Robinett to complain he could not respond to orders from two equal headquarters.
Later, near the end of January when the situation was more stable, Eisenhower advised Fredenhall that, considering the situation and the problems with supplies, 1st Armored Division should be kept concentrated. Rather than combine the entire division as it arrived in II Corps' area Fredenhall ordered Gen Dan Ward (CO 1st AD) to break the division into four (4) combat commands (A through D) so they could be blooded in upcoming fighting. Besides committing the error of splitting his available armour into 'penny packets' in the face of an active enemy known for their tactical prowess, an error the British had made early in the war themselves, Fredenhall then retained command of all four Commands leaving Ward with just his headquarters and 'technical command' of formations he did not actually control.
The relations within US II Corps were not at all collegial with Fredenhall actively disliking Ward and making 'noisy' complaints about his subordinate, a rival for command of II Corps. As Rutherford (Kasserine: Baptism of Fire) notes, Gen. Ward was the antithesis of the combative and bigoted Fredenhall and Ward returned the feelings with "a quiet implacable contempt". Thus was the state of relations between II Corps and its main armoured force as the Kasserine battles approached.
The placement of US II Corps HQ raised more than a few eyebrows at the time and ever since. All sources I have note the headquarters was deployed in a deep ravine on a high plateau 70 miles (~130 kilometers) behind the front lines near Tebessa. The headquarters was bloated with some 69 staff officers alone and was protected by a full battalion of AA artillery. It is worth noting here that in 1940, even French corps headquarters, reliant almost solely on telephones, were not located this far to the rear. Fredenhall assigned an entire engineer regiment to dig a pair of long tunnels into the banks of the ravine despite being advised that the regiment had neither the equipment nor the experience in tunneling, still the corps commander insisted.
Fredenhall was prone to use unofficial code language when discussing orders over open radio networks. Unfortunately, these code words were known only to himself and appeared to be improvised on the spot. He often broke off using this code when he or his assistant became confused. Here are two examples:
(CCB 1st Armored during the fighting in the French sector in late January)
"Move your command, that is, the walking boys, pop guns, Baker's outfit and the outfit which is the reverse of Baker's outfit and the big fellow to M, which is due north of where you are now, as soon as possible. Have your boss report to the French gentleman whose name begins with J at a place that begins with D which is five grid squares to the left of M."
Robinett, his staff and a French liaison officer took some time to translate this cryptic message to mean that the command was to move to Maktar, that J stood for General Juin and that D stood for the French headquarters at Djerissa. Robinett was to note that it likely took any German listening in about an equal amount of time to decode the message as his own staff (Rutherford, pg 46).
Atkinson notes another example in mid January when US Gen Truscott at Eisenhower's HQ was in conversation with II Corps:
"I do not have enough MENUS,.... Relative to the force at Ousseltia, it has passed from the head ASH TRAY to a second ASH TRAY,.... Everything DAGWOOD of GARDEN has been withdrawn or collapsed. I cannot spare any CLOUDS.
Translation: He was short of infantry. A unit that had been serving under one French commander was now under another French commander. Forces north of Pichon had been routed. Fredenall had no extra battalions (Atkinson, pg 273).
In my own view, it is not all surprising that Fredenhall lost control of the situation as it developed from 14 February, 1943 onwards. While I agree that II Corps' position was not ideal, Fredenhall did not inspire confidence in his superiors or most subordinates and in the end it is the results that generals are judged by even if events transpired against those unfortunate enough to be defeated.
