How to become better at using AFVs in ASL?

[stuh42asl]

Having tanks bolting down the road at 70-90 kph does little for you when your guns and infantry will be moving columns at 40-50 kph, even in an admin move. If you run into the enemy you've liklely just lost you tanks.

A very good day in WWII, even with light/no resistance, was only some 30-50 km per day (not much further than Napoleon or Caesar, really). The reasons for this are numerous but mainly had to do with unit formation and force security while advancing in hostile territory.

Research Operation Bagration. the Russians used the deep operation the developed. They would form small formations that once the line was broken would rush behind enemy lines to grab bridges, fuel depots HQ , this was combined with their first use of Spetznas(long range recce units)It work very well. So yes armor borne infantry would work very well with the light tanks.

 

[The Purist]

Yes, indeed, I am aware of Red Army "Deep Battle" and how they combined this with "Maskirovka" to aid in setting up conditions for the numerous penetrations that led to the collapse of the front. Note that T-34s, SU-85s and the early IS tanks were not confined to the roads running without tracks.

Red Army operations were fine tuned between late 42 and mid-44 and the doctrine called for the front to be penetrated in multiple areas such that reserves were soon exhausted/overwhelmed and the tactical and operational depth of the defence was penetrated and could not be repaired. This gave the Germans bad options - retreat, surrender, or die in place.

Bagration's success was also largely due to Makirovka, or Red Army deception tactics. The German command was convinced the summer offensive would be resumed in the Ukraine/southern Poland, believing they had located most of the Red Army mobile forces in the south. As such the reserves for AG Centre were almost non-existent. When Bagration began, the Red Army had some 1.6 million troops, 32,000 artillery pieces and nearly 6000 tanks on the attack front (achieved by thinning other non-active fronts). AG Centre could muster only some 500,000 men about 3000 guns and less than 500 tanks and AG.

Despite a few local defensive successes, the Red Army went through the German front like butter. The initial assault teams were soon followed by larger exploitation forces that widened the breaches and pushed deep into the German rear. Note that the Germans had little/no opportunity to slow these drives as thier main strength was in the south. There was little that one weak panzer (20th) and a de-motorised infantry division (14th) could do.

Combined with follow up offensives in the north Ukraine and southern Poland, the German front from Riga to the Carpathian Mountains had effectively ceased to exist. Similar to what happened in the west, the Red Army offensive out ran its supply and staggered to a halt along the Vistula/East Prussian border and near Riga.

There are numerous texts available, Glantz and House (of course), Citino (very good), Zaloga and Krivosheev are all worth the read.

I would also recommend two monographs by Lt Col. (ret) Richard Armstrong (US Army). Colonel Armstrong was a Red Army analyst and intelligence officer in the US Army. Both papers explore the development of Red Army operational art and the use of deception in creating the conditions for victory.

"Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak", published by the Combat Studies Institute, US Army and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

"Battlefield Innovation: Red Army War Experiences, 1941-45", National Security Program Discussion Paper, Series 92-1, National Security Program, Harvard University, John F Kennedy School of Government.

 

[Eagle4ty]

Yes, indeed, I am aware of Red Army "Deep Battle" and how they combined this with "Maskirovka" to aid in setting up conditions for the numerous penetrations that led to the collapse of the front. Note that T-34s, SU-85s and the early IS tanks were not confined to the roads running without tracks.

Red Army operations were fine tuned between late 42 and mid-44 and the doctrine called for the front to be penetrated in multiple areas such that reserves were soon exhausted/overwhelmed and the tactical and operational depth of the defence was penetrated and could not be repaired. This gave the Germans bad options - retreat, surrender, or die in place.

Bagration's success was also largely due to Makirovka, or Red Army deception tactics. The German command was convinced the summer offensive would be resumed in the Ukraine/southern Poland, believing they had located most of the Red Army tmibile forces in the south. As such the reserves for AG Centre were almost non-existent. When Bagration began, the Red Army had some 1.6 million troops, 32,000 artillery pieces and nearly 6000 tanks on the attack front (achieved by thinning other non-active fronts). AG Centre could muster only some 500,000 men about 3000 guns and less than 500 tanks and AG.

Despite a few local defensive successes, the Red Army went through the German front like butter. The initial assault teams were soon followed by larger exploitation forces that widened the breaches and pushed deep into the German rear. Note that the Germans had little/no opportunity to slow these drives as they main strength was in the south. There was little that one weak panzer (20th) and a de-motorised infantry division (14th) could do.

Combined with follow up offensives in the north Ukraine and southern Poland the German front from Riga to the Carpathian Mountains had effectively ceased to exist. Similar to what happened in the west, the Red Army offensive out ran its supply and staggered to a halt along the Vistula/East Prussian border and near Riga.

There are numerous texts available, Glantz and House (of course), Citino (very good), Zaloga and Krivosheev are all worth the read.

I would also recommend two monographs by Lt Col. (ret) Richard Armstrong (US Army). Colonel Armstrong was a Red Army analyst and intelligence officer in the US Army. Both papers explore the development of Red Army operational art and the use of deception in creating the conditions for victory.

"Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak", published by the Combat Studies Institute, US Army and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

"Battlefield Innovation: Red Army War Experiences, 1941-45", National Security Program Discussion Paper, Series 92-1, National Security Program, Harvard University, John F Kennedy School of Government.

Also:
"Analysis of Deep Attack Operations: Operation Bagration, Belorussia, 22 June-29 August 1944", LTC William M. Connor, Combat Studies Institute, Ft Leavenworth, KS.

 

[stuh42asl]

Yes, indeed, I am aware of Red Army "Deep Battle" and how they combined this with "Maskirovka" to aid in setting up conditions for the numerous penetrations that led to the collapse of the front. Note that T-34s, SU-85s and the early IS tanks were not confined to the roads running without tracks.

Red Army operations were fine tuned between late 42 and mid-44 and the doctrine called for the front to be penetrated in multiple areas such that reserves were soon exhausted/overwhelmed and the tactical and operational depth of the defence was penetrated and could not be repaired. This gave the Germans bad options - retreat, surrender, or die in place.

Bagration's success was also largely due to Makirovka, or Red Army deception tactics. The German command was convinced the summer offensive would be resumed in the Ukraine/southern Poland, believing they had located most of the Red Army tmibile forces in the south. As such the reserves for AG Centre were almost non-existent. When Bagration began, the Red Army had some 1.6 million troops, 32,000 artillery pieces and nearly 6000 tanks on the attack front (achieved by thinning other non-active fronts). AG Centre could muster only some 500,000 men about 3000 guns and less than 500 tanks and AG.

Despite a few local defensive successes, the Red Army went through the German front like butter. The initial assault teams were soon followed by larger exploitation forces that widened the breaches and pushed deep into the German rear. Note that the Germans had little/no opportunity to slow these drives as they main strength was in the south. There was little that one weak panzer (20th) and a de-motorised infantry division (14th) could do.

Combined with follow up offensives in the north Ukraine and southern Poland the German front from Riga to the Carpathian Mountains had effectively ceased to exist. Similar to what happened in the west, the Red Army offensive out ran its supply and staggered to a halt along the Vistula/East Prussian border and near Riga.

There are numerous texts available, Glantz and House (of course), Citino (very good), Zaloga and Krivosheev are all worth the read.

I would also recommend two monographs by Lt Col. (ret) Richard Armstrong (US Army). Colonel Armstrong was a Red Army analyst and intelligence officer in the US Army. Both papers explore the development of Red Army operational art and the use of deception in creating the conditions for victory.

"Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak", published by the Combat Studies Institute, US Army and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

"Battlefield Innovation: Red Army War Experiences, 1941-45", National Security Program Discussion Paper, Series 92-1, National Security Program, Harvard University, John F Kennedy School of Government.

Read those as well as other books...been researching for over 30 years.

 

[Actionjick]

Bumping this up for some of our new players.

 

[Actionjick]

Just read through this thread again, really some good stuff!

 

[jyoung]

I would become a master of Platoon Movement.

Sorry if this has been thrashed out before, I was wondering if there was a design rationale for why an AFV platoon can only be fired upon after entering a new hex, whereas a single AFV gets rounds on it as soon as it expends a start MP. It seems to offer many (IMHO) sleazy escape options that wouldn't be available to the single AFV (which doesn't have to wait around for all its brethren to execute the same manouevre, so should be more agile).

 

[Sparafucil3]

Platoon Movement was re-written. Be careful you are using the latest version of the rules. Having said that, it can be subject to some abuse although most of it was written out in the update. For instance, a Start MP is one Impulse and could be shot on in the new rules. Each unit gets to make on expenditure of MF/MP's. If that's a Start MP, that's one expenditure and they can be fire on. This is all in D14.3x. -- jim

 

[jyoung]

Thanks Jim! That'll learn me for using my old rulebook. I didn't think to look in my pocket edition, where I can now see it all clearly laid out, before I fired off the question. Much like I usually don't think before moving my tanks into harm's way .

 

[Sparafucil3]

Thanks Jim! That'll learn me for using my old rulebook. I didn't think to look in my pocket edition, where I can now see it all clearly laid out, before I fired off the question. Much like I usually don't think before moving my tanks into harm's way .

It happens. I use an eASLRB that is complete with all the patches, errata, etc. I also have all the Q&A close at hand. Now, if I could only think as fast as I type sometimes ... -- jim

 

[Actionjick]

Thanks Jim! That'll learn me for using my old rulebook. I didn't think to look in my pocket edition, where I can now see it all clearly laid out, before I fired off the question. Much like I usually don't think before moving my tanks into harm's way

It is interesting to take a rule which seems to be a major handicap and then to find the advantages that may be there, either by itself or combined with another rule or concept.

 

[Actionjick]

It happens. I use an eASLRB that is complete with all the patches, errata, etc. I also have all the Q&A close at hand. Now, if I could only think as fast as I type sometimes ... -- jim

Well at least you can type fast. Some of us can't do either, much less both.

 

[Rock SgtDan]

Does the tank wish to enter a hex that it has insufficient MP to enter?
If not, it's good.
If it does, and chooses to enter then it enters the new hex at whatever MP expenditure the driver want to spend.

I was following you until that.

IF THE TANK DOES wish to enter a hex that it has insufficient MP to enter,
AND IT chooses to enter
THEN it enters the new hex at whatever MP expenditure the driver want to spend.

So, if the hex costs X MP and the tank has <X , I can enter the hex and choose to spend anything from zero to infinity MP doing so (declaring the MP at the moment of entry).

 

[Rock SgtDan]

Altered this slightly:

If a - AFV- only have 1/2 MP left, you can claim that you want to move the AFV into Open Ground for 10 MP and thereby allowed by the rule to stay put in your Location,

This makes sense. I am driving my tank at 5 mph and come into view of ground that I want to cross at 30mph. So I [stop, back up, and get a running start so I am in 4th gear]
by the time I enter that ground.

The actions in [...] take place within the hex I am in, so in the scale of the game, it is not represented by actually moving the counter. Only the time it takes is represented (abstractly) in the game - I enter the hex next turn.

That situation is the converse of being allowed to enter a hex by spending MORE than the minimum entry cost - I have enough time/distance to get into 4th gear by the time I exit my current hex.

 

[Rock SgtDan]

Why is the website deleting my "greater than" characters, which I use to denote quoted material, in accordance with the most fundamental RFCs in the computer world? In this composition box, while editing in this comment, I see the word QUOTE in brackets [] where the symbol ought to be; but when I Preview, the material is not visibly denoted as being a quote, in any manner. So I will write QUOTE or END QUOTE instead... what a royal PIA.

QUOTE
D.2 Vehicular Movement
2.1 A vehicle may expend up to its full MP allotment (and tracked vehicles may even exceed it at some risk; ESB, 2.5) during its own MPh in accordance with the COT entered, as listed on the pertinent MP Entrance Cost column of the Terrain Chart.
END QUOTE

Is the word "may" used a) conversationally, or is it supposed to b) indicate a player choice?
THUS:
a) A vehicle may BE REQUIRED TO expend up to its full MP allotment TO ENTER A HEX, in accordance with the COT entered...

b) THE PLAYER MAY DESIGNATE THAT a vehicle IS expendING up to its full MP allotment TO ENTER A HEX, in accordance with the COT entered...

QUOTE [ & INTERPRET ]
A vehicle may enter one or more enemy-occupied hexes during the Mph, ...
and perhaps additional MP cost [BEYOND THE MP ENTRANCE COST MIGHT BE REQUIRED OR SOMETIMES OPTIONALLY SPENT...]
END QUOTE

And MF/MPs expended to move into a hex are deemed to be spent in the hex moved into, right?
At the moment the only place I can locate where the rules specify in which hex the entry MF/MP is spent is:

QUOTE
4.63 Dash:...The Dashing unit... may expend no MF in ...the Dashed-to location beyond the... required to enter, ...
END QUOTE

 

[Rock SgtDan]

"D2.4 MOTION STATUS: ... A vehicle may end its MPh in Motion without expending all of its MP only if it has insufficient MP remaining to enter the next hex it wishes to enter.

"D2.1 ... A vehicle which ends its MPh with MP remaining is assumed to use all those MP in that hex.
von Marwitz

The rules specify a HEX. If you are in Bypass, are you IN a hex? If so, WHICH hex?
Maybe the sentences specifying "in a hex" are moot with respect to Bypass ?

 

[Gordon]

You are in the hex of the obstacle being bypassed.

 

[Sparafucil3]

You are in the hex of the obstacle being bypassed.

Players know this. Don't feed the troll. -- jim

 

[von Marwitz]

You are in the hex of the obstacle being bypassed.

I find that Rock Sgt. Dan is one of the most notorious trolls here on GS. He's been quiet for a while, now apparently, he's popped up again.

His usual ploy is to question the obvious and then laughing his a** off while those not yet acqainted to him pain themselves trying to explain it to him. Or he is encouraging others to do some work for him by following up on some of his notions. Numerous veteran players have offered to teach him the game years ago. He has never taken up the offer.

He went to my Ignore List years ago. No other user around here has ever deserved it more than him IMHO.

Of course everyone is free to handle him as he sees fit. Find out for yourself. I wouldn't waste my time. Just my 2 cents. Never regretted it, I won't even care to check if he's changed. He has duly earned my doubting that in the past.

von Marwitz

 

[Gordon]

Thanks for the info.