How could KGP have achieved more?

[The Purist]

True,.... but I would submit that XXX Corps had a better chance of crossing the Rhine at Arnhem than Peiper did of ever reaching the Meuse.

Note that by the time Peiper was crossing the upper Ambleve near Stavelot the balance of forces that favoured the Germans on the 16th had already been eliminated. By the 18th of December, the informality of the American command system (and the fact that most div and corps commanders knew each well and were, if not actual classmates, very close to it) had set in motion the movement of troops the Germans had not anticipated.

On the 16th CCB 9th Arm'd was released from reserve to move to St Vith

On the 17th those parts of 4th ID not already fighting in the south were shifting north. The 1st and 9th ID and 7th AD were moving to the Ardennes from the north.

On the 18th the 10th Armoured is marching to the southern flank with CCB tasked to move to Bastogne (both in their areas by nightfall). Lead elements of 101st AB begin arriving at Senonchamps SW of Bastogne with the first battalions moving east of Bastogne by the morning of the 19th.

The same happens with 82nd AB near Werbomont up north, with the first troops crossing the Lienne River by dawn the 19th and bumping into Peiper's scouts at Rahier that evening. Finally, 30th Infantry is coming down from the north and forming combat teams north of the La Gleize-Stoumont area that evening. These would be in position the next morning as Peiper arrives.

On the 19th the 3rd Armoured and 334 Reg't of 84th ID begin arriving from the north and will be moving to block the 6th Pz Army that evening.

And on it goes.

In the north alone, by the evening of the 18th (3rd day), the US 1st and 9th Armies have moved or are moving 1st, 9th, 30th and 84th Infantry divisions, 3rd and 7th Armored Divisions to the American left in the Ardennes while 82nd Airborne arrives from SHAEF reserve. Add to this their attached tank, tank destroyer, AA and masses of and corps and army artillery assets and it soon becomes evident that Peiper has no where to go without crossing corps and army boundaries,...and completely fouling the lines of supply and routes of neighbouring units.

A better argument may be to throw German reserves such as the Fuhrer Begleit and Grenadier Brigades, 2nd SS, 9th SS Pz and 3rd Pz Gren Div behind 5th Pz Army's breakthrough and use the 6th Pz Army to guard the northern flank against US counterattacks. However, these units are largely deployed behind 6th Pz Army (along with their logistics tails) and could not be easily shifted.

Besides, at this point it is not yet clear to the Germans what is happening and they still think Peiper may break free and the US front collapse south of Elsenborn. By the time they realise the US Army has won the race in the north it is too late.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Arnhem and the Meuse were both fantasies. Hitler could have spent his money so to speak to much better effect in the East (or even Italy), and Montgomery should have used his airborne divisions to secure the Scheldt. I believe II Canadian Corps had even devised a plan for taking Walcheren Island by paratroops - but in the end bombed the dikes and drowned much of the island while leaving the coastal guns intact and necessitating amphibious operations anyway.

 

[The Purist]

Hindsight gives us many options. It's hard for us to understand the viewpoint of the allied commanders at the beginning of Sep 44. They truly believed the Germans were beaten while not recognizing (entirely) the shift in reality brought on by logistics tails running all the way back to Normandy.

Our view is 20/20,... theirs,.... not so much.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

True enough. The one thing I find interesting is when people say how out of character Market-Garden was for Montgomery (I believe Bradley was one of them in his memoirs). But Monty actually planned a second parachute drop in the days immediately following D-Day, in order to capture Caen. He was vetoed by the RAF.

Is there a list anywhere of the 17 or 18 cancelled airborne ops between D-Day and Market-Garden? I'd be curious to know how many would have taken place on the 21 Army Group front.

 

[The Purist]

Of the sixteen most never got past the initial planning stage.

Seven apparently got further along before Market-Garden.

Transfigure, "Axehead, Boxer, Linnet, Linett II, Infatuate and Comet.

Here is a wiki link for what it may be worth

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Allied_Airborne_Army#:~:text=The First Allied Airborne Army was an Allied,Western Europe from August 1944 to May 1945.

 

[Eagle4ty]

True,.... but I would submit that XXX Corps had a better chance of crossing the Rhine at Arnhem than Peiper did of ever reaching the Meuse.

Note that by the time Peiper was crossing the upper Ambleve near Stavelot the balance of forces that favoured the Germans on the 16th had already been eliminated. By the 18th of December, the informality of the American command system (and the fact that most div and corps commanders knew each well and were, if not actual classmates, very close to it) had set in motion the movement of troops the Germans had not anticipated.

On the 16th CCB 9th Arm'd was released from reserve to move to St Vith

On the 17th those parts of 4th ID not already fighting in the south were shifting north. The 1st and 9th ID and 7th AD were moving to the Ardennes from the north.

On the 18th the 10th Armoured is marching to the southern flank with CCB tasked to move to Bastogne (both in their areas by nightfall). Lead elements of 101st AB begin arriving at Senonchamps SW of Bastogne with the first battalions moving east of Bastogne by the morning of the 19th.

The same happens with 82nd AB near Werbomont up north, with the first troops cross the Lienne River by dawn the 19th and bumping into Peiper's scouts at Rahier that evening. Finally, 30th Infantry is coming down from the north and forming combat teams north of the La Gleize-Stoumont area that evening. These would be in position the next morning as Peiper arrives.

On the 19th the 3rd Armoured and 334 Reg't of 84th ID begin arriving from the north and will be moving to block the 6th Pz Army that evening.

And on it goes.

In the north alone, by the evening of the 18th (3rd day), the US 1st and 9th Armies have moved or are moving 1st, 9th, 30th and 84th Infantry divisions, 3rd and 7th Armored Divisions to the American left in the Ardennes while 82nd Airborne arrives from SHAEF reserve. Add to this their attached tank, tank destroyer, AA and masses of and corps and army artillery assets and it soon becomes evident that Peiper has no where to go without crossing corps and army boundaries,...and completely fouling the lines of supply and routes of neighbouring units.

A better argument may be to throw German reserves such as the Fuhrer Begleit and Grenadier Brigades, 2nd SS, 9th SS Pz and 3rd Pz Gren Div behind 5th Pz Army's breakthrough and use the 6th Pz Army to guard the northern flank against US counterattacks. However, these units are largely deployed behind 6th Pz Army (along with their logistics tails) and could not be easily shifted.

Besides, at this point it is not yet clear to the Germans what is happening and they still think Peiper may break free and the US front collapse south of Elsenborn. By the time they realise the US Army has won the race in the north it is too late.

Perhaps one of the most overlooked yet significant battles determined the eventual outcome for KGP happened a couple of days prior to to start of The Battle Of The Bulge. Of course I'm talking of the almost never heard of battle for Kesternicht where Gerow's V Corps would attack towards Lammersdorf & Whalerscheid into into the flank of Gen Hitzfeld's LXVII Korps overlooking the entire staging areas of the 6th Pz Armie on the northern flank occurring on the 13-14-15 Dec 1944. Because of the American attack the LXVII Korps had to react with a considerable force to stop the 78th & 2nd U.S. Division's thrust through Kesternicht thus denying/delaying those German forces for the initial push toward Monschau-Eupen. The battle to retain their flank would involve elements of 3 German Divisions, 272d VGD, 326th VGD, and also the 277th VGD which had been tasked to shift further south to assist the 1st Pz Korps initial assault, not to mention a great portion of the Korps supporting units of assault guns and artillery pieces and ammunition for their scheduled assault on the 16th.
Though technically a U.S. defeat as the Germans were able to push the American's back out of Kesternicht, the force required to do so diminished LXVII Korps assets available for its scheduled attack. All told about 2/3rds of his assault guns were unavailable on the 16th and the 326th VGD was torn up as they arrived and committed to action piece-meal; the employment of the 272d VGD was totally scrapped altogether, and because of lack of ammunition and transport only about 10% of the Korps and NW artillery became available not to mention the disjunct in planning and coordination. Had the Germans been able to employ the full combat power of the LXVII Korps against the 99th ID & the 102nd Cav on the 16th and cut the Eupen-Monshau supply route (very possible if not probable), the U.S. would have been forced to use a 180 mile detour through Marche to arrive on the battlefield rather than a roughly 2 hour drive from 1st Army area to the Elsenborn area. If one uses the normal rate of march calculations of 25MPH for units as a basis, you can see what effect this may have had. As it was in the 1st two days both the U.S. 1st, 9th, & 30th Divisions had been inserted into the battle on the Northern flank of the bulge and by the 20th at least 6 more divisions/Corps assets (including 3 armored divisions) had passed through Monchau to contest the advance of the 1st Pz Armie; Good news for the Americans, not so much for KGP.

 

[Faded 8-1]

One of my all time favorites. They dont make movies like that one anymore. I even remember the scene you are talking about. A little arrogant to think they were after him, haha.

One of my favorites too.
Believe that General was FM Model.

 

[Faded 8-1]

Another amusing scene with the German high command was when von Runnstedt asks his generals if the Allies impending offensive would be led by Patton or Montgomery. They say Patton. Runnstedt says yes, it will be Patton - not even Eisenhower is that stupid.

 

[The Purist]

Perhaps one of the most overlooked yet significant battles determined the eventual outcome for KGP happened a couple of days prior to to start of The Battle Of The Bulge....

They say timing is everything in war.

The attack by US 2nd ID towards the Wahlerscheid Crossroads did impact the 326th VG but by the end of the 15th, even though the 2nd Divs 38th Reg't had taken the crossroads after three days of fighting, the attacking units of the 9th were depleted and tired. This allowed the 326th to side step a couple of weak battalions south so the 277th VG could move to attack the 394th of the 99th. However this meant that the 326th was effectively out of the battle and the German attack at Monschau never got off the ground.

Interestingly, had the US attack begun perhaps two days earlier they may have forced the German attack to be postponed while the Wahlerscheid attack was dealt with.

What is remarkable is that despite this fighting the Germans completely missed the presence of two of the 2nd Division's reg'ts (9th and 38th) attacking through the 99th's 395th. Not only that but the 23rd Inf Reg't of 2nd Div as well as the supporting 644th TD Bn, 612th TD Bn (Towed) and 741st Tank Bn were unengaged (mainly due to terrain) and were back in reserve near Elsenborn. When these troops moved forward they formed the basis of the defence of the twin villages of Rockerath and Krinkelt as well as protected the retreat route south from the crossroads. Together with the 99th's reserve battalion and the 99th's 801st TD Bn (Towed) they cut great swaths through the young recruits of the 12th SS infantry and shot dozen of tanks and assault guns into scrap. The Volksgrenadiers of the 277th, attacking late, were equally roughly handled in the Hansfelderwald a few miles east of the twin villages.

This is why I believe the threat to Monschau supply road was transitory. Once the 2nd ID had withdrawn from the north and the Monschau area was secured, V Corps anchored its right on Elsenborn Ridge with 2nd and part of 99th Divs. The 12th SS was further mauled in repeated futile attacks trying to take the ridge. It is probable that with the weight of American firepower, especially with the 15+ artillery battalions available to the two divisions, any German attack in this sector was likely to fail.

Peiper would get no help from that sector.

This pic is from the NE corner of Rockerath Dec 20, 2018. It was pouring rain so it was hard to take any good shots. A bit to the south opposite Krinkelt the ground drops sharply southeast and east of the ridge the villages sit on. It was no wonder the German assaults were such a problem - steep slopes to the southeast of the villages, heavy woods to the northeast. The ground was like a sponge,...my hiking boots were sinking into the mud despite the pasture in nearby fields.




The approach into Rocherath from the road in Dec 2018. The two villages appear as one and the same and run for maybe a kilometre and half north to south. Still not very wide but they dominate the ridge they are on.



2nd Division monument in Rockerath-Krinkelt (had to crop quite a bit to fit file size limit here).



And the 99th Divisions monument

 

[Old Noob]

Reread the Osprey books concerning Market-Garden over the weekend. Might do the same for the Ardennes.

What strikes me is that those who planned both offensives failed to take into account that the defenders might react a little faster than supposed
on bringing up reserves to plug gaps.

 

[Gamer72]

Just finished my 3rd reading of Time for Trumpets, an excellent book. One question I keep coming back to is how could KGP have achieved more than they did? High water mark in the area of Stoumont Station, neat Stoumont. I'm asking what could KGP themselves, 1st SS panzer etc done differently - with what they knew at the time, to result in greater results by Peiper?

I recommend The Devil’s Adjutant by Michael Reynolds to you - terrible title, excellent study of KGP’s operations in the Bulge. The author discusses several factors in Peiper’s failure to reach the Meuse, mostly occurring higher up the command chain, but highlights the failure to attack Stavelot on the evening of 17th December as a major contributor to the delays that ultimately stifled KGP’s movements.
The author also makes the following statement which others may wish to discuss : “Four days after the start of the offensive, German forces were nowhere near, let alone over, the Meuse; but despite all his problems Peiper, as planned, had made the best progress. He had covered over 100km in 72 hours. Forty-six years later, using the very latest technology and equipment, it took the British 1st Armoured Division only two hours less to cover the same distance in the 1991 Gulf War.”

 

[The Purist]

Reynolds is an interesting read but there is a bit too much hindsight in his arguments.

I would suggest Peiper could not attack Stavelot on the evening of 17 Dec.

At least twice during the day Peipers lead units had run into small units of US armour and other "accidental" roadblocks. In this one case it cost a destroyed tank or two and the lead halftracks. East of of Leigneuville that afternoon, for example, two Sherman tanks from a maintenance unit of the 14th Tank Bn (CCB 9th AD), were in place to cover the road (one immobile), as 9th AD was fully equipped with 76mm Shermans these two tanks forced Peipers column to a halt and it took most of an hour to sort out the situation. Peiper then deployed his lead units to take the down, further impacting progress.

His troops had been on the move since the early hours of the 16th and it was beginning to show. As his column pushed west again the sun set and he did not arrive on the heights above Stavelot until 1830h, in total darkness. His lead unit was again hit by a few engineers with Bazookas, losing another tank and after a brief firefight, his troops pull back up the road.

Peiper then saw what he believed to be heavy reinforcements entering Stavelot and prepared to assault the town. The fog of war and fatigue played a role here as most (not all) of the vehicles he saw were retreating echelon units or units moving south to fight at St Vith. Peiper deployed to attack but wanted to give his men some rest before doing so (now more than two days without rest).

While all this was going on a company of armoured infantry with three 57mm guns, supported by a platoon of towed tank destroyers ( four 76mm AT guns) were already in place on the other side of the bridge over the Ambleve. When Peiper advanced, his troops hit this position and his lead units were again hammered, losing quite a few infantry to canister fire and HE rounds as well as heavy small arms. The German infantry dispersed into the houses east of the river and would not be able to press forward again until near dawn when more light allowed the German tanks to advance in support. The American 76mm guns knocked out another four German tanks before they were forced to withdraw with the infantry and Peiper was able to push into and through Stavelot.

All this aside, American engineers were already in place at Trois Ponts and when Peiper approached from the north they blew the bridges Peiper needed to get south of the Ambleve and back on his way west. Peiper now had no choice but to turn west and north towards La Gleize and Stoumont.

The rest we know.

The thing is, had Peiper stuck to his own assigned route, he may have missed all these roadblocks and arrived at his orginally planned crossing point 3 miles southeast of Trois Pont (see below). He didn't like the nature of the roads so he deflected north and into trouble.


One of the bridges east of Trois Pont (before the Salm joins the Ambleve).

 

[Actionjick]

Reynolds is an interesting read but there is a bit too much hindsight in his arguments.

I would suggest Peiper could not attack Satvelot on the evening of 17 Dec.

At least twice during the day Peipers lead units had run into small units of US armour and other "accidental" roadblocks. In this one case it cost a destroyed tank or two and the lead halftracks. East of of Leigneuville that afternoon, for example, two Sherman tanks from a maintenance unit of the 14th Tank Bn (CCB 9th AD), were in place to cover the road (one immobile), as 9th AD was fully equipped with 76mm Shermans these two tanks forced Peipers column to a halt and it took most of an hour to sort out the situation. Peiper then deployed his lead units to take the down, further impacting progress.

His troops had been on the move since the early hours of the 16th and it was beginning to show. As his column pushed west again the sun set and he did not arrive on the heights above Stavelot until 1830h, in total darkness. His lead unit was again hit by a few engineers with Bazookas, losing another tank and after a brief firefight, his troops back up the road.

Peiper then saw what he believed to be heavy reinforcements entering Stavelot and prepared to assault the town. The fog of war and fatigue played a role here as most (not all) of the vehicles he saw were retreating echelon units or units moving south to fight at St Vith. Peiper deployed to attack but wanted to give his men some rest before doing so (now more than two days without rest).

While all this was going on a company of armoured infantry with three 57mm guns, supported by a platoon of towed tank destroyers ( four 76mm AT guns) were already in place on the other side of the bridge over the Ambleve. When Peiper advanced, his troops hit this position and his lead units were again hammered, losing quite a few infantry to canister fire and HE rounds as well as heavy small arms. The German infantry dispersed into the houses east of the river and would not be able to press forward again until near dawn when more light allowed the German tanks to advance in support. The American 76mm guns knocked out another four German tanks before they were forced to withdraw with the infantry and Peiper was able to push into and through Stavelot.

All this aside, American engineers were already in place at Trois Ponts and when Peiper approached from the north they blew the bridges Peiper needed to get south of the Ambleve and back on his way west. Peiper now had no choice but to turn west and north towards La Gleize and Stoumont.

The rest we know.

The thing is, had Peiper stuck to his own assigned route, he may have missed all these roadblocks and arrived at his orginally planned crossing point 3 miles southeast of Trois Pont (see below). He didn't like the nature of the roads so he deflected north and into trouble.


One of the bridges east of Trois Pont (before the Salm joins the Ambleve).

View attachment 14759

Nice. Why go to the library when I've got you,!?

 

[FrankJ]

Reread the Osprey books concerning Market-Garden over the weekend. Might do the same for the Ardennes.

What strikes me is that those who planned both offensives failed to take into account that the defenders might react a little faster than supposed
on bringing up reserves to plug gaps.

I like the Osprey books. There are also some good books that go even more in depth on these battles. I will sometimes use the Osprey books as a reference because their maps are so good.

when you mention reaction time, what comes to mind for me is the deployment of the 101st airborne division to Bastogne. IMO, one of the best decisions of the western front campaign. I am also learning new things about how quickly the allies deployed their forces from some of Gerry‘s posts. It seems the allies were slow at first to react, but once they realized it was a full offensive, things moved into a different gear. The Germans had surprise on their side, but the allies at a certain point reacted full on, which may have not always been the case in other ww2 battles.

 

[FrankJ]

Another amusing scene with the German high command was when von Runnstedt asks his generals if the Allies impending offensive would be led by Patton or Montgomery. They say Patton. Runnstedt says yes, it will be Patton - not even Eisenhower is that stupid.

Von Rundstedt was always a interesting historical person in my book. I got the feeling he had the ability to instill confidence and was also very blunt in his opinions.

There was a quote from Patton that I always liked. At a meeting with other allied generals at the beginning of the bulge crisis, he apparently said we could still lose this war. It’s one thing to look back at history but being there in the moment with multiple panzer divisions breaking through your front lines took some nerves of steel to overcome and not panic.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Von Rundstedt was always a interesting historical person in my book. I got the feeling he had the ability to instill confidence and was also very blunt in his opinions.

There was a quote from Patton that I always liked. At a meeting with other allied generals at the beginning of the bulge crisis, he apparently said we could still lose this war. It’s one thing to look back at history but being there in the moment with multiple panzer divisions breaking through your front lines took some nerves of steel to overcome and not panic.

Patton also made a joke, telling everyone assembled that if they had any guts, they'd let the Germans make it to Paris before counter-attacking at the base of the advance, because that way they could bag more German divisions. IIRC Eisenhower told him to shut up.

Patton did the same thing at a salt mine in Bavaria - riding a rickety elevator suspended by a single cable down the mine shaft, he looked at the other generals on the lift with him, including Eisenhower, and remarked that if the single cable were to let go, promotions in the US Army would have been considerably accelerated. Eisenhower had the same response for him....guess whenever Eisenhower got nervous, Patton got cheeky.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

when you mention reaction time, what comes to mind for me is the deployment of the 101st airborne division to Bastogne. IMO, one of the best decisions of the western front campaign. I am also learning new things about how quickly the allies deployed their forces from some of Gerry‘s posts. It seems the allies were slow at first to react, but once they realized it was a full offensive, things moved into a different gear. The Germans had surprise on their side, but the allies at a certain point reacted full on, which may have not always been the case in other ww2 battles.

Part of that quick reaction was putting forces on the north side of the Bulge under one commander - Montgomery. This included the 1st and 9th US Armies. Montgomery managed to hold on to the 9th until the Rhine Crossings in March, long after 1st Army went back to American command (12th Army Group).

 

[The Purist]

That decision made sense as it soon became apparent Bradley couldn't manage the battle with the front split in two. Bradley bares some responsibility in Eisenhower making this decision as he refused to move his AG HQ from Luxembourg City to a point west of the Bulge where he would have had better communications with the northern and southern sections. Land lines had been cut and radio communications with division and corps HQs were not reliable over the distances involved.

Bradley accepted the decision in the end and later admitted that had Montgomery been American, he would not have reacted as he did at the time.

One important decision Bradley did make on 17 Dec (prior to the 19 Dec conference with Eisenhower) was to order Patton to start winding down his planned attack into the Saar and be prepared to pivot north for an attack into the southern wing of the salient. When Patton made his "I can attack with three divisions in three days" comment it surprised many. What they did not know that the troops had already begun redeploying. It was a crafty bit of PR on Patton's part as "I can attack with three divisions in three days, General Bradley had me begin moving them two days ago" would not have warranted any comment at all.

Personalities and relationships between senior officers can sometimes affect operations as much as troop movements.

 

[von Marwitz]

One of my all time favorites. They dont make movies like that one anymore. I even remember the scene you are talking about. A little arrogant to think they were after him, haha.

Ha!

I, Oberst von Marwitz, can assure you: Genius just appears as arrogance when viewed from below.

Had you given me the resources of a handful of allied divisions and set me in command of an army, I would have swept the Allies back into the sea and reconquered all relevant French wine-growing districts to boot.

von Marwitz ?

 

[Eagle4ty]

One has to also remember the Western Allies were the most mobile armies of WW-II. With the plethora of Jeeps, 6x6 trucks, halftracks and mobile gun platforms they were able to shift and deliver substantial firepower to a sector faster than their adversaries. Even logistically the Western Allies, though not having completely solved their logistical problems present on the continent, were in far better position than the Germans. Add to this the fact the Allies simply had the resources available to create and/or maintain reserves along the front and could pull other formations from the front-lines simply because the Germans lacked the ability to provide for any simultaneous subsidiary offensive action to draw off Allied combat power to other sectors. In short, strategically and operationally, WaM in general and KGP's thrust in particular was a gamble, a throw of the dice needing snake-eyes and probably a subsequent dr to succeed. Even if KGP had succeeded along the Ambleve, they most probably would have run into substantial forces at/near Liege/Huy, U.S. or British or both, that would have precluded the successful accomplishment of their mission even if they had captured sufficient fuel reserves at Spa.

At the tactical or tactical support level the disparity was even greater. The Western Allies, and the U.S. in particular, were able to replace combat losses much more quickly than the Germans. The replacement system of the U.S. Army, though a subject of some some controversy and somewhat stretched for adequate trained personnel, was able to replace a large majority of combat losses within a matter of days if not hours. The Germans on the other hand had to rely upon additional combat formations being funneled into a fight (not really a solution for Peiper) or return of wounded to the fight to replace losses. On the material side there is no real comparison as the equipment and ordnance replacement systems were so vastly different both in function and circumstance. The Sherman for example could usually be refitted at forward "trains" areas and returned quickly to the fight where the German panzers had to be withdrawn to higher echelon maintenance facilities far in the rear (again not an option for Peiper) or left on the battlefield for such minor problems as a mechanical malfunction or accident. As for ammo and POL (petrol-oil-lubricants) resupply, nothing more than cursory examination need be entailed; KGP had only what it took along or could capture, the U.S. and an almost inexhaustible supply. In the end KGP was simply at the end of its tether along the Ambleve River.