The US Army conducted far more amphibious landings in the Pacific than the USMC did, but that is not what I was talking about.
A quick look at a list of major amphib "landings" at
may not support that assertion. And furthermore I stated "assaults." In the most major landings in the Pacific that involved both Marine and Army forces, the marines were the intial assualt force and the Army was a reinforceing force or replacment forces (such as at Guadalcanal).
Now if you add up less than division scale landings, there may be more Army landings in number.
As to unit training, a good exercise would be to determine the following:
How many days between landings were Marine & Airbonre units units out of contact and able to train.
How many combat veterans were infused into newly built divsions. How many of those veterens had made an amohib assualt.
Critically, how many unit staffs & Commanders conducted mulitple landings.
Did Army divisions train specifically for amphibious assaults? Did they train to the same standard and doctrine as the USMC (or better)? (Talking only Pacific Army divisons in all of this)
However, all too often (on Guadalcanal, Bougainville, etc.) the fighting they engaged in was *exactly* the same sort of fighting the U.S. army was engaged in.
That is a tough one to consider. To me, the fight that the 1st MARDIV had on Guadalcanal was different that of the Army. the 164th Regiment only faced a few nights of the Japanese attacks whereas the Marines did for months. The rest of the fight on the island was going on the offense.
The fight on Iwo Jima was different than that of Bougainville. Okinawa was different than both.
So it is hard for me to understand what you mean by "exactly" the same fight. Similar, maybe, but hardly exactly. Please elaborate.