Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied) [PARTIAL]

Veers

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8 January, 1942

To what fate have I arrived?

I have arrived in Burma, at the capital and main port of the country, Rangoon. Through low cloud and near zero visibility, my Indian pilot skilfully touched down in our light transport amid the bustle of activity that a city often will experience when war is quickly headed in its direction. Unceremoniously, I exit the craft just as a light drizzle begins; a foreshadowing, I suspect, of what conditions will be like in this part of the world.

The disorganization that has fallen over the country is quickly made evident by the lack of any transportation to take me to my destination in the city, Burma Army Headquarters. Fortunately, my ADC found and confiscated a jeep from a British soldier who also grudgingly gave directions to Burma Army HQ.

Arriving at Burma Army Headquarters, I finally met General Wavell. He was, at least in my opinion, an excellent military commander who had done an admirable job in the Middle East, considering the resources he had been allotted. Churchill, however, thought otherwise, and so he had been removed from Cairo and sent to the backwater that was Burma, only now to be thrown into another ill-prepared for battle that he would be hard-pressed to come away from any better off.


Wavell was currently busy dealing with the tactical situation on the Salween R., preparation for the defence of Rangoon against possible sea invasion, and trying to organize the entry of Chinese units into north-east Burma. Understandably then, he was pleased to see me and quickly brought me up to speed on the situation:

The Japanese had invaded January 1st, crossing into Burma from Siam, a country which had recently signed a treaty of friendship with Japan. Wavell had ordered 17 IND ID to deploy east of the Salween, in an attempt to extricate 2 and 16 Brigades and the division's infantry. It had been a gamble, but it paid off, as the Japanese had gone for securing Moulmein, instead of massing their 33 ID in an attempt to destroy the 17th.
With those elements rescued the Salween had been crossed, the bridge destroyed, and excellent defensive positions on the western bank taken up to cover the crossing. 1 BUR Bgd (1 BUR ID) had been deployed south of the bridge, guarding the crossing at Martaban.
Further north a possible crossing point f the Salween, near Mongpan, had been garrisoned by two Burman Battalions until the newly arrived CHI 93rd ID (Currently at the Chinese border) could get into position.
Jan 1


Jan 7


I was informed that I was to meet Maj Gen J Bruce-Scott at the main port, where he was supervising the fortification of the port with his newly arrived 13 BUR Bgd and 1 BUR Engineers. I was to get to know him, as he would be leading one of the divisions in my command. Finally I inquired of Wavell just what my position was. "Why command of I Burma Corps, weren't you informed?"

I had not been.

HISTORICAL NOTE: Slim was not as fortunate as I. He arrived after the decisive battle of the campaign had already been fought, that being the battle around the Sittang R. bridge. GOC Smyth had been faced with a cruel decision of whether to strand over half of his division on the wrong side of a destroyed bridge, or risk that vital bridge falling into enemy hands. Smyth, of course, decided to destroy the bridge, irrevocably damaging the only fighting unit between the Japanese and Rangoon.

DESIGN NOTE:
Having read Slim's memoirs, one realizes that the 7th ArmBgd was equipped with American Stuarts, not British Matildas. One of many things I would change if I was to rework this Burma Campaign scenario.
Using the same book as a source, it would appear that the Allied airforce is in much better shape than it was historically, numerically, at least. Historically, they did extremely well against the Japanese Army pilots, but in April (I think) they were entirely forced out of Burma due to Japanese numerical superiority and their ability, therefore, to bomb and destroy many Allied craft on the ground.
 
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Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

8 January, 1942 (evening)

After getting further acquainted with Wavell and his staff I drove down to the main port and set about finding Scott. I found him giving direction to the placement of one of the few 6 pound AT guns in the city that would hardly due if the Japanese chose to invade the city in force. Despite the sparse resources he had to work with, he was brimming with confidence and this was electric in galvanizing the men under his command into action. He had distinguished himself in the First World War, and I was now expecting him to again distinguish himself in this war.

Upon my announcement of my arrival, Scott took me on a quick tour of the defences, which were very meagre, but nothing more could be expected, given the scant resources with which Scott was forced to have to work with. I left confident that if the Japanese decided to invade Rangoon by sea that our troops would put up a good fight, but that the Japanese would have the city within a day.

Late into the night I held conferences with Wavell and gathered what would become I Burma Corps headquarters' troops. I was able to gather a small, poorly equipped group of maybe 60 officers and men and gave them orders to be ready to move out tomorrow morning. The only thing I could be happy with about my headquarters was my Chief of Staff, Brigadier "Taffy" Davies. He was an excellent staff officer, and I was confident he would be able to whip this headquarters into shape in no time.

9 January, 1942

With the rising of the sun, my ADC, myself, and my new staff joined a supply column headed for the Salween R. front. I was surprised not to see any 6 pounder ammo on-board. Inquiring with the captain in charge of the convoy he matter-of-factly informed me that there was no 6 pounder ammo on-board, because there were no 6 pounder guns to supply. I slumped back into my seat, as this was finally giving a picture of just how woefully supplied this theatre was.

12 January, 1942

Late in the evening, I arrived at the Salween bridge front to the sound of artillery and small arms fire. Quickly I rushed the 17th's Divisional Headquarters, where Major General Jakie Smyth was hurriedly giving orders for Brigadier Ekin's 46 Bgd to move forward to reinforce the north part of the line against attacking Japanese tanks.

Radio chatter was frantic as untried Indian troops faced armoured behemoths bearing down on their positions, after Japanese engineers had lain quick, temporary bridges across the Salween. As soon as it died down I introduced myself to Smyth, who was only too happy to see someone who could take over responsibility for supply, coordination of reinforcements, and communication with 1 BUR Bgd, guarding the ford north of Martaban. I found out from Smyth that the main attack was currently being put in by Japanese tanks, with very little infantry support. I also found out that his brigades were almost all at just about half strength, as this had been all that had been allocated to a theatre that nearly all thought was safe from the Japanese.

I stayed in Smyth's Headquarters until 2 or 3 am, when the fighting died down. In the distance one could see the flame that was the village of Kuzeik as it burned following the fight for the river on which bank it sat.

14 January

The 13th saw all but the hastily ordered in from reserve 46 Bgd thrown out of Kuzeik. Fortunately, however, 46 Bgd was able to hold onto the city throughout he 13th and 14th.

 
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15 January, 1942

Attacks by Japanese tanks against Kuzeik continued on the 15th, with Indian soldiers barely holding onto the city throughout the day. In the afternoon, with the Indians starting to tire out and dwindling in numbers, I made the call to Scott for him to bring his 13 Burman Bgd to the Salween bridge to act as a reserve for 17 IND ID, and to leave his chief engineer (and engineer Rgt) at Rangoon, to continue to work on the city's seaward defence. He informed me that he would make best speed, but would still not be able to arrive for four more days.

Throughout the day the RAF had been preforming air attacks on the Salween bridge and the Japanese troops crossing it. These attacks did little to damage the Japanese efforts, but they did reveal that the Japanese had about 70 tanks involved in the attack. All told we had about the same number of 2-pounder AT guns in the whole of 17 IND ID.

17 January, 1942
Though air attacks continued against Japanese forces on the 16th and 17th, on the 17th their tanks were reinforced by 143 Rgt-55 JPN ID, and with these reinforcements, they managed to get tanks and infantry over the Salween, but south of Kuzeik, where defences were not as strong. Here they forced Jones' 16 Bgd and half of Cowan's 48 Bgd to retreat, leaving the Japanese with bridgehead over their first major obstacle.

19 January, 1942

With Curtis' 13 BUR Bgd (which had arrived the night of 18-19) available we immediately committed it to battle in Kuzeik. This was not enough, however, to stop the Japanese tanks that entered the city and wrestled it from our control, as those tanks pushed out 2 and 46 Bgs (which had been the city's main defenders), 16 Bgd (which had retreated into the city from the south), and the hastily rushed in 13 BUR Bgd.

Japanese troops have landed by sea at Martaban! Under the cover of darkness Japanese ships had landed a battalion of the 112 Rgt-55 JPN ID in the village. 1 BUR Bgd had only become aware of the situation when Japanese troops had begun their attack from the south.

21 January, 1942

The Japanese continued to press my troops west of Kuzeik, though they made no significant gains as they were juggled to cover all avenues of Japanese advance.


 
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Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

22 January 1942

Attacks at the Salween bridge are very light today, as the Japanese work on getting more of their forces on the west bank. 55 JPN ID now has a Tank Rgt, a Light/Cav Rgt, an Inf Rgt, and an Engineer Rgt across.

24 January 1942

Japanese troops have crossed the Salween at Dagwin. Fortunately, 17 IND ID's Engineers are already partway up the road between Bilin and Papun.

26 January 1942

17 IND ID's Engineers report that there's a whole Japanese division driving down on them.

27 January, 1942

17 IND ID's Engineers report a Japanese Rgt has gotten in behind them.
It's clear now that the Japanese are planning to outflank our Salween defences and word is sent to Scott, commanding 1 BUR Bgs and 1 BUR ID's artillery in attacks against Martaban, to withdraw from his positions as quickly as possible.

After hours of attempting contact it becomes evident that Scott's wireless must be out. A truck and driver are sent barreling down the road to towards Martaban, bearing Scott's orders to immediately withdraw as quickly as possible.

With orders sent, I immediately headed to Smyth's HQ, informing him that if we were to have any chance of extricating Scott and his forces at Martaban 17 IND ID would have to hold its current position against the attacking 55 JPN ID, even as the JPN 33 ID was rapidly closing in on their only escape route, the bridge over the Sittang northwest of Kyaikto. Smyth, full of energy and confidence, promised he'd hold his current positions for as long as it took to get Scott's forces in the south back.

 
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29 January 1942

The morning saw heavy Japanese assaults by their tanks, the 143rd Rgt-JPn 55 ID, JPN 55 ID's Engineers, and JPN 55 ID's Light Infantry (Cavalry).

I arose to the announcement that the truck I had sent to get word to Scott had arrived safely back. They reported that Scott's Divisional headquarters had been bombed by Japanese craft and that most of his headquarters' staff had become casualties, but that he was going to withdraw with all haste,
after extricating his 1 BUR Bgd from the house-to-house fight for Martaban that it was currently embroiled in. They said that he estimated that, with his lack of signalling equipment following the Japanese aerial bombardment, he would need the better part of a week to finish the withdrawal. Almost a week was longer than I had expected to have to wait, but I got the feeling that Scott was not the kind of commander that would exaggerate difficulties.

With this news I immediately left my headquarters in Thaton, via jeep, to travel to Smyth’s HQ nearer to Kuzeik. The sounds of battle, which could be heard faintly even at Thaton grew in intensity as we approached Smyth’s HQ. It was obvious the Japanese were putting in a real effort. Upon arrival I found Smyth, filled him in and got the reaction I expected of him, and energetic, “We’ll hold, sir.”

30 January 1942

On the morning of the 30th I received the best news I had yet received since hearing that I would receive a Corps command: The Chinese were coming. In an unexpected move, Chiang-Kai-Shek had offered the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies to assist in the defence of Burma. The CHN 93rd ID had already arrived in the southern Shan States to head off any possible invasion of this area by the Japanese. It had been intended to add the CHN 55 ID to this defence, but Wavell, knowing the desperate situation my Corps was facing had gotten the Chinese to divert this division into southern Burma, using British rail transport. It was estimated that the CHN 55 ID would arrive on the 3rd or 4th near Waw, were it would take up defensive positions on the Sittang River and guard the bridge, and escape route, for I Burma Corps. Upon its arrival the division was to be temporarily added to I Burma Corps, under my direct command.

31 January 1942

In the middle of the day I drove to Smyth’s HQ to assess the situation and get his take on the progress of the battle. I arrived a pivotal time in the day, it seemed, as Smyth was just receiving signals from Brigadier Jones’ 16 Bgd that his troops were being overrun by Japanese tanks. I knew Smyth had no reserve to throw at this potential Japanese breakthrough and knew that the only thing Smyth could be telling Brigadier Jones was to hold on. After giving what I was sure he felt were unfair orders to his own subordinate he turned to me and informed that the battle was a close thing, as his troops appeared to outnumbered, outgunned, and out-trained. He assured me, however, that the élan of his troops and commanders would carry the day and that they would be able to hold long enough to extricate Scott and his troops in the south.

1 February 1942

The first day of the second month of my first Corps command saw, thankfully, no bad news. Fighting continued throughout the day, but no disasters ensued.
Further, it saw the second piece of critical news in this pivotal moment in the campaign. The tanks of Brigadier John Henry Anstice’s 7 Arm Bgd were going to be landing at Rangoon on 5 February, the first in a wave of reinforcements scheduled to arrive at Rangoon if it could be held through the month of February. Holding Rangoon through February seemed an impossible dream, but the news of the arrival of my first batch of tanks was an undeniable boost to my own morale, as well as that of the entire Corps.

2 February

The fact that a battalion of Burma Rifles and a Rgt of Indian Engineers had so far held off most of a Japanese Division was a genuine miracle; one I was always expecting to end at any minute. Late on the 2nd, the news finally came from the commander of the Engineer Rgt that his unit had been broken and was falling back on the hastily prepared defences the Burma Rifle Battalion had improvised.

3 February 1942

By the middle of the day Jones was reporting that he had lost contact with two of his three Battalions and that he was hard pressed to keep the last Battalion under his command together as they were pushed back another 10km or so, with their backs to Bilin, north of Thaton.

4 February 1942

The rain began late in the evening...

GAME NOTE: Rain=Cease Fire TO I activated on turn 5, which enacts on turn 6, which begins Feb 5.

HISTORICAL NOTE: Jackie Smyth lost the decisive battle of the early campaign when Japanese forces got between the majority of his 17 IND ID and the Sittang Bridge.
Had Silvain managed to get his troops between my forces and the Sittang Bridge, I likely would have lost any chance of eventually liberating Burma at all!

 
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5 February 1942

The rain continued...and it would be the perfect mask for our withdrawal. To this end I gave Smyth orders to prepare to extricate whatever parts of his division as he could.

6 February 1942

Japanese attacks had quieted down to almost nothing. It was assumed that with their tanks bogged down, the Japanese had decided to halt their attacks here and await our encirclement by JPN 33 ID.
Midway through the day Smyth radioed me with the news that communication with Brigadier Ekin’s 46 IND Bgd had not been re-established, and it could only be assumed that they had had their wireless sets destroyed, or worse, that the entire brigade had already been wiped out. I informed him that if we could not regain contact with them by tomorrow we would be forced to withdraw without them. This was a very unfortunate piece of news, as it meant that now both of my divisions would be down to just 2 brigades.

News also arrived that 7 ArmBgd had arrived and was heading east.

7 February 1942

Scott’s 1 BUR Bgd begins to arrive near Thaton, where it had been ordered to assemble by Scott. Scott, I was informed, was personally commanding the rear guard elements of his column. This was gallantry not surprising knowing the Brigadier’s penchant for gallantry in WWI. It meant, however, that I now had most of two brigades (1 BUR Bgd and 13 BUR Bgd) under my direct command, as well as having to try to coordinate the withdrawal of Smyth’s 17 IND ID and the movements of our relief force from the west.

8 February 1942

Disaster! Japanese forces had been encountered by the CHN 55 ID and 7 ArmBgd. Reports were sketchy as to the strength of the enemy in between us, but I knew that there was a whole Japanese Division that it could potentially be, so I ordered our relief elements to sit tight, and await the concentration of 1 BUR ID and 17 IND ID, so that all together we could crack this enemy road block.

9 February 1942

Scott arrived at about midday with the last of 1 BUR Bgd and the remaining 7 guns of BUR ID’s artillery. I immediately ordered him to assemble his whole division (minus his engineers, which were still in Rangoon) and head to an area about 10km north of Bilin, where he would await the arrival of myself and 17 IND ID. He was all too happy to finally have his two brigades together and started off towards Bilin straight away.

10 February 1942

Up at an ungodly 0200, “Taffy” Davies was rounding up the last of the staff of I Burma Corps and preparing to move them out with Smyth’s troops. I, meanwhile was sitting with the last unpacked wireless in constant contact with Smyth, and finally, at 0300 I issued the order for Smyth to extricate his troops. With the order given and confirmation received, I ordered this last wireless packed up and headed to my jeep, to join my retreating Corps HQ.

Arriving at Bilin in the late afternoon all I could do was wait to see how much of Smyth’s ID made it out. With any luck he’d get all of 2 and 48 Bgds, and I’d have 4 Bgds of infantry, a brigade of tanks, and a Chinese division with which to push aside the Japanese road block between my two forces.

11 February 1942

By midmorning the last of Smyth’s troops had arrived in Bilin. As their respective divisions formed up, I finally had the chance to have a conference with my division commanders. Reconnaissance had revealed that the road block was of a relatively small unit, probably only a single Rgt of light infantry. Needing to ensure victory we decided not to commit anything piecemeal. We’d wait till 17 IND ID’s 22 guns had unlimbered and then attack in an assault timed to coincide with an equal effort from 7 ArmBgd early the next morning...

GAME NOTE: I activated an offensive TO that would enact on T7, giving me some punch to break that road-block.

 
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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

12 February 1942

With the morning sun rising slowly in the east, the troops of 2 and 48 Bgds-17 IND went into action. Several thousand Riflemen were backed by about 40 mortars and 20 antique field guns. Fortunately, the Japanese were going to be trying to fight off an enemy attacking from two opposite directions. I had been on the horn with Brigadier Anstice earlier in the morning ensuring his tanks and men were ready to attack at the crack of dawn. He did not disappoint, as the rumble of his guns could be heard between the noise of our own.

About mid-day a particularly sharp Japanese counter-attack sent most of Brigadier Bourke’s 2 Bgd scattering about. The last we heard from Bourke, he was radioing that his headquarters was under Japanese attack.

By late evening, Anstice reported that he was pursuing the remaining Japanese south, and I instructed him to pursue them with due haste and attempt, if possible to destroy the unit.

Throughout the day the Chinese commander, General Tang , had protected 7 ArmBgd’s flank from the possibility of attack by JPN 33 ID. Fortunately, the Chinese were not put to the test.
Late that evening I ordered Tang to attack whatever JPN 33 ID positions he could find in an attempt to throw off their own plans.

13 February 1942

Early in the morning Tang reported that his attacks had not gone well, as the Japanese were holding exceptionally good defensive ground. I ordered him to continue, but not to suffer too many casualties.

Mid-day brought reports from Asntice that his tanks had trapped the Japanese against the coast and he was attempting to negotiate their surrender.

Darkness brings a report that Anstice, unable to convince the Japanese to surrender, had ordered his tanks forward. Only two Japanese soldiers surrendered, the majority having died fighting, with a few swimming away. Anstice had yet to lose a tank. I ordered him north, to assist CHN 55 ID in attacks against JPN 33 ID, as Tang again reported poor results.

14 February 1942

The morning revealed that Bourke and his entire headquarters had been slaughtered. The troops that found the bodies reported that many had been bayoneted to death; indicating the fighting had obviously been fierce and hand-to-hand. The Sergeant that reported it, however, informed that it had a much darker look to it, as several headquarters clerks appeared to have been rounded up, bayoneted and then left in a heap. It was unlikely that this would have been accomplished if the Commonwealth troops had not first surrendered. This was, I feared, probably the first of many such atrocities.

By mid-morning, Jones and his largely intact headquarters were charged with re-assembling the men of 2 Bgd and merging their own remaining men into the brigade.

During the afternoon Bruce-Scott’s 1 BUR ID took up positions along the river to face any Japanese advance, and await the arrival of Jones’ struggling brigade.

15 February 1942

The afternoon saw Anstice’s 7 ArmBgd join Cowan’s 48 Bgd and Tang’s 55 CHN ID in launching an attack just as the Japanese of 33 ID were launching their own attack. Fighting was fierce and heavy casualties were suffered by Tang’s 55 ID. Anstice remained at full tank strength, and Cowan’s men again displayed their fighting talent and his own leadership skills. The battle lasted the entire day and into the night.

16 February 1942

Early morning saw the Japanese renew their attacks, this time on 48 Bgd’s frontage. Tang’s worn out CHN 55 ID was allowed to rest, while Cowan used the 17 IND ID’s field guns to great affect as his under strength brigade fought desperately to hold their ground, as if they faltered, the Sittang bridge would be threatened. Fighting again continued throughout the day.
Anstice, meanwhile, attempted to hit the JPN 214 Rgt in the left flank as they advanced. What he ran into were Japanese soldiers wholey prepared for the move, and his Riflemen paid a heavy price, and 1 of his tanks was also damaged.

The last of Jones’ 2 Bgd arrived at 1 BUR ID’s positions, continuing their move west, to be in reserve, as less than a thousand Riflemen remained.

17 February 1942

During the morning I visited Smyth’s HQ to confer with him, Cowan, Anstice, and Tang about the only situation currently threatening our withdrawal across the Sittang.
The Japanese had taken the day to rest, and our forces were none to fresh, either. Smyth, Cowan, and Tang requested to rest their forces before our next major withdrawal, but Anstice was eager to get one last whack in. Not wanting to curb such keen enthusiasm from such a clearly talented commander of tanks, I allowed Anstice to go in one more time, slated for the evening.

The evening saw Anstice’s tanks go in, while Smyth and I watched from Anstice’s headquarters. While, at first, they made progress Anstice’s right flank was soon attacked and his infantry took reather heavy casualties. Seeing this he immediately ordered a withdrawal of his tanks, which they completed within the next hour. It had been a stellar display of how tanks, with their vision already reduced, could be badly taken advantage of at night, and we all agreed that we’d limit the amount of night action Anstice was granted in the future.

18 February 1942

During the morning Anstice’s tanks were withdrawn from their forward positions and positioned in reserve, prepared to assist in the withdrawal.

 

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19 February

Japanese attacks started early in the morning, but made no significant progress.

20 February

Continued Japanese attacks have brought calls for help from Cowan, holding the line closest to the Sittang bridge and General Tang, holding the other section of the northern line. Both are now under extreme pressure from JPN 33 ID. Anstice radioed me early in the day saying the he was ready and waiting to rush to their aid.

Scott's 1 BUR ID's front was still relatively quiet as the majority of JPN 55 ID had yet to be brought to bear.

21 February

The morning's scattered radio traffic brought the news that Tang's CHN 55 ID had been forced to yield their defensive positions, retreating into Kyaikto.
Cowan, with his flank thus exposed was forced to withdraw his 48 Bgd, falling back on Anstice's tanks dug in on the east bank of the Sittang.

22 February

Japanese river-boat borne infantry landed at and took the Sittang bridge from the Burma Rifles that had been guarding it. News of this reaches me almost at the same time as news that JPN 214 Rgt is entering Kyaitko.

With the city threatened, the headquarters of my Corps, 1 BUR ID, and 17 IND ID, (located together in the city) began packing up esential equipment and burning important papers. Meanwhile, the majority of the staffs were forced to grab their rifles and join the troops of Tang's CHN 55 ID fighting in the north of the city.

At the same time as Kyaikto is being occupied by JPN 214 Rgt, Anstice's tanks, and Cowan's 48 Bgd, were being pressured by JPN 215 Rgt.

Further, the first attacks had begun on 1 BUR Bgd's front, forcing the hasty retreat of Jones' still only partially assembled 2 IND Bgd.

23 February

By mid-day, Kyaikto was in Japanese hands, and all of our headquarters troops, both 17 IND's and 1 BUR's arty, Cowan's 48 Bgd, Jones' 2 Bgd, and Tang's CHN 55 ID were staving off Japanese attacks against them north of the city, maintaining a tenuous link with 1 BUR ID's 1 and 13 Bgds.

Only Anstice’s tanks are desperately trying to hold the road to the Sittang River bridge open.

24 February

Heavy fighting continued, with no change in relative positions. Scott had driven off to take personal command of the battle his division was fighting to hold back JPN 55 ID, Smyth was trying to organize the defence of our current position with his two Bgds, while Anstice was radioing that we had better attempt to get to his position before he was no longer able to hold it, as he'd already lost 8 of his tanks.

25 February

On one of our few remaining long range wireless sets I received the merry news from Anstice that 1 BUR ID's engineers had made contact with his tanks after re-securing the Sittang bridge, and that they and the Burma Rifle Battalion originally charged with defending the bridge would hold out as long as possible to give us a chance to escape.

Late that night I was finally able to raise Scott on the wireless to inform him we'd be retaking Kyaikto in the morning!

 
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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

26 February

Scott rallied his 1 and 13 BUR Bgds early in the morning to join the assault on Kyaikto. From our position north of the village, Smyth, Tang, and myself did our best to rally together as much of we could of our own troops to join 1 BUR ID; we ended up with most of the remains of Cowan’s 48 Bgd, and a couple Rgts of Tangs CHN 55 ID.

Throughout the day the fighting went on in the village, now much reduced in size and liveability. The initial assaults were handily beat back by the Japanese, causing us considerable casualties. As the day wore on, Cowan reported that he had gained a considerable foothold in the city and that he thought he could clear the rest if he was given further support and if a bit of shelling could be directed at the south of the town. The few shells we had we then flung, but they had little effect, except the relieve us of our last reserves of artillery shells. Cowan was unable to get any further into the village, and 1 BUR ID was still being held to the east of the city.

By nightfall, the situation was unchanged, though the battle had continued.

27 February

By nightfall on this, the second day of our attack, Cowan and 13 BUR Bgd’s commander, Brigadier Curtis, reported that the JPN 214 Rgt had retreated south.

28 February

With Kyaikto re-occupied, and the Japanese road block there removed, I BUR Corps was finally ready to retreat across the Sittang bridge. The Japense would not have it.

The Japanese launched an early morning assault on the Sittang Bridge positions and again using their skilled river commandoes, they managed to push our defenders back, trapping I BUR Corps. At the same time, they had also launched a severe attack against Anstice’s tanks, such that he was also unaware of the plight of the Sittang Bridge defenders.

1 March

‘Taffie’ Davies and I arrived at Anstice’s tank lot early in the morning ahead of the bulk of I BUR Corps, with no combat units. We were shocked to find out that Anstice was in a bad way, just barely holding off serious Japanese attacks. We were horrified to find out that he had learned that the Sittang Bridge was again occupied by the Japanese. I immediately sent Davies back towards Kyaikto to scrounge up any combat units he could to get them forward. I, meanwhile stayed with Anstice to observe the battle. Davies did not disappoint, and by midday he had arrived with a Rgt of CHN 55 ID and 13 BUR Bgd. They, tired and sleep-deprived, immediately went into action in futile attempts to push the Japanese back and re-establish contact with the Sittang bridge.

The battle continued back and forth throughout the bay, but by nightfall, no territory had changed, and our troops were becoming exhausted.

2 March

The morning saw a renewed offensive, but not a commonwealth offensive. This morning, from the south, came JPN 214 Rgt, which had retired from Kyaikto two days ago. With their added weight we were pushed back towards the village, bolstered by falling back into Cowan’s 48 Bgd just west of the village. Cowan began a spirited attack with his Bgd, but it was beat back, and we learned later that Cowan had lead the final push personally, a Brigadier in the front line, and had been killed by Japanese gunfire.

By early evening the remains of I BUR Corps, a spattering of troops from four different nationalities, and several different units, were being squeezed into an ever tightening perimeter in and around the village of Kyaikto.

3 March

Night gave no respite from Japanese attacks, as they continued to squeeze our perimeter.

This night was the last I would see of the Burma campaign, as my headquarters, set up in what had once been a small school, was hit by two mortar shells that pierced the roof and exploded in the midst of myself and my officers. I was hit with enough force to be knocked unconscious. Division commanders Smyth and Bruce-Scott were both killed instantly, and ‘Taffie’ Davies lost an eye to a piece of shrapnel.

After that, confusion reigned in the city as units were no longer receiving any kind of orders, and often ended up finding themselves surrounded when a flank gave way, being resigned to the fate of surrender to the Japanese.

4 March

I found out later that injured ‘Taffie’ Davies had organized the remaining troops, only a few hundred by the morning, and fought his way out of the city north. Eventually he and just under one hundred men made it into India, ending the story of I BUR Corps.

 
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Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

Having lost my main character, and any hope of an interesting defence, this AAR will be retired. You can continue to follow the campaign through Silvain's AAR, located here
 

Sker

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

I reallly enjoyed this one but I understand that the lost of the main character made it difficult to continue. Anyway you can try to do the same during another game, obviously if you have the time to do it.

I'll surely continue to follow what's goin on in the game from Silvain's AAR.
 

Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

As a weak example of what I might start doing for AARs, I posted something on youtube, here.
 

Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

Yeah, that one just took too much prep time. Most of which was spent setting up the camera at the right angle as I don't have a tripod. :laugh:

Although if everyone keeps saying that I might get my act together and finish off my EA AAR in that fashion.

EDIT: And, because of the way I created and converted the file, the quality is absolutely SHITTY! THat'll be fixed for my next release like that.
 

Sker

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

Very interesting idea but it will work only for scenarios that don't have many units involved. With bigger scenarios I think that it will take too much time to move everything and it will be impossible to think before playing how to move every unit.
 

Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

Very interesting idea but it will work only for scenarios that don't have many units involved. With bigger scenarios I think that it will take too much time to move everything and it will be impossible to think before playing how to move every unit.
Yeah, I plan to do my thinking first in the future, for this one I knew it would be short, so I didn't bother. :D

But you could be right!
 

Polynike

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

Great idea Wyatt. Nice to have a voice to the face now.

Im sure all TOAWers say, or at least think exactly the same things as we play our turns!
 

Goliath

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

As a weak example of what I might start doing for AARs, I posted something on youtube, here.
Nice work, Wyatt! I like your commenting while moving. This could be the way to present the ultimate TOAW tutorial, with links from the TOAW University :cool:

BTW one week ago, I flew over Burma with clear sighting conditions. The view was spectacular: The unbelievably twisted delta of the Irrawaddy river, and further north hills separated by valleys with foggy jungle. Of course, you can get some of it on Google Earth, but it is quite another thing to have it "under your feet"!
 

Veers

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Re: Diary from the Burma Campaign (Allied)

Nice work, Wyatt! I like your commenting while moving. This could be the way to present the ultimate TOAW tutorial, with links from the TOAW University :cool:
Yeah, I was thinking this, as well. :D

BTW one week ago, I flew over Burma with clear sighting conditions. The view was spectacular: The unbelievably twisted delta of the Irrawaddy river, and further north hills separated by valleys with foggy jungle. Of course, you can get some of it on Google Earth, but it is quite another thing to have it "under your feet"!
That would be AMAZING!
 
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