Going back to the original question, yes, the system is somewhat pro-German but mostly from 1944 onwards (maybe late 43). Mid to late war ELRs are arguable too high as we now know that even in early 1942 German infantry replacements had as little as 8-9 weeks of training before being sent to the front, with the obvious impacts to combat abilities. German rifle companies were chronically depleted and the pre-Barbarossa cadre of experienced combat veterans and pre-war "Weirmar NCOs" were mostly gone by the summer battles of 1942.
This doesn't mean the German infantry fell apart but it goes far in explaining how and why German infantry performance declined and losses again soared even before Stalingrad. Arguably, the Germans were fortunate that most of their opposition in 1942 consisted of hastily raised, poorly trained and underequipped Red Army formations that were used to bleed the Wehrmacht white. By late 42 and 43, as training and equipment became more available the Red Army had retained a growing core of more experienced field and senior officers, even if their junior officers were seldom a match for their German opponents (at least until mid-44 and later).
German OoBs should probably see the introduction of the 2nd line squads far earlier than most scenarios do. ELrs should probably seldom rise above 3 after mid-1942.
The real gaps in the system appear to be in representing the growth of western Allied experience and tactical nous before the second half of 1944. What some may not realise is that after 1940, western allied infantry were never again sorely pressed by German infantry when the Wehrmacht commenced offensive actions. On defence the Germans could be, under certain conditions (such as Normandy), very difficult to dislodge but these conditions were seldom met and German infantry was usually badly trounced by both US and Brit/CW infantry along with their supporting arms. Some still criticize the western allies for fighting (and winning) their battle using their own fire-based doctrine, instead of German methods. I usually ask why should they? The Germans lost (it is, of course, much more complicated).
Normandy is something of a late war outlier. The Germans were able to quickly reinforce a narrow front and create a seldom seen tactical depth backed by mobile reserves that made creating, and exploiting, any breach in the line very problematic. However, once those mobile reserves were exhausted German infantry positions were overrun and no amount of stalwart determination could maintain the front. The allies broke the front open and advance almost as fast as the Red Army.
German support weapons (mortars and machine guns) are not much of an issue in the game and do a good job representing these excellent weapons. That said, their ammunition consumption was extremely high and the Germans often had to limit the fire of these weapons in order avoid depleting the available ammunition before the current fightg had been resolved.
Should they be B12 or B11 'circled' (low ammo)? Perhaps after 1942?
The primary culprits for "
wunder" weapons are, of course, the panzerfaust and ATMM - too many and/or too easily obtained, the squads pay no portage for their possession and they can be used anywhere in the OoB as desired. Let's face it,... a usage dr of 1-3 is not that risky (except, perhaps in smaller scenarios), especially since a squad can try twice at the cost of its IFP (probably not neededif the squad(s) is (are) needed to stalk tanks). They possess an impact in a scenario far in excess of their actual battlefield performance.
And yet the rules are the rules and every player who draws the German side is right to rub his hands with glee when gifted these powerhouses.
I do wonder where the plethora of US Bazookas are (normal issue to a rifle coy was 5). I don't recall many scenarios where 5 US Baz 44s are included with 10 US squads.
At the same time Chapter H is actually very well crafted and is of excellent value (especially with the updates) in the scenarios. There are few minor issues with overrating the Suffleupagus found on Tigers and such. The grenades launched by the sN# certainly do not rate 16FP. Again this a problem of earlier available details not being clear enough or understood (ie: the launcher 'looks' huge, but the grenades were not any more powerful than a regular nor numerous enough to rate the high FP value assigned in ASL).
It is worth noting that when the rules were written 35 years ago our knowledge of certain aspects of the war were flawed and still heavily influenced by the post-war pro-German narrative that allied intelligence officers gobbled up with glee as the iron curtain descended across central Europe. The view that the Wehrmacht was only overwhelmed by numbers became very deeply engrained and that view still lingers on in some circles even to day.
It is only in the last 20 odd years (perhaps even the last 10-15) that we have come to understand that while the Germans held a decided tactical advantage in the early war years, this declined rapidly from 1942 and only accelerated as the war went on. As both the western allies and Red Army adjusted their doctrines and equipment levels to compensate for the improvements in the internal combustion engine, the Wehrmacht found less and less scope for fighting their preferred method of warfare (
bewegegunskrieg).
My own 'wish list' is for the known rules loopholes and flaws to be corrected before releasing the next version rather than hand waving away the advances in historical understanding since 1985.
Cheers.