ASL and the StG-44

Paul M. Weir

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I don't think that the StG was that widespread. Offhand, I would venture to say that around 650,000 were issued [edit: Wiki says only 424,000]. Probably not enough to assume that all 548s / 658s were equipped with that weapon.

A significant number of these went to Volksgrenadier Divisions, i.e. not the unit type reflected in ASL by 548s / 658s. So I would assume that for the latter, a more generous equipment with (inherent) LMG should be assumed rather than with StG 44.

von Marwitz
Yes, that's my reading of it, preference, though not exclusive, to the VG. I would see a VG infantry mix as being about 2/3 A and 1/3 B, where A is 548->547->447->436 and B the traditional 468->467->447->436 (both non-SS). That is why I would like to see an official 5-4-7, though LC's VG squads will do nicely. I would have no qualms about having some 548/468 E squads in a VG unit as some proved themselves as quite good in Wacht am Rhein, though many were sub par. It depended upon whether they were built around a good but shredded Inf Div core or not.

A Platoon = 3 squads, a Company has 3 platoons, say 10 squad = 100 Infantry (ignoring MTR, MG crew etc). A battalion has 3 Inf Co or 300 Inf. A late war German Inf Div had about 7 Battalions (3 Inf Regt each 2 Inf Battalions and a Fusilier Battalion, a combined Recon and shock unit) for 2100 inf. Round that up to 2.5k who might be issued StG. I know that sounds ridiculously low for a 10+k division but MG gunners, artillery men, supply, medical, etc people only need pistols, rifles and the odd SMG. So 650k StG is the equivalent of 260 Inf Divs and 424k a mere 170 Inf Divs! So even 424k can go a long, long way. Until I did the math I had not realised the magnitude.
 

Michael Dorosh

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I'm missing the part where the Germans changed their infantry doctrine to accommodate these new weapons. If they relied on their mortars and machine guns to do the heavy lifting, what difference would a few StG44 have made?
 

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I'm missing the part where the Germans changed their infantry doctrine to accommodate these new weapons. If they relied on their mortars and machine guns to do the heavy lifting, what difference would a few StG44 have made?
I've always assumed that, although the squad may have been built around the MG, it doesn't mean that the rest of the squad was sitting around thumb-twiddling while the MG was firing. In a fire-and-maneouvre scenario, the manoeuvre element will be firing something, and the StG would put out more rounds and faster than the Kar-98. Not that this would have changed the outcome of the war, though...
 

Michael Dorosh

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I've always assumed that, although the squad may have been built around the MG, it doesn't mean that the rest of the squad was sitting around thumb-twiddling while the MG was firing.
One infantry platoon commander stated flat out in multiple articles in our Legion Magazine after the war that the fire put out by his riflemen in action in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and NW Europe was negligible, and in his opinion, could have given the majority of riflemen pitchforks for all the difference it would have made. SLA Marshall, despite the rough handling his work has received, pretty much concluded the same thing. I'd have to review Engen once more, but he dealt with the Canadians - and it was common for the rifle squads (nominally 10 men) to go into action with 5 or 6 men. That means your squad leader with tommy gun, LMG crew, and maybe 2 or 3 guys left over to shoot their rifles. Even if they did fire them, it's doubtful they hit much, and casualty statistics seem to bear that out.
 

holdit

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One infantry platoon commander stated flat out in multiple articles in our Legion Magazine after the war that the fire put out by his riflemen in action in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and NW Europe was negligible, and in his opinion, could have given the majority of riflemen pitchforks for all the difference it would have made. SLA Marshall, despite the rough handling his work has received, pretty much concluded the same thing. I'd have to review Engen once more, but he dealt with the Canadians - and it was common for the rifle squads (nominally 10 men) to go into action with 5 or 6 men. That means your squad leader with tommy gun, LMG crew, and maybe 2 or 3 guys left over to shoot their rifles. Even if they did fire them, it's doubtful they hit much, and casualty statistics seem to bear that out.
Interesting. I was thinking something similar if the output from the rest of the squad really was so negligible, but I was thinking muskets instead of pitchforks. :)
 

Robin Reeve

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Another factor, besides the weapons used, is fire discipline.
The 5 range of the British squads, added to their cowering immunity, aims to underline the fact that they used their ammo sparingly and had a good markmanship.
Certainly an exaggeration, as other nationality characteristics.
Did the end war Germans have orders to spare ammo?
Did they fire full auto their StG or just semi-auto, to save ammo?
In the latter case, VG troops with StG could still be well depicted with 447 and 436 (also due to limited training).
 

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Yes, that's my reading of it, preference, though not exclusive, to the VG. I would see a VG infantry mix as being about 2/3 A and 1/3 B, where A is 548->547->447->436 and B the traditional 468->467->447->436 (both non-SS). That is why I would like to see an official 5-4-7, though LC's VG squads will do nicely. I would have no qualms about having some 548/468 E squads in a VG unit as some proved themselves as quite good in Wacht am Rhein, though many were sub par. It depended upon whether they were built around a good but shredded Inf Div core or not.

A Platoon = 3 squads, a Company has 3 platoons, say 10 squad = 100 Infantry (ignoring MTR, MG crew etc). A battalion has 3 Inf Co or 300 Inf. A late war German Inf Div had about 7 Battalions (3 Inf Regt each 2 Inf Battalions and a Fusilier Battalion, a combined Recon and shock unit) for 2100 inf. Round that up to 2.5k who might be issued StG. I know that sounds ridiculously low for a 10+k division but MG gunners, artillery men, supply, medical, etc people only need pistols, rifles and the odd SMG. So 650k StG is the equivalent of 260 Inf Divs and 424k a mere 170 Inf Divs! So even 424k can go a long, long way. Until I did the math I had not realised the magnitude.
I guess here's where figures lie. One has to consider the monthly production figures, issue date(s) of the equipment, fielding time and training (if any), and loss rate to mention but a few factors. As von M had sated there's quite a difference in numbers attributed to the issue of the STG44 and this may simply be the difference in the number purportedly built to the number estimated issued during the entire war effort. In as much as their fielding time was during some of the most trying times for the German Army and their economy in general, their loss rate cannot be deemed insignificant, nor their issue rate as anything more than just above haphazard in many instances. Robin has aptly pointed out that the weapon doesn't make the man, but the man makes the weapon as was poinently noted as well by Mike D.
 

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... SLA Marshall, despite the rough handling his work has received, pretty much concluded the same thing. ...
As I understand it, not super expert, and I am not trying to ding Marshall again,... but as I understand Marshall's revisionists have shown fairly.... volume of fire (regardless of weapon structure) is much more correlated to bond to other shooters, and its leadership, that does not have to mean SF, Rangers, USMC, Commando, SS, etc., etc., (though often times is so), but could be that platoon X in Y Coy, in BLAH Division, was just 'better' than platoon Z in Y Coy in same division because of that bond...and that bond is subject to fortune and fate (that is it retains many old hands, or the passing along of old hands as witnessed by its 'survivors'...legacy...or does not and therefore is just a collection of bodies...not a unit).

By 1944+ the Allies / Axis are well shot through (i.e. the lads you trained with, while you remain in the line, are dead, wounded, replaced, and the FNG...well he is green and I don't know him...), and as you note you are down to 5-6 vs. 8-10+ (milder safety in numbers...and one more guy I do 'trust').

In essence the revisionist of Marshall say you fight for the man in the hole with you and the holes next to you either side, if you have no firm determination for these men* (not the cause) then well maybe you don't pull the trigger and are "Pinned"....and the consequences follow.
 

Michael Dorosh

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As I understand it, not super expert, and I am not trying to ding Marshall again,... but as I understand Marshall's revisionists have shown fairly.... volume of fire (regardless of weapon structure) is much more correlated to bond to other shooters, and its leadership, that does not have to mean SF, Rangers, USMC, Commando, SS, etc., etc., (though often times is so), but could be that platoon X in Y Coy, in BLAH Division, was just 'better' than platoon Z in Y Coy in same division because of that bond...and that bond is subject to fortune and fate (that is it retains many old hands, or the passing along of old hands as witnessed by its 'survivors'...legacy...or does not and therefore is just a collection of bodies...not a unit).

By 1944+ the Allies / Axis are well shot through (i.e. the lads you trained with, while you remain in the line, are dead, wounded, replaced, and the FNG...well he is green and I don't know him...), and as you note you are down to 5-6 vs. 8-10+ (milder safety in numbers...and one more guy I do 'trust').

In essence the revisionist of Marshall say you fight for the man in the hole with you and the holes next to you either side, if you have no firm determination for these men* (not the cause) then well maybe you don't pull the trigger and are "Pinned"....and the consequences follow.
There's lots more work to be done, I am sure. Engen studied combat effectiveness in the Second World War and came to different conclusions than Marshall, but the methodology seems to have been different. IIRC Engen reviewed the questionnaires filled out by platoon commanders, Marshall talked directly to the troops. I have no doubt you are correct about the impact of morale, unit cohesion, and expecting more of 'good' units. But the officer I originally mentioned, (Strome Galloway, who fought with the British Army in North Africa and the Canadians in Italy and NW Europe as company commander, battalion 2 i/c and acting battalion commander) wrote much about it also and his unit (an Irish regiment in Africa and The Royal Canadian Regiment thereafter) was probably at least average in terms of training and experience.
 

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There's lots more work to be done, I am sure. Engen studied combat effectiveness in the Second World War and came to different conclusions than Marshall, but the methodology seems to have been different. IIRC Engen reviewed the questionnaires filled out by platoon commanders, Marshall talked directly to the troops. I have no doubt you are correct about the impact of morale, unit cohesion, and expecting more of 'good' units. But the officer I originally mentioned, (Strome Galloway, who fought with the British Army in North Africa and the Canadians in Italy and NW Europe as company commander, battalion 2 i/c and acting battalion commander) wrote much about it also and his unit (an Irish regiment in Africa and The Royal Canadian Regiment thereafter) was probably at least average in terms of training and experience.
Related to Marshall alone, I have no ability to comment on Engen, having hot read his works (a task in hand for me to address), as you are aware I am certain there is a "method" issue, which cannot be overlooked, and you spoke to directly in your post... "questionnaires" are a paper trail...(verifiable over time)..."talked too" not so much...
 

Justiciar

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To simulate German late-war non-elite squads with the Stg-44, use the 4-4-7 counters with a very healthy supply of 3-8 LMGs.
No. That is not a good solution at all. "Healthy" amount of LMG are full of fire lanes, and TK vs HT, and spray fire at ranges beyond STG-44, and fill in the blank on what I am missing...oh the MMC lost a PP, etc. The upstream answer in post #10 by Officer Krejsa re use 548 with low ELR is far more on track.
 

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There's lots more work to be done, I am sure. Engen studied combat effectiveness in the Second World War and came to different conclusions than Marshall, but the methodology seems to have been different. IIRC Engen reviewed the questionnaires filled out by platoon commanders, Marshall talked directly to the troops. I have no doubt you are correct about the impact of morale, unit cohesion, and expecting more of 'good' units. But the officer I originally mentioned, (Strome Galloway, who fought with the British Army in North Africa and the Canadians in Italy and NW Europe as company commander, battalion 2 i/c and acting battalion commander) wrote much about it also and his unit (an Irish regiment in Africa and The Royal Canadian Regiment thereafter) was probably at least average in terms of training and experience.
Yes Marshall's view was primarily based upon hospital cases and graves registration annotations (in other words catastrophic cases). However, in may instances wounds were treated at field aid stations and the soldier rapidly RTD. As a matter of fact many of the U.S. awards for Purple Hearts just noted "WIA (wounded in action) and did not contain a specific remark at all beyond perhaps the location of the wound. Another factor was that another study based primarily upon combat wounds in the Pacific found that the majority were sustained by small arms but did not take into account enemy (Japanese) casualties IIRC. There has much controversy over Marshall's work in this area especially in the last 20 or so years.:study::waiting:
 

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Basically all the FP/Range counter values are 'wrong'. It would not be difficult to redo them all using up to date research but then it would break all the scenarios and render the counters obsolete. Ergo it will not happen.

There are fudges to take most things into account. The Germans don't get enough LMGs but upping the issue to give all squads an extra one runs foul of the fire lanes rules.

Regarding StG44 issue a 5-4-8 with ELR around 2 seems to work quite well. Most went to the VG units with a few going to the SS and ending up in specialist Sturm units. However, by late 44 TOEs were probably not followed and local commanders may well have issued these weapons in other ways.

I redid ASL from scratch, keeping almost none of the original rules. Of course this means I play only solo and just visit here to see how ASL is doing in it's old age....still creaking on much like myself. I have special counters for Sturm units that have 3x the FP of regular rifles but they don't get any LMGs. Shorter range than rifles too.

If you buy the story that a 4-6-7 has 7 riflemen and 1 Mg34/42 then a 5-4-8 having 8-9 StG44 and no Mg34/42 is not far off actually.
 

Paul M. Weir

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I guess here's where figures lie. One has to consider the monthly production figures, issue date(s) of the equipment, fielding time and training (if any), and loss rate to mention but a few factors. As von M had sated there's quite a difference in numbers attributed to the issue of the STG44 and this may simply be the difference in the number purportedly built to the number estimated issued during the entire war effort. In as much as their fielding time was during some of the most trying times for the German Army and their economy in general, their loss rate cannot be deemed insignificant, nor their issue rate as anything more than just above haphazard in many instances. Robin has aptly pointed out that the weapon doesn't make the man, but the man makes the weapon as was poinently noted as well by Mike D.
I won't disagree with any of that. I was just trying to see how far the figures given in another post would stretch. We are used to seeing total numbers for a division, anything from 5k-7k for the TO&E of reduced Soviet Inf Div (Yes, they had OFFICIAL TO&E for worn, reduced strength Inf Div.) through 10k-12k for a late war German Inf Div to 15k-17k for a '44 SS Pz Div. Every one of those will need a weapon whether it is a pistol, SMG or rifle of some kind.

However a ART/AT/AA gunner, MRT or MG crew will benefit little from having a StG, their job is to fire their heavy weapons. Ditto supply troops and staff units primary job is to drive or plan/command. Sure there will be times when they have to fulfil an infantry role, but most of the time not. Those whose primary job is infantry work and who would most benefit from a StG are quite a small number. For a 7 battalion German Infantry Division I deliberately rounded up a bit. A 10 man squad would have a MG gunner and assistant who would not fire their personal pistol or rifle much, so the squad would only need 8 StG so a company should only require 72. I upped that to 100 to allow decent numbers to give to platoon and company HQs and Officers/NCOs who were not part of the infantry squads. Ditto the 3x7=21 infantry companies bring that to 2100, but again I threw in some extras to 2500. Despite that you are talking about only 1 in 4 who might find that having a StG instead of a rifle to be of great benefit.

I agree that from training weapons, loss replacements and stuff still in the pipeline you won't equip 260/170 divisions. The revelation to me is how few who could really use a StG to full effect were within a normal division and in turn how many divisions could in theory be so equipped. So the 650k or 424k while dwarfed by normal rifle production numbers could have a disproportionate effect on the battlefield.
 

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I appreciate the thought and historical knowledge that people are showing here. At the same time, my faith in the link between history and ASL firepower and range factors was seriously weakened by reading the (General? Annual?) article on the Japanese as a nationality in ASL. The article basically made it seem like the IJA logistics and supply arm was so nonfunctional that mid- and late-war units were starving and using rocks and sharp sticks. And yet they still rate 4-4-X in most designs. Sorry, those two things just don't go together.
 

Michael Dorosh

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I appreciate the thought and historical knowledge that people are showing here. At the same time, my faith in the link between history and ASL firepower and range factors was seriously weakened by reading the (General? Annual?) article on the Japanese as a nationality in ASL. The article basically made it seem like the IJA logistics and supply arm was so nonfunctional that mid- and late-war units were starving and using rocks and sharp sticks. And yet they still rate 4-4-X in most designs. Sorry, those two things just don't go together.
As is often the case, I think the scenario designers bear more responsibility to historical inaccuracies than the game developers. The rules are a toolbox, it is up to the designers to ensure whatever level of historical fidelity they want. Though I would be interested in reading an account of a late war Japanese unit whose firepower and combat effectiveness was affected, at the tactical level, by these kinds of conditions. I'm more familiar with the case in NW Europe, and while the Germans suffered shortages, many units were able to operate at a fairly high level of combat capability right up until the end.

Any good references you'd recommend on late-war Japanese units? I'd be interested in reading more.

And on second thought, it may be that scenario designers - as good ones do - are simply cherry-picking the more interesting situations, even late in the war, where the Japanese are capable of doing more than just starving and throwing rocks...

I mentioned in another thread I'm currently reading the history of the German 65th Infantry Division, a no-name unit on the Italian front that included about 20% Silesian (Polish) conscripts. Their first battles on the Sangro were a disaster and they were wiped out in a couple of days by British, Indian and New Zealand troops. It would be possible to portray the quality of these troops in a number of ways (conscript squads, low ELR, battlefield integrity, SSR, etc.) but a scenario designer might well simply choose to pass on trying to recreate a battle where half the defenders gave up without firing a shot.
 
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Eagle4ty

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As is often the case, I think the scenario designers bear more responsibility to historical inaccuracies than the game developers. The rules are a toolbox, it is up to the designers to ensure whatever level of historical fidelity they want. Though I would be interested in reading an account of a late war Japanese unit whose firepower and combat effectiveness was affected, at the tactical level, by these kinds of conditions. I'm more familiar with the case in NW Europe, and while the Germans suffered shortages, many units were able to operate at a fairly high level of combat capability right up until the end.

Any good references you'd recommend on late-war Japanese units? I'd be interested in reading more.

And on second thought, it may be that scenario designers - as good ones do - are simply cherry-picking the more interesting situations, even late in the war, where the Japanese are capable of doing more than just starving and throwing rocks...

I mentioned in another thread I'm currently reading the history of the German 65th Infantry Division, a no-name unit on the Italian front that included about 20% Silesian (Polish) conscripts. Their first battles on the Sangro were a disaster and they were wiped out in a couple of days by British, Indian and New Zealand troops. It would be possible to portray the quality of these troops in a number of ways (conscript squads, low ELR, battlefield integrity, SSR, etc.) but a scenario designer might well simply choose to pass on trying to recreate a battle where half the defenders gave up without firing a shot.
You don't really need to go into late war for the Japanese. When General MacArthur made his big leap to Hollandia much of Gen Adachi's 18th Army was cut off east of there and made a horrendous march thru the jungles of northern New Guinea to the Hollandia area. Many of the troops were malnourished and almost weaponless, discarding their weapons on the march. Arriving along the Driniumor River several units launched fanatic attacks against the Americans armed with little more than sharpened bamboo sticks or weapons without ammo. Approximately 20,000 Japanese troops launched repeated almost suicidal attacks against the American lines, so fierce indeed were their assaults for example that their 1st Battalion 78th Infantry was reduced from an attack strength of approximately 400 to 30 men in only a few minutes. My father's battery of 105's was hit so hard that they were firing over open sights at charging enemy troops 400-200 yards away for about 2 days on going. I remember him saying that after the battle they found almost no weapons among the dead. A BAR gunner from the supporting Company E 128th Inf Regt fired over 26 magazines of ammo in less than 15 minutes during the initial assault on their position, yet many of the assaulting Japanese simply ran past him, having no way to effectively engage him from a distance. Likewise the 4th Company 237th Inf Regt (IJA) about 120-200 strong but nearly weaponless would try to cross a 30-40 yd wide stream against the flank of Company F 128th Infantry and not a single Japanese soldier stepped foot on the opposite bank, they were completely wiped out in less than 5 minutes. These are only a few of examples, but the PTO is replete with instances of such actions. One need only to read of actions by the Japanese on Guadalcanal, Bougainville or a plethora of other locations in the South/Southwest Pacific to find examples of almost weaponless Japanese forces conducting such attacks-to say nothing of the huge Banzai attack on Saipan at the end of that operation.
 

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An easy way to handle a few armed men amongst a throng of weaponless wretches is to ignore the wretches and only include armed units. While it's not literally true that the only ones present were the armed troops, if the weaponless ones just died by dozen without any material impact, design for effect.

JR
 

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An easy way to handle a few armed men amongst a throng of weaponless wretches is to ignore the wretches and only include armed units. While it's not literally true that the only ones present were the armed troops, if the weaponless ones just died by dozen without any material impact, design for effect.

JR
I suppose one could always SSR an attack factor to be used in CC only as well (say a mix of 447s & 347s with the 347s having only the capability to engage in CC attacks). Interesting, never really thought much about it before now.
 
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