Alternative I-class BCs

Bullethead

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The problem with determining what was and was not considered for design and what was adopted for construction was the lack of actual combat experience which contemporary navies were able to draw....Thus the construction strategies were constantly changing.
But construction strategies were very largely a factor of available technology, and the development especially of machinery technology had a huge impact on the history of cruisers.

In the latter 1880s when the predreadnought era really began to stabilize (as in the general outline was in place, although there was still a continuous string of detail improvements), machinery was big, heavy, and hungry for the power it produced. As such, in those days, the only viable design for a fleet scout or commerce raider/defender able to go several knots faster than the battleline for hours, perhaps days, on end was the AC. These displaced nearly as much as BBs but were longer due to finer lines. Only such ships big ships could carry the necessary power and the fuel it needed, and even then had to have lighter guns and armor. They did build small cruisers back then, but most of them weren't any faster than BBs due to the inability to carry sufficient power and fuel. Besides, the fleet CL role hadn't yet been invented because DDs/TBs weren't yet capable of working with a fleet. Thus, such small cruisers were mostly for patrol work. In fact, for a couple decades to come, navies would still be bulding masted small cruisers for such work.

Time passed, machinery improved, and that changed the picture. By around 1900, it had become possible to build small cruisers with the speed and nearly the range of ACs. DDs had also grown enough to work with the fleet, but needed fast flotilla flagships to control them, due to their nonexistent bridge space. IOW, machinery development created the niche for what would become the CL.

CLs were much cheaper and thus soon more numerous than ACs, and able to perform almost all AC roles, plus could do the new job of flotilla leader. As a result, navies decreased the number of ACs they built in favor of CLs. After all, an AC was not only about as expensive as a battleship, but was serious overkill in most of its jobs. How big a gun do you really need to capture a merchant or sink a pirate dhou, for example? Thus, for example, whereas before the RN was building about 1 AC per BB up to about 1902, afterwards their new AC:BB ratio declined to about 1:3. The difference was being made up in CLs.

With respect to light cruisers, they were becoming larger and progressively armed with bigger guns over time. In addition to the Cavendish class mentioned, there is also the Courageous class which went the whole hog and mounted heavy guns in a light cruiser. Thus the trend in cruisers may have eventually led to intermediate guns being adopted.
I see the growth of CLs as just part of the general trend of all types of ship to get bigger over time. The combat (as opposed to recon) role of CLs was killing DDs; as DDs got bigger, CLs had to grow, too. And because so many were needed, they only grew just enough to keep pace, to keep costs down. As such, they didn't grow very much during the war. Note that from the Arethusas all through the dozens of C and D classes, CL size had remained between 4000-5000 tons, the only real change being going to all 6" guns.

In this context, the Cavendishes, Emeralds, and the never-built designs of 1918 were statistical outliers, not trend-setters, as their sudden doubling in size over previous CLs should indicate. As mentioned earlier, the Cavendishes were not at all intended for fleet work, but were specialized hunters of commerce raiders in the far seas, precisely to avoid having to deplete the fleet's stock of normal CLs for this job. The Emeralds and 1918 designs were even more aberrant. The Emeralds were designed solely to catch Brummer and Bremse, while the 1918 designs were merely ideas to match a rumored new German cruiser with medium guns, should such a thing ever be built.

Note that all the while, however, the RN was still building C and D cruisers as fast as they could, laying many down after starting the bigger ships. They even completed a fair number after the war and had more still on the stocks when the war ended that were canceled, although they certainly would have been built had the war continued, and no doubt more would have been laid down. Thus, IMHO you can't use Cavendish et al as guides to the future in a treatyless world. The RN apparently thought it's existing ~4500-ton CL formula was perfectly adequate for CL duties, but that Their Lordships hadn't quite lost all of Fisher's wild hairs. The Cavendishes weren't especially liked in service (one was even completed as a carrier) and the others were just examples of the common naval folly of building a ship to fight 1 specific adversary instead of being useful in general.

If I personally was procuring warships in this period, I would be emphasising an increase in the construction of light cruisers and protection/armour in my Battleships. I am not entirely convinced that contemporary navies and politicians would have gone down this route though; if for no other reason that they did not have a copy of Jutland to play!!!!
This seems to have been what most navies did. The US, Germany, Japan, and Russia, besides the UK, all had large late-war CL programs in hand. Most of the German and Russian CLs were never finished, but the available German CLs were gobbled up after the war by France and Italy, which hadn't yet built any (or many) of their own. And of course BBs were getting bigger guns the whole time, so were also getting more armor.
 

saddletank

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CLs were much cheaper and thus soon more numerous than ACs, and able to perform almost all AC roles, plus could do the new job of flotilla leader. As a result, navies decreased the number of ACs they built in favor of CLs.
I think it's curious that in fact most navies did *not* build CLs. Germany and Britain did but then that was I think because they both saw a large fleet encounter on the horizon in the north sea. France ever only had one class laid doown none of which was completed and for a decade didn't build any, long after Britain and Germany had them, which is surprising given that they were the worlds #2 navy and had a vast overseas empire to communicate with.

Italy, Austria, Russia... nothing much.

It was only Britain and Germany that really went for CLs and thus it seems they built them merely to counter the others, not for (in Britains case) cruising the oceans and protecting commerce for which the old ACs proved suitable until the end of the war. Remember Britains position - she had to be seen to be strong all over the globe and the Good Hope and County classes although of marginal military value were politically very powerful ships, serving long years on foreign stations as flagships.

Its not about sinking pirate dhows, its about cowing rebellious Sultans and Fakirs and various other Princes into playing nicely and to do that you need to park a whopping big imposing ship off his capital city and point lots of big guns at his palace.
 

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I guess AC's were more suitable for long range operations compared to smaller CL's.
 

Bullethead

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I think it's curious that in fact most navies did *not* build CLs.
That wasn't for lack of desire, it was for lack of money or other resources. Navies without them (or with insufficient numbers of them) were constantly begging for them.

US: No money at all for cruisers of any type from 1904 until the massive 1916 naval budget, when they built the large Omaha class. Then peace and the Depression happened, so no more for a couple decades. In between 1906 and 1917, they spent their limited money on the 2 absolute essentials of a dreadnought navy: dreadnoughts and modern destroyers. And they couldn't even get many of them compared to the UK and Germany, nor make them as capable as desired, all due to parsimonous governments until the money floodgates opened in 1916.

France: Naval policy was a complete shambles from before the start of the dreadnought era until the start of WW1. This was due to frequent changes of government and therefore naval ministers, who alternated between wanting to build and wanting to scrap the navy. But either way, money was very tight so like the US, the French could only afford a few dreadnoughts and modern DDs, all of which took too long to build due to both lack of money and lack of constant policy. Then WW1 started and France lost most of her iron-producing regions, and the army got the vast bulk of what production was left. Also, most shipwrights got drafted into the army and promptly killed in 1914-1915. As a result, the French wartime naval industry was practically nonexistent. Straining every nerve, it was only capable of repairing some existing ships and building small things like trawlers for ASW work.

Austria-Hungary: From the beginning of the war, they actually had as many modern CLs as they had dreadnoughts, a ratio only the RN could match. But since they only had 4 of each, that tells you how little money was spent on the KuK navy. Once the war started and Italy stayed neutral, the Danubian Monarchy was so outnumbered by the French navy that trying to achieve parity was pointless, and it got even worse when Italy came in on the other side. As a result, the KuK navy did the only sensible thing: built submarines and escort vessels for use in the Adriatic. A few more CLs would have been useful, but with the army suffering repeated disasters, it got by far the lion's share of the defense budget.

Italy: Like France, there was little steel and, like the US, most of the naval budget went to dreadnoughts and modern DDs, although they did manage to build 3 CLs. But that was all they got because, again like France, once they got into the war, the army took most of the defense money, and their main problem was ASW, not surface superiority. They wanted more CLs but they weren't as high a priority. Besides, the RN sent a CL squadron to them.

Russia: Following the RJW, the Russian navy suffered for some years from a combination of administrative chaos (many heads had rolled) and government refusal to spend anywhere near the money needed. When the money did come, however, it provided for dreadnougths, CLs, and modern DDs. The dreadnoughts came first so the CLs weren't started until 1913, but they laid down 10 all at once, which IMHO makes a serious commitment to the type. Also, as with the new DDs, the Russian CLs were considerably bigger and more heavily armed than their contemporaries elsewhere. Unfortunately, due to a variety of military and political factors, only 5 of these 10 CLs were ever completed for Russia, and those all after WW1 (although 2 were completed during it for the Germans).

Germany: Arguably invented the CL type (in both its original PC-type incarnation and also the later WW1 type with the belt integral to the hull structure). Germany built scads of CLs long before anybody else, but then naval policy changed to focus more on the battlefleet. Because the naval budget was small compared to the army's, as elsewhere construction focused on battleships and modern DDs, although CLs continued to be built in very small numbers. The bottom line was that in WW1, Germany had only a few modern CLs although still lots of obsolescent older ones. One the war started, most of the naval money went to U-boats, although Germany did begin a large program for modern CLs later on, but too late to complete many of them.

Its not about sinking pirate dhows, its about cowing rebellious Sultans and Fakirs and various other Princes into playing nicely and to do that you need to park a whopping big imposing ship off his capital city and point lots of big guns at his palace.
Which only works if his capital is conveniently located within gun range of the coast AND he wasn't serious about causing trouble anyway. In all other cases, only ground troops will decide the issue. Given that the uncooperative regime would have had no navy worthy of the name, getting the necessary troops there was no problem and could be handled by the old type of small, slow (or even masted) cruisers.
 

saddletank

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Which only works if his capital is conveniently located within gun range of the coast AND he wasn't serious about causing trouble anyway. In all other cases, only ground troops will decide the issue. Given that the uncooperative regime would have had no navy worthy of the name, getting the necessary troops there was no problem and could be handled by the old type of small, slow (or even masted) cruisers.
That does not mean the ship type is not viable for that kind of police work. It need not be his palace, it can be his major port. It has the same effect, one which a small ship armed with small guns would not. And a two or three month cruise to nip an issue in the bud is far preferable to a 2 or 3 year war.

Flying the flag this way, whether peacefully or belligerently, was something an AC could do that a CL could not and it was one reason (though a minor one I admit) Britain built so many.
 
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delcyros

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armour and shells as of period technology...

...needs to be taken into account for when judging about the "I"´s alleged weak armour protection.
The typical shell at this period was the early soft capped and lyddite filled, non-delay action APC. These shells were brittle and had a sensitive filler. They wouldn´t penetrate plates but rather make a big hole in it and burst in holing. Krupp shells of this period were not better at all!
In fact, 6in of modern KC armour was state of the art for 1910. Manufacturers could apply the best quality controll to plates of this thickness range, hence 6in plates turned out to give relatively more protection for weight invested than thinner and thicker plates, respectively:
In terms of wrought iron plate thickness aequivalent, the figure of merit differs for thicknesses-
4in KC represented in between 8.8in and 9.3in wrought iron,
6in KC represented in between 16in and 17.2in wrought iron,
9in KC represented in between 21.6in and 23in wrought iron &
12in KC represented in between 27in and 28in wrought iron.
as You see, the 6in KC plate had the highest figure of merit and this was known by then, as these figures stem from Brasseys Nav. Ann. 1890 -1910.
Medium armour was effective in stopping major calibre projectiles at the long ranges envisioned for the "I"s (in this timeframe, everything past 12,000 yards may be considered "long range"). Tests carried out 1909 and 1910 suggested that the 12in period APC is
likely to break up, rather than penetrate- striking 6in armour at any obliquity (Memorandum to Controller, dated 24 October 1910). 1910 was still a technology sharing agreement between Krupp and some british armour shell manufacturer and Krupps APC didn´t perform better than british ones, so it was suggested that 6in armour to be used in ships extensively as it offered a measurable degree of protection against major calibre APC except for very close ranges. Armour quality improved markedly in this timeframe and allowed british post 1911 armour to shatter their soft capped projectiles as if they had no cap at all (not just over 15 deg, even at impacts to the plates normal), giving the 6in plate another, ca. 1/3 advantage in relative plate thickness. This was considered to be a big advantage in world where everybody else used the same soft capped APC and kept as a secret in Britain (MNC and Witkovitz had the same findings, but this was unknown by then).

On the other side, Krupp improved it´s APC towards the first true, reliable delay fused, hard capped, TNT-filled and decrementally hardened Panzersprenggranate in 1911. The new britsh CA´s ability to shatter soft capped projectiles at all obliquities didn´t affected Krupps AP because they already moved to hard capped ones.
This was a major breakthrough and nothing short from an quantum leap in projectile design. BY 1914, Krupps APC were able to handily penetrate and burst behind medium armour at long range and a large range of impact obliquities. This major rule changer couldn´t have been foreseen by the british nor anyone else. After examining these projectile for the first time at Doggerbank, and later with more critical impact 1916 at Jutland, Britain tried to copy certain design elements (the base fuse and hard, sombrero shaped armourcap) and urged domestic development which finally culminated in the GREENBOY APC 1918. Many other naval powers (except Austro-Hungary which shared technology with Krupp) didn´t reached this level in projectile technology until the mid- or even late 20´s.


The consequences for the proposal submitted here are:
Why use 8in armoured belts? This is a waste of weight unless Britain foresees the enhanced capabilities of german APC, which it cannot do before Doggerbank.
8in armoured belts are only useful if You consider short range engagements (6,000 yards and less) but is this cruiser with it´s high speed and tactical scouting purpose really designed to knife down enemy cruisers at close ranges?
 
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saddletank

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

Great post and a very interesting point.
 

martin worsey

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That wasn't for lack of desire, it was for lack of money or other resources. Navies without them (or with insufficient numbers of them) were constantly begging for them.

US: No money at all for cruisers of any type from 1904 until the massive 1916 naval budget, when they built the large Omaha class. Then peace and the Depression happened, so no more for a couple decades. In between 1906 and 1917, they spent their limited money on the 2 absolute essentials of a dreadnought navy: dreadnoughts and modern destroyers. And they couldn't even get many of them compared to the UK and Germany, nor make them as capable as desired, all due to parsimonous governments until the money floodgates opened in 1916.

France: Naval policy was a complete shambles from before the start of the dreadnought era until the start of WW1.
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Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10
This is a very informative and interesting post; however, I would question a few aspects.
When considering the comment that the respective navies wanted light cruisers, this is presumably reflecting that they were so useful and versatile. They started out a scouts (i.e. eyes for the fleet) but were gradually found valuable operating with the light forces, for communication, commerce raiding and for interdiction of enemy patrols and could thus be considered as an essential component of a balanced fleet. To site lack of money as a reason for not building light cruisers appears indicative of total folly in the procurement programme.
If we take the comments on the USA for example; the USA had large numbers of older battleships (which were on the whole large and formidable ships) together with a reasonably large force of post Dreadnought types. Thus the USA was easily the third largest maritime power and it was only in the period around 1914-15 that Germany started to pull away and Japan started to mount a serious numerical challenge in battleship numbers. The response was the 1916 construction programme mentioned. Geography would largely rule out Germany as a potential threat and Britain was essentially occupied watching the Germans. In the unlikely event of a war with Britain, the USA would presumably need cruisers at least as much as battleships if not more so. Also, there was little chance of her achieving anything approaching parity in battleships in the short to medium term. The sacrifice of the construction of one battleship would enable the construction of 4-5 light cruisers and not significantly reduce her battleship superiority over Japan. I would suggest that the lack of money for cruiser construction was due to obsession with the pride and prestige of battleships rather than sensible or logical reasoning.
As stated, the French construction programme was a shambles due to ever changing political whims.
I would maintain that the application of sound and logical arguments to trends in naval construction is flawed insofar as decisions would be made based upon political considerations, rumours and speculation. Any contemporary argument would generally lack necessary hard evidence due to the lack of combat experience and the primitive nature of investigative trials. Thus an eloquent and respected champion of a particular option for construction would most likely prevail in the introduction of his ideas, especially if public support could be gained.
For a similar analogy, look at the arguments for horsed cavalry over tanks in the 1920s and 30s and there was actual combat experience to draw on in that debate.
 

martin worsey

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

...needs to be taken into account for when judging about the "I"´s alleged weak armour protection.
This is very interesting.
Do you have any views on why the Germans were incorporating quite high armour thicknesses in their designs well in advance of their breakthrough in shell design?
 

saddletank

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

Going a little off-topic but much of the reasoning for retaining horsed cavalry inter-war was for reasons of prestige, the class system (in Britain at any rate where a commission in a cavalry regiment was always deemed socially superior to a like-for-like commission in a regiment of foot) plus conservatism... even until recent years the light reconnaissance tank regiments of the British Army have borne the names "hussars" and "lancers" indicating the extent to which conservatism and tradition rules the British armed forces.

The horse has been the undeniable symbol of the British upper class since 1066 and resistance to it's claimed military redundancy in the 1920s and 30s was extraordinarily fierce.

Whether that same social trend might be relevant in an argument about cruiser design, construction and use in the Edwardian navy I am unsure though the sorts of personalities and social backgrounds of the Arbuthnots, Tyrwhitts, Cradocks and Troubridges of that era make me think it had some relevance: without a doubt having command of a large armoured cruiser on a foreign station was considered a superior career move to that of a light cruiser with the home fleet.
 

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

Do you have any views on why the Germans were incorporating quite high armour thicknesses in their designs well in advance of their breakthrough in shell design?
The philosophy of armour protection in HSF designs in the period 1902 to 1912 was following very different routes as to the expected range of decisive battle. They didn´t consider long range feasable, except for bombardment missions, hence the comparably low elevation of their BB main guns (13.5 deg), while large cruisers had initially higher elevation (20 deg) and the emphasize was put on sustainable rapid fire for both, main and secondary guns with regards to firing gears, hoists and handling equipment designed accordingly. The armor layout has to follow the function - to fight and keep up this ability. The intention was mainly to make a BB/BC/ACR immun against penetration at close range against period projectiles. In addition they tried to built them "unsinkable" with massive subdivision and internal protection such as armoured scarps, splinterbulkheads and multiple decks. This must be seen in accordance to the battle-doctrin which was going for dogfighting (meleé) as quick as possible. That was also the origin of triple- and quad-splitted armament and decentralized firing-directors found amply ingerman ships at this time. The teaching was to "battle-down" the opponent by highest rate of fire of different calibers from as close a range as possible to produce an overwhelming steel-rain of shells. Following this battle-doctrine the armor must be the more effective the closer you are to your enemy. Any serious horizontally arranged armor which didn´t augmented the side protection system was considered as a waste of material because it was not PLANNED to stay in far distance. Everbody expected that once after sighting each other the distance would rapidly decrease between the lines.
This explains the thick (for the period) armour protection of german battleships AND large cruisers.
 

martin worsey

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

Going a little off-topic but much of the reasoning for retaining horsed cavalry inter-war was for reasons of prestige, the class system (in Britain at any rate where a commission in a cavalry regiment was always deemed socially superior to a like-for-like commission in a regiment of foot) plus conservatism... even until recent years the light reconnaissance tank regiments of the British Army have borne the names "hussars" and "lancers" indicating the extent to which conservatism and tradition rules the British armed forces.

The horse has been the undeniable symbol of the British upper class since 1066 and resistance to it's claimed military redundancy in the 1920s and 30s was extraordinarily fierce.

Whether that same social trend might be relevant in an argument about cruiser design, construction and use in the Edwardian navy I am unsure though the sorts of personalities and social backgrounds of the Arbuthnots, Tyrwhitts, Cradocks and Troubridges of that era make me think it had some relevance: without a doubt having command of a large armoured cruiser on a foreign station was considered a superior career move to that of a light cruiser with the home fleet.
My example was admittedly extreme and did not consider the many centuries of selective inbreeding necessary to produce the cranial vacuum found in the typical aristocrat and the manifest vested interest. Having said that the French still had quite a few cavalry divisions and mixed cavalry/tank divisions in 1940. Possibly more appropriate would be the theories on tank design and deployment in the same period; a great plethora of designs and formations resulted (presumably from the potential created by the advancing technology). Actual combat resulted in rapid evolution to relatively few types of design and much more standardisation in the types of formation that the belligerents used.
I am not suggesting that the 1920s and 30s have any great relevance to the Edwardian navy and cruiser warfare; rather the general point that advancement of technology may push the development in directions that we would not expect. It is only actual combat which will prove period contemporary theories right or wrong.
Something that I have been considering is; how effective would battlefleets have been in a Pacific war between the USA and Japan? Close blockade would have been even more difficult than in the North Sea as few destroyers could be on station at any time due to the distances between the respective bases (e.g. Manila – Japan). Would such a conflict be decided by cruisers operating over wide areas with the battlefleets lumbering around without ever getting near each other?
 

martin worsey

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

The philosophy of armour protection in HSF designs in the period 1902 to 1912 was following very different routes as to the expected range of decisive battle..
This makes a lot of sense thank you
 

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

...needs to be taken into account for when judging about the "I"´s alleged weak armour protection.
Great post and good points :toast:

This is a very informative and interesting post; however, I would question a few aspects.
When considering the comment that the respective navies wanted light cruisers, this is presumably reflecting that they were so useful and versatile. They started out a scouts (i.e. eyes for the fleet) but were gradually found valuable operating with the light forces, for communication, commerce raiding and for interdiction of enemy patrols and could thus be considered as an essential component of a balanced fleet. To site lack of money as a reason for not building light cruisers appears indicative of total folly in the procurement programme.
The problem is, the sheer utility wasn't foreseen by most navies at the time. CLs were a new type of ship made possible by very recent machinery developments, so didn't fit into the pre-existing fleet structure that had prevailed for the last few decades, which admirals were used to thinking about and politicians had become accustomed to paying for. IOW, few recognized their full potential to start with but instead tended to regard them as specialists instead of generalists. Thus, they were often considered luxuries, especially when naval money was tight, until time had shown how versatile they were. And in some cases, this recognition came too late for the fleets of WW1.

Also, the rise of the CL roughly coincided with the start of the dreadnought era. That of course meant any nation with aspirations of becoming or at least remaining a major naval power suddenly had to spend huge sums on new battleships. This was especially galling because battleships were viewed as major, long-term investments with a useful life of say 20 years. Thus, the last few predreadnought programs represented major financial losses. This did not favorably dispose politicians toward the navies' budget requests in the early dreadnought era, especially if the nation involved was isolationist or viewed itself primarily as a continental power. Even the British and Japanese had this problem to some extent.

If we take the comments on the USA for example...
...
Geography would largely rule out Germany as a potential threat and Britain was essentially occupied watching the Germans. In the unlikely event of a war with Britain, the USA would presumably need cruisers at least as much as battleships if not more so. Also, there was little chance of her achieving anything approaching parity in battleships in the short to medium term. The sacrifice of the construction of one battleship would enable the construction of 4-5 light cruisers and not significantly reduce her battleship superiority over Japan. I would suggest that the lack of money for cruiser construction was due to obsession with the pride and prestige of battleships rather than sensible or logical reasoning.
Up until about 1890, the USN was a coast defense force in the usual sense: monitors, torpedoboats, etc., combined with commerce raiders and a few flag-showers. From then until WW1, it added a Mahanian outer defensive layer, a sea-going battlefleet intended to meet incoming invaders. In fact, during the early 1900s, the US built the largest coast defense fortification project in history, running from Maine to Texas and from San Diego to the Columbia River, plus in the Philippines and later the Panama Canal Zone. Go to nearly any harbor in the country, even a relatively minor one, and you can still see many of these works.

In the Western Hemisphere, US naval strategy, based on the Monroe Doctrine, revolved around stopping a European invasion fleet. Such an invasion would need to secure a fortified base from which to pursue its main objective, so the idea of the US battlefleet was to stop the invader before it could set up shop. Believe it or not, Germany was seen as the most likely enemy, which was fortunate because the USN had no hope of matching the RN. In fact, Germany actually conducted studies and made preliminary plans for just such an operation.

Locating the incoming invasion fleet in the vast ocean obviously required scouts with long range. At the time this strategy was taking shape, the only thing capable of doing the job (as well as the other AC roles) was the AC, so the US built a large number of them. They also built a few slow, colonial-type small cruisers and a very small number of DDs (given the number of BBs), which at that time weren't seen really as capable of oceanic work. So bottom line, the US fleet at this time was pretty much all predreadnoughts and ACs.

Building the US fleet to this point happened very rapidly, mostly between 1900 and 1906. That was a huge outlay, on top of the massive fortification project, but the idea was that the US could then rest secure for a number of years. Thus, naval budgets dried up even before the program was complete, which is why the last US predreadnoughts were too small to be satisfactory and were quickly sold to Greece while older ships remained in service. And just then, Dreadnought came along.

Having just spent all this money, Congress wasn't at all happy. So from then until the huge 1916 authorization, yearly US naval construction budgets were miniscule. They were just enough to build 2 dreadnoughts and a handful each of DDs and subs. Given that during this period, the RN and KM were building BBs in batches of 3-5 plus a BC or 2 thrown in, and that low US funding also meant comparatively long construction times, you can see why the USN was unwilling trade a BB for a CL squadron, or even a BC. After all, in those days, what mattered at the bottom line was BBs. If you didn't have them, you couldn't play with the big boys at all. Other types of ship just let you play better.

In terms of number of ships, the USN's 1917-1918 addition to RN seems insignificant compared to the might of the Grand Fleet, doesn't it? A single battle squadron (most of which had only 12" guns), later on a detachment of 2 more BBs in southern Ireland, and about 2.5 destroyer flotillas (later rising to about 4 as the first few flushdeckers of the 1916 program came into service). But this was almost the entire front-line strength of the USN at the time, as in ships built during the dreadnought era. That should tell you how small US naval budgets were prior to 1916.
 

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

Something that I have been considering is; how effective would battlefleets have been in a Pacific war between the USA and Japan? Close blockade would have been even more difficult than in the North Sea as few destroyers could be on station at any time due to the distances between the respective bases (e.g. Manila – Japan). Would such a conflict be decided by cruisers operating over wide areas with the battlefleets lumbering around without ever getting near each other?
We are talking in the WWI era I assume? Taking BH's post above into consideration, 'island hopping' or more accurately 'forward naval base developing' would perhaps have been the order of the day. Given the vast distances and the existing fleets it seems likely the US would have deployed almost every AC it possessed to the Pacific (after having no doubt secured suitable treaties with the major European powers to protect the Atlantic coast) but it strikes me that dirigibles and heavier than air recon would have shown itself to be far too useful not to be used. Whether that would have taken the form of hurriedly established air- and sea-plane stations on suitable islands or reliance on airship technology I can't say but probably the former and also probably with an ad-hoc mish-mash of seaplane tenders and possibly short-deck "take off only and land at the nearest island" carriers like Campainia. In short, pretty much what Britain was doing in WWI in the N sea aviation wise.

I can see a desperate scramble for the undersea cable telegraph station islands too - the ones Emden liked to visit or avoid depending on her captain's agenda at the time.

It would definitely make a great wargame campaign.
 

martin worsey

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Re: armour and shells as of period technology...

The problem is, the sheer utility .
This is a fine narrative.:)
I would observe that the justifications used relate almost entirely to the contemporary political situation, philosophies and the like. I would respectfully maintain that these types of consideration are most likely to determine how a fleet is composed and it is thus difficult to extrapolate with accuracy what trends would occur based on purely military considerations.
 

TBR

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A computer game based on the politics and economics of the day with restricted technology (assuming no WWI) and a ship design and construction routine that lets you make treaties, plan empires, manage taxes, shift politics then build fleets and fight wars but based solidly on a 1930s and 1940s Europe without Versailles, Stalin and Hitler would be quite an interesting game.
A game to dream of...
 

grayst

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Suppose I ought to apologise for starting a topic and then disappearing off on vacation!

Thanks to all those more knowledgeable than I who have chipped in. In particular, I can see that the notion of a 10x9.2", 28-kt alt I-class is unreasonable. Could I maybe squeeze a 26-kt version instead? It still ought to be fast enough to catch CLs in any sort of seaway.

As for the effectiveness of a larger number of 9.2s versus a smaller number of 12s, I just tried a little experimental scenario, pitching one each of the historic I-class and their Minotaur predecessors against a Nassau-class BB and a Deutschland-class PD, as follows:

Invincible vs. Nassau
Indomitable vs. Deutschland
Minotaur vs. Posen
Shannon vs. Hannover

Daylight, clear vis, range ~9500m, all ACHs switched off, all ships at 12 kts.

The first run was with the Germans "dumb" - no retaliatory fire.

Guess which British class was most effective?

That's right, the Minotaurs.

After allowing the British ships the shoot their magazines empty, the result was that Shannon managed to sink Hannover and Minotaur had almost managed to sink Posen - which had been showing moderate damage and out-of-control flooding for some time, but managed to survive. The I-class only managed to get Nassau and Deutschland to light damage.

This seems to show that the 9.2" was a serious threat to early dreadnoughts as well as PDs - and bear in mind that the Minotaurs only have a broadside of 4x9.2" and 5x7.5", while the imaginary "alt-I" would have a broadside of 8x9.2".

I need to do some more runs, of course: with the Germans shooting back, and maybe also with the 2nd I-class as well, to see if getting a true 8-gun broadside makes a significant difference.
 

grayst

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OK, another run:

Indefatigable vs. Nassau
New Zealand vs. Deutschland

Invincible vs. Posen
Indomitable vs. Hannover

Minotaur vs. Rheinland
Shannon vs. Pommern

Once again a clear win for the AC oldsters: Shannon scoring the first sinking with Pommern, followed by NZ with Deutschland. Then Minotaur finally got Rheinland, with the German BB eventually sinking long after Minotaur had shot her magazines empty.
 

saddletank

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I have a couple of thoughts on this.

Try about 10 or 20 runs to start to get a more statistical result. A sample of 1 is not very helpful. To save your brain turning to jelly you can run it at 20x speed which will help a bit, though I know the game clock reverts to 1x speed often when events happen.
Try it at longer ranges. 9500m isn't a very fair range as its well within the ACs ideal range. Try it at 12000m then 15000m. I suspect the I class might then show up in a better light.
I'd try it at more realistic speeds as well, say 16knts for the pre-dreadnought targets and 19kts for the Posens. I would also regularly shift courses by about 10deg every ten minutes to give a representation of ships in combat.

Remember also the I-class's gunnery quality is seriously nerfed in the game as BCF were notoriously bad shooters. Presumably the ACs gunnery efficiency is higher as they are GF ships and so get more gunnery practice. So you are not really comparing like for like with this test, nor conducting it at ranges fairer to the I Class.
 
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