1916 Campaign - Kaiserliche Marine

saddletank

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WAR DIARY ADMIRAL SCHEER, 1916

REDEPLOYMENTS AND STRATEGY

Upon taking up my new command I made a complete review of all forces assigned to the North Sea theatre of operations.

Decided that the weak torpedoboats of the Flanders Flotilla will be withdrawn immediately and replaced by more modern forces of torpedoboats and light cruisers when these are available. The present flotilla is too weak and slow to venture out and would be more useful based at Helgoland where the small ships could patrol inside the mine belt and operate to the north to intercept British merchant ships off the Danish coast.

At a date as practical as possible stronger and more modern boats to be sent to Zeebrugge, possibly some light cruisers as well in order to interdict Royal Navy shipping in the Channel and to tie down superior forces in southern waters where they would be more vulnerable to attack by the High Seas Fleet. Exact nature of the ships to be transferred to Zeebrugge under review.

The Flanders minelaying U-Boats to immediately commence minelaying operations off Dover, the Straits, the Thames estuary and Harwich with the intention of causing losses of attrition to Royal Navy forces and enemy merchant shipping in this area.

The small Flanders UB Boats to be used to gather intelligence in the eastern Thames and Channel basins and off the coast of East Anglia. It would be of assistance to fleet operations to have advanced notification if the Arethusa class cruisers and modern destroyers based at Harwich put to sea.

The Ahlhorn Zeppelins have been assigned a patrol area between Harwich and Zeebrugge to cover all southern enemy ports and coasts and the main shipping lanes in the 'narrow seas' area. One ship, the L19, ordered to transfer to Tondern in order to make up a six-ship squadron there divided into two sub-squadrons, the first to concentrate on patrols off the Orkney Islands and the second to focus it's patrol area off the Firth of Forth.

* * *

At our main bases it has been decided that the obsolete light cruisers of the various Defence Squadrons would best serve as additional scouts for the main fleet and therefore Arcona from the Ems, and Nymphe and Medusa from the Elbe ordered to Wilhelmshaven at once to join Thetis, Niobe and Frauenlob. These six ships to form VI and VII Scouting Groups.

It is resolved to have destroyer flotillas led from destroyers themselves and the firepower and screening capability of Rostock and Regensburg are to be combined with Stralsund to form III Scouting group, operating with the Scouting Forces.

Danzig, Stuttgart and Munchen to be combined to form V Scouting Group. Frauenlob transferred to VI Scouting Group. IV, V, VI and VII Scouting Groups to work with the main fleet while the Scouting Force comprises I, II and III Scouting Groups plus attendant destroyers.

Some light cruisers to be assigned to Zeebrugge in due course. Proposal under consideration.

* * *

The small defence torpedoboat flotillas at the Ems, Jade, Elbe and Helgoland are to remain on patrol duties for the time being, principally searching for English merchant shipping off the Dutch and Danish coasts and to escort the fleet minelayers. The 'A' Class boats from Flanders should perform these functions and free up these boats for other duties.

* * *

Nautilus and Pelikan tasked with mining the northern and western exits to the Bight to make these passages as difficult as practical for Royal Navy submarines.

III and IV U-Boat Flotillas at Helgoland tasked with maintaining standing patrols to the SE of Scapa Flow and E of Rosyth to report enemy fleet movements and interdict their patrols of light craft and attack British merchant shipping.

* * *

The principal units of the High Seas Fleet to remain in readiness. However it has been mooted to divide the Scouting Forces into raider groups each of a battlecruiser and a 15cm-armed light cruiser each to conduct fast operations against English merchant shipping and patrol forces. Proposal under consideration.

1 - 2 JAN

During the 2nd of the month the older cruisers had arrived in the Jade from Emden and Cuxhaven and VI and VII Scouting Groups were formally organised under the command of Commodore Hoffman of Frauenlob and Commodore Seiferling of Thetis.

III Scouting Group formed of Rostock, Stralsund and Regensburg to be commanded by Commodore Michelsen in Rostock.

During the night of 1-2 Jan Nautilus and Pelikan laid a new minefield of 600 mines at 55-09north, 08-07east W Tondern. This field is intended to make it more hazardous for enemy submarines to penetrate behind the Bight mine barrier.

Reports came in during the afternoon of 2nd January of the Norwegian cargo ship Trondheim with her German cargo of foodstuffs that had been seized to the east of the Shetland Isles by a British armed merchant cruiser. It is a possibility that the Scouting Forces might raid this patrol line and sink a number of the RN auxiliary ships thus helping our cargoes get home.

The six boats of the Flanders Submarine Minelaying Flotilla laid mines off Harwich completing this task in the night before dawn on the 2nd.

The 'A' Class boats of Flanders Flotilla moored up at Emden at daylight on the 2nd having made the transit from Zeebrugge without incident. This force of 16 boats was immediately split into 4 half-flotillas. Two are to remain based in the Ems and would form a standing patrol N of Borkum. Two half-flotillas were sent to Helgoland, there to undertake patrol work off the Danish coast in search of enemy cargo shipping.

The Scouting Forces under Rear Admiral Franz Hipper are to make a preliminary sweep up the coast of Norway to the latitude of Bergen and there patrol for enemy auxiliary cruisers, sink as many as they can and return. This is to be a short range patrol. If successful further sorties of longer range without torpedoboat escort shall be considered.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

One - Swedish Trondheim E Lerwick (unknown AMC), 1st Jan

British cargoes captured:

Nil

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 

saddletank

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I thought it was only fair on you fans of the KM that I should start to record a campaign from Scheer's perspective. I'm not so good at the language and terminology so will be using ranks and unit names in English and will probably interchange the terms 'torpedoboat' and 'destroyer' freely though in reference to RN and French boats the distinction is more clear.

I tend to think of the boats that operate with the HSF and ISG as 'destroyers' the newer bigger boats, and I tend to refer to the big B97/G101 class as 'zerstorer' just for flavour but the older smaller boats that begin based at Helgoland and the Ems etc and at Zeebrugge are definitely 'torpedoboats' in my mind.

I have actually begun a KM campaign about 4 or 5 times but each time it was ruined by AI silliness - usually the RN hurling flotillas of destroyers against Zeebrugge's guns when the 'A' Class boats retreated there, or Harwich Force committing suicide in a night action against the whole HSF but this time it started better and I'm finding it a whole lot of fun because its essentially an offensive campaign rather than the RNs defensive one (they equate very much to the same strategic positions of the Russians and Japanese in Distant Guns I) and thinking up subtle ways to take the war to the enemy is good exercise for the brain in the same way that playing the Russians in DG1 is more interesting.

I am trying to take the war to the enemy by sending out small raider groups to capture British merchant ships that our Zeppelin patrols have sent W/T positions of which is fun.
 

saddletank

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3 JAN

By 1030 the Scouting Forces were off Stavanger and had so far seen no enemy. Our U-Boats were well positioned to the west of Rear Admiral Hipper to observe any units of the Royal Navy that might be in the area.

At 2359 Scouting Forces were only 125km ENE of Lerwick but during the night had encountered no enemy warships. They turned for home thereafter due to fuel limits in the smaller torpedoboats. A second sweep is planned in which all but the 11 larger zerstorer class of boats will remain in port.

Our agent in Dover advised that the monitor Prince Rupert was reported to have struck a mine. No German mines have been sown off Dover recently and our short-range U-Boats are not yet operating in that locality. It is possible the monitor struck a British mine.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

Nil

British cargoes captured:

One - Codrington SSW Lemwig (2.Helgoland Defence Flotilla of A15, A16, A19 and A20)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

4 JAN

In the small hours of the morning our spy at the Admiralty in London reported that two small old British patrol craft had been lost yesterday, TB.9 and Racehorse. The location of these losses is unknown.

Since yesterday we have reorganised our Bight Defence Forces. The 16 slow A Class boats shall continue to operate in two flotillas based at Emden and Helgoland. The 9 boats of IV Flotilla plus the 13 boats of the Ems, Jade and Elbe Defence Flotillas have been reorganised into the IV and VIII Flotillas of 11 boats each, to operate on patrol as a pair of half flotillas. These units are tasked with longer ranging patrols, VIII Flotilla being based at Helgoland and IV Flotilla at Emden. IV Flotilla will sweep the outer perimeter of the Bight minefields which is a known British shipping lane and down the Dutch coast as far as Rotterdam. These boats are capable of 32 knots and should be able to outrun any British or French destroyers known to operate in these waters except the M Class based at Harwich. Being in half-flotillas they should easily overwhelm single patrolling enemy craft and cargo ships. IV Flotilla will sweep the northern Bight exit and conduct long range patrols up the Danish coast and into the Skagerrak as far as Kristiansand and to the Norwegian coast as far as Stavanger, all areas where British merchant shipping sails and far from the patrols of the RN.

These deployments should net us a low but steady haul of captured English cargoes.

Nautilus and Pelikan Minelayers were moved to a base at Helgoland where their normal operation areas are closer.

Determined to not return home empty handed, at 0430 Admiral Hipper on his own initiative detached the smaller older destroyers of VI and IX Flotillas and ordered them back to the Jade. The remainder of his force (4 battle cruisers, 7 cruisers and 11 large destroyers) which had ample fuel would return to the latitude of Bergen and conduct another sweep towards the Shetlands, this time in daylight.

1400 115km E Lerwick Pillau leading the port pair of screen cruisers, Elbing astern of her, sighted smoke to the SW and gave chase, working up to 27kts. Hipper sent the bulk of his force in pursuit but ordered his other screen cruisers to proceed W and NW in search of other enemy.

The smoke was being overhauled and it was seen to be a single ship with one funnel and merchant style rig with crane derricks fore and aft. She was making 15kts so it was unlikely she was a cargo ship.

At 1420 the target was 12500m from Pillau and both she and Elbing opened fire. The enemy was identified as the armed merchant cruiser Patnea of 6100 tons and 6 6-inch guns. The enemy replied at 1432 when the range was 8000m. Patnea was now steering a course of 217 and Pillau led Elbing onto 198 to open up their starboard arcs.

Patnea was struck by a salvo from Elbing at 1438, at the same time Patnea scored her first hit on Pillau which struck on the starboard side of her forward funnel. At 1440 a second hit struck the side plating below #1 starboard gun. The enemy had been hit 7 or 8 times by now and a small fire had started forward of her superstructure.

At 1445 Pillau fired a salvo of which three shots hit and a second more serious fire was started astern of Patnea's wheelhouse. By now she had ceased firing but refused to surrender.

At 1500 Pillau altered to 258 to close the range decisively and by 1518 our two cruisers were pouring in broadsides from 1500m, almost every shot hitting. By 1520 the enemy was well ablaze, from the cargo hatch areas ahead and abaft the wheelhouse and she was listing 3 or 4 degrees to port. Her speed had dropped to 7kts and she sank slowly by the bow at 1526, the first victory of our surface forces! Being aware that he was a long way from home and with the cover of night now helpfully falling, Hipper turned his Scouting Forces towards base. During the action, although both our cruisers were hit two or three times each, both were fully repaired by the damage control teams by the end of the action.

At midnight the 19 older destroyers with reduced range from the Scouting Groups reached Helgoland and proceeded back to the Jade.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

Nil

British cargoes captured:

Nil

Blockading Ships Sunk:

One - AMC Patnea 85km NE Lerwick Is (II SG)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 
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saddletank

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They are a right pain in the rear those AMCs. It's so frustrating to see neutral ships enter the top of the map and know the 10th CS will get them. Hence my determination to do something about it.

I had the SS Onega enter at Blue8 and she got as far as past Cromarty going right through the Pentland Firth at night only to get caught somewhere near Aberdeen. So annoying!

I realise the Germans need to help get the neutral cargoes home, but do you know if capturing British cargoes helps in VPs? Either way I'm having fun trying to find them.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

5 JAN

In the small hours of the morning our spy at the Admiralty reported that the old British destroyer Brazen had been lost yesterday, whether to a mine or torpedo attack from one of our boats is unknown at this time, as is the location.

At 1545 Scouting Forces passed the Horns Reef light. The first 'Blockade Lifting' operation had been a success in that no major enemy warships had been encountered and we had sunk one auxiliary cruiser, but more positive results are sought in future operations and it is thought we need to sweep north and west of the Orkney-Shetland line to locate and destroy more ships of the Royal Navy's blockading squadrons.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

Nil.

British cargoes captured:

Two - Liverpool 90km NNW Rotterdam (8.IV Flot from the Ems - G194, G195, G196, G197, V163, V164)
- Hong Kong 250km W Lemwig (16.VIII Flot from Helgoland - S165, S166, S167, S168, V161, V162).

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 
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saddletank

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6 JAN

8.IV Flotilla had, during the night responded to a wireless report from the airship L.6 of a British cargo ship off Rotterdam. The ship proved to be the Liverpool and was duly captured. However on their return, our torpedoboats were warned that L.6 had also observed a group of light cruisers and destroyers moving NE towards 8.IV Flotilla and our six small boats withdrew.

The capture of both the Liverpool and Hong Kong was the result of sightings and W/T reports from Zeppelins and our defence patrols being fortuitously placed and available to intercept. This use of air- and surface- scouting units is proving useful and shall be continued. It may even be practical to break down the torpedoboat half-flotillas into pairs of boats to be able to cover a wider area. Consideration to be reviewed as necessary.

Admiral Hipper's forces had just passed Helgoland and the Scouting Force was sent to the western or 'Dutch' Bight exit to patrol and await 8.IV Half-flotilla's return which it safely did. There was a proposal to send the battle cruisers out after the enemy cruisers but given that this would bring on an encounter at night it was decided to patrol inside the Bight and await events, however in the morning there was no sign of the British ships.

A bold patrol was authorized late on 4 January. The five torpedoboats of 7.IV Flotilla based at Emden (G192, G193, G169, G170, G172) under Captain Goette left the Ems at dusk on the 5th and avoiding the reported British light cruisers to their south made their way to a position off the English coast between the Humber and the Wash in search of coastal mercantile traffic to attack. Here at 0700 on the 6th they encountered however, the old British destroyer Earnest which was sighted astern. Goette ordered maximum revolutions and the flotilla attained 32kts and lost sight of the enemy for 30 minutes during which time Goette steered 355 and then, at 0720 onto 076, hoping to circle around the enemy and out to sea to approach the coast in another place.

Earnest however was sighted bearing 155 5000m away at 0728 and at 0731 a second British destroyer, Locust came out of the dawn gloom bearing 318 and steering a course of 135. It seemed the enemy had rumbled us and was calling in various patrol craft to attack. Goette maintained a course of 076 and decided to break off to the east, shooting his way out between the two enemy ships.

The shooting of both British destroyers was very good and our three leading boats had all been hit by 0733 when Earnest was at last hit although by now the range was down to 1400m and the enemy was steering 034 to use his broadside guns.

G169, third in line fired two torpedoes at Earnest at 0734 but they narrowly missed astern. Earnest fired one torpedo at G170 astern of her which also missed. By 0739 all five of our boats had been hit, and G170 was making only 30 knots. Earnest however was down to 12 knots and being left astern, badly shot about.

At 0820 still being pursued by Locust, Goette altered to course 060, aware the group of British cruisers and destroyers might still be somewhere to his south east. At 0837 Goette succeeded in breaking contact and headed east to the open sea to resume a southward sweep as the morning progressed.

At 0900 following W/T reports from Zeppelin L16 off Great Yarmouth stating that two merchant ships were off the coast there, it was decided to send a stronger raid to the area. III Scouting Group (Rostock, Regensburg and Stralsund) together with 4.II Flotilla of G101, G102, G103 and G104 was formed into an independent raiding force tasked with sinking or capturing British merchant ships and any weak patrol forces in the locality. Even if shipping was absent, the sinking of the patrol craft would benefit future raids. It is assumed the 'Earnest Patrol' is based in the River Humber.

At the same time Rear Admiral Hipper was ordered to take I and II Scouting Groups and 3.II Flotilla on a second long range sweep to the Bergen-Lerwick line and beyond.

At 1130 Captain Goette who had taken 7.IV Flotilla south as originally planned sighted and captured the English collier Actaeon 36km N of Great Yarmouth. She was within 5km of the coast when boarded and a group of fishing trawlers bearing Lowestoft markings could only watch as we snatched the valuable cargo of heavy steel forgings from under their noses.

During the afternoon while steering a course of 090 to the Dutch coast, 7.IV Flotilla encountered the group of British light cruisers and destroyers that is now known to patrol these seas regularly. Four Arethusa class light cruisers and 23 destroyers were present plus an unknown vessel with a large structure aft which was thought to be either a repair vessel or a minelayer. Increasing speed to 31kts Goette manoeuvred his boats around the enemy and left them astern, the British apparently not prepared to leave their slow vessel unescorted.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

Four - Swedish Helsingborg 160km ENE Lerwick (AMC Motagua)
- American Onega 25km S Scapa (unknown vessel)
- Norwegian Gelria 100km NW Amsterdam (large group estimated by Gelria as '5 cruisers, 30 destroyers')
- Norwegian Hjelm 135km NNE Lerwick (AMC Motagua)

British cargoes captured:

Two - Actaeon 35km N Great Yarmouth (7.IV Flotilla based at Emden (G192, G193, G169, G170, G172)
- Tyler 45km WSW Tondern (2.Helgoland Defence Flotilla of A15, A16, A19, A20)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 

saddletank

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7 JAN

To date the ratio of mercantile losses is satisfactory - both us and the enemy, as far as we are aware, have lost five ships in six days. If we can maintain this rate of attrition I will be satisfied.

On 3rd January Nautilus and Pelikan laid 600 mines at 53-52N 06-26E 25km NW of Borkum to assist in closing off the 'Dutch Bight' entrance to British submarines and offensive patrols. This minefield has been maintained since then by the 'A' Class Ems patrol flotilla: As the boats leave port they sow additional mines before continuing their patrols to north or south of the Bight entrance. In similar fashion the 'A' Class boats of the Helgoland Flotilla maintain the 'Danish Bight' entrance minefield when they exit on patrol.

This morning our spy in London advised that the British destroyer Angler was lost last night at about 2000, cause and location unknown.

At 0240 Goette returned to Emden to be congratulated on his operation into hitherto British-ruled waters.

The limited successes of 'Goette's Raid' encouraged me yesterday to authorize a second operation using the six boats of 8.IV Half-Flotilla under Commander Hoppe. Hoppe was sent further north and intended to make landfall off Hartlepool and then sweep south for enemy cargo ships. We hope to avoid the area that is heavily patrolled off the Humber estuary.

IIISG Raiding Force under Commodore Michelsen and ISG and escorts under Adm Hipper weighed at 0300 and proceeded to sea. Michelsen had orders to proceed west on the latitude of Hull until he reached land and then was to sweep SE to Great Yarmouth before returning via the Dutch coast. Michelsen is going into the locality where Goette met several destroyers yesterday; the intention is to weaken the British patrols.

At 0618 while patrolling 236km W Lemwig on course 315, 16.VIII Half-Flotilla received an unpleasant surprise. Ahead of us out of the dark loomed a line of shapes, a British flotilla leader and 8 'L' Class destroyers. We exchanged fire with the enemy and turned hard about to port turning away together to 090 and making all speed. The enemy did not pursue. S165 was quite badly hit, all of her weapons being disabled in a matter of two or three minutes. Our destroyer patrols need to stay closer against the Danish coast. The 'L' Class boats as far as we are aware are based at Harwich. Possibly this was the same force that was observed off the Dutch coast yesterday afternoon.

Commander Hoppe was off Hartlepool at 0700 but was unable to locate any trade. He then began a sweep SE towards the Humber estuary but with orders to be wary of meeting single Royal Navy patrolling destroyers as these would appear to have a tactic of sending their W/T position and calling in other boats. Zeppelin L16 had sent a W/T report of a merchant ship steaming N off Lowestoft at 2345 yesterday but this target was too far south for Hoppe to attack. If the ship came north and Hoppe maintained his patrol it might be encountered though its destination was unknown.

At 0900 Zeppelin L13 reported that the group of British small cruisers and destroyers 16.VIII Half-Flotilla had encountered was at 55-43N 05-53E and steering SW.

Hoppe was proceeding S 11km off Flamborough Head at 1100 when smoke was sighted to the south 24km distant. The German destroyers set off at increased revolutions to investigate and it was soon clear the target was a cargo ship. However at 1120 two British destroyers were sighted beyond the other vessel heading N so Hoppe reversed course and disengaged at 1136. Our boats cruised north for an hour and then reversed course once more to make contact with the enemy cargo ship at 1315 off Whitby. Once again we pursued and this time no British patrols were close enough to protect the steamer which surrendered her cargo of iron ore after a chase lasting an hour and twenty minutes. Commander Hoppe now chose to sweep N up the coast away from the known enemy patrolled area off the Humber, the plan was to go as far as Berwick and then turn for home.

Off Zeebrugge at 1435 a British cargo ship was sighted from UC.6 as she returned from a minelaying operation off Dunkerque. This information was passed to our technical office and relayed to Commodore Michelsen on Rostock who was then at 53-55N 02-43E approximately half way between Emden and Hull. Despite the target being 250km S of him, he agreed to detach G101 and G102 and send them to intercept.

The five damaged boats of Half-Flotilla 7.IV all completed repairs at 1440 and the unit made ready for active duty once more.

Zeppelin L16 reported the British cargo vessel that was seen off Zeebrugge earlier was now off Rotterdam. The G101 and G102 were therefore given her new position and course.

At 1758 IIISG was on course 270 90km SE Hull when they encountered the destroyer Panther which appeared out of the dark astern of Rostock, the centre ship of the formation. Michelsen had deployed his ships in line abreast at 7000m intervals, Stralsund to port, Rostock in the centre and Regensburg to starboard. The two wing cruisers were accompanied by a destroyer each, G103 and G104. To deal with the Panther Michelsen turned his own ship to port and steered SE then S, the enemy boat set a course of SSW and thus on converging courses the two exchanged an unequal fire. By 1812 Rostock steamed back towards her station, leaving Panther behind her making 9 knots and ablaze in several places, all her guns silent.

A second enemy destroyer was encountered at 1905, Locust appearing on Stralsund's port bow at 3000m. She and G101 engaged without changing course from 301 or speed and after a brief exchange of gunfire the enemy boat was left behind heeling over and sinking on a course of 036. G101 had both pairs of torpedo tubes disabled in this short fight.

III SG met Orwell 56km ENE Hull at 2212, on course 321 towards Flamborough Head the starboard pair of our ships, Regensburg and G104 were fired upon from port and moments later the British destroyer emerged from the darkness. Our ships turned to 001 as did our opponent and in a short running fight the enemy was disabled and set well alight by 2225, all guns silent, decks awash and making only 10knots. G104 had a pair of torpedo tubes and one 8.8cm gun disabled in this action. Earlier in the night Michelsen had captured the British collier Adolphe Andersen. He later encountered and captured the freighter Aarhus carrying sugar to London.

By midnight Rear Admiral Hipper was passing the latitude of Stavanger, thus far there had been no contact with the enemy.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

One - Swedish Hamar 135km ENE Lerwick (AMC Patia)

British cargoes captured:

Three - San Francisco 30km E Whitby (8.IV Flotilla based at Emden (G194, G195, G196, G197, V163, V164)
- Adolphe Andersen 60km SE Hull (III SG)
- Aarhus 65km E Whitby (III SG)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 

rgreat

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Good read.

Seems like you rather careful with main body of fleet. Good for brits. ;)

Thanks. Looking to read more.
 
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saddletank

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8 JAN

During the later part of the night III SG turned for home, there being no other trade off Whitby and the enemy forces to the south by now thoroughly alerted to our presence. Commander Hoppe leading 8.IV Half-Flotilla was also ordered home, having encountered no enemy surface forces or mercantile traffic between Hartlepool and Berwick.

G101 and G102 patrolled for three hours between Rotterdam and Amsterdam but the English cargo ship seen moving northwards was not found. It is suspected it went into Amsterdam. Our two boats withdrew.

Despite some frustrations it had been a highly successful operation, III SG having sunk 3 old destroyers and captured two cargo ships for no loss. The utility of even a few 10.4cm-gunned small cruisers over several faster but weakly gunned and lightly built torpedoboats is evident. It is planned to make further sweeps of the east coast with III SG.

At 0945 U.22 sent a W/T report that she had dived to avoid being rammed by an armoured cruiser half an hour earlier. The report stated numerous battleships and destroyers present, indicating the Grand Fleet is out. U.22s position was given as 58-35north 01-10west, the enemy course being 220. Urgent W/T transmission to Hipper informing him of U.22s report.

At 1235 Zeppelin L.17 reported a British cargo ship at 57-45north 03-56east. 15.VIII flotilla was then 200km SE of that position on a patrol at the entrance of the Skagerrak and was ordered to reverse course to intercept.

At 1320 while on course 314 85km NE Lerwick and intending to head north about the Shetland Islands, Hipper's port wing cruisers Pillau and Elbing saw smoke 23km bearing 243 and set off in pursuit. By 1347 the range was 14000m and the target was identified as Patuca, 6000 tons. She was steering 240 presumably trying to make for Lerwick. At 1349 Pillau opened fire at 13,500m though she had to check fire after four salvoes due to the target being indistinct. Both our cruisers now fired only intermittently as the enemy was lost in haze against the Shetland Island of Fetlar beyond.

The enemy commenced firing at 1402 and the light was very much in his favour as he struck Pillau with two shells from his first salvo at 8800m, one striking forwards on the starboard bow and the second bursting on Nr.3 starboard gun, disabling both it the starboard deck mounted torpedo tube forward of it.

Patuca had to turn to pass the island of Fetlar at 1410 and she turned towards our ships rather than away, to take the channel between the island and the mainland which we consider to be a grave mistake. The range now quickly came down to 4000m and the enemy began to take hits. She had her last gun in action silenced at 1413 and fires broke out forward of her wheelhouse. By 1424 Patuca was a blazing wreck, making 7 knots. Pillau and Elbing ceased fire and turned away to the N. At 1435 Patuca ran herself ashore on the eastern promontory of Fetlar and burned fiercely as our ships withdrew.

By 1730 Hipper was NNW of the Shetlands and the starboard pair of screen cruisers, Frankfurt leading Wiesbaden, saw a large shape off their starboard quarter, illuminating it with searchlights and starshell it was seen to be another British auxiliary cruiser, the Changuinola. In a fierce, short fight ending at 1735 the enemy ship was set ablaze and left drifting and listing. Although Wiesbaden was hit some six or seven times she suffered damage to only minor structures.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

One - Norwegian Telemark 75km S Scapa (destroyer Cheerful)

British cargoes captured:

One - Boston 185km WNW Lemwig (15.VIII Flotilla based at Helgoland V152, V153, V155, V156, V159)

Blockading Ships Sunk:

Two - AMC Patuca off Fetlar Is (II SG)
- AMC Changuinola 130km N Lerwick (II SG)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 

saddletank

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9 JAN

Hipper decided to turn back when he was 100km N of the Shetlands and swept down their eastern flank intending to make towards the Orkneys before daylight. At just before midnight when 75km SE of Lerwick and steering 180 the starboard cruiser pair, Frankfurt leading Wiesbaden, sighted another large merchant-rigged ship 4000m on the starboard quarter. Turning to 260 the unknown vessel also came about on a westerly course and fire was opened.

The other ship proved to be the armed merchant cruiser Motagua which was a special target of ours as she had been responsible for capturing several German cargoes. By 0010 our cruisers hauled away to rejoin the screen, leaving Motagua a burning sinking wreck.

Hipper now set a course of 230 and by 0800 was south of the Shetlands steering 155. Dawn was breaking and Pillau and Elbing came in contact not with a patrolling destroyer as had been expected but four enemy cruisers; Galatea, Inconstant, Phaeton and Cordelia, 6500m on Elbing's port quarter. The enemy course was 330. This was known to be the Royal Navy's 1st Light Cruiser squadron that was thought to operate with the Grand Fleet and Hipper therefore signalled all speed and a turn away to 170. The Grand Fleet had last been observed yesterday morning by U.22 heading south towards Aberdeen but evidently a W/T signal from one of the sunken auxiliary cruisers had alerted Jellicoe to our presence and he had reversed course.

As Hipper turned away the British cruisers did likewise to 095 though not before both Pillau and Elbing had been hit, Phaeton also. Soon the British were lost to sight in the dawn murk. For a few minutes contact was lost and then a new shape emerged from the mist, Antrim, an armoured cruiser of 1905 vintage, 10,800 tons and 22 knots. Her course was 278 and she bore 038 from Pillau. Her course would take her to Hipper's battle cruisers. She opened fire at 0812 on Elbing at a range of 7200m but after a single salvo the visibility became too murky and contact was lost with the enemy fleet.

Hipper continued S towards the Head of Kinnaird. Thirty minutes after losing sight of Antrim, two enemy light cruiser squadrons came in sight on Von der Tann's port quarter bearing 080 course 225. The Galatea and her squadron was to starboard and approaching Seydlitz while further to port and more distant Yarmouth, Falmouth, Gloucester and Birkenhead were in sight at 8000m. It would seem that our unseen enemy was on a course of west by south and Hipper was passing across their line of advance in a south-easterly direction, having almost got beyond the enemy such that his screen made contact with the port flank of our main body. The enemy light cruisers opened fire and our battle cruisers were hit several times but Von der Tann and Moltke at the rear of our line engaged Falmouth and Yarmouth while Derfflinger and Seydlitz opened fire on Galatea and Inconstant.

Von der Tann recorded one hit on Falmouth before this enemy squadron reversed course and disappeared but both Galatea and Inconstant were hit hard. By 0846 the enemy were slipping away in the murk having sheered off on course 035 but as she was swallowed up in the gloom Galatea was moving very slowly and was becoming separated from her squadron.

Hipper now knew that he was not being sought by the Grand Fleet but by Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. Nevertheless, trapped as he was between Duncansby Head and Kinnaird Head he preferred not to seek a general engagement, preferring to get east of the enemy and then accept battle. Accordingly at 0845 Hipper ordered a turn away to 160.

As the enemy light cruisers were lost to sight the Antrim reappeared at 9000m on a similar bearing to the other enemy ships. She was engaged and hit heavily by our three rear ships and turned away, on fire, to course 010. Minutes later Devonshire and then Kent came in sight and these were briefly engaged until, at 0855 the unmistakeable silhouettes of Lion class battle cruisers were seen bearing 023 from Von der Tann range 11400m. The enemy course was 175 at 24kts though the British ships turned port to 148 when they saw our battle line.

At first only Lion leading Princess Royal were visible and our ships engaged by pairs. It now began to rain and sighting was uncertain. For several minutes Seydlitz had no target in view and our other ships could only bring their stern and port wing turrets to bear. Nevertheless Lion and Princess Royal were both hit soon after the engagement opened.

By 0900 four enemy ships could be seen and with the light improving, opposite numbers were engaged, Moltke hitting Queen Mary, third ship in the enemy line, at 0901. Von der Tann was hit by three 13.5" shells from a salvo of four at 0902. Hipper ordered a turn away together to 175 at 0904 when ten enemy battle cruisers were in sight. The enemy held on course 132 and the range opened to 15000m.

At 0915 Von der Tann's belt was penetrated on the port side outboard of the barbette of Dora turret which jammed the turret ring, disabling it. Hipper ordered his ships to engage as pairs the two leading British ships at 0925, his intention being to slow the whole enemy line if he could cripple one of the leaders. At 0931 Hipper ordered course 160 which would allow him to clear the Head of Kinnaid, now 44km from Seydlitz. This turn also brought his ships forward turrets onto bearing, increasing his firepower from 18 guns to 34. Prior to this II SG and II Flotilla had turned to 130 and were cutting now across the head of the British line towards the east.

At 0935 Beatty turned in succession to 216, apparently attempting to close the range decisively. Hipper responded with a turn in succession to 130, crossing Beatty's 'T' and heading for the open sea. Beatty responded by a turn to 207 at 0938. At 0943 the range was down to 15400m when Beatty began a turn away to 261, cutting across the rear of the German line. It was the manoeuvre Hipper had been hoping for as his escape route was now open, providing no new enemy were blocking him to the SE.

Astern of the British battle cruisers a vast fleet of destroyers could now be seen, approximately some thirty boats. Antrim, Devonshire and Kent were still shadowing the Germans to the N but the British light cruisers were not in sight.

Little effect had been seen on the British ships in the last thirty minutes while Von der Tann had received one 12" hit that destroyed a 15cm gun and Moltke had taken some seven 13.5" hits though this had not affected her fighting ability at all. At 0948 Beatty turned to 133 placing himself in a very weak position astern of the German battle cruisers and it would seem a knot slower.

At 0950 Hipper ordered Pillau and Elbing to steer 090, the destroyers also. Frankfurt and Wiesbaden kept on 130 observing ahead of I SG. The range from Seydlitz to Lion was now 17600m and opening again. Beatty had swung around to 112 by 0954.

A study of the enemy line at 1002 revealed that Lion's 'B' turret was out of action, Princess Royal's 'Q' and Tiger's 'X'. Dora turret on Von der Tann was our only loss of firepower though the early salvo of which three shells hit that had slowed her to 25 knots was proving to be the most serious issue, disengagement being all but impossible. Hipper turned I SG to 115 at 1005, conforming to the rest of his force which had steered away from 090 to 115 at 0957. Fire was once again redistributed back to the leading two ships by pairs and following the turn all turrets were brought to bear again.

At 1010 the British turned towards once more, onto 163 and at 1014 resumed onto 123 and at 1019 onto 113. At 1032 Hipper turned away together to 145 and the range opened to 18500m. Two minutes later Beatty turned away to 106, opening the range further. At 1036 the German ships checked fire though the British continued at a slow rate, Moltke being hit by two 13.5" shells at 1037. At 1039 Beatty edged a little closer to 117. Moltke was hit again at 1042. Beatty turned to 126 at 1043 though by now the range from Von der Tann to Lion was 20000m. Incredibly Moltke was hit again by two shells from Queen Mary at 1045 though the range was now 21000m and Tiger fired at Von der Tann at 1052 when the range was more than 22000m. The British finally checked fire at 1057. Hipper had now turned to 150 and at 1114 broke contact, somewhat sobered by the very long range of the British 13.5" gunned ships.

Thereafter Hipper set a course due east and made towards the centre of the North Sea before turning to the south east and the Horns Reef light as daylight was fading. No further contact was made with the British fleet. We have named this the Battle of Kinnaird.

Despite being in action with Beatty's battle cruisers for more than two hours, we received only some sixteen hits, five on Von der Tann, thought to have been fired by Tiger, between nine and eleven on Moltke which we presume were fired by Queen Mary and one, fired by Lion, on Seydlitz. Derfflinger was not hit at all.

* * *

Further south, 7.IV Flotilla and 8.IV Flotilla had been despatched in the evening of yesterday to conduct further raids off the East Anglian coast. At 1130 7.IV Flotilla was heading towards and 60km from Lowestoft on a due westerly course and 8.IV Flotilla was some 80km north on the same heading when the Harwich Force was sighted by Commander Hoppe's G.194, lead boat of 8.IV Flotilla. Hoppe immediately reversed course and headed east at maximum revolutions.

South of Hoppe, Commander Goette in G.192 leader of 7.IV Flotilla held on until 1146 when smoke to the NW revealed five 'L' Class British destroyers and the small cruiser Undaunted. Goette too reversed and headed east. The enemy light forces proved to be tenacious and the pursuit was conducted with vigour and the enemy were only lost astern as darkness approached at 1542, a pursuit of four hours ending with our forces within 15km of the Dutch coast.

Harwich Force is proving to be more than a little tiresome. It protects the English coast well and is too strong for even our III SG raiding force to fight. It must be brought to battle and weakened and Hipper's Scouting Forces are the best units for this but we feel it is more important that they continue to conduct operations in the north to open up safe routes for our vital war supplies. Some other force needs to be sent against these annoying English ships and it is being considered that we send II Battle Squadron with III SG and IV SG (Stettin, Berlin, Hamburg) as screen and the shorter ranged torpedo boats not currently in use by Hipper as escort.

Agreed that this sweep will commence preparations forthwith and be under the command of Rear Admiral Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels in the battleship Hannover.

During the night Commander Goette chose to return westward to carry out his orders however at 2243 his flotilla met the River class destroyer Teviot at only 1000m range while some 110km NNE Great Yarmouth. Fire was exchanged and though hits were observed on the enemy the weight of firepower of these quite old English destroyers is formidable in comparison to our older boats. Goette's boat, G.192 was seen to be hit badly and ceased fire and began to lose speed. The remainder of the flotilla retreated and although gunfire was heard and flashes seen to the west for forty-five minutes, after 2330 nothing more was heard or seen. G.192 is our first loss of 1916 and we trust that the brave and resourceful Commander Goette survived the action to be taken prisoner. He was at least successful in his last raid in capturing the British trader Glasgow, carrying a mixed cargo of textiles, foodstuffs and motor lorries and on the return leg the Zeppelin L.13 reported a French merchant ship steaming N off the Humber and 7.IV Flotilla went in pursuit, capturing a second ship (which is accounted for under the entry for 11 Jan).

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

One - Swedish Thunberg 25km S Scapa (destroyer Cheerful)

British cargoes captured:

One - Glasgow, 100km N Rotterdam (7.IV Flotilla based at Emden G192, G193, G169, G170, G172)

Blockading Ships Sunk:

One - AMC Motagua, 85km SE Lerwick (II SG)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 

saddletank

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Hheh, thanks. How do I do what? I write the accounts as the battles are being fought, in a word document with much pausing and checking of times, ranges, bearings and ship damage screens.

I've taken buckets of screenshots. I must dig the better ones out. Same goes for my RN campaign. My computer is quite old though so I do have the graphics turned down a bit, I can't run the game with the fully rendered 3D sea surface at all, so my screenshots are not that great.

That battle with the British battle cruisers was quite scary as they began to pop into sight out of the dawn haze one at a time... But the AI seems to be so intent on keeping formations on the slowest ship that I was just able - as you can see it took me over two hours - to crawl away from them. I think that battle must have had a LOT of haze and stuff in use because the shooting was pretty poor - much to my relief! I noticed several times my rear ships shooting while Derfflinger and Seydlitz at the head of the line not firing, then firing one or two salvoes and falling silent again, so yes, good haze and poor visibility effects.

Some of the battles the AI fights are embarrassingly odd, but sometimes you get extremely good ones, almost as good as if a human were commanding them.
 

saddletank

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10 JAN

II Battle Squadron weighed and proceeded to sea from the Jade at 0900. The plan of the operation is to approach the Humber estuary and turn SE to sweep through the area where the British River class destroyers usually patrol and then to bombard Great Yarmouth and return, which it is hoped will draw Harwich Force out.

At 0930 Hipper's battle cruisers passed the Horns Reef light and entered safe waters.

Seydlitz entered the Jade at 1450 and came to anchor with the other vessels of Hipper's force, a most successful operation accomplished with three enemy auxiliary cruisers sunk. The ships were stood down and were at once swarmed by dockyard hands to commence repairs.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

Two - Norwegian Amstelland 75km N Lerwick (AMC Patia)
- American Atlantic Sun 15km N Oostende (French TBs Sirocco and Mistrale)

British cargoes captured:

One - Amiral de Kersaint (Fr), 275km E Blyth (7.IV Flotilla based at Emden, G193, G169, G170, G172)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 

saddletank

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11 JAN

At 0200 Zeppelin L.16 sent a W/T report of a French-flagged cargo ship steaming NE off Harwich. Rear Admiral zu Lichtenfels was advised and he detached IV SG (Stettin, Berlin and Hamburg; Commodore von Reuter commanding) south to investigate. II Battle Squadron was then approximately 200km N of the enemy ship. At 0500 von Reuter encountered and captured the French freighter Marseilles, carrying timber 25km NE of Great Yarmouth. He turned to the NW back towards II Battle Squadron's intended reciprocal course after zu Lichtenfels had made landfall at Spurn Head.

At 0527 Hamburg on the port wing of IV SG's line abreast encountered three 'L' Class destroyers at approximately 2800m. Knowing this could be the whole of Harwich Force, Hamburg turned away to course 339, the British boats in pursuit. Stettin and Berlin turned to close and give Hamburg support.

At 0534 Stettin arrived at hand to support Hamburg and at 0539 Berlin added her fire against the enemy destroyers which had turned to form a column in pursuit. The enemy initially speeded up to 28 knots but then slowed to 23, enabling us to keep the range at 2500m. Considerable damage was now being inflicted on the lead enemy boat which had been identified as Liberty, with Laurel astern. The enemy was no longer shooting and our three cruisers maintained a line abreast some 3000m ahead of the British and fired as rapidly as visibility would allow.

At 0548 von Reuter ordered a turn to 320 and the enemy destroyers after heading on 340 for a time followed to 318. At 0557 Liberty had been hit sufficiently to slow her speed to 20 knots and our cruisers began to draw away. Our captains however knew that day would break in an hour and behind the 'L' Class were probably four Arethusas.

Stettin checked fire at 0600 and Berlin and Hamburg at 0603. The enemy had slowed to 18 knots and our ships gradually drew away until contact was lost at 0612. It is a mystery to us why the enemy did not send his undamaged destroyers past Liberty to continue the pursuit when she was slowed.

* * *

At 0704 zu Lichtenfels' force was steaming at 15 kts on course 194, 75km E of Hull when Regensburg, the starboard wing cruiser of the screen identified a British River class destroyer 3500m on her port bow, course 080. Regensburg increased speed and opened fire, the enemy boat sheering off to starboard.

By 0711 Rostock had increased speed and her position allowed her to close rapidly with the enemy boat, now on course 135 and open fire. Regensburg resumed her assigned course and speed and checked fire, Rostock taking on the engagement and quickly wrecking the British boat. The enemy destroyer passed only 500m astern of Rostock, well ablaze and apparently not under power. It was our old adversary Earnest and she would trouble our commerce-raiding patrols no more.

G101's Half-Flotilla (Commander Heine) now engaged the wrecked destroyer, finishing her off. Earnest sank at 0718 within 50m of G104 which stopped to lower boats and drag the surviving English sailors from the icy water. Forty eight men were saved, though five died later from wounds.

* * *

At 0811 80km ESE Hull we made contact with the Harwich forces just as we had hoped. IV SG was on course 270, disposed 2000m abeam with Hamburg as the port ship when four Arethusa class cruisers appeared in the morning gloom some 6000m bearing 122, on course 275 at 20 knots. The three ships of IV SG turned together to 320 and accelerated to 23 knots, while the British turned away in succession to 163 while a column of 'M' Class destroyers appeared out of the mist behind them from the same direction.

Zu Lichtenfels was then 19km due N of von Reuter's ships on course 090 and he at once turned his battleships to 150 and ordered III SG and their escorting G101 class destroyers south to support von Reuter and locate the rest of Harwich Force. Michelsen in Rostock set a course of 165 and ordered Regensburg ahead of him to maintain 22 knots while his ship and Stralsund which had been spread out on screen duty increased speed to close with his lead ship. The sun was coming up in the SE colouring the sky, visibility was about 11km and the wind was a light WSW breeze of 5 knots with an almost flat calm sea. The day looked promising for a long chase engagement should the British turn away which they were expected to do.

Hamburg had been hit several times in the opening exchange and had one of her port 10.5cm guns disabled and she would only make 22 knots. Nevertheless she turned back to 170 at 0819 with Stettin and Berlin conforming, all three cruisers now selecting targets in the long column of enemy destroyers appearing on a bearing of 110 and turning away to 170. III SG was on its way south, the leading ship, Regensburg at 22 knots, the others at full speed to close up. At 0829 Regensburg increased revolutions to make 25 knots, the enemy destroyers were in sight bearing 191 from her at 15000m.

Zu Lichtenfels' course of 150 would place II Battle Squadron to the east of the enemy which was always the preferred position to engage, giving us sea room to make an escape if necessary. VI and IX Flotillas led by G.37 and V.26 respectively were stationed to port. The British were in fact heading for the coast of north Norfolk, specifically somewhere between Sheringham and Cromer and thus would be trapped within the bay of the Wash. Sensing that the enemy were about to make a grave tactical blunder, zu Lichtenfels pressed on, III SG being directed to take a more easterly course to head them off if necessary.

The British launched several torpedoes at approximately 0830 and avoiding these disrupted IV SG, forcing Stettin and Berlin to turn away. Stettin turned back astern of her sister ship at 0840. IV SG was now steering parallel to the enemy at 6000 to 6500m range, the enemy still would not exceed 23 knots and the strange vessel with the large box structure and cranes aft was seen in his line.

By 0843 it was apparent the enemy had seen the trap and was turning away onto course 142 which would clear the curvature of the Norfolk coast. II BS was now 23km distant and dropping behind, it was up to III SG and IV SG to inflict as much damage as possible on the retreating enemy.

Given that time and distance were of the essence, at 0852 Commodore von Reuter hauled Stettin to port from out of line at the stern of IV SG's formation to overtake the slower Hamburg. Berlin did likewise to starboard.

At 0900 III SG was closed up and increased to full speed to catch the tail of the British destroyers, now 14000m distant bearing 209. By 0920 it could be seen that a number of destroyers at the rear of the British line were being damaged but as yet none decisively.

By 0925 IV SG had run out of sea room; the English coast was just 7000m away and von Reuter turned to port to pass across the rear of the enemy formation. This was to our advantage as the WSW wind direction would clear the smoke from our guns away from our targets to the west, though of growing concern was the ammunition usage in IV SG. Stettin was down to 650 rounds from 1500, Berlin had used a little more and Hamburg had only 400 rounds remaining. It was looking like the British would escape with just some minor damage.

At 0940 there was some confusion at the rear of the enemy line, one destroyer, Landrail began to accelerate, the boat ahead of her moving aside to let her pass. As the British line continued to turn a little more east, Landrail headed down the disengaged side of the formation, building up speed until she was at 27 knots, she then, to our surprise drove headlong onto the foreshore at Penning Point which is some 25km N of Great Yarmouth. We must suppose that the boats machinery and rudder were in some way jammed and her crew unable to free it. Landrail was left behind, her bow lifted high up on the mud, her keel no doubt seriously strained if not broken.

The enemy force now swung round towards a southerly course as the curvature of the land allowed. It was 1015 and we were running low on ammunition, we would be forced to break off the action soon. However at about this time the whole enemy force slowed to 20 knots and the rear boat, Laurel, was reduced to 19. Our long engagement was slowly bearing fruit.

Stettin and Hamburg checked fire at 1020, their magazines all but empty, however the tail end enemy destroyer, Laurel, sank at 1025 under fire from Berlin.

At 1030 the minelayer or repair ship was hit and swung out of line towards the coast, possibly with a jammed rudder and further up the line the destroyer Lysander was losing way, limping along at 10 knots. She sank at 1043. Upon her loss the enemy formation which had slowed to 16 knots at one point, now increased to 22. Commander Heine in G.101 was tasked with taking his four boats to deal with the crippled repair ship but his unit had fired off all their ammunition. Zu Lichtenfels then ordered 11.VI Half-Flotilla commanded by Captain Schulz and comprising G.37, G.41, V.43 and V.44 to sink the target.

Upon closing, the large structure at the stern was seen to contain seaplanes, stored with their wings folded. A seaplane carrier. Sinking this vessel became a priority. However at 1104 as 11.VI Flotilla was 6400m N, the enemy vessel freed its jammed rudder and resumed a course S. Shultz made after her at 32 knots. At 1114 he opened fire at a range of 3800m and by 1129 the enemy ship was no longer shooting back, listing to port and turning away towards the shoreline, on fire. 11.VI Flotilla passed the sinking vessel to join III SG ahead.

At 1120 a fourth destroyer near the rear of the enemy line suddenly heeled over to port and sank. III SG was however now critically low on ammunition and with II BS unable to catch the enemy it was decided to break off the action and withdraw. We had sunk a seaplane tender and four destroyers and damaged several more. Our losses were two cruisers and three destroyers damaged.

We disengaged at 1144 after almost a four-hour fight which we have named the Battle of Mundesley. There was, unfortunately no question of waiting in the area for an hour to conduct the bombardment of Great Yarmouth as planned. Zu Lichtenfels ordered his force to steer NE to the latitude of Borkum and then at 53-55N 04-12E, turn east for the Dutch Bight entrance. IV SG was to shadow II BS 50km to starboard.

* * *

During the afternoon 7.IV Half-Flotilla was reorganised by the addition of V.164 to replace the lost G.192. Commander Wünsche took over the unit and he was immediately tasked with a long range sweep to the English coast at Berwick, then to patrol south down the coast to Flamborough Head where he would turn east for home. The patrol's purpose was to sink or capture enemy mercantile traffic and currently since Hipper's force was conducting repairs and Michelsen's III SG was returning from the Great Yarmouth operation in company with II BS, our defensive patrol flotillas were all we had available. Wünsche was instructed not to fight enemy patrol vessels but to avoid them and only capture unescorted cargo ships. Various administrative duties needed to be undertaken and 7.IV Flotilla will proceed to see at 2230.

* * *

Zu Lichtenfels return leg of the sortie went without incident until after dark he was passing 35km off the coast of the Texel at 1905 on course 045 when the stern-most boat of 12.VI Half-Flotilla, S.52 saw a line of unknown ships astern as though formed up behind the flotilla. Guns opened fire and the S.52 was hit. The destroyer flotillas increased speed and the unknown ships hauled away to starboard, showing themselves to be of distinctive outline with three raked funnels, the centre one of greater diameter than the others - clearly Arethusa Class cruisers. The Harwich Force which we had so badly injured this morning had pursued us and come upon us in darkness.

By turning to starboard the leading cruiser which proved to be Arethusa herself cut across astern of II BS which was 2000m to starboard of 12.VI and 11.VI Flotillas which were acting as the battleships port screen. Rear Admiral zu Lichtenfels ordered the squadron to reverse course to port together and the rear ship, Hessen switched on her searchlights and opened fire on Arethusa at approximately 3000m with everything she had. The lightly built British cruiser was rocked by numerous hits and returned fire. As II BS turned about more battle ships saw the British squadron and added their fire.

After approximately five minutes destroyers were sighted approaching from the south west at speed and a second course reversal was ordered to return the battleships to 045 which turn was made, though rather untidily, Schlesien turning out to port to avoid what she thought was a torpedo track. By now all seven battleships were in action, four engaging the British cruisers which had made a port turn behind our squadron and were now returning to the attack, presumably with torpedoes from the south, while three of our ships, Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein and, at the rear, Hessen, gallantly firing every gun she could bring to bear from both broadsides at the fast approaching destroyers, a second division of which were coming in from the bearing the four Arthusas had appeared from. Hessen's expert fire shattered a Nimrod type flotilla leader and two 'L' Class boats - Lightfoot and Llewellyn within minutes and crippled an 'M' Class, Mentor, with the two other battleships crippling Mansfield and Loyal.

The scene was absolute and complete chaos, shots being exchanged at ranges under 1500m and the violent blasts and flashes of big guns mingling with the noises of splashes, the cracking of hits and the rushing of boats at high speed, the whole scene lit by the eerie phosphorescence of the churning sea.

Schlesien aided her sister in peril by knocking out of action three destroyers in quick succession - Loyal, Lydiard and Leonidas as Hessen finished off Mentor. Arethusa and Penelope as though unable to withstand the hail of shells, like men walking bent over into a strong headwind, staggered aside and slowed, heeling over and passing astern again behind Hessen where they mingled with the heeling and drifting and burning wrecks of half a dozen destroyers.

At 1915 zu Lichtenfels ordered the lead ship, Deutschland, to come around to 180, the line to turn in succession to bring their broadsides to bear on the confused mass of British boats. III SG now arrived to assist, having turned back from widely separated posts as our screen, Stralsund engaging Talisman and Rostock helping Schlesien by firing on Cleopatra.

In 35 minutes it was all over, the enemy were driven back and apart from the sporadic flickering glow of flames on the water from drifting hulks here and there no more enemy approached. We are unsure what damage we inflicted but we believe it to be two cruisers sunk and two heavily damaged and two flotilla leaders sunk or crippled and some eight to ten destroyers either sunk or disabled. By some stroke of providence we had only three ships take damage - the torpedoboats S.52 and S.36 which had been at the rear of their formations and Hessen - and that amounted mostly to the mountings and crews of the old battleship's tertiary armament.

Course was resumed for the Jade.

* * *

Following Rear Admiral Hipper's encounter with Beatty on the 9th, Moltke and Von der Tann required heavier repairs than the other units of the Scouting Forces. It was thought imperative that we send a force north on a third operation to sink ships of the British blockading patrol and therefore the two more damaged battle cruisers were left in dockyard hands and Seydlitz and Derfflinger with the four light cruisers of II SG and the seven destroyers of 3.II Half-Flotilla were ordered to make ready to sortie to Bergen again and then sweep west to the Shetland Islands. Given that the whole of Hipper's force was stood down to rest, the order was received at 2200 and the ships would weigh and proceed to sea at 2300 on the 12th.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

German cargoes lost to the enemy:

One - Swedish Arendal, 80km WNW Stromness (AMC Virginian)

British cargoes captured:

One - Marseilles, 25km NE Great Yarmouth (IV SG)

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
 
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NR61

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Fantastic reports - keep up the good work, following this one with interest
 

VaDingo

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You must have a background in storytelling/writing. You could write a book about your campaigns, you'ed just have to fill in the spaces between actions with a story line.
 

saddletank

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Thanks guys. Not only is this very enjoyable, but writing down battle reports in this much detail is helping my tactics as well. I also think I am seeing some trends and the way the game AI works which is quite enlightening.

I do enjoy writing and have done some short stories, though nothing good enough to sell. I also do some written role-playing online which is something quite different to wargaming! I was worried the reports would be so much a mass of times, bearings, ranges and names that they would just be confusing. I can try introducing some dialogue but I was going more for a dry war diary feel with these ones. More of a Cambell's "Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting" rather than a Bolitho novel if you get what I mean.

When our multi-player campaign starts I plan on reporting that as well though those reports will be limited for reasons of not giving too much away that the two teams wouldn't know.
 

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ST - I totally enjoy your AARs as they are written. Don't change a thing!!! :clap::hail:

I was just observing that the reports are so cleanly written that if you decided to write a book based upon one of your campaigns you'ed just have to fill in the periods between battles. (I.E. take an Officer/enlisted man from one of the ships and give him a life between sorties) :smoke:
 
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