Kursk - could the outcome have been different?

Brian W

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What they could have done was what they were actually good at: shift the impetus of the attack somewhere else that didn't have a built up defensive zone that could have offered some benefit from a local envelopment, and do it quickly so the Russians couldn't have countered in time.
I don't think packing up and moving an army sized attack is that easy. The low resources included low levels of mobility. The attack on the Psel was already an axis that was not planned originally, but developed during the battle. And the Soviet + western allied economies were really getting into gear, so that any delay meant an increase in odds, at least in terms of equipment, both quality and quantity.

Frankly, I think the Germans did as well as can be expected. It is the Soviets that could have performed far better than they did. Why does everyone always fixate on possible German improvements against a Soviet defense that is reified as stiff and unchanging as a bronze statute?
 

Paul M. Weir

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The discussion has reminded me of the question of why the Southern arm got as far as it did while the Northern arm was stalled from the start.

Some of the comments I have read over the years were to the effect that the Soviets expected the stronger thrust in the North, from AG Centre. The fact that it was AG Centre that threatened Moscow in '41 likely reinforced that opinion. If the stronger fortifications had been in the South then there might have been less or no need to use up Steppe & Southwestern Front reserves (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army and 2nd Tank Army) to shore up the Southern lines.

That might have had the result that Brian W suggested, later better Soviet counter offensive results.

1. The historical result. Despite being wrong footed with regard to the relative N-S strengths, the Soviets recovered and blunted the Southern arm. Despite suffering far greater losses at Prokhorovka than the Germans, the Germans morale was severely battered and they started to doubt their ability to break through. Their tempo and confidence was their only real edge and once that was gone ... they were done. The mishandling of 5th GTA by Rotmistrov had later counter offensive repercussions. It was not entirely his fault, Stavka had a bad dose of the jitters and forced him into too hasty a deployment, but it could have been better.

2. The Soviets had more of their forces in the South. That would have resulted in a bigger Northern incursion but given how little the Germans got there, I doubt that it would have affected the Northern battle and subsequent counter offensive. A stronger Southern line, while it might have only reduced the penetration a bit, might have led to a less panicky Stavka reaction and thus not committing the reserves or at least committing them in a more deliberate manner. That might have left 5th GTA in much better shape for the Southern counter offensive. The nett result would have been even more losses in units and land by the Germans post Kursk.

3. The Germans, while posing as an envelopment attack, really attack the face. While initially more successful than historically would still have met the massive Soviet reserves that were available. They might have done more damage overall but could have been at risk of being (partially) pocketed themselves. I really don't know how that would have gone.

4. The Germans sit on their hands and wait for the Soviet offensives. That would have been the best option, making the Soviets bleed more. Fortunately Hitler could not sit on his hands nor could any of his Generals sit on him hard enough to force that choice.

Except for option 4, the Germans did about as good as they could given the force correlations in '43. They could have done much, much worse.
 

witchbottles

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The Germans should have never attacked. It was a giant obvious trap.
This bears weight in the grander scheme of things, yes. June 22nd , 1941 was a giant, obvious trap insofar as an armed assault on the USSR was concerned.

Tactically, even Manstein was behind the idea that a single harsh blow needed to be landed in 1943, if for no other reason than to eat up the massive Soviet buildup of forces since the retreats of 1942. Zitadelle did this, at least as far as AG Center was concerned, the Soviets lacked a large enough reserve formation / unit capacity to take strategic advantage of their tactical victory at Kursk. If they had, Bagration would have begun in 1943, rather than 1844, and actually shortened the war by a year (more or less).
 

witchbottles

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That is not a popular opinion in many Western countries as they like to think that they were responsible for winning the war, however, you are absolutely correct. About the only way Germany would have had a chance is if they could have gotten the Japanese to intervene in the East and after Nomonhan there was not a snowball's chance in hell of that happening.
Perhaps in the 1960's to 1990's they did, but there are no western countries today that espouse an official line that their effort alone led the destruction of Nazi Germany. The former Soviet Union could always claim and rightly so, this idea, their individual republics still do.
 

witchbottles

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Bob, I grew up with the same widespread opinion. The British on their own were capable in holding the Germans, but not to defeat them. In combination with the US (or the US on its own) they could have done that without the USSR. Both the Soviet and Western blocks were capable, each in their own right, of doing that. In combination they were unstoppable and together shortened the war.

The only way the Germans could have won would have been a failure of will on the Soviet's part. The success of Barbarossa would have been the only cause of that. I feel it is important to not only evaluate simple possible combat strength but tempo of operations in gauging relative strengths. If a side can keep its opponent always on the back foot, it has a very significant advantage that can be used at what it regards as critical points. In physics momentum = mass * velocity and can be used as a parable for the '41 USSR situation. The Soviets had the greater mass, but the Germans had a great velocity advantage and used that to smash the Soviets. However once the velocity dropped (resistance, logistics, exhaustion, etc), the German advantage disappeared. Sheer tempo is a weapon in its own right, something that I feel is too often under appreciated.

While Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East might have made the German position a bit better, I seriously doubt that it would have changed the outcome. In such a situation the Soviets would not have been able to repeat Khalkhin Gol for some time, but the Japanese would not have had the strength to seriously weaken the Soviets. The Soviets did take units from Siberia. However Siberia as an entity is bigger than the whole US. Where the Soviets fought the Japanese in '38-'39 was regarded by the Soviets as the Soviet Far East. So a 'Siberian' division could be recruited many hundreds of miles from the nearest Japanese. The Soviets kept from 1 to 1.5 million troops in the Soviet Far East 'just in case'. While they did syphon off better units for use in the West, they seemed to do so only after building fresh units which would be sufficient.

There was some previous discussion on the matter and rather than repeating, I will refer to my part at http://www.gamesquad.com/forums/index.php?threads/t-34-the-best-tank-of-the-war.118625/page-6#post-1697711.
I am of a considered opinion myself that Paul is correct- from an operational viewpoint, the invasion of the Soviet Union failed the day Hoth and Guderian turned form the Smolensk-Moscow road to close the Kiev pocket. Those 6 weeks of campaigning weather ended any hope for Barbarossa.

From a strategic standpoint, Hitler lost the war on June 22nd, 1941.
 

witchbottles

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I don't think packing up and moving an army sized attack is that easy. The low resources included low levels of mobility. The attack on the Psel was already an axis that was not planned originally, but developed during the battle. And the Soviet + western allied economies were really getting into gear, so that any delay meant an increase in odds, at least in terms of equipment, both quality and quantity.

Frankly, I think the Germans did as well as can be expected. It is the Soviets that could have performed far better than they did. Why does everyone always fixate on possible German improvements against a Soviet defense that is reified as stiff and unchanging as a bronze statute?
This.... Manstein faced the same strategic problem that Rommel had faced the year before after Tobruk fell. Allied build-up was going to outpace the German ability to contend with it if left alone, so the only remaining option was to attack in order to deplete the Allied resource pools before they could grow to levels impossible to contend with.
 

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Though somewhat in jest, jrv does hit a salient point, neither the Panther not the Ferdinand delivered on their promise of being the super weapons that would defeat the masses of Soviet armor. In fact the critical engagements on the Southern Front were fought with the "old Reliables", the PzKpfw III's, IV's and a smattering of Tigers supported by the ubiquitous StuGs and various Tank Destroyers as most of the Panthers were lost in simply moving up or due to terrible employment. The fate of the Ferdinands employed on the northern shoulder had even a less successful debut, though by most accounts were systems to be feared when employed correctly, as Tank Destroyers.

As Paul & Perry have stated, the real Achilles' Heal in the German Order of Battle was their paucity of infantry. However, one cannot or should not imagine that the Soviets had masses of trained and combat ready reserves to throw into the fight either. Many of the Russian reserves were units in refit or training. Though some reserve formations did exist as whole units, for many of the newly arriving armies one need only to look at heir order of battle to see that they were made from a mix of remnants of previously engaged units, units pulled out of other fronts and newly formed formations (the state of training being suspect based upon their subsequent performance against a depleted and badly shaken opponent). The Soviet formations employed against Orel may have been a little different as this part of their Summer Offensive had been planned for well in advance and was considered to be against the most dangerous German Army Group, at least as it pertained to the defense of Moscow and Russia proper.
 

Bob Walters

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This bears weight in the grander scheme of things, yes. June 22nd , 1941 was a giant, obvious trap insofar as an armed assault on the USSR was concerned.

Tactically, even Manstein was behind the idea that a single harsh blow needed to be landed in 1943, if for no other reason than to eat up the massive Soviet buildup of forces since the retreats of 1942. Zitadelle did this, at least as far as AG Center was concerned, the Soviets lacked a large enough reserve formation / unit capacity to take strategic advantage of their tactical victory at Kursk. If they had, Bagration would have begun in 1943, rather than 1844, and actually shortened the war by a year (more or less).
The Germans had a far harder time replacing their losses than did the Russians and, of course, during their retreat they lost Kharkiv. I don't think that Kursk lengthened the war.
 

witchbottles

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I'
The Germans had a far harder time replacing their losses than did the Russians and, of course, during their retreat they lost Kharkiv. I don't think that Kursk lengthened the war.
I'd disagree. No attack at all would have left a huge buildup of Soviet forces more than capable of breaking AG Center's positions wide open in the summer of 1943, the Germans still would not have had any forces to stop the major onslaught, the Germans would not have been able to field any effective late generation AFVs in any role (as they did not on the attack, they would not have on the defense, either.), the Soviets would have established air superiority over the bulge as they did anyway, only this time in support of their own assaults, and the bulge itself would have presented the same opportune location that it did in 1944, only this time a full year sooner. Further, an entire year spent grinding down the entire front in the East in defense, pockets, destruction, failed breakouts, Hitler's fortress cities being surrounded and destroyed - all adds up to less forces that could have been pulled out to face Overlord in 1944. The Soviets would have been on the Polish border by Christmas, 1943, and on the Oder by the summer of 1944. It was the destruction of the reserve forces, supplies, units, equipment, planes, tanks, ammunition expenditures, casualties needing replaced, and the drawn in reinforcements of lower quality also being chewed up - all by Zitadelle, that stymied any Soviet advance in strength in 1943. Take Zitadelle away completely, and the Eastern front becomes another Alamein - a catastrophic loss for Germany. Zitadelle was not a catastrophic loss. It accomplished Manstein's goals in the operation, stopping a major Soviet thrust in 1943. To expect anything more was simply to buy into Hitler's paranoid fantasies in the first place.
 

RRschultze

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Though somewhat in jest, jrv does hit a salient point, neither the Panther not the Ferdinand delivered on their promise of being the super weapons that would defeat the masses of Soviet armor. In fact the critical engagements on the Southern Front were fought with the "old Reliables", the PzKpfw III's, IV's and a smattering of Tigers supported by the ubiquitous StuGs and various Tank Destroyers as most of the Panthers were lost in simply moving up or due to terrible employment. The fate of the Ferdinands employed on the northern shoulder had even a less successful debut, though by most accounts were systems to be feared when employed correctly, as Tank Destroyers.

As Paul & Perry have stated, the real Achilles' Heal in the German Order of Battle was their paucity of infantry. However, one cannot or should not imagine that the Soviets had masses of trained and combat ready reserves to throw into the fight either. Many of the Russian reserves were units in refit or training. Though some reserve formations did exist as whole units, for many of the newly arriving armies one need only to look at heir order of battle to see that they were made from a mix of remnants of previously engaged units, units pulled out of other fronts and newly formed formations (the state of training being suspect based upon their subsequent performance against a depleted and badly shaken opponent). The Soviet formations employed against Orel may have been a little different as this part of their Summer Offensive had been planned for well in advance and was considered to be against the most dangerous German Army Group, at least as it pertained to the defense of Moscow and Russia proper.
Ferdinand and later Elephant were the most succesful tank destroyer of WW2 period. They were deployed incorrectly at Kursk. Obviously there were never enough of them. As per other posts, the Germans lost the war when invading Russia. They might of had a chance if they allowed if they fought with the Ukrainians who were desperate to break free from the clutches of Stalin and would of willingly fought for the Germans.
What i cant get my head around is that the Germans knew the Russians were heavily fortifying the Kursk area but nevertheless continued with 'Zitadelle'. Following the defeat at Stalingrad and the subsequent demise of 6th Army and the failed attempt to break through 'Wintergetter?' the Germans were forced on the defensive from 1943 onwards. I read somewhere that Hitler insisted on Zitadelle to 'focus' the minds of the russian generals as the russians were in the process of lauching a number of operations elsewhere on the eastern front, namely 'Bagration' which ultimately was delayed due to Zitadelle.
 

Brian W

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What i cant get my head around is that the Germans knew the Russians were heavily fortifying the Kursk area but nevertheless continued with 'Zitadelle'.
You should of seen what happened at Verdun in the previous war. :)

The German army had a history of penetrating defenses, which they did in the southern attack at Kursk.
 

witchbottles

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Ferdinand and later Elephant were the most succesful tank destroyer of WW2 period. They were deployed incorrectly at Kursk. Obviously there were never enough of them. As per other posts, the Germans lost the war when invading Russia. They might of had a chance if they allowed if they fought with the Ukrainians who were desperate to break free from the clutches of Stalin and would of willingly fought for the Germans.
What i cant get my head around is that the Germans knew the Russians were heavily fortifying the Kursk area but nevertheless continued with 'Zitadelle'. Following the defeat at Stalingrad and the subsequent demise of 6th Army and the failed attempt to break through 'Wintergetter?' the Germans were forced on the defensive from 1943 onwards. I read somewhere that Hitler insisted on Zitadelle to 'focus' the minds of the russian generals as the russians were in the process of lauching a number of operations elsewhere on the eastern front, namely 'Bagration' which ultimately was delayed due to Zitadelle.
I would be most interested to see surviving action reports in the Bundesarchiv that reported AFV kills by unit, on hand strength in AFVs and recent losses.

Given the service life, the sheer numbers produced, the anecdotal autobiographical evidence I can find, the employment across the battlefields - I'd say the StuG III was the overall most successful German tank destroyer of the war - albeit it was built as an Assault Gun, not a tank destroyer. I highly doubt either the Ferdinand or the Elefant were in action long enough or prolific enough to score a total number of AFV kills that came anywhere close to the Stugs' record. The "proof in the pudding" would be scans of the original unit action reports, which do exist, for most units of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS, over most of the war years.

KRL, Jon H
 

Yuri0352

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Ferdinand and later Elephant were the most succesful tank destroyer of WW2 period.
I disagree with this opinion. Historical and anecdotal evidence would suggest that the Ferdinand/Elephants may have been among the least successful tank destroyers of the war. Their design flaws are many; too large, too slow, too heavy, overly mechanically complex. As a powerfully armed, massively armored self-propelled A-T pillbox, the Ferdinand was a success. My opinion is from a purely design standpoint, and not based upon how these vehicles were tactically deployed.

In terms of success, in my opinion,the Stug's, M-36 series, and SU-85\Su-100 series were the most successful tank destroyer designs of WWII.
 

Bob Walters

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I disagree with this opinion. Historical and anecdotal evidence would suggest that the Ferdinand/Elephants may have been among the least successful tank destroyers of the war. Their design flaws are many; too large, too slow, too heavy, overly mechanically complex. As a powerfully armed, massively armored self-propelled A-T pillbox, the Ferdinand was a success. My opinion is from a purely design standpoint, and not based upon how these vehicles were tactically deployed.

In terms of success, in my opinion,the Stug's, M-36 series, and SU-85\Su-100 series were the most successful tank destroyer designs of WWII.
I think you hit he nail on the head. Yes they had a great kill ratio until they broke down, ran out of gas, or got too far behind. There was a good reason they only made a few of them. There is a great tendency for people lionize German weapons because many of them look really cool or have what was wiz bang technology for the time. However, they always forget that the German weapons were generally very complex and hard to manufacture. That was not a good combination when using slave labor for one's industry.
 

RRschultze

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I disagree with this opinion. Historical and anecdotal evidence would suggest that the Ferdinand/Elephants may have been among the least successful tank destroyers of the war. Their design flaws are many; too large, too slow, too heavy, overly mechanically complex. As a powerfully armed, massively armored self-propelled A-T pillbox, the Ferdinand was a success. My opinion is from a purely design standpoint, and not based upon how these vehicles were tactically deployed.

In terms of success, in my opinion,the Stug's, M-36 series, and SU-85\Su-100 series were the most successful tank destroyer designs of WWII.
I like opinions. I should have elaborated the Ferdinand/elephant was the most successful tank destroyer of WW2 based on kills to loss ratio. The 653rd heavy tank claimed to have killed 320 tanks for a loss of 13 of their own.
 

Tom Morin

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Regarding Kursk alone, once the element of surprise was lost, since the whole operation was known to the Russians through superior espionage, and the timing delayed giving the Russians plenty of time to set up their defences in great depth, I believe the operation was doomed.
Better to have canceled and either tried somewhere else, or not to have attacked at all and prepared a more advantageous defensive line, since a Soviet offensive was clearly on the way.

I think the biggest reason for Zitadel's failure was the fact that the Russians knew where and when the blow was coming and prepared accordingly.
This.
 

AdrianE

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I like opinions. I should have elaborated the Ferdinand/elephant was the most successful tank destroyer of WW2 based on kills to loss ratio. The 653rd heavy tank claimed to have killed 320 tanks for a loss of 13 of their own.
Its a massive error to believe German kill claims and kill ratios. They have been shown to be grossly over inflated. They only count their own total write offs as losses while battle damaged tanks that other armies would write off are kept on the roster.
 

AdrianE

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Frankly, I think the Germans did as well as can be expected. It is the Soviets that could have performed far better than they did. Why does everyone always fixate on possible German improvements against a Soviet defense that is reified as stiff and unchanging as a bronze statute?
It is interesting to note that the Soviet defense of the Mius river bridgehead in August 1943 ripped the guts out of 3SS. It certainly implies that the Soviets could have done better on the Southern flank of Kursk than they did.
 

Paul M. Weir

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While we can argue the strengths and weaknesses of the Ferdinand/Elephant, let us not forget it was an afterthought. Porsche had ordered some 90 Porsche Tiger hulls in expectation of winning the Tiger competition. When the Henschel entry won, then what to do with the hulls? Why, make them into super heavy StuGs! That goes some way in explaining the deletion of the hull MG, as StuGs didn't have them either.
 
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