Could Paulus have disengaged on 11-10-42?

Proff3RTR

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happens everywhere. I got told one time to get my arse up on the flight deck in desert cammies, for an award ceremony ( I was knee deep in muck inside the floorboards of a CH-46 with a terminal case of exfoliation on her main vertical cabin spars). I had no idea why I was supposed to be up there. IO get a uniform on, and pin on a set of cheap-o plastic chevrons - then pulling on my cover as I exited the shelter area, the Sgt Maj grabbed me and told me to get in the head of the award line. I was getting an award.

okay... god knows what the heck for.

I found out when the XO read the award letter as the CO pinned it on me. for doing my job, I got my Air Medal ( I kept some silly CNN reporter from walking into a set of spinning tail rotors with his "interviewee" as they exited our CH-53E a few weeks prior. Turned out that "interviewee" was really the CO 3-24 Mech. I had saved some LtCol's arse from being fishie food off of KKMH.

heck, if I'd known he was a tractor driver..... ;)
ROFL, should of let him eat tail rota! good for you though Jon.
 

bendizoid

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Paulus was pussy and if I was running that outfit we would have taken Astrakhan.
 

Proff3RTR

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Paulus was pussy and if I was running that outfit we would have taken Astrakhan.

Not with the force levels Paulas had by 13th September 42 you would not, 6th Army was basically all but bleed out before it even started it's main attack on Stalingrad. The fact that they actually attempted to take the city and all but did is simple amazing and stupid all in the same motion.
 

witchbottles

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Not with the force levels Paulas had by 13th September 42 you would not, 6th Army was basically all but bleed out before it even started it's main attack on Stalingrad. The fact that they actually attempted to take the city and all but did is simple amazing and stupid all in the same motion.
I think in September it was more a case of stripped bare rather than bled out, the advance from the Dneiper bend to 'Grad had stretched the line to the maximum point, and OKH / Hitler were pulling unit after unit out to man up the drive towards Grozny in the south.

I think Paulus hit rock bottom on manpower just before Hubertus. By then, it was too late to save the army, is my hypothesis.

KRL, Jon H
 

Proff3RTR

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Bayonet strength was low to say the least, most of Paulus's Infantry battalions were rated average at best, (not at home at the moment so can not give exact numbers, will do that later). some units were in a good state (29th Motorized was very well off in comparison to some units, such as 24th Panzer which was roughly 55/60% full strength, a lot less than that Panzer wise). 71st infantry was by 24th September pretty much hors de combat and was running at less than 40% strength.

What I still find simple mental is the low man power numbers during Hubertus, in an exchange of e-mails between myself and Jason Mark he alluded to the fact that most infantry battalions were at most 150 men strong by the 11th Nov, and that was in the two infantry Divisions (305 & 389th) that bore the brunt of the fighting during the offensive.

the 6th Pioneer Abtielung were averaging 360/400 per Abtielung, IIRC GePz Pio Abt 50 was the strongest at around 450 combat strength. and all 6 were drained within the space of a week.

62nd Army was not much better off, but managed to keep their numbers around the 50,000 mark through out most of the battle, although most units on the west bank by Nov were on average 2,000/2,500 per division, The numbers always stun me, the losses alone are painful, even to read.
 

witchbottles

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Chuikov was never going to gt or be allowed to commit enough to defeat Paulus, even though he told Zhukov he could again and again throughout the period from October 1st on. Zhukov had other plans for his men and his subordinate, keeping Paulus and Hitler focused on "Grad while he first stopped the Army Group B drive towards Grozny and then built up and initiated the large scale encirclement he had wanted at the Dneiper the previous spring, and missed due to von Manstein jumping the gun on him. Chuikov got just enough to hold the riverbank and bleed the germans white - and not one soldier more. What is amazing is how quickly Zhukov learned from the Germans about massive - scale encirclement and how to achieve them. Marks a general worth his weight in gold braid, and explains a lot why Stalin never shot him, even though he threatened to many times over.

KRL, Jon H
 

Proff3RTR

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Chuikov was never going to gt or be allowed to commit enough to defeat Paulus, even though he told Zhukov he could again and again throughout the period from October 1st on. Zhukov had other plans for his men and his subordinate, keeping Paulus and Hitler focused on "Grad while he first stopped the Army Group B drive towards Grozny and then built up and initiated the large scale encirclement he had wanted at the Dneiper the previous spring, and missed due to von Manstein jumping the gun on him. Chuikov got just enough to hold the riverbank and bleed the germans white - and not one soldier more. What is amazing is how quickly Zhukov learned from the Germans about massive - scale encirclement and how to achieve them. Marks a general worth his weight in gold braid, and explains a lot why Stalin never shot him, even though he threatened to many times over.

KRL, Jon H
:D:D yes indeed, Zhukov came close to saying hello to the wrong end of an NKVD Nagant on many occasion. yep agree 100%, Stalin dripped just enough in to hold what Chuikov had left of Stalingrad, the fighting was just mental, some of the AAR are very sobering.
 

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A few of factors may have benefitted Paulus with an early breakout attempt.
  • First, he would have been falling back on his base of supply. This alone would have been at least a reasonable criteria for conducting a withdrawal. However, having said as much, a unit on the move requires much more logistical support than does a "stationary" unit. Fact of the matter though is as they approached their MSBs the difficulties of support would have been somewhat alleviated. Added to this is that much non-essential equipment would have been abandoned or destroyed prior to their move, thus alleviating the strain on an already stretched logistical system and shortening of the retreat columns. And finally, as was subsequently shown, the supply situation wasn't as bad as shown by daily "log" reports as much unreported or under-reported fuel, ammo, food & other sundries existed within the command.
  • Secondly, time & again German forces had shown that smaller German units effectively organized had outfought larger Russian formations in about every engagement, especially if given freedom of movement. Added to this is the effect that the personnel were moving towards friendlies as evidenced in the withdrawal from the Caucasus. Also, the Germans had shown on several occasions that they were masters at organization and improvisation on the spur of the moment. Here their planning and potential conduct of operations would have stood them in good stead. With the state of The Russians within Stalingrad itself, little pressure could have been applied against a precipitous withdrawal of German forces to their front and any other reactions to the pull-back would have to had come from outside (e.g. the flanks).
  • This bring me to the last, if somewhat iffy, premiss: Could the Russians have "effectively" reacted to the immediate withdrawal of an entire reinforced Army. Given the state of Soviet intelligence it would be hard to believe that they would have been caught unawares. However, if their sources had not been completely believed (as was the case until mid 1943 for the most part), or if OKH had not been too actively engaged in the planning & execution (doubtful), it may have been possible to "pull one on Ivan". Even with forehand knowledge of such an operation the Soviets up to this time, and in subsequently during the winter of 42-43, had shown themselves to unable to quickly adapt to a rapidly changing situation. Meanwhile, the Germans had shown themselves to be, if not masters of the situation yet, at least superior to Russian capabilities.
Would there have been severe casualties & a large loss of equipment? Certainly there is no doubt, given even the best estimations, this would certainly have been the case. However, their last best hope for the salvation of the 6th Army lay with a withdrawal from Stalingrad, even at this late date, as events have shown. (Just food for thought ;)).
 

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Even by mid September, let alone November, 6th Army was very worn down, most combat divisions were running at roughly between 60/70% full strength with the actual combat strength running at best at 65/70%, by mid November 6th army was officially non combatant as regards to attempted withdrawal in contact as that is what it would of been, look to the combat strength returns just prior to Hubertus (the last real attempt to take the 'Barrikady' an average infantry Battalion had at best 150 men all in, the pioneer battalions were the only real strength left in 6th army and they had been flown/trucked in to give this last attack some punch.

as an example here are a few strength returns to illustrate just how weak 6th army was.

Strength return evening 31st October 1942:
Panzer Regiment 24:
Operational Panzers
2 x Pz IIF
8 x Pz III Lange
2 x Pz III Kurz
1 x Pz IV Lange
1 x Pz IV Kurz
2 x Panzerbefehlswagen

In division workshops due to lack of spare parts: (which were not forth coming before the Soviet counter attack, nor afterwards).
27 x Pz IIF
30 x Pz III Lange
43 x Pz III Kurz
8 x Pz IV Lange
16 x Pz IV Kurz
4 x Panzerbefehlswagen

Trench (I.E combat strength) of the main infantry units within 24th Panzer division:
PanzerGrenadier Regiment 21-16 x Officer, 401 x NCO & Soldiers
PanzerGrenadier Regiment 26-10 x Officer, 299 x NCO & Soldiers
Kradshutz Abtielung 4 5 x Officer, 129 x NCO & Soldiers
Panzer Pioneer Abtielung 40 10 x Officers, 131 x NCO & Soldier

As can be seen this is a very weak Division, and was considered to be one of 6th armies main fighting units.

any withdrawal would of been conducted under the harshest of conditions combat wise, it would of been possible but the losses would of written off 6th army for a very long time.
it is a question that will always make historians and wargamers alike wonder. For myself, 6th army should never of entered Stalingrad full stop, it was a powerful army in June 42, but by September it was weak, and by November basically burnt out.

it was doable, but at a high cost, but at least the Germans would still of had an army of sorts to use, and not as was the case in the end, nothing.
 
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witchbottles

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Even by mid September, let alone November, 6th Army was very worn down, most combat divisions were running at roughly between 60/70% full strength with the actual combat strength running at best at 65/70%, by mid November 6th army was officially non combatant as regards to attempted withdrawal in contact as that is what it would of been, look to the combat strength returns just prior to Hubertus (the last real attempt to take the 'Barrikady' an average infantry Battalion had at best 150 men all in, the pioneer battalions were the only real strength left in 6th army and they had been flown/trucked in to give this last attack some punch.

as an example here are a few strength returns to illustrate just how weak 6th army was.

Strength return evening 31st October 1942:
Panzer Regiment 24:
Operational Panzers
2 x Pz IIF
8 x Pz III Lange
2 x Pz III Kurz
1 x Pz IV Lange
1 x Pz IV Kurz
2 x Panzerbefehlswagen

In division workshops due to lack of spare parts: (which were not forth coming before the Soviet counter attack, nor afterwards).
27 x Pz IIF
30 x Pz III Lange
43 x Pz III Kurz
8 x Pz IV Lange
16 x Pz IV Kurz
4 x Panzerbefehlswagen

Trench (I.E combat strength) of the main infantry units within 24th Panzer division:
PanzerGrenadier Regiment 21-16 x Officer, 401 x NCO & Soldiers
PanzerGrenadier Regiment 26-10 x Officer, 299 x NCO & Soldiers
Kradshutz Abtielung 4 5 x Officer, 129 x NCO & Soldiers
Panzer Pioneer Abtielung 40 10 x Officers, 131 x NCO & Soldier

As can be seen this is a very weak Division, and was considered to be one of 6th armies main fighting units.

any withdrawal would of been conducted under the harshest of conditions combat wise, it would of been possible but the losses would of written off 6th army for a very long time.
it is a question that will always make historians and wargamers alike wonder. For myself, 6th army should never of entered Stalingrad full stop, it was a powerful army in June 42, but by September it was weak, and by November basically burnt out.

it was doable, but at a high cost, but at least the Germans would still of had an army of sorts to use, and not as was the case in the end, nothing.
I'm not in agreement, look only at what occurred in AG North in late 43 after Zitadelle, in AG Cetner and South from 43 on after Zitadelle. Time after time, units in the face of a Soviet Front built up and ready to / going over to the offensive were shattered, surrounded, and destroyed. Very few units managed any sort of withdrawal in the face of a Soviet assault / offensive, even those that did were hors de combat, and the most that one could reasonably expect was, as Manstein put it " a collaboration of shocked survivors drifting into the lines in ones and twos."

The retreat from the Caucasus was possible only because Zhukov had stripped the southern Fronts for the units to launch the counter-offensive at the 6th Army. Zhukov had his sights set on the 6th at the Don river bend since May of 42, and had worked diligently to make it happen. That meant Leningrad stayed cut off and surrounded for another summer, to starve, Moscow was held safe by Siberians and militia reinforced with a smattering of older tank designs, and the Caucasus Fronts were stripped to bare bones of militia and cossack units, so the two front Uranus offensive could succeed with overwhelming strength ( which it had).

My best guess is any attempt to disengage would have a: attracted the immediate attention of Zhukov; b: caused a pre-emptive Uranus to be launched a week earlier than it did; and c: result in the total destruction of the 6th anyway, faster than was historically the case.

Hitler was a madman, but had a knack from time to time of seeing the correct instrumentation to bring about what he desired. He wanted AG B saved from the Caucasus, the 6th was there just to protect it, and impossible to now extricate from the ruins. So the order to refuse withdrawal was , in fact , the correct one, and one that by mid November, Manstein agreed with in any case ( for the same reasons).

Ultimately, the sacrifice of one army saved two others retreating in decent order with their equipment, and gave Manstein the tools he needed to seal the breach after Uranus was successful. It would be far from the last time the Germans sacrificed a whole higher level unit to save the front line in toto.
 

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I'm not in agreement, look only at what occurred in AG North in late 43 after Zitadelle, in AG Cetner and South from 43 on after Zitadelle. Time after time, units in the face of a Soviet Front built up and ready to / going over to the offensive were shattered, surrounded, and destroyed. Very few units managed any sort of withdrawal in the face of a Soviet assault / offensive, even those that did were hors de combat, and the most that one could reasonably expect was, as Manstein put it " a collaboration of shocked survivors drifting into the lines in ones and twos."

The retreat from the Caucasus was possible only because Zhukov had stripped the southern Fronts for the units to launch the counter-offensive at the 6th Army. Zhukov had his sights set on the 6th at the Don river bend since May of 42, and had worked diligently to make it happen. That meant Leningrad stayed cut off and surrounded for another summer, to starve, Moscow was held safe by Siberians and militia reinforced with a smattering of older tank designs, and the Caucasus Fronts were stripped to bare bones of militia and cossack units, so the two front Uranus offensive could succeed with overwhelming strength ( which it had).

My best guess is any attempt to disengage would have a: attracted the immediate attention of Zhukov; b: caused a pre-emptive Uranus to be launched a week earlier than it did; and c: result in the total destruction of the 6th anyway, faster than was historically the case.

Hitler was a madman, but had a knack from time to time of seeing the correct instrumentation to bring about what he desired. He wanted AG B saved from the Caucasus, the 6th was there just to protect it, and impossible to now extricate from the ruins. So the order to refuse withdrawal was , in fact , the correct one, and one that by mid November, Manstein agreed with in any case ( for the same reasons).

Ultimately, the sacrifice of one army saved two others retreating in decent order with their equipment, and gave Manstein the tools he needed to seal the breach after Uranus was successful. It would be far from the last time the Germans sacrificed a whole higher level unit to save the front line in toto.
I agree Jon, that is why I said it was doable, but only just and what ever got out would be non combat worthy, if they had pulled back in September to hunker down for the winter then they would of been in a much better position, but they did not. We all know 6th Army once Ivan launched Uranus and Saturn had to hold and stay in place, and ultimately sacrifice itself to save the entire southern army groups, interesting throughout could of happened if they had stopped before Stalingrad and went over to the defensive instead.
 

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Manstein's suggestion in early June was an advance to the outskirts, then envelop and surround the city while the 11th and 24th panzers dug into the Rynok to the Dneiper bend line near Kachalinskya. Pulling the 11 panzer out to reinforce AG B in early september ended that idea, and put Manstein into his " hold what we can" mode that ultimately saved Heeresgruppe Sud in the winter of 42.

Now if those panzers had stopped in open steppe country as noted to form a mobile defense screen to the north, and the 6th eveloped the city outskirts without entering - would Chuikov have attacked? Mu gut is Zhukov, who wanted the 6th surrounded since the flip flop at Voronezh had bled the units for Case Blue in april and may, would have still decided to hit the 6th from the north and south. The plan was still 2 weaker panzers guarding one flank, and the Rumanians and Hungarians guarding the other., so AG B could dash to Grozny. von Kleist needed tanks, so the 11th got transferred, and the italians committed as well, weakning the plan farther. and of course Kleist and AG B got all the spares. The 6th did its job - did it err in entering the city, sure. Did it err to the point of failing the plan as given in May of 42? not at all.

Even a shallow line as envisioned by Manstein in June of 42 woulds still have resulted in the same ending, just the 6th perhaps being able to disengage some of its infantry and get some across the Dneiper more or less usable, for the reasons that Eagle 4ty noted. That force of landsers within the 6th were doomed the moment Kuprosnoye and the Sawmill were attacked in force.
 

Dr Zaius

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What most people fail to understand is just how weak 6th Army was by Novemberr 42. 94th infantry Division for example was by end of November 42 only 650 odd strong! that is a whole Infantry Division! I have posted combat returns on this subject on this section of the forum before. Also fuel levels would of ran out before 6th army had moved 30 miles, far short of Kalach.

14/16/& 24th Panzer Divisions were very, very weak, and would of been burnt out very fast and then the army would of lost it's cutting teeth.
True, 6th Army was weak. But it wasn't that weak, else it wouldn't have taken the Russians months of bitter fighting and horrendous losses to finally crush it. 6th Army, though surrounded and low on supplies, was still able to put up a hell of a fight for quite a while.

I can only conclude the failure to attempt an immediate breakout was a catastrophic strategic blunder. Almost certainly the Germans would have been better off had they done so.

If a good portion of 6th Army had managed to extricate itself, would it have altered the course of the war? Probably not but it's hard to say. It most certainly would have led to a different end state at the conclusion of the summer campaign, so the Kursk salient might never have come into existence.

More than likely the survival of 6th Army would have made the conflict take another 6-12 months to play out on the Eastern Front, and not doubt added to overall carnage. Interestingly, prolonging the conflict in Europe could have resulted in Germany being the target of the A-bomb instead of Japan. Who knows how that might have altered history. Also, 6th Army's survival on the Eastern Front probably would have meant the Russians would never had had the opportunity to occupy Poland, Hungary, half of Germany, etc.
 
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jrv

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The decision to hold Stalingrad in spite of encirclement has to be taken in context of the winter 1941 battles of the encirclements of Demyansk and Kholm. The Germans held those two pockets in the same way that they planned to hold Stalingrad. Their success in 1941 led the Germans to conclude that they could repeat the feat in the winter of 1942 even though they were weaker, the Soviets stronger, and the scale of the problem bigger. In retrospect it was a blunder; in the context of the time it was a daring decision that could not be foreseen to be clearly wrong.

JR
 

Proff3RTR

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True, 6th Army was weak. But it wasn't that weak, else it wouldn't have taken the Russians months of bitter fighting and horrendous losses to finally crush it. 6th Army, though surrounded and low on supplies, was still able to put up a hell of a fight for quite a while.

I can only conclude the failure to attempt an immediate breakout was a catastrophic strategic blunder. Almost certainly the Germans would have been better off had they done so.

If a good portion of 6th Army had managed to extricate itself, would it have altered the course of the war? Probably not but it's hard to say. It most certainly would have led to a different end state at the conclusion of the summer campaign, so the Kursk salient might never have come into existence.

More than likely the survival of 6th Army would have made the conflict take another 6-12 months to play out on the Eastern Front, and not doubt added to overall carnage. Interestingly, prolonging the conflict in Europe could have resulted in Germany being the target of the A-bomb instead of Japan. Who knows how that might have altered history. Also, 6th Army's survival on the Eastern Front probably would have meant the Russians would never had had the opportunity to occupy Poland, Hungary, half of Germany, etc.
You need to look at the force levels, 24th pz Div was roughly running at 60-65% on 12th September (Day before main assault on Stalingrad began). At work at the moment so not got my books handy, soon as i get home I will dig up some info, sure she was not non combat worthy, but she was certainly not ready for a major city fight, that is why after 27th September there was a comparative lull (as far as the fighting in Stalingrad went) before the next big attack on the Northern Factory District kicked off on the 14th October, Reduction of the Orlovka pocket notwithstanding, and that small fight showed just how weak certain units in the 6th were by this time.

All the best

Perry
 

Brian W

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More than likely the survival of 6th Army would have made the conflict take another 6-12 months to play out on the Eastern Front, and not doubt added to overall carnage.
Germany ran out of fuel at the end of 1944. Having 200,000 more troops in 1943 wasn't going to change that. I doubt a successful breakout would have prolonged the war a month. And even if it would have affected the war in such a way, why would it have been on the Russian front? The decision was made in late 1943 (or early 1944?) to cease offensive operations on the Russian front in order to prepare for the Allied invasion of France. Another 200k men on the French coast might have stopped the invasion cold and driven it into the water (I don't think it would have, but maybe). Then we are talking about the USSR liberating all of Germany, not just half, and France.

And what of the risk of a failed breakout? What happens if the 6th Army makes it 15 miles west, and then is forced to stop, or simply disintigrates into a complete rout which the Soviets could roll over. The Russian offensives to destroy the 6th Army while it was in the rubble of Stalingrad becomes a lot easier on the open steppe. You would free up the three (?) soviet armies that were tasked with digging the Germans and Romanians out of the rubble. With these forces freed up in December (and not having suffered all the tens (hundreds?) of thousands of casualties it suffered in Stalingrad, it isn't inconceivable that an attack to Rostov, would cut off Army Group A in the Caucuses (ie. Big Saturn). An unsuccessful break out could have shortened the war by six months.
 

Proff3RTR

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True, 6th Army was weak. But it wasn't that weak, else it wouldn't have taken the Russians months of bitter fighting and horrendous losses to finally crush it. 6th Army, though surrounded and low on supplies, was still able to put up a hell of a fight for quite a while.

I can only conclude the failure to attempt an immediate breakout was a catastrophic strategic blunder. Almost certainly the Germans would have been better off had they done so.

If a good portion of 6th Army had managed to extricate itself, would it have altered the course of the war? Probably not but it's hard to say. It most certainly would have led to a different end state at the conclusion of the summer campaign, so the Kursk salient might never have come into existence.

More than likely the survival of 6th Army would have made the conflict take another 6-12 months to play out on the Eastern Front, and not doubt added to overall carnage. Interestingly, prolonging the conflict in Europe could have resulted in Germany being the target of the A-bomb instead of Japan. Who knows how that might have altered history. Also, 6th Army's survival on the Eastern Front probably would have meant the Russians would never had had the opportunity to occupy Poland, Hungary, half of Germany, etc.

Initial comparison of forces 13th September 1942:

Units either attacking Stalingrad or Defending Stalingrad directly).

6th Army:
XIV Panzer Korps (elements 16th Pz Div 3rd & 60th Motorized Divisions, all along the North edge of the Orlovka pocket and along the Volga west bank in the Spatakovka region).
LI Army Korp Gruppe Stahel (Gorodische area), 295th Infanterie Div (Razgulaevka, objective Hill 102.2), 71st Infanterie Div (Tsaritsa gorge sector, objective central Stalingrad).

Fourth Panzer Army:
XLVIII Pz Korps 24th Pz Div 19 Operational Panzers(Tsaritsa river line), 94th Infanterie Div (Sadovaia station, objective Minina Suburb), 29th Motorized Div 20 x Panzers(Minina area, objective Kuprosnoe/Volga river bank).

Total fighting force available 80,00 men and roughly 100-150 AFV (Panzer & Stug).

62nd Army:

Remnants 33rd Guards,124th/149th/115th Rifle Brigades & 282nd NKVD Rifle Regt & 724th Rifle Regiment(196th Rifle Div) (Northern flank Orlovka Salient)

2nd Motorized Brigade (western nose of Orlovka Salient).

6th Guards Tank brigade (15 x T34, 4 x T-70), remnants 87th Rifle Div, 189th Tank brigade (8 x T34, 6 x T-70),38th Motorized brigade,remnats 112th Rifle div, elements 42nd Rifle brigade, 1 Regiment 244th Rifle Div (south side of Orlovka salient down the western side of Stalingrad to northern bank Tsaritsa gorge).

2 x Regiments 244th Rifle Div, 10th Rifle brigade, 6th Tank brigade (18 x T34 ), 131st rifle div (remnants in reserve), 133rd Tank brigade (23 KV-1) & 271st NKVD Rifle Regiment (holding from south side Tsaritsa Gorge all the way down past the MTS and Barracks hill, west of Minina suburb and northern edge of Kuprosnoe suburb.)

Remnants 35th Guards Rifle division (Kuprosnoe and Electro Furnacemill).

Total Fighting force available as far as records show 90,000 men and roughly 150 Tanks (although at least 18 of these were immobile and dug in in the Minina area).

As can be seen, 6th army was attacking into a major Urban area with less men and strength than the defender, as we all know, in rural you are looking for at least 3 to 1 odds in the attackers favour, this is when attacking into Urban, so 6th army was stacking the odds against itself from the off.

As to a withdrawal in November, possible as said, but 6th army would of been in no fit state for a very long time, so even IF it did manage to break out, it would of been of very little use if any to Heers Gruppe Sud.

All of this is clearly 'what if' IMHO, I still think if they had conducted a proper withdrawal in late October/Early November the army may still of been able to save itself to a certain degree, Zhukov may well of tried to stall/stop this pull back. Fighting would of been very, very heavy and losses again would of dealt the 6th a major blow, but the army would of still been in the field and usable, even if only to hold a sector and free up better equipped and manned units to fight the Russian attacks.

But yes, in a nut shell, 6th army was between a rock and a hard place manpower wise even before they attacked into Stalingrad proper, that they managed to rest as much as they did from the Russians with what they had on hand is if you ask me nothing but close to remarkable, also, that the Russians managed to hold what they did with what they had near the end is even more remarkable.
Will we ever see another battle like the 'Grad' ever again? who know's, I doubt it (and that includes Alleppo before anyone cries that name out), but it has and will continue to fascinate people and provide a source of ASL material for years to come.

all the best

Perry
 
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R Hooks

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Since you are talking about manpower and to put a bit of ASL in the mix, what is the generally approved minimum strength of a squad? Can a lmg crew and 4 others be a squad (6men) can it be lower then that with or without a lmg? I think most squads were officially 10 men at time of Stalingrad, but obviously they were fighting much under strength.
 

robh91

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Since you are talking about manpower and to put a bit of ASL in the mix, what is the generally approved minimum strength of a squad? Can a lmg crew and 4 others be a squad (6men) can it be lower then that with or without a lmg? I think most squads were officially 10 men at time of Stalingrad, but obviously they were fighting much under strength.
In my humble opinion it is all really an abstraction. Ten troops would seem to be a reasonable figure. A depleted squad may be represented by substituting say a 4-4-7 for a 4-6-7. A "more depleted" squad may be substituted to a HS.

What is even more of an abstraction (and rather problematic) in the whole issue of "inherent" LMGs versus LMG counters. It is assumed each squad has an inherent LMG which cannot be separated from the squad. Then extra, actual LMG counters also exist! I think this leads to the typical german squad (say a 4-6-7) being poorly represented - and being underrated. SL (as opposed to ASL) quite neatly dealt with the "problem" by giving Germans a fairly high ratio of LMGs to Squads. This balanced out the higher firepower of the US troops which had no LMG counters. ASL has certainly made the MG rules much more detailed (and complicated) which has probably resulted in the need to reduce ratio at which they are issued - which arguably leads to a less accurate portrayal of the typical German squad. The reduced ratios in regards to the Germans are probably also due to the fact that the MG34/42 in ASL are much more potent than in SL.

I know it is "just a game" - but I wonder what ASL would like with either all LMGs removed (and squad factors readjusted as required) or with more realistic ratios of LMGs that were slightly less effective and had perhaps simpler rules (so that the increased ratios were playable).

Also, the concept of an inherent squad LMG is incongruous with effectively "inherent" vehicular support weapons that can actually be scrounged (i.e. be separated from the counter).
 

Proff3RTR

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Since you are talking about manpower and to put a bit of ASL in the mix, what is the generally approved minimum strength of a squad? Can a lmg crew and 4 others be a squad (6men) can it be lower then that with or without a lmg? I think most squads were officially 10 men at time of Stalingrad, but obviously they were fighting much under strength.
Rob gives you a good answer, I will try to give a detailed 'Real world' take, first off we need to understand that we can not 'shoe horn' real ORBATS (Order of Battle) into ASL, we can approximate at best.
As Rob points out if we use the Germans for our look at units we see the following:
Infantry 10 man Squad/Section:
1 x Section Commander NCO (normally a Cpl or Corporal or a Obergefrieter) Smg or later maybe a Gewehr 43 or Stg 44
1 x Section 2 i/c (again a NCO but a LCpl or Lance Corporal or a Gefrieter), again maybe armed along the same lines as the Section Commander
1 x 4 man Rifle Group or Schutzen Gruppe, (each a Private or senior Private, Schutze or OberSchutze), with K98 or K98 Krz or maybe the odd Gewehr 43 when available
1 x 4 man MG Group or Maschinengewehr, (lead by the 2 i/c and armed with 3 x K98, 1 x MG (Either MG34 or MG 42 depending on year & 1 x pistol for the actual MG Gunner).

This can be done as said with the normal 4-6-7, but it seems weak, especially when you add the MG into the mix, IMHO normal 1st Line German sections armed with MG34 should be 6-6-7's,
those armed with an MG 42 7-6-7 (to replicate the MG42's much higher cyclic rate).
This is all good and well until you take into move into the world of the PanzerGrenadier Squad/Section who tended to have 2 x LMG per Squad/Section (at least in the authorised ORBAT/TO&E).
what effect would it have on the game if when playing Germans and you have a load of PzGr you get an extra LMG counter to go with the so called inherent LMG! game changer I would say.

as to squad/section sizes, a MMC is a squad/section as we all know, all sat around the 10 men mark, some were larger (USMC 12/13 but 10 is the average).
a H/S to me represents something like either an LMG team or just that, the remnants of a squad/section 3-5 men left over.
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Not overly exhausted in any sense, but just how I look at ASL/Real world abstraction.

all the best

Perry
 
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