Double Whisky
Member
I suppose this AAR will be my farewell to DG 1.0, even if I do not intend to remove it from my computers - purely because of sentimental reasons 
It is also my small "what if" speculation about the possibility of RJW being won by Russia :nuts:
____________________________________________________________
Gentlemen!
I was invited here, to the respectable Academy, in order to present You short description of the battle in the Strait of Tsushima, twenty months ago, as well as some lessons learned from this victory of our fleet.
As You are all well aware, by the will of His Illustrious Majesty I was appointed as Commander in Chief of the Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian Imperial Fleet.
After the fall of the Port Artur Fortress and bitter end of the main body of the First Pacific Squadron there, the Second Pacific Squadron was the last resource of Russia and only hope for turning the fate of the war.
Bringing the Squadron to the theatre of war was the great challenge in itself. Lack of any own bases between Baltic and the Far East made this task almost unfeasible. Only the friendly attitude of German and French governments allowed us to reach our final destination.
While closing the shores of our enemy I knew that a time and place of the future battle are the crucial factors in this war. It was possible to take two routes to Vladivostok, our only remaining base in the area of the war. One was the safer choice – the way around Japan and through the La Perouse Strait. Unhappily, taking this route meant the defeat anyway. The Vladivostok lacked the facilities necessary to refit the fleet quickly and was quite prone to blockade by the superior forces of Japanese fleet. Heading to Vladivostok with Japanese fleet behind was going straight into the trap. It was clear danger of prolonged war, losing the Vladivostok to the Japanese army and also losing the entire fleet bottled there. Such a defeat was beyond any imagination.
The only choice left was to challenge the Japanese fleet immediately, on our way to Vladivostok, and this meant the route through Tsushima Strait and Sea of Japan. Only defeating the Japanese fleet then and there made a single chance to win the war. With heavy heart I did this choice personally, as I felt this burden can not be put on my subordinate admirals and officers.
The second necessary decision was how to fight this battle. I was tempted by the possibility of sending auxiliaries independently through La Perouse Strait, but this meant lack of resources in Vladivostok, and substantial delay in refitting the fleet after the battle. This was unacceptable, so I made a decision to take the auxiliaries along with the main fleet.
As Japanese fleet was greatly superior in numbers fighting the battle in the convoy formation was not really the choice. I decided, that the auxiliaries should be detached and screened from the distance, while the battle should be fought aggressively, in order to not allow Japanese fleet to hunt for our transports.
During the voyage to the destination the fleet exercised as much as was possible. Practice in keeping stations in line abreast and line of bearing, as well as joining the line by separated squadrons was gained, even if not to extent one could wish to.
At least, at sunrise of 14-th day of May 1905, the Second Pacific Squadron met the Japanese fleet in the Tsushima Strait.
The auxiliaries were immediately detached to the south west and the Squadron was quickly formed accordingly to my previous decisions, repelling the Japanese scouts in the meantime.
Two battleship divisions – one, of all four Borodino class battleships, complemented by Oslablya and armoured cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and second, of three older battleships and three coastal battleships – led the fleet in the line abreast.
Two cruiser divisions – one, of Oleg, Avrora, Izumrud, Zhyemchug and Svietlana and second, of Dmitri Donskoj, Vladimir Monomakh, Almaz and Ural – also formed in single line abreast followed the battleships.
The destroyers were stationed between the main body of the squadron and the auxiliaries with orders to cover them as long as possible, retaining the visual contact with the squadron.
Cruisers were ordered to retain stations behind the battleships line, to act as repeaters for the orders and to protect the battleline against torpedo attacks.
The battle itself was fought in four stages.
In first, thank to our good maneuvering and to aggressiveness of the Admiral Togo, commanding the Japanese fleet, we were able to cross the “T” of advancing enemy. When distance diminished I ordered the turn to the line of bearing and finally to the line abreast, running before the enemy. Many of our battleships suffered from the Japanese shells, and our oldest battleships, Imperator Nikolay I and then Navarin felt off the line. However the four Japanese battleships, leading the enemy line were also heavily shelled, went into flames and lost much of their speed. This allowed us to disengage temporarily and reform our line on eastern course. Three of enemy battleships one by one felt off the line and the remaining Japanese ships started to pursue the Squadron, led by Shikishima, covered by heavy flames.
The second stage of battle began. I ordered our battleline to turn north, and our cruisers retook their station to the east from battleships. Finding the proper time I ordered the Squadron to turn south and reform on this course. Japanese “T” was crossed again. Remaining battleships of second division put Shikishima out of commission in the matter of minutes, while first division shelled closest armoured cruisers in the line of enemy. Japanese turned south east and finally south, paralelly to our Squadron but it was to late for them, as at least three four armoured cruisers were burning heavily. First battleship division dealt with them, while first division shelled the remnants of Japanese battleline, putting their ships into flames one by one. I decided to turn east, into the line abreast, open the distance and reform the Squadron. The second stage of the battle ended, with all Japanese capital ships turned into inferno of uncontrollable fires.
After short time, in order to cover their precious battleships and armoured cruisers Japanese mounted a massive attack by not less than four divisions of protected cruisers, one complemented by ancient battleship Chin Yen and all available destroyers. All enemy ships tried to get into torpedo range, cruisers advancing straight to our battleline, while destroyers attacked from van and rear. Squadron met them with battleships formed on southern course and cruiser divisions offset to east, guarding van and rear of battleships. Battleships repelled the attack of enemy cruisers and our cruisers dealt successfully with enemy destroyers. The battle turned into complete victory in this stage, but was not yet finished.
Some enemy scouts and some destroyers were spotted steaming from the north in the general direction of our auxiliaries. Immediately I ordered to detach cruisers Admiral Nakhimov, Dmitri Donskoj and Vladimir Monomakh to protect the auxiliaries, as our own destroyers were not enough to fulfill this task. The old armoured cruisers caught up with auxiliaries in time to cover them and to sink most of this enemy group, two small cruisers between them.
At the same time the main body of the Squadron performed the sweep of the battle area, sinking damaged and crippled enemy ships and picking up survivors.
At the evening it was completely clear that the victory was overwhelming, but only after interrogation of enemy survivors we learnt that only three Japanese ships escaped the fate – small aviso cruiser called Yayeyama and two destroyers.
Happily the damages to our ships – except for the loss of two old battleships – were rather negligible. For example not single turret on the battleships was destroyed, there were no significant underwater damages or propulsion damages. Thank to supplies delivered by our auxiliaries it was possible to refit the ships enough to serve against so weak opponent as Japanese navy after the Tsushima battle,
Gentlemen!
As You all know well the battle in Tsushima Strait became the turning point of the war.
The Second Pacific Squadron, augmented by the remnants of First Pacific Squadron in Vladivostok was able to completely interdict the enemy communications between Korea and home island. The Russian Army was slowly but continuously reinforced by troops coming by Great Far Eastern Railroad. The counteroffensive against Japanese army was launched and Port Artur was finally retaken. While our troops advanced deeply into Korea the government of the United States intervened and diplomacy took over. The treaty finishing the war was signed only four months ago, as You are aware.
The treaty, granting to the Russia the control over the Korea changed the status quo on the Far East very deeply. At the same time the provisions transferring the ownership of the Japanese warships in built to Russian Imperial Navy as war reparations, as well as scrapping of the enemy ships in early stages of construction means, that after salvaging the ships earlier self sunken in Port Artur we will be perfectly able, at least for time being, to protect our possessions in the Far East adequately. In two or three year time the Russian Imperial fleet will be more powerful than ever.
The victory in the war against Japan was the one of most glorious and complete victories in the history of our country. The most of the price for the victory was paid by our noble army. But we all need to remember, that only the enormous effort of our Navy and the victory in Tsushima Strait made the final victory happen.
Gentlemen!
The war was won, but there are the lessons to be learnt and challenges to be met.
In my opinion this war shown that all the concept of the seagoing fleet, common to nearly all navies of the world before, was outdated.
The battleships proved to be to small, and lacking enough firepower. The power of heavy guns is overwhelming, so it is necessary to put as many of them as possible on the ship and to do this, it is necessary to built ships large enough to accommodate them.
The battleships need to have a means of effective targeting on long distances of fight, as most battles in the war were fought on distances twice or triple exceeding the prewar predictions.
The battleships need to be well protected, but also need to be fast, significantly faster than now, to effectively maneuver in the battle. As You are well aware, Gentlemen, such a ship, namely HMS Dreadnought, was recently commissioned in Portsmouth and entered the service in Royal Navy.
The armoured cruisers proved to be completely inadequate. The are too expensive, and too demanding in terms of manning and maintenance for the transport interdiction ore fleet scouting role, and are not protected nor armed enough to fulfill the role of highly maneuverable element of the battlefleet. The battle in Tsushima Strait proved the last definitely. We should rather look for a possibility to include in the battlefleet some kind of faster by some 20 – 30 %, slightly less armoured and slightly less armed battleships in order to improve the maneuver capabilities of the main battleline.
Protected cruisers proved just to be unprotected. This reduced their usefulness to the commerce raiding, anti destroyer screening and scouting from the distance. For the fleet of near future two kinds of cruisers are probably necessary. Firstly, quite, but not excessively large units for fleet scouting and transport interdiction, armed with 13 – 18 cm guns, with adequate armour protection for ammunition chambers and machinery. Completely redesigned Oleg class, enlarged, with vertical armour protection, improved artillery and propulsion can be a kind of model for such a ships. Secondly, smaller, even faster, armed with 12 – 15 cm guns, lightly but adequately protected units should be useful for close screening of the battlefleet. Such a ships, could be easy modeled on Novik class, but with some improvements in propulsion, armour (vertical plating) and endurance.
The destroyers are at present almost useless for the fleet work. They are hardly adequate for base protection now. For the future the big, sturdy destroyers of some 1.000 tons probably, armed with guns no smaller than 10 cm. and several torpedo tubes for as heavy, long range torpedoes as possible are necessary without and reasonable doubts.
In the matter of fact it mean that all the present fleets, except single British ship, are obsolete by now and there is the necessity to built the seagoing fleets from scratch.
It is unique historical situation, as all naval status quo is no longer valid thorough the world and will be established in a new way in few incoming years. It is necessary for Russia to learn this lesson and to reestablish our position as one of the leading naval powers. Five years ago we were happily the third sea power of the world, but this is not longer the case.
Gentlemen!
The geographical and geopolitical situation of our country is unique. It is obvious for any of the officers of the Navy. Most sea powers, like Great Britain, France and now also Germany have the colonies spread all over the world, providing the suitable bases and enabling the projection of power by sea on great distances. Germany is in the weakest position there, but it can change in the future. Great Britain and France have both the unrestricted access to sea lanes, and they home bases are concentrated on relatively limited territories, with good and unthreatened communications between them. Germany again is in worse situation, as British fleet, in the case of conflict, can probably confine the German fleet to the North Sea. But it mean, that Germany will need to built the fleet able to fight the Royal Navy on equal terms, and because of the reasons explained earlier has a rare opportunity to achieve this.
Only the United States are in somewhat similar position to Russia, as this is a great country with the access to two oceans. But differences are bigger than similarities.
The American naval bases are well developed on both shores, the access to the oceans is unrestricted, the land communication between the shores effective and sea lanes between the bases rather unthreatened. Additionally they have some detached bases to support their operations on Pacific Ocean.
In contrast our shipyards, main bases and other naval resources are concentrated on the Baltic Sea. It mean that we need always to have friendly relations with both Germany and Great Britain, or we need to have a fleet able to fight the way to the open ocean against German or British fleet. First is not depending on us, the second is the great challenge, but not totally impossible to accomplish.
Our bases in Far East are undeveloped and poorly located. The land communication depends totally on lone pair of railway tracks. Two third of the area of our country, between the Ural Mountains and Pacific Ocean is full of resources, but largely inaccessible and barely populated. In the case of conflict with any of sea powers we will be in short time unable to protect the Far East. For the incoming years only the new and resourceful Russian Imperial Navy can guarantee our position as one of great powers of the world.
We need to retain friendly relationships every time with at least two of three leading European sea powers – Great Britain, Germany and France, in order to secure the communication by sea between Baltic and Pacific.
We need to avoid any hostilities with United States.
We need to built well developed communication system between our Far East possessions and the European part of the country. This will enable us to limit reasonably the land forces and use the resources elsewhere.
We need to develop a system of naval bases in Far East, upgrading the Port Artur and Vladivostok and establishing the big and well protected base in southern Korea.
Above the all we need the built modern, well composed, well trained and as powerful as possible Russian Imperial Navy as a mean of projection of power by sea.
Thank You, Gentlemen, for Your attention.
____________________________________________________________
View attachment 25427
It is also my small "what if" speculation about the possibility of RJW being won by Russia :nuts:
____________________________________________________________
THE PROJECTION OF POWER BY SEA
Lecture delivered by General Admiral Zinovi Petrovitch Rozhdestvenski, CSG, at Nikolayev Naval Academy, St. Petersburg, in January 1907
Gentlemen!
I was invited here, to the respectable Academy, in order to present You short description of the battle in the Strait of Tsushima, twenty months ago, as well as some lessons learned from this victory of our fleet.
As You are all well aware, by the will of His Illustrious Majesty I was appointed as Commander in Chief of the Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian Imperial Fleet.
After the fall of the Port Artur Fortress and bitter end of the main body of the First Pacific Squadron there, the Second Pacific Squadron was the last resource of Russia and only hope for turning the fate of the war.
Bringing the Squadron to the theatre of war was the great challenge in itself. Lack of any own bases between Baltic and the Far East made this task almost unfeasible. Only the friendly attitude of German and French governments allowed us to reach our final destination.
While closing the shores of our enemy I knew that a time and place of the future battle are the crucial factors in this war. It was possible to take two routes to Vladivostok, our only remaining base in the area of the war. One was the safer choice – the way around Japan and through the La Perouse Strait. Unhappily, taking this route meant the defeat anyway. The Vladivostok lacked the facilities necessary to refit the fleet quickly and was quite prone to blockade by the superior forces of Japanese fleet. Heading to Vladivostok with Japanese fleet behind was going straight into the trap. It was clear danger of prolonged war, losing the Vladivostok to the Japanese army and also losing the entire fleet bottled there. Such a defeat was beyond any imagination.
The only choice left was to challenge the Japanese fleet immediately, on our way to Vladivostok, and this meant the route through Tsushima Strait and Sea of Japan. Only defeating the Japanese fleet then and there made a single chance to win the war. With heavy heart I did this choice personally, as I felt this burden can not be put on my subordinate admirals and officers.
The second necessary decision was how to fight this battle. I was tempted by the possibility of sending auxiliaries independently through La Perouse Strait, but this meant lack of resources in Vladivostok, and substantial delay in refitting the fleet after the battle. This was unacceptable, so I made a decision to take the auxiliaries along with the main fleet.
As Japanese fleet was greatly superior in numbers fighting the battle in the convoy formation was not really the choice. I decided, that the auxiliaries should be detached and screened from the distance, while the battle should be fought aggressively, in order to not allow Japanese fleet to hunt for our transports.
During the voyage to the destination the fleet exercised as much as was possible. Practice in keeping stations in line abreast and line of bearing, as well as joining the line by separated squadrons was gained, even if not to extent one could wish to.
At least, at sunrise of 14-th day of May 1905, the Second Pacific Squadron met the Japanese fleet in the Tsushima Strait.
The auxiliaries were immediately detached to the south west and the Squadron was quickly formed accordingly to my previous decisions, repelling the Japanese scouts in the meantime.
Two battleship divisions – one, of all four Borodino class battleships, complemented by Oslablya and armoured cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and second, of three older battleships and three coastal battleships – led the fleet in the line abreast.
Two cruiser divisions – one, of Oleg, Avrora, Izumrud, Zhyemchug and Svietlana and second, of Dmitri Donskoj, Vladimir Monomakh, Almaz and Ural – also formed in single line abreast followed the battleships.
The destroyers were stationed between the main body of the squadron and the auxiliaries with orders to cover them as long as possible, retaining the visual contact with the squadron.
Cruisers were ordered to retain stations behind the battleships line, to act as repeaters for the orders and to protect the battleline against torpedo attacks.
The battle itself was fought in four stages.
In first, thank to our good maneuvering and to aggressiveness of the Admiral Togo, commanding the Japanese fleet, we were able to cross the “T” of advancing enemy. When distance diminished I ordered the turn to the line of bearing and finally to the line abreast, running before the enemy. Many of our battleships suffered from the Japanese shells, and our oldest battleships, Imperator Nikolay I and then Navarin felt off the line. However the four Japanese battleships, leading the enemy line were also heavily shelled, went into flames and lost much of their speed. This allowed us to disengage temporarily and reform our line on eastern course. Three of enemy battleships one by one felt off the line and the remaining Japanese ships started to pursue the Squadron, led by Shikishima, covered by heavy flames.
The second stage of battle began. I ordered our battleline to turn north, and our cruisers retook their station to the east from battleships. Finding the proper time I ordered the Squadron to turn south and reform on this course. Japanese “T” was crossed again. Remaining battleships of second division put Shikishima out of commission in the matter of minutes, while first division shelled closest armoured cruisers in the line of enemy. Japanese turned south east and finally south, paralelly to our Squadron but it was to late for them, as at least three four armoured cruisers were burning heavily. First battleship division dealt with them, while first division shelled the remnants of Japanese battleline, putting their ships into flames one by one. I decided to turn east, into the line abreast, open the distance and reform the Squadron. The second stage of the battle ended, with all Japanese capital ships turned into inferno of uncontrollable fires.
After short time, in order to cover their precious battleships and armoured cruisers Japanese mounted a massive attack by not less than four divisions of protected cruisers, one complemented by ancient battleship Chin Yen and all available destroyers. All enemy ships tried to get into torpedo range, cruisers advancing straight to our battleline, while destroyers attacked from van and rear. Squadron met them with battleships formed on southern course and cruiser divisions offset to east, guarding van and rear of battleships. Battleships repelled the attack of enemy cruisers and our cruisers dealt successfully with enemy destroyers. The battle turned into complete victory in this stage, but was not yet finished.
Some enemy scouts and some destroyers were spotted steaming from the north in the general direction of our auxiliaries. Immediately I ordered to detach cruisers Admiral Nakhimov, Dmitri Donskoj and Vladimir Monomakh to protect the auxiliaries, as our own destroyers were not enough to fulfill this task. The old armoured cruisers caught up with auxiliaries in time to cover them and to sink most of this enemy group, two small cruisers between them.
At the same time the main body of the Squadron performed the sweep of the battle area, sinking damaged and crippled enemy ships and picking up survivors.
At the evening it was completely clear that the victory was overwhelming, but only after interrogation of enemy survivors we learnt that only three Japanese ships escaped the fate – small aviso cruiser called Yayeyama and two destroyers.
Happily the damages to our ships – except for the loss of two old battleships – were rather negligible. For example not single turret on the battleships was destroyed, there were no significant underwater damages or propulsion damages. Thank to supplies delivered by our auxiliaries it was possible to refit the ships enough to serve against so weak opponent as Japanese navy after the Tsushima battle,
Gentlemen!
As You all know well the battle in Tsushima Strait became the turning point of the war.
The Second Pacific Squadron, augmented by the remnants of First Pacific Squadron in Vladivostok was able to completely interdict the enemy communications between Korea and home island. The Russian Army was slowly but continuously reinforced by troops coming by Great Far Eastern Railroad. The counteroffensive against Japanese army was launched and Port Artur was finally retaken. While our troops advanced deeply into Korea the government of the United States intervened and diplomacy took over. The treaty finishing the war was signed only four months ago, as You are aware.
The treaty, granting to the Russia the control over the Korea changed the status quo on the Far East very deeply. At the same time the provisions transferring the ownership of the Japanese warships in built to Russian Imperial Navy as war reparations, as well as scrapping of the enemy ships in early stages of construction means, that after salvaging the ships earlier self sunken in Port Artur we will be perfectly able, at least for time being, to protect our possessions in the Far East adequately. In two or three year time the Russian Imperial fleet will be more powerful than ever.
The victory in the war against Japan was the one of most glorious and complete victories in the history of our country. The most of the price for the victory was paid by our noble army. But we all need to remember, that only the enormous effort of our Navy and the victory in Tsushima Strait made the final victory happen.
Gentlemen!
The war was won, but there are the lessons to be learnt and challenges to be met.
In my opinion this war shown that all the concept of the seagoing fleet, common to nearly all navies of the world before, was outdated.
The battleships proved to be to small, and lacking enough firepower. The power of heavy guns is overwhelming, so it is necessary to put as many of them as possible on the ship and to do this, it is necessary to built ships large enough to accommodate them.
The battleships need to have a means of effective targeting on long distances of fight, as most battles in the war were fought on distances twice or triple exceeding the prewar predictions.
The battleships need to be well protected, but also need to be fast, significantly faster than now, to effectively maneuver in the battle. As You are well aware, Gentlemen, such a ship, namely HMS Dreadnought, was recently commissioned in Portsmouth and entered the service in Royal Navy.
The armoured cruisers proved to be completely inadequate. The are too expensive, and too demanding in terms of manning and maintenance for the transport interdiction ore fleet scouting role, and are not protected nor armed enough to fulfill the role of highly maneuverable element of the battlefleet. The battle in Tsushima Strait proved the last definitely. We should rather look for a possibility to include in the battlefleet some kind of faster by some 20 – 30 %, slightly less armoured and slightly less armed battleships in order to improve the maneuver capabilities of the main battleline.
Protected cruisers proved just to be unprotected. This reduced their usefulness to the commerce raiding, anti destroyer screening and scouting from the distance. For the fleet of near future two kinds of cruisers are probably necessary. Firstly, quite, but not excessively large units for fleet scouting and transport interdiction, armed with 13 – 18 cm guns, with adequate armour protection for ammunition chambers and machinery. Completely redesigned Oleg class, enlarged, with vertical armour protection, improved artillery and propulsion can be a kind of model for such a ships. Secondly, smaller, even faster, armed with 12 – 15 cm guns, lightly but adequately protected units should be useful for close screening of the battlefleet. Such a ships, could be easy modeled on Novik class, but with some improvements in propulsion, armour (vertical plating) and endurance.
The destroyers are at present almost useless for the fleet work. They are hardly adequate for base protection now. For the future the big, sturdy destroyers of some 1.000 tons probably, armed with guns no smaller than 10 cm. and several torpedo tubes for as heavy, long range torpedoes as possible are necessary without and reasonable doubts.
In the matter of fact it mean that all the present fleets, except single British ship, are obsolete by now and there is the necessity to built the seagoing fleets from scratch.
It is unique historical situation, as all naval status quo is no longer valid thorough the world and will be established in a new way in few incoming years. It is necessary for Russia to learn this lesson and to reestablish our position as one of the leading naval powers. Five years ago we were happily the third sea power of the world, but this is not longer the case.
Gentlemen!
The geographical and geopolitical situation of our country is unique. It is obvious for any of the officers of the Navy. Most sea powers, like Great Britain, France and now also Germany have the colonies spread all over the world, providing the suitable bases and enabling the projection of power by sea on great distances. Germany is in the weakest position there, but it can change in the future. Great Britain and France have both the unrestricted access to sea lanes, and they home bases are concentrated on relatively limited territories, with good and unthreatened communications between them. Germany again is in worse situation, as British fleet, in the case of conflict, can probably confine the German fleet to the North Sea. But it mean, that Germany will need to built the fleet able to fight the Royal Navy on equal terms, and because of the reasons explained earlier has a rare opportunity to achieve this.
Only the United States are in somewhat similar position to Russia, as this is a great country with the access to two oceans. But differences are bigger than similarities.
The American naval bases are well developed on both shores, the access to the oceans is unrestricted, the land communication between the shores effective and sea lanes between the bases rather unthreatened. Additionally they have some detached bases to support their operations on Pacific Ocean.
In contrast our shipyards, main bases and other naval resources are concentrated on the Baltic Sea. It mean that we need always to have friendly relations with both Germany and Great Britain, or we need to have a fleet able to fight the way to the open ocean against German or British fleet. First is not depending on us, the second is the great challenge, but not totally impossible to accomplish.
Our bases in Far East are undeveloped and poorly located. The land communication depends totally on lone pair of railway tracks. Two third of the area of our country, between the Ural Mountains and Pacific Ocean is full of resources, but largely inaccessible and barely populated. In the case of conflict with any of sea powers we will be in short time unable to protect the Far East. For the incoming years only the new and resourceful Russian Imperial Navy can guarantee our position as one of great powers of the world.
We need to retain friendly relationships every time with at least two of three leading European sea powers – Great Britain, Germany and France, in order to secure the communication by sea between Baltic and Pacific.
We need to avoid any hostilities with United States.
We need to built well developed communication system between our Far East possessions and the European part of the country. This will enable us to limit reasonably the land forces and use the resources elsewhere.
We need to develop a system of naval bases in Far East, upgrading the Port Artur and Vladivostok and establishing the big and well protected base in southern Korea.
Above the all we need the built modern, well composed, well trained and as powerful as possible Russian Imperial Navy as a mean of projection of power by sea.
Thank You, Gentlemen, for Your attention.
____________________________________________________________
View attachment 25427
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