Jutland Leaders: Good, Bad, Ugly

[Bullethead]

I figure we should have a new thread to discuss the foibles and fortes of the various senior commanders at Jutland. As in guys in charge of more than 1 ship, not just admirals. I've been bashing Scheer pretty hard in another thread where it wasn't really on topic, so let's carry the argument over here.

To get the ball rolling, I'll toss out my favorites in the good, the bad, and the ugly. This isn't a complete list, it's just the ones that have caught my attention. Feel free to blast me and add your own favorites.

The Good
Jellicoe: Except for failing to find out WTF was going on behind him during the night, he did an excellent job in a very difficult situation. So instead of having an overwhelming strategic triumph, he just got a decent strategic victory, and a tactical victory as well, despite things looking bad to start with.

Hipper: He did his job pretty well, although he ended up getting the way later on.

Hood: Did the best he could with what he had and did more damage than he took on the balance sheet, although he died in the process.

Stirling: The only Brit DD leader with chutzpah, and he deservedly met with fair success. Besides, he's a cousin on my mother's side :D

The Bad
Beatty: Although he did 95% of his job to perfection, he blew it on the single most important aspect, which outweighs all the rest: keeping his boss informed.

Burney: Disabling his whole squadron by keeping the lamed Marlborough around slowing everybody down.

The Ugly
Scheer: For a large number of huge errors starting before the battle and continuing into the night.

Evan-Thomas: For a complete lack of initiative and decisiveness, and total failure to grasp the obvious.

Arbuthnot: For single-handedly destroying most of a cruiser squadron.

[Hinchinbrooke]

I believe Jerram on KGV should have a brickbat thrown at him for not making an effort when confronted with the obvious during the night. Never been much of a fan of Beatty. His twit flag-lieutenant Seymour. A result of patronage, and Beatty later admitted that he was a dunderhead.

Goodenough strikes me as halfway decent

[WallysWorld]

I thought Scheer did a fine job considering his excellent 180 turn in front of the Grand Fleet to escape it. I think rating him at Ugly is way too harsh.

On other hand, Jellicoe allowed the High Seas Fleet to escape too easily and his inaction and cautiousness cost him a chance to trap Scheer.

I rate Jutland as a tactical victory for the Germans and a strategic one for the British.

Bullethead, how can you rate Jutland as a tactical British victory when the British lost 6,094 sailors to Germany's 2,551? In just numeric terms, it should be a German tactical victory.

[Enforcer]

Bullethead, how can rate Jutland as a tactical British victory when the British lost 6,094 sailors to Germany's 2,551?

I think he rates it a tactical victory, given the fact that they could take some losses, they could handle it more than the Germans. The British fleet was still powerful enough after the battle, whereas at least 2 very important German capital ships lay in disrepair.

Still, I feel Jutland was a German tactical victory. They had a smaller fleet, yet they distributed way more damage to the British fleet than they took themselves, if you can do that with a much smaller fleet, it isn't just luck, it is quality. But of course, luck and bad luck are always involved, especially in sea battles.

A good example is the Bismarck: one bullet finds its right way into the magazines of the British pride: bam, the Hood is gone. One tidy aircraft hits the Bismarck's rudder....

[Bullethead]

I thought Scheer did a fine job considering his excellent 180 turn in front of the Grand Fleet to escape it. I think rating him at Ugly is way too harsh.

I dunno. I don't think Scheer was the worst admiral in the battle. Evan-Thomas and Arbuthnot are tied for that. But the next worst place has to go to Scheer IMHO.

Scheer made at least 3, probably 4, huge mistakes that should absolutely have gotten him totally annihilated. On top of that, he never had a clue what was going on, got played like a fiddle all day, and only escaped due to extreme amounts of Clauswitz's "frictions". He did 1 thing right: he turned and ran the 1st time he met the GF. But then he blew that immediately thereafter, cutting himself off from home in the process.

Scheer's certain major gaffes were 1) taking II Squadron, 2) chasing Beatty north, and 3) heading back into the GF, thereby losing his escape route. The 4th was telling the world he was going to Horns Reef, but the Admiralty back home blew that one, so Jellicoe never had the chance to capitalize on it. Hence, I'll give him a pass on that one. But if, during a wargame in front of the usual mix of impartial and partisan judges, some admiral had done the things Scheer did at Jutland, he'd have been sacked. That was a subject of contemporary discussion in the HSF after Jutland.

On other hand, Jelicoe allowed the High Seas Fleet to escape too easily and his inaction and cautiousness cost him a chance to trap Scheer.

That's the conventional wisdom, but I disagree with it. Jellicoe brought his fleet into perfect position despite a lack of updates on the whereabouts of the HSF, formed it into line on the best possible course, and then positioned himself in the best place (based on the info he had) to catch the HSF next morning, all while getting only 1 BB somewhat lamed and doing considerable damage to the best BBs of the HSF.

If Jellicoe screwed up, it was in not reminding his troops, "Hey guys. I'd REALLY appreciate it if you all would tell me when you meet Germans. And some info on where they are and what they're doing would be nice, too." But SHOULD you have to say that to anybody worthy of the stripes on his sleeve? Wasn't the whole point of them being out there in the 1st place to find and kill the Germans? Weren't the CL and DD commodores aware that their primary mission was usually scouting? Or did they think they were just posted on the fleet's outskirts because Jellicoe didn't like them?

Take Goodenough, for example. Sure, he did a good job with his initial spotting report on the HSF at the start of the Run to the North. But nothing after that, not even during the night when he ran into IV SG. So Jellicoe had to deploy his fleet on guesswork at the end of the day action and never got word that the Germans were pushing through the DDs and CLs he'd posted in his rear to block the way to Horns Reef, until Stirling said something. But Stirling was the last line of defence, by which time it was too late.

I rate Jutland as a tactical victory for the Germans and a strategic one for the British. Bullethead, how can rate Jutland as a tactical British victory when the British lost 6,094 sailors to Germany's 2,551?

It's usually accepted that the tactical attacker is going to take considerably more casualties than the tactical defender. But if the tactical attacker carries the position and his casualties are sustainable, then he still has a tactical victory.

At Jutland, the Germans were the strategic attackers, but were definitely the tactical defenders because they had no desire to fight the GF just then. The GF had to chase down the HSF to get a shot at it, which makes the Brits the tactical attackers. When the smoke cleared, the Brits had possession of the field, hadn't lost anything they couldn't replace, and had taken the HSF out of contention for a good while. So despite the disparity of losses, I still think the Brits won on both strategic and tactical grounds.

[Haida]

I agree Jellicoe did well considering that his subordinates gave him little or no information. He could have been caught with his pants down but his initial deployment into line of battle was perfect. Turning away from the final torpedo attack was what got him in hot water, but he had planned to make such a move long before the battle, the plan was approved, and he stuck to it, can't really fault him there. The Royal Navy was determined not to fritter away their strength by taking losses to torpedoes.

I don't think Scheer was that bad. He made some mistakes, like bringing the pre-dreds along and of course the second battle turn. But he got his fleet safely home with minimal losses. At the time he didn't know the British were reading German signals so the radio transmission about Horn's Reef can be tossed out. As for chasing Beatty, what else was he supposed to do? He couldn't pass up the chance that he might have outnumbered the Royal Navy that day. He caught Evan-Thomas' super-dreads in a bad situation and he thought Warspite had been sunk. That was the objective of his plan for the conduct of the war up to that point, to trap a smaller portion of the RN. Heck, at least Scheer took the fleet to sea and gave battle, which is more than you can say for Von Pohl and Von Ingenohl.

Arbuthnot has to be the worst performer. He lost 3 out of 4 good cruisers and his own life attacking a ship that was already disabled (Wiesbaden).

The dork of the battle award goes to the Royal Navy officer who signaled the night challenge and reply in clear. The Germans picked up part of the code and they were able to use it to pass through the British line at night. The British didn't fire at many of the German ships because they used the British challenge.

[asheshouse]

Poor old Scheer is picking up more bad press here, much of it for his 2nd Battle Turn back towards the GF. Before being too critical it needs to be realised that Scheers information was limited. At the time of the first contact between the main fleets the centre of the GF's line was 7 miles northeast of the Konig at the head of the german line. Scheers was located at the middle of the line therefore would not have had a clear view of the disposition of the british fleet, only a general sense that it then lay to the northeast. It would be reasonable to assume that when contact was broken either the GF would pursue or would continue southeast to impose itself between the HSF ad its route home. At 7.45 Moltke reports that the head of the british line is east-by-south (101.25 deg). This tends to confirm that the british are continuing to move southeast and at battle speed would be moving 7 miles every 15 minutes. In fact it seems that the Moltke report was greatly misleading since the head of the british battleline was nearer to northeast at that time, although the battle cruisers were further south, though still nearer east by northeast. It was a few minutes after this that Scheer gives the 2nd battle turn order. Had the Moltke sighting report been accurate this turn to northeast would have brought the HSF down on the rear of the british line, or given the poor visibility prevalent, may even have passed it. Having got to the east of the british line Scheers options would have been greatly improved.

[Hinchinbrooke]

Perhaps we should give Reinhold Scheer a little rest.

How about the ultimate bad boy................. David Beatty? Personally, I'm just glad he wasn't GF C-in-C in 1916. If he had been, if might have been "Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our bloody fleet today!".

[Bullethead]

How about the ultimate bad boy................. David Beatty? Personally, I'm just glad he wasn't GF C-in-C in 1916. If he had been, if might have been "Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our bloody fleet today!".

I dunno. For all Beatty's aggressiveness, I'm not sure he'd have handled the GF much differently than Jellicoe did. Both of them were in substantial agreement on many strategic issues, especially those involving maintaining the battlefleet's safety. After the 19 Aug 1916 HSF sortie, both Jellicoe and Beatty agreed that the GF wouldn't even go south of Dogger Bank except in exceptional circumstances. Beatty even said, "When you're winning, risk nothing".

The question is whether or not he'd have felt this way at Jutland if he'd been ACGF instead of VABCF. I tend to think he would have, since strategically he was pretty much in agreement with Jellicoe beforehand. Plus, I'm sure most folks know from personal experience that opinions and outlooks can really change once you get a promotion. Suddenly, you see why your previous boss didn't act on all your suggestions :).

But enough hypotheticals. Time to critique Beatty's actual Jutland performance.

In fairness, I think I can only grade Beatty for things the BCs did. IMHO, Evan-Thomas deserves almost all of the blame for 5BS being way late on both turns. Sure, Beatty didn't make it easy for him (no briefing, Seymour, not waiting for him), but Evan-Thomas had to have been completely braindead to have just let these things happen without taking the least bit of initiative. So while Beatty was at the bottom line responsible for 5BS's performace due to being the overall boss at the time, I think E-T's incompetence gives Beatty a pass.

Beatty did several things very well. He persevered in his mission despite serious losses, found the HSF, and led it by the nose back toward Jellicoe. High marks there. However, once he made his initial spotting report, he didn't keep Jellicoe updated, so that when Beatty and Jellicoe finally came in sight of each other, Jellicoe had to ask Beatty directly by blinker light where the HSF was. Not good at all. This could very easily have negated all his work to this point and possibly even led to a Brit disaster. Thus, I have to give Beatty an overall bad grade, because timely reporting was such an important part of his job.

There's also the issue of what Beatty did as he came up to Jellicoe--cutting across between the fleets. He started this move upon spotting the western-most AC of Jellicoe's screen and realizing the bulk of the GF was far east of the HSF. So he did the aggressive thing and headed NE, bending Hipper and Scheer the same way and thus into the path of the GF.

Beatty's taken some fire for this, due to blocking the GF's view of the HSF and causing some near-collisions with Jellicoes screening CLs and DDs. And he can't say he was just heading for his station at the front of the line because the GF hadn't yet decided which way to go when he was doing this. What if the GF had ended up heading west instead of east? Would he have then gone back across between the fleets? OTOH, some folks say that instead of blocking the GF's view, he was shielding it during its deployment. But either way, the situation only arose in the 1st place because Beatty hadn't been keeping Jellicoe informed on where the HSF was.

What I've never heard argued, however, is what would have happened if Beatty HADN'T done this at all, and whether not doing it would have been better. Suppose, upon spotting Black Prince, that Beatty had kept going NNW. Scheer would have done the same, and thus have gotten himself even more trapped and further from home than he really did. There probably wouldn't have been any BB action during 31 May but there would have been a much better chance of it starting fairly early on 1 June.

[Haida]

Beatty's taken some fire for this, due to blocking the GF's view of the HSF and causing some near-collisions with Jellicoes screening CLs and DDs. And he can't say he was just heading for his station at the front of the line because the GF hadn't yet decided which way to go when he was doing this. What if the GF had ended up heading west instead of east? Would he have then gone back across between the fleets? OTOH, some folks say that instead of blocking the GF's view, he was shielding it during its deployment. But either way, the situation only arose in the 1st place because Beatty hadn't been keeping Jellicoe informed on where the HSF was.

That's interesting, I'd never heard the British critique of this move before. I read in a book that after the battle Scheer and Hipper thought Beatty turned NE to prevent them from sighting the Grand Fleet too soon. They praised him for this move. From the German perspective, had they been able to see the GF earlier they probably would have turned and ran. Of course we'll never know but saying "what if" is the thing that makes these historic battles so interesting.

[Bullethead]

They praised him for this move. From the German perspective, had they been able to see the GF earlier they probably would have turned and ran. Of course we'll never know but saying "what if" is the thing that makes these historic battles so interesting.

I dunno. The GF spotted the HSF and opened fire while it was in the process of deploying into line. Beatty obstructed this fire from west to east as he went by. Then Arbuthnot went by from east to west causing similar problems. The GF finished deploying about the time this smoke had cleared, leaving just the regular murk which had before been good enough to shoot at the HSF. However, by time time, Scheer was already gone, and Jellicoe hadn't been able to see him go (and those who had seen didn't bother to tell him), so he didn't react quickly.

Thus, it seems to me that the HSF ran immediately upon spotting all those muzzle flashes, and were gone in less time than it took the GF to form line. Which isn't surprising--they weren't planning to fight the GF. IOW, Beatty's presence between the fleets didn't make much, if any, difference to the promptness of the German retreat.

Instead, IMHO this move of Beatty's really helped the Germans. First, must have significantly limited the amount of fire Scheer took. BCF's column was about 20% the length of the GF's line, and it trailed much smoke behind it. Beatty, the GF, and the wind were all going more or less the same direction, so he was in the way for a while and his smoke lingered. So Scheer benefitted from fewer shells coming his way during the period of his exposure due to Beatty being in the way, and another amount less due to Arbuthnot. Considering what the HSF did receive did a fair amount of damage, it's probably lucky for the Germans that Beatty got in the way.

Second, Beatty's move delayed the deployment of the GF. Jellicoe slowed from 19 to 14 knots at the start of the deployment to let Beatty get by quicker. Until this was complete, there wasn't much else Jellicoe could do even if he had been able to see what Scheer was doing. In addition, this delayed deployment certainly also reduced the amount of fire Scheer took, because the BBs could only start firing once the ones ahead of them turned into line and cleared the range.

Third, Beatty's maneuver provided cover for the German retreat and delayed, if not completely aborted, pursuit. It also put a big dent in what little situational awareness Jellicoe had at the time, which had repurcussions for the rest of the battle. And finally, there's my question of what if Beatty had kept on NE dragging the HSF with him? Wouldn't that have made it easier to trap Scheer the next day?

[HMSWarspite]

What ever Beatty's intent (and there is some logic in the theory that he had method in his madness), he should have let Jellicoe know what he intended, and allowed him to countermand if necessary. He kept Jellicoe in the dark, and then further obscured Jellicoe's view of the battle! Unforgiveable. As for Arbuthnot - less said the better.

I actually think (based on Beatty's style all day) that he was trying to get to the head of the GF line (which incidently is a stupid place for the BCs in a fleet action IMHO - once lines of battle are engaged, I would position them on the unengaged side of the BB, level with the head of the line, accepting the loss of their fire, to avoid their getting into a shooting match with HSF BBs! But then the RN never really understood the stupidity of going head to head with 12" armed ships in light BCs). I think Beatty didn't stop to think that Jellicoe would not know which column to deploy on, and just assumed that Jellicoe knew what was going on. Thus deploying to port is of course what the GF would do, and hence his (Beatty's) place was at the front. 'Blocking the GF fire?:surprise: er, well, um, that doesn't matter, I need to be in the van!'

Off subject, but this whole discussion shows how important the blanking of fire (and visibilty for that matter)mod is in Jutland to get the real flavour of manoeuvering these large fleets. Current DG wouldn't matter two hoots what Beatty did, and the HSF will turn tail as soon as the GF blue triangles appear!

[Bullethead]

As for Arbuthnot - less said the better.

Yeah, but I'm still going to look him up when I get to Hell. I figure he'd be an interesting character to meet :D.

I actually think (based on Beatty's style all day) that he was trying to get to the head of the GF line

Good argument. Could well be you're right, too.

(which incidently is a stupid place for the BCs in a fleet action IMHO - once lines of battle are engaged, I would position them on the unengaged side of the BB, level with the head of the line, accepting the loss of their fire, to avoid their getting into a shooting match with HSF BBs!
But then the RN never really understood the stupidity of going head to head with 12" armed ships in light BCs).

I dunno. I think everybody kept this mentality right up until carriers silenced the big guns. The Germans realized the type of fire their BCs would be facing so built their BCs with decent armor, accepting smaller guns to keep the speed up and the cost within reason. But everybody seems to have wanted to keep BCs, ACs, and CAs out front (both as scouts and to deter CL/DD torp attacks), and to have expected them to contribute to the general BB action.

This contribution to the BB fight, which had been valuable in RJW times, had become almost a necessity by WWI, due to the huge cost of BCs. Either you built a BB or a BC, but you couldn't afford both at once, and either way you still needed X number of heavy guns afloat to get the odds you wanted in the fleet action. In those days, BCs had to compromise on either guns or armor to get their speed. With BB armor and gun size increasing over time, most navies went with the big guns in their BCs to keep them effective against BBs. Plus, the Brits needed big guns to deal with German BC armor, too, which was basically on a BB scale.

I think the situation was worse actually for the "Treaty Cruisers" of the 20s and 30s. They had to fill the same roles as the ACs and BCs before them, but with less armor and no effective answer to BB fire. Plus, there were some pre-treaty BCs still at large to worry about, which would have done the CAs as they'd done the ACs.

Off subject, but this whole discussion shows how important the blanking of fire (and visibilty for that matter)mod is in Jutland to get the real flavour of manoeuvering these large fleets. Current DG wouldn't matter two hoots what Beatty did, and the HSF will turn tail as soon as the GF blue triangles appear!

I hope you'll see some improvement on these issues in Jutland. No promises, though ;).

[PepsiCan]

I disagree

I think Beatty was the worst of all for three reasons:
- failing to instruct Evan-Thomas on his style of command. Evan-Thomas came from Jellicoe's GF. And Jellicoe had a completely different style of command. Beatty never even met Evan-Thomas to speak about command and the conduct of battle.
- Beatty lost to his direct opponent Hipper, despite having an overwhelming majority. But because he never properly instructed Evan-Thomas he lost his biggest asset from the outset of the battle.
- The man never replaced his signal officer, despite bad flag signals on previous occassions (Doggers bank for example).

If it hadn't been for Beatty's bungling up, the German's could never have claimed a victory after Jutland. And the British won Jutland on the basis that they held the sea. Their problem was that they were unable to capitalise on their tactical advantage because all the British captains stood by and watched, or heard, the HSF break through the line.

And by the way: hi! :-)

[FastPhil]

I disagree

I think Beatty was the worst of all for three reasons:
- failing to instruct Evan-Thomas on his style of command. Evan-Thomas came from Jellicoe's GF. And Jellicoe had a completely different style of command. Beatty never even met Evan-Thomas to speak about command and the conduct of battle.
- Beatty lost to his direct opponent Hipper, despite having an overwhelming majority. But because he never properly instructed Evan-Thomas he lost his biggest asset from the outset of the battle.
- The man never replaced his signal officer, despite bad flag signals on previous occassions (Doggers bank for example).

If it hadn't been for Beatty's bungling up, the German's could never have claimed a victory after Jutland. And the British won Jutland on the basis that they held the sea. Their problem was that they were unable to capitalise on their tactical advantage because all the British captains stood by and watched, or heard, the HSF break through the line.

And by the way: hi! :-)

Another aspect(I don't think it was previously mentioned) was the gunnery of the BCF which was abysmal(*5th BCS not a part of BCF for this) and directly laid at Beatty's feet. The 5th BS and the rest of the Grand Fleet had extensive gunnery training under Jellicoe's direction. Most of the accounts atribute(I believe including Campbells-which must be taken with a grain of salt) most of the sucessful hits to the 5th BS and not the BCs of the BCF.
JMHO

[Bullethead]

I disagree

I think Beatty was the worst of all for three reasons:....

I don't deny that Beatty screwed up, and that some of these were rather serious. However, I can't rate Beatty as the worst. To me, during the battle itself, Beatty mostly did the right thing and usually did it fairly well, given what he had to work with. Most of his major mistakes took place well before the battle, such as some of the things you mention: failure to brief E-T when he showed up and retaining Seymour after Dogger Bank.

During the battle itself, I only really ding him for failure to keep Jellicoe updated during the RTTS and RTTN, and for cutting across between the GF and HSF at the merge (sorry for the flightsim term :D ). You could also perhaps beat on him (per Gordon) for his pre-contact formation and for not waiting on 5BS to close up before charging off after the DDs and CLs that Galatea initially reported. However, given that the Admiralty had already said the whole exercise was a false alarm as to the HSF, why wait for BBs (even QEs) when you're trying to catch just a couple of CLs?

There are several guys I have to rate worse than Beatty. Evan-Thomas tops that list. No matter his lack of briefing and Seymour's failings, E-T's being way late on both important turns was at least 90% his own fault. It shouldn't have been necessary to have to tell him to follow the BCs to start with, and he shouldn't have had to be told not to keep closing the HSF after passing Beatty going the other way. He was content first to sail off into the blue in the opposite direction of the known enemy, and then to sail on to certain destruction. Signals high priest or not, I find it hard to believe he hadn't been weeded out long before Jutland.

So IMHO, if you're going to hold it against Beatty for retaining Seymour, you've got to bash Jellicoe for fostering E-T's career. And that seems to be a bigger crime because even with Seymour, if RA5BS had had the brains God gave a cockroach, he'd have done a better job than E-T did. Hell, even Arbuthnot certainly wouldn't have waited on the initial turn to the south, and probably wouldn't have waited on the turn to the north.

[Bullethead]

Another aspect(I don't think it was previously mentioned) was the gunnery of the BCF which was abysmal(*5th BCS not a part of BCF for this) and directly laid at Beatty's feet.

In fairness, I don't think Beatty should take all the blame here. BCF didn't have a place to practice while the GF did, and this situation wasn't Beatty's doing. Once the RN realized that this was having an adverse effect on BCF's gunnery, corrective measures were taken. That's why 5BS was with Beatty and 3BCF with Jellicoe at Jutland.

[PepsiCan]

I don't deny that Beatty screwed up, and that some of these were rather serious. However, I can't rate Beatty as the worst. To me, during the battle itself, Beatty mostly did the right thing and usually did it fairly well, given what he had to work with.

Yes, but that is my point. What he had to work with was wholy his own doing! If he had taken better precautions, he would have beaten Hipper by the sheer fact of his numerical superiority. But because he ignored Evan-Thomas he lost the man before the first shot was fired and because he didn't replace his signal officer after Doggers Bank, he had crap communication with his fleet.

Sure, tactically Beatty was alright, but strategically he failed. And being in such a senior position he was definetely required to NOT fail strategically.
;)

[Bullethead]

Yes, but that is my point. What he had to work with was wholy his own doing! If he had taken better precautions, he would have beaten Hipper by the sheer fact of his numerical superiority. But because he ignored Evan-Thomas he lost the man before the first shot was fired and because he didn't replace his signal officer after Doggers Bank, he had crap communication with his fleet.

I still think you're being too hard on Beatty here. You seem to be judging him too much with hindsight, and also putting some of E-T's failure on him.

First off, Beatty had a slight advantage in numbers and a considerable advantage in firepower even without 5BS. These alone should have given him the better of a fight with Hipper. But they didn't, and the reasons why were definitely not Beatty's fault. Beatty wasn't responsible for the weak armor of the Brit BCs, the deadly nature of Brit propellant, the crappy quality of Brit AP shells, or the BCF not having a place for target practice. And it wasn't realized by the Brits until after Jutland just how much these hardware issues shifted the advantage to the numerically weaker and out-gunned German BCs. So at the time, nobody in the RN would have thought twice about 6 Brit BCs taking on 5 German BCs without 5BS handy. In fact, had Beatty turned away upon spotting Hipper to wait for 5BS to close up, he'd probably have lost his job.

Second, at the time of the 1st contact reports, the Admiralty had already mistakenly said that the HSF hadn't sortied after all. So when Beatty heard that his screen had seen a few German CLs and DDs, it's understandable if he assumed, like apparently everybody else in the RN, that there was nothing else out there. After all, German light forces went running around in the North Sea fairly often, so seeing CLs and DDs did not imply the presence of the HSF. Only the BCs had the speed to attempt to catch such prey, they could have handled the fight alone, and there was no time to waste if there was to be any hope of a successful pursuit. So based on the info Beatty had at the time, charging off without waiting for 5BS seems like a pretty good decision. And had there only been light forces in the offing, he would have been applauded for his handling of the situation. It's only in the light of later events that his "failure to concentrate" (as Gordon calls it) assumes grave proportions.

Third, you're assuming that the fight would still have happened if 5BS had been right beside BCF from the get-go. I rather doubt this would have been the case. Had Hipper (or his scouts) seen so many Brits all at once, he'd have turned and run immediately, before anybody was in range. And he'd have gone faster than he did in the RTTS. This would have left 5BS behind for sure, and probably 2BCS as well. So then Beatty would have had the option of continuing the pursuit with just 1BCS (which would now have been outnumbered), letting his force get more and more strung out as time passed, or giving up. IOW, something of a repeat of Dogger Bank.

And fourth, as mentioned before, E-T's own lack of command ability caused most of the extra distance to appear between 5BS and BCF, regardless of Seymour and lack of briefing. There were default rules for what to do in various situations when signalling broke down, and E-T definitely knew them because he was a signals guru. There were several possible options under these default rules, and the best option under the circumstances (known enemy in the offing) would have been for E-T to have followed Beatty's turn to retain as close as possible the position he was still under orders to be in relative to Lion. What E-T really did, sailing off in exactly the opposite direction, was not one of the available default options, but just him having brainlock. And it was during this time that the gap grew.

[PepsiCan]

Nevertheless, it's fun to debate this :-)

How about we put Beatty and Evan-Thomas on a par level?

[Bullethead]

Nevertheless, it's fun to debate this :-)

Though I doubt anybody's opinion will change regardless of what's said :D.

How about we put Beatty and Evan-Thomas on a par level?

Well, I don't particularly agree with that, but enough of them for now. And we've beaten Scheer into the ground, too. So what about Jellicoe and Hipper next?

[PepsiCan]

Well, I think the issue with Jellicoe is twofold. First of all, he went to sleep. Sure, he was tired. But so where many of his fellow commanders. And I don't believe Scheer went for a nap. Had he been awake, he may have heard the gun fire and could have prodded his commanders to inform him of what was going on.

And of course, the man totally lost the publicity war. He allowed the Germans to claim victory by not having accurate data available for the First Lord. And subsequently he let Beatty blacken his reputation. One of the reasons this whole thread has come into existence is because the British didn't state the obvious and let the Germans claim victory: "How can you claim victory when you fled the fight?"

Verdict: good with guns, lousy with words. But both are important.

How's that for a set up?:devious:

[Hinchinbrooke]

Nevertheless, it's fun to debate this :-)

How about we put Beatty and Evan-Thomas on a par level?

I'm no Beatty fan, but Evan-Thomas' performance was far worse. He showed absolutely no initiative, constantly wanting to do things 'by the book'. I don't know much about him, but why he was given command of a squadron made up of the RN"s finest and fastest battleships is a constant puzzle.

[Hinchinbrooke]

Well, I think the issue with Jellicoe is twofold. First of all, he went to sleep. Sure, he was tired. But so where many of his fellow commanders. And I don't believe Scheer went for a nap. Had he been awake, he may have heard the gun fire and could have prodded his commanders to inform him of what was going on.

Jellicoe was old before his time. CinC of the GF from 1914 with the hopes of an Empire on his shoulders! And with a Boxer bullet in him! I'm not surprised he needed relief. If his subordinates had been up to the task, I'm sure he would have acted accordingly.;)