View Full Version : Jutland: New Screenshots
Just thinking...I wonder what are the battle screenshots looks like ?
What are the ship info screen ?
And etc.
Just some and any new screenies are welcome.
Hinchinbrooke
04 Jun 07, 14:26
Oh, and there I was, hoping to see some! Oh well!
Yes, the title of the thread is a bit misleading :-D
Still, dear SES - please give us something more to drool about. Perhaps a picture of a British BC blowing up... or the burned-out hulk of "Iron Duke" being served a coup de grace by some German "Torpedoboots" :-D
Hinchinbrooke
04 Jun 07, 16:32
... or the burned-out hulk of "Iron Duke" being served a coup de grace by some German "Torpedoboots" :-D
Was that before or after Derfflinger and Von der Tann collided in their haste to escape, both sinking with all hands?;)
Was that before or after Derfflinger and Von der Tann collided in their haste to escape, both sinking with all hands?;)
The British capital ships were blowing up at such a rate, that the Germans had to make away in haste in order to avoid some flying turrets and other stuff :-D
asheshouse
14 Jun 07, 13:34
The British capital ships were blowing up at such a rate, that the Germans had to make away in haste in order to avoid some flying turrets and other stuff :-D
It really didn't matter that the High Seas Fleet ships were so hard to sink. They took such a pounding from the Grand Fleet that many of them were more like sieves than warships by the end of the battle.
Within 10hrs of the Grand Fleet returning to Scapa Flow Admiral Jellicoe was able to signal the Admiralty that the fleet was refuelled and ready for sea at four hours notice.
On the other hand Admiral Scheer was not able to report the High Seas fleet as being ready for sea before mid August. two and a half months after the battle, and that did not include Derfflinger and Seydlitz which were still undergoing repair.
HMSWarspite
14 Jun 07, 14:28
It's a bit like land combat - killing a guy stops him. Woundcing him stops him, the two guys who carry him out, the ambulence that drives him out etc. Sinking a German ship removes it, but (apart from the crew) has no effect on new builds. Wrecking it, but getting it home diverts resources from new build, and when you repair it, you've got... an older ship back again!:laugh:
Arghhh! I get excited every time I see the title, then no screenies.
Bullethead
14 Jun 07, 20:23
It really didn't matter that the High Seas Fleet ships were so hard to sink. ...
Within 10hrs of the Grand Fleet returning to Scapa Flow ... the fleet was refuelled and ready for sea at four hours notice.
On the other hand Admiral Scheer was not able to report the High Seas fleet as being ready for sea before mid August ...
Quite true. And this is one of the things that's always puzzled me, as a non-Brit, about the subsequent Jellicoe-Beatty fued.
Time and distance factors conspired to make it a virtual certain that the GF and HSF would only ever meet, if they met at all, in the late afternoon. This would allow very little time to kill the Germans before dark. Jellicoe (and all thinking admirals) knew this, and had said so to the Admiralty long before Jutland, just to make sure they knew if they didn't already (since they were not generally noted as being thinking admirals :D). In the process, he also stated his disinclination to fight the Germans after dark because this would deprive the GF of its numerical advantage, and it was known that the Germans had spent more time training for night fighting (the usual recourse of the weaker side) than had the Brits. And before Jutland, nobody had a problem with any of this.
Thus, the accepted plan all around, in the event the Germans ever came out, was to meet them in whatever daylight was available and do whatever damage could be done while the light lasted. In the process, the Brits would try to cut the Germans off from their base. During the night, they'd pull back to avoid night action but maintain concact, and then finish the job the next day when they could use all the daylight. Nobody had any problem with this, either.
So then Jutland happened and, as predicted, it was late afternoon before the GF and HSF met. Jellicoe, despite not getting any intel on the HSF for a long time after 2LCS's 1st spotting of the HSF, still managed to put the GF in the best position to accomplish the above objectives. And the Dark Gods even showed Their favor to him by letthing him hammer the best German BBs while the light lasted, without them being able to reply effectively. All was set for the utter annihilation of the HSF come sunup. There was nothing to fault Jellicoe for in any of this.
But during the night, the HSF stormed through the rear of the GF and escaped. And nobody on the scene bothered to tell Jellicoe of this. Thus, next morning, instead of Jellicoe destroying the HSF as he should have, he had to go home empty-handed.
So on what grounds does the Beatty camp condemn Jellicoe? If their positions had been reversed, there would still have been the same incommunicative subordinates, AT BEST. Sure, Beatty could have appointed his favorites to those positions, but his record is of favoring men who sucked up to him first and foremost, even when he backstabbed them, rather than men of ability. How else do you explain Seymour? And given the low state of tactical initiative in the RN at the time, who else was there who would have done a better job than those whom Jellicoe appointed?
Anyway, with Jellicoe at the helm, GF was able to shrug off Jutland even if they got the worst of it on the bodycount. Meanwhile, the HSF was licking its wounds for months. Nothing ever goes perfectly in war, so what was there to complain about?
Lempereur1
14 Jun 07, 22:19
Sorry fellows,
Still a week or two away from more screen shots!
Sorry fellows,
Still a week or two away from more screen shots!
Well, any new screenshots please ?
:halo:
Bullethead
26 Jun 07, 10:21
Screenshots are Jim's thing and like he said, he'll have some more for you all fairly soon. However, he was on vacation last week and has to get caught up this week, so I wouldn't expect them immediately :).
This thread has been quiet for a month now - any sign of some new screenies or general news ?
It really didn't matter that the High Seas Fleet ships were so hard to sink. They took such a pounding from the Grand Fleet that many of them were more like sieves than warships by the end of the battle.
Within 10hrs of the Grand Fleet returning to Scapa Flow Admiral Jellicoe was able to signal the Admiralty that the fleet was refuelled and ready for sea at four hours notice.
On the other hand Admiral Scheer was not able to report the High Seas fleet as being ready for sea before mid August. two and a half months after the battle, and that did not include Derfflinger and Seydlitz which were still undergoing repair.
but sinking a ship, i.e. British ships at Jutland, is worth more than severely damaging it (like the Seydlitz and Derfflinger were damaged). When a ship sinks or as we have here at Jutland, explodes, there will be more loss of life. So Jutland really was, by all means, a German tactical victory.
The British fleet was big, had always been big, and could take some losses against a German fleet which was 30% smaller. Even today some historians don't agree when it comes the the clear result of the battle. (in some books I read "German victory" , in others "British victory") I've discussed it a lot and what we made out of it at the end was:
who remained in control: The British, of course
who were the best: the Germans
2 contradictions, but in war it's all possible :devious:
who
There definately were no such thing as tactical victory, cuz whole Jutland battle was simple tactical stupidity.
Maybe Brits were a bit more stupidier than Germs, I can't say it for sure.
PS: Months passed, not only couple of weeks, but still there is even no sound of ANY new screennies at all.
Maybe Jutland project if freezed ?
asheshouse
03 Aug 07, 14:53
but sinking a ship, i.e. British ships at Jutland, is worth more than severely damaging it (like the Seydlitz and Derfflinger were damaged). When a ship sinks or as we have here at Jutland, explodes, there will be more loss of life. So Jutland really was, by all means, a German tactical victory.
The British fleet was big, had always been big, and could take some losses against a German fleet which was 30% smaller. Even today some historians don't agree when it comes the the clear result of the battle. (in some books I read "German victory" , in others "British victory") I've discussed it a lot and what we made out of it at the end was:
who remained in control: The British, of course
who were the best: the Germans
2 contradictions, but in war it's all possible :devious:
who
Any claim of a tactical victory by the german fleet is just ignoring reality. The Battle of Jutland can be considered as two actions. The first is the battlecruiser fleet action. Whilst the British fleet took a few hard knocks it cannot be disputed that it had the German battlecruiser fleet effectively beaten by the time the main german fleet arrived. If Scheer had not been present then it is likely that the entire german battlecruiser fleet would have been destroyed. However once the Highs Seas Fleet was sighted Beatty did his job and lead Scheer north towards the Grand Fleet. The action between the two main fleets was undoubtably a British tactical and strategic victory and if you consider the material damage to each fleet in terms of reduction of effective fighting force again the British fleet comes away with an overwelming advantage. Scheers turn back towards the British line after his first tactical retreat was probably intended to catch the British fleet at a disadvantage assuming it had turned to pursue. Jellicoes actions in maintaining the battleline and shadowing the german retreat prevented any advantage of this sort being obtained.
Bullethead
03 Aug 07, 21:35
PS: Months passed, not only couple of weeks, but still there is even no sound of ANY new screennies at all.
Maybe Jutland project if freezed ?
No, Jutland is very much alive. It's completely taken over my life and, while I can't yet see daylight at the end of the tunnel, I can at least see a glow in the distance :). You've already got your hands on some of the work, where we've stuck a few enhancements from Jutland into recent RJW updates. More of these will likely follow in the future. But that's also part of the reason for a lack of new screenies: SES now has to split time between Jutland development and RJW support. Remember, we're a VERY small company :).
HMSWarspite
07 Aug 07, 19:02
No, Jutland is very much alive. It's completely taken over my life and, while I can't yet see daylight at the end of the tunnel, I can at least see a glow in the distance :)....
Bl**&^ RN battlecruisers again no doubt:clown::laugh:
Bullethead
07 Aug 07, 21:18
Bl**&^ RN battlecruisers again no doubt:clown::laugh:
Probably Black Prince actually :).
No, Jutland is very much alive. It's completely taken over my life and, while I can't yet see daylight at the end of the tunnel, I can at least see a glow in the distance :). You've already got your hands on some of the work, where we've stuck a few enhancements from Jutland into recent RJW updates. More of these will likely follow in the future. But that's also part of the reason for a lack of new screenies: SES now has to split time between Jutland development and RJW support. Remember, we're a VERY small company :).
Your words made my heart beating calm. Anyway, how far is Jutland from release ?
Just asking...
Bullethead
08 Aug 07, 13:54
Your words made my heart beating calm. Anyway, how far is Jutland from release ?
Just asking...
As it says on the web site, our target release date is "late summer - early fall 2007", which isn't that far from now. While there's always the chance we might miss our target, we're trying very, very hard to release the game in this timeframe. It's definitely crunch time here.
Speaking of which, I'd better get back to work before Jim notices :eek:
As it says on the web site, our target release date is "late summer - early fall 2007", which isn't that far from now. While there's always the chance we might miss our target, we're trying very, very hard to release the game in this timeframe. It's definitely crunch time here.
Speaking of which, I'd better get back to work before Jim notices :eek:
Yea, don't stop now with all of us waiting for the game! Are you trying to make us more crazy? :nuts:
We are going to need shock treatment if we have to wait very much longer for this awesome release named Jutland.:shock:
Take your time. DG was far too buggy when released, so there's no reason to repeat that debacle. The quality assurance process should never be rushed, no matter how much people want you to release your game immediately. (No offense meant to anybody.)
Take your time. DG was far too buggy when released, so there's no reason to repeat that debacle. The quality assurance process should never be rushed, no matter how much people want you to release your game immediately. (No offense meant to anybody.)
I wouldn`t say it was a debacle ;)
Take your time. DG was far too buggy when released, so there's no reason to repeat that debacle. The quality assurance process should never be rushed, no matter how much people want you to release your game immediately. (No offense meant to anybody.)
A debacle, far to buggy? I do not think it was quite that bad! we had very few issues with the game when it came out. Was there some ? Yes but they where fixed quickly and they seemed to happen on a very few type machines.
If I may, I think you are over stating the problem that was not bad at all.
I have played this game from the very start,and only had a couple of issues,and they did not stop the game from being played, and when the issue was submitted to the Tec Support it was fixed promptly .
A debacle, far to buggy? I do not think it was quite that bad! we had very few issues with the game when it came out. Was there some ? Yes but they where fixed quickly and they seemed to happen on a very few type machines.
If I may, I think you are over stating the problem that was not bad at all.
I have played this game from the very start,and only had a couple of issues,and they did not stop the game from being played, and when the issue was submitted to the Tec Support it was fixed promptly .
I disagree.
There were way too many pretty obvious bugs which appeared commonly - like disappearing ships etc.. True, they were eradicated pretty quickly, but they should have been eradicated before the game was released.
I disagree.
There were way too many pretty obvious bugs which appeared commonly - like disappearing ships etc.. True, they were eradicated pretty quickly, but they should have been eradicated before the game was released.
As soon as I'm, was, an will be the QA Lead for some Russian GameDev projects, I have to say that the release version of DG must not even launched on sales.
We got some sort of stable gameplay like 1.5-2 months later.
I don't want that Jutland would force same conditions...
Any claim of a tactical victory by the german fleet is just ignoring reality. The Battle of Jutland can be considered as two actions. The first is the battlecruiser fleet action. Whilst the British fleet took a few hard knocks it cannot be disputed that it had the German battlecruiser fleet effectively beaten by the time the main german fleet arrived. If Scheer had not been present then it is likely that the entire german battlecruiser fleet would have been destroyed. However once the Highs Seas Fleet was sighted Beatty did his job and lead Scheer north towards the Grand Fleet. The action between the two main fleets was undoubtably a British tactical and strategic victory and if you consider the material damage to each fleet in terms of reduction of effective fighting force again the British fleet comes away with an overwelming advantage. Scheers turn back towards the British line after his first tactical retreat was probably intended to catch the British fleet at a disadvantage assuming it had turned to pursue. Jellicoes actions in maintaining the battleline and shadowing the german retreat prevented any advantage of this sort being obtained.
quote: "If Scheer had not been present" , we don't discuss results with "ifs" ... Scheer WAS present, period. IF some German balls had fallen a few inches wider, then the HMS Lion's fate would match that of the Invincible's etc...
Of course the British fleet came away with an overwhelming advantage (they already had it before the battle started) , in my humble opinion, that doesn't detract the German fleet's tactical victory, just look at the loss of life and the ships lost on both sides. And it's not just that only the Germans had some battlecruisers severely damaged. The Britons also had ships that only nearly didn't sink.
The Admirality lied to the British population and made up about German ships being sunk at Jutland, ships that came to Scapa Flow in one piece in 1919, that alone tells us the British Navy really felt embarassed by the outcome. The Germans only lost one battleship, and an obsolete one. over 6000 people dead on the British side, against +- 2500 on German side.
Eventhough the German plan had also failed, calling this a British victory is a bit excessive, don't you think?
asheshouse
13 Aug 07, 12:55
quote:Eventhough the German plan had also failed, calling this a British victory is a bit excessive, don't you think?
Up until 1916 the High Seas Fleet (HF) was a serious challenger to the Grand Fleet (GF). Although smaller in size the HSF was able to choose the time and place of battle to their best advantage. Despite this they were unable to bring the GF to action on terms they were prepared to accept. Such was the scale of the moral defeat suffered at Jutland that the HSF never again made a serious challenge and the material resources which had been directed towards expanding the navy were redirected elsewhere.
The HSF lost one battleship and and one of its most powerful battlecruisers. The GF lost no battleships and two of the battlecruisers lost were effectively obsolete, being too slow and undergunned and were in any case immediately replaced by new more powerful ships.
The german fleet effectively stopped building capital ships after 1916. Only those nearing completion were finished. This demonstrates that they had no confidence in achieving success in future battles, as a consequence of the events of Jutland.
The GF on the otherhand kept building at a prodigous rate until it became clear that the HSF had given up the game.
Both the HSF and the GF put out misinformation after the battle. In some cases this was due to genuine error. In others it was deliberate deception as in the initial denial by the HSF of the loss of the Lutzow, Rostock and Elbing.
The GF went into action with 28 battleships and 9 battlecruisers
losses due to sinking and damage reduced the fleet to 24 and 3 respectively in the immediate aftermath (ignoring replacements).
In the case of the HSF they started with 22 battleships and 5 battlecruisers which were reduced to 16 and 1 respectively in the immediate aftermath. (the HSF had no immediate replacements).
So the end result was that the GF's superiority in capital ship numbers of x1.38 over the HSF was increased to x1.58 after the battle. In terms of objectives the HSF had failed to isolate and destroy a section of the GF. On the other hand the GF had contained the HSF and prevented it from threatening British interests. However you look at the facts it is clear that the HSF ended the battle in a worse position tactically and strategically, than when it started. Such a situation is normally termed a defeat.
quote: "If Scheer had not been present" , we don't discuss results with "ifs" ... Scheer WAS present, period. IF some German balls had fallen a few inches wider, then the HMS Lion's fate would match that of the Invincible's etc...
Of course the British fleet came away with an overwhelming advantage (they already had it before the battle started) , in my humble opinion, that doesn't detract the German fleet's tactical victory, just look at the loss of life and the ships lost on both sides. And it's not just that only the Germans had some battlecruisers severely damaged. The Britons also had ships that only nearly didn't sink.
The Admirality lied to the British population and made up about German ships being sunk at Jutland, ships that came to Scapa Flow in one piece in 1919, that alone tells us the British Navy really felt embarassed by the outcome. The Germans only lost one battleship, and an obsolete one. over 6000 people dead on the British side, against +- 2500 on German side.
Eventhough the German plan had also failed, calling this a British victory is a bit excessive, don't you think?
It is both British and German loss.
British lost this battle, because they weren't able to sink major part of HSF.
German's lost, cuz they didn't achieve any big resulst to somehow even the amount of ships in HSF and Grand Fleet. They do sink some crappy BCs, but that was not because the German superiority in tactics only - mostly cuz of Mr. "Stupid" Fischers ideas of light armored heavy armed ships.
The QEs and Revenges were still on duty after Jutland, and there was like 8+ ships total agains 2 ships of same class Germans have.
HMSWarspite
13 Aug 07, 15:51
It is both British and German loss.
British lost this battle, because they weren't able to sink major part of HSF.
German's lost, cuz they didn't achieve any big resulst to somehow even the amount of ships in HSF and Grand Fleet. They do sink some crappy BCs, but that was not because the German superiority in tactics only - mostly cuz of Mr. "Stupid" Fischers ideas of light armored heavy armed ships.
The QEs and Revenges were still on duty after Jutland, and there was like 8+ ships total agains 2 ships of same class Germans have.
It was not actually British Naval policy to sink the major part of the HSF in one battle, that was just the expectation of the public, aided by the press, bred on stories of Trafalgar. As the lack of a close blockade illustrates, the aim was to neutralise the HSF threat, whilst preserving freedom of action for the GF. Jutland supported that policy successfully, whilst (as you say) showing up Fishers ideas as erronious. Unfortunately, Fisher didn't notice, and continued with wacky ships (Curious, Spurious and Outrageous for example)., Hood did get up armoured a lot on the drawing board, and Renown & Repluse were rejected from the GF until also modified
It was not actually British Naval policy to sink the major part of the HSF in one battle, that was just the expectation of the public, aided by the press, bred on stories of Trafalgar.
That's kinda where the 'defeat' part of it comes in for the British though. It's that whole 'perception is reality' aspect. The British public and more than a few members of the Royal Navy believed that they would 'Trafalgar' the Germans in one glorious afternoon. Jutland was the Royal Navy's chance to do that and it didn't happen.
Nowadays, we'd say the British didn't cover the spread. ;)
Such a situation is normally termed a defeat.
Your information is - of course - correct, but I think when Jutland is being discussed, we talk about the battle itself and not the number of ships that were built and replaced et cetera. Germany chose for the unrestricted submarine warfare, yes... after Jutland, but that doesn't alter the battle itself.
That's why I don't agree with you when you claim this a clear British victory. The battle itself was anything but a British victory, rather a German... but they couldn't exploit it as their navy was much much smaller. At Jutland they proved they could kick some serious ass.
On the naval warstage as a whole, the Britons were the victors, because they had a very large fleet, the ideal geographical position, two things the Germans didn't have. Perhaps that's what you mean, everything taken into consideration.
But Jutland? No, no British "victory" at all.
Bullethead
13 Aug 07, 19:14
A debacle, far to buggy? I do not think it was quite that bad! we had very few issues with the game when it came out. Was there some ? Yes but they where fixed quickly and they seemed to happen on a very few type machines.
As I recall things, the campaign was pretty buggy as released. In fact, it wasn't very playable at first, due to things like disappearing ships as KGB mentions. And he's right--it took about 2 months to get the campaign into good shape.
There have never been that many complaints about the tactical side of things, and most of those have involved AI behavior instead of nuts-and-bolts of ship movement, shooting and damage modeling, etc. However, due to there being no scenario editor, the campaign is about 80% of the game's value. There's very little chance to really enjoy the tactical side outside the campaign, and very little scope for multi-player. So in the absence of other things to do in the game, the initial problems in the campaign initially overshadowed the many things that worked fine.
Bullethead
13 Aug 07, 19:45
That's why I don't agree with you when you claim this a clear British victory. The battle itself was anything but a British victory, rather a German... but they couldn't exploit it as their navy was much much smaller. At Jutland they proved they could kick some serious ass.
I think all the Germans proved at Jutland was that their BCs were better (in some ways) than contemporary Brit BCs. But the Brits proved that this didn't matter. And not only in the long run stragetically, but also tactically that very day.
The Brits maintained the initiative all day, doing just what they set out to do while shrugging off their losses, and were ready to do it all over again the next day. Sure, they had their share of confusion and blunders, but that's to be expected in war. The point is, once the Brits realized the Germans were really out, they reacted with decisiveness. In general the Brits always acted according their accepted plan and arranged things as they wanted. The Germans OTOH never had a clue what was going on, were played like puppets all day, took serious and irreplaceable losses both to material and morale, and only escaped at all thanks to FOW, leaving the Brits in possession of the field.
So despite the bodycount, I'd say it was a Brit tactical victory. The Brits deserved a more favorable outcome than they got, but c'est la guerre.
As I recall things, the campaign was pretty buggy as released. In fact, it wasn't very playable at first, due to things like disappearing ships as KGB mentions. And he's right--it took about 2 months to get the campaign into good shape.
There have never been that many complaints about the tactical side of things, and most of those have involved AI behavior instead of nuts-and-bolts of ship movement, shooting and damage modeling, etc. However, due to there being no scenario editor, the campaign is about 80% of the game's value. There's very little chance to really enjoy the tactical side outside the campaign, and very little scope for multi-player. So in the absence of other things to do in the game, the initial problems in the campaign initially overshadowed the many things that worked fine.
Yes there where issues, and I did not mean that there where not any.
If I remember we had a issue with the ships going away :) when we needed them most. And a few others.
But it was not going on with all the systems.
I was stating that it was not a debacle as was stated.
asheshouse
14 Aug 07, 08:25
The battle itself was anything but a British victory, rather a German... but they couldn't exploit it as their navy was much much smaller. At Jutland they proved they could kick some serious ass.
The HSF were in no position to do anything after their attempt to "kick some serious ass" because they had busted their leg in the attempt. Their best opportunity to kick more ass came in the night action. German training and equipment for night actions was greatly superior to the GF's but instead of seeking to use this advantage they ran for home with their tail firmly between their legs. -- Not the action of a victor.
The HSF lost the use of 1/3rd of their capital ships in the action so the HSF was, for some time, crippled. -- Often happens when you bust your leg trying to kick a hard ass.
Of the two principal german commanders Scheer and Hipper, Scheer seems to have received much credit for successfully running away from the GF three times over the course of the battle and Hipper who was commanding the Scouting Group failed in his task of spotting the approach of the GF before it was too late to avoid contact, mainly due to Beatty's action in turning across the path of the GF to mask its approach, and in the latter stages of the battle Hipper played little part because he had lost his flag ship - very careless.
We have this issue with the German Fleet running back to base.
I read where there was a growing problem with the Officer Core in the German Navy, in fact if I read it right, there was a mutiny growing and that did happen when the fleet returned to port.
The Fleet rejected orders from command on attacks on a coastal area.
And a few other plans that where brought forward. If this was true and I have no reason to doubt it ,then I am sure that the over all mood had affected the battle fleet out at sea while the battle of Jutland was in full swing and the outcome.
IF there was a issue like this then I can only imagine what happed during this battle and the orders that where not followed or where tweaked to the liking of the officer or officers in charge.
One has to wonder how long this had been going on, as I do not think that a professional Navy would have done this at a moments notice.
So when one takes this into account then some of the actions that where taken by the German Royal fleet during the Battle of Jutland does not seem so strange. I also read that this is being investigated as a cause for the Fleet turning home.
I myself think that they where recalled for more than the reason given at that time.
If the Kaiser had been told this then he and his staff may have had reason to worry what the Navy would do while at sea.
The reason I bring this up is that I have not seen anything about this in a post, and I would like to get the feeling on what others here think about the mutiny ? And to see what others know about this and the outcome.
Hinchinbrooke
14 Aug 07, 11:55
If there hadn't been the confusion of the night action at the rear of the British line and the communications failure, allowing the HSF to escape to Horns Reef, the GF would have been in a position to kick some serious German arse on the morning of 1st June. As it was, the RN was left with possession of the battlefield. Hardly a winning position for Scheer. As for another Trafalgar, that might have been the dream of the popular press, but Jellicoe was much more of a realist and operated accordingly in order to keep the North Sea 'British'.
I read where there was a growing problem with the Officer Core in the German Navy, in fact if I read it right, there was a mutiny growing and that did happen when the fleet returned to port.
There were indeed some serious social issues affecting the German navy during WW1. The more time the HSF spent passively hiding in the port, the more its men began to despise their leaders and poor living conditions. Skagerrakschlacht (The battle of Jutland) was a huge disappointment and a serious blow to the morale of ordinary German sailors, who had already been losing their faith in the naval leadership. In 1918, the so-called November revolution in Germany, which quickly led to the collapse of the imperial regime first began in the naval bases of the HSF when its sailors refused to follow the orders of their hated superiors. Socialist revolutionaries also had plenty of support among sailors and the population of major coastal cities.
But I haven’t read anything about these problems having a serious impact on the HSF’s fighting ability at Jutland.
There were indeed some serious social issues affecting the German navy during WW1. The more time the HSF spent passively hiding in the port, the more its men began to despise their leaders and poor living conditions. Skagerrakschlacht (The battle of Jutland) was a huge disappointment and a serious blow to the morale of ordinary German sailors, who had already been losing their faith in the naval leadership. In 1918, the so-called November revolution in Germany, which quickly led to the collapse of the imperial regime first began in the naval bases of the HSF when its sailors refused to follow the orders of their hated superiors. Socialist revolutionaries also had plenty of support among sailors and the population of major coastal cities.
But I haven’t read anything about these problems having a serious impact on the HSF’s fighting ability at Jutland.
Yes I had heard very little on this in the past. But after thinking about what had happened I remembered a show that I had seen on the History channel on this very thing. It was there or the Military channel that I saw this! But they had stated and talked about this very thing, about the battle of Jutland and the effects of the break down of the HSF and what was happening to morale among the sailor's of the fleet.
After seeing this I looked every where I could to find out about what I had seen. So far there is only a very few places that you can find anything on this.
But as one site said,( what was said on the show was this was a cause of the HSF doing what it did during the battle. )
I myself can't say as I do not know, but I wanted to bring up what I had heard to get what Idea's others had about Jutland. And the morale of the German Navy Before during and after the Battle of Jutland.
Hinchinbrooke
14 Aug 07, 20:20
As far as I've read, up to and including Jutland, the morale of the German navy was very high. It was a well trained, very efficient force with state of the art equipment. Sailing north to meet the GF on 31st May, 1916, all thoughts were on "Der Tag".................. and victory. After the battle, as priorities changed and the battlefleet skulked in Wilhelmshaven, attitudes changed. By 1918, the situation made a mockery of all the high hopes of 1914.
Bullethead
14 Aug 07, 21:37
As far as I've read, up to and including Jutland, the morale of the German navy was very high. It was a well trained, very efficient force with state of the art equipment. Sailing north to meet the GF on 31st May, 1916, all thoughts were on "Der Tag".................. and victory.
Yeah, morale of the German ratings was very high. They had a real "death or glory" mentality, it seems. For instance, when word was passed through Seydlitz (which had already been shot up and torpedoed) that they were going on the "Death Ride", the crew broke out in cheering.
But as I can vouch for from personal experience, a "death or glory" attitude is a real bummer when "Der Tag" comes and you achieve neither result. Instead, life just goes on in the same old routine, with the situation the same as before. This can be very depressing.
I can see this happening to the German crews. They'd been at Jutland, they knew how lucky they were to still be alive, and also that the big, mean GF was still out there, so they knew they were more likely to get death than glory if they tried again. But then they heard that their Big Boss wasn't much interested in trying again, so they had nothing to look forward to except more of the same dull routine. As in the same monastic confinement within sight of the brothels ashore, the same lousy food, and the same damn paint to chip every friggin' day for another couple years. Meanwhile, the family's starving back home. And the more they thought about this, the more bitter, disillusioned, and pissed off they became.
After the battle, as priorities changed and the battlefleet skulked in Wilhelmshaven, attitudes changed. By 1918, the situation made a mockery of all the high hopes of 1914.
That's the general perception, but it's not entirely accurate. Scheer tried again on 18/19 Aug 16, and was going to go out once more later (October IIRC) but was told to stop by the Kaiser. So the HSF was still looking for a fight for much of the rest of 1916, and had modified its plans try to avoid the suprise it got at Jutland. Also, the HSF came out in the spring of 1918 and went further than it ever had before, up to the latitude of Bergen. So morale was still good enough to take that sort of risk even then. The fleet didn't mutiny until the end of 1918.
The folks on the homefront weren't so disciplined, however. IIRC, the winter of 1916-17 was called the "Potato Winter" with riots over food shortages amonst the civilians.
asheshouse
15 Aug 07, 15:49
If there was a morale issue in the High Seas Fleet at the battle of Jutland then I think it was only present in the higher command who were, perhaps understandably, intimidated by the strength of the Grand Fleet. The individual sailor shut up in his battle station would have little idea of what was going on except when information was relayed down. They would just be responding to orders, and would know that their best chance of winning and surviving was to keep doing their job and to rely on their ship mates to do theirs. When the fleet mutinied in 1918 it was because they knew that armistice negotiations had already started and thought further action was a pointless sacrifice.
The sortie towards Bergen in 1918 was intended to attack british convoys from scandanavia and was nearly successful, except, due to faulty intelligence they got the day wrong. It was only abandoned because of mechanical failure on Moltke which reduced its speed to a crawl. On the return it was torpedoed by a submarine but still survived. Prior to the fleet sortie, the HSF had launched attacks twice with light vessels in the same area with complete success. In the first action on 17 Oct 1917 two german light cruisers destroyed a convoy of 12 vessels escorted by two destroyers and two armed trawlers. Only three vessels escaped. In the second action, on 12 Dec 1917, four german destroyers sank a convoy of five vessels escorted by two destroyers. It was in response to these attacks that the admiralty began escorting the convoys with dreadnoughts which prompted Scheer to try an attack with the battlefleet.
Hinchinbrooke
15 Aug 07, 20:36
That's the general perception, but it's not entirely accurate. Scheer tried again on 18/19 Aug 16, and was going to go out once more later (October IIRC) but was told to stop by the Kaiser. So the HSF was still looking for a fight for much of the rest of 1916, and had modified its plans try to avoid the suprise it got at Jutland. Also, the HSF came out in the spring of 1918 and went further than it ever had before, up to the latitude of Bergen. So morale was still good enough to take that sort of risk even then. The fleet didn't mutiny until the end of 1918.
The folks on the homefront weren't so disciplined, however. IIRC, the winter of 1916-17 was called the "Potato Winter" with riots over food shortages amonst the civilians.
True enough, but I think that after June, 1916, perceptions and attitudes changed. Jutland shattered illusions, and with the the re-emphasis on U-Boat warfare, the surface fleet began to accept that it was something of an Imperial bijou (as others had claimed in the years prior to WWI). Willing to go to sea, yes, but feeling second rate all the same.
Bullethead
15 Aug 07, 23:44
True enough, but I think that after June, 1916, perceptions and attitudes changed. Jutland shattered illusions, and with the the re-emphasis on U-Boat warfare, the surface fleet began to accept that it was something of an Imperial bijou (as others had claimed in the years prior to WWI). Willing to go to sea, yes, but feeling second rate all the same.
Scheer's role in all this is rather curious, don't you think? It seems to me never really had any faith in the ability of the HSF to accomplish anything meaningful, instead insisting on unrestricted sub warfare. But when he assumed command of the HSF, subs were on a leash and the HSF was expected to win the war. So he saluted and marched, and really did put a lot of thought and effort into trying to do as good a job with the HSF as possible. But I get the definite impression that he secretly hoped to get his ass kicked, so he could come back to Kaiser Bill and say, "See? I told you that wouldn't work. NOW will you give the subs their freedom?" And the sooner that happened, the better.
You could, in this sense, score Jutland as a personal victory for Scheer's agenda. He put up a good fight, did a lot of headlines-grabbing damage, didn't lose too much of his own stuff, lived prove his point, and eventually won the argument. That's probably the best possible outcome he could have gotten :).
Hinchinbrooke
16 Aug 07, 16:42
Hmm, I hadn't thought of Scheer's performance in that light. Of course, if the High Seas Fleet had never been created, chances are there never would have been a substantial submarine force ................ and few admirals (or generals, as of old) needed to command any force that did exist, so Scheer would likely have been out of a job.
There's a certain ambivalence towards Scheer I think. Granted, he was superior to Admirals von Ingenohl and von Pohl, and successfully brought the HSF back home after Jutland, but some of his decisions (notably the "battle about-turns"), have attracted a lot of comment.
Bullethead
17 Aug 07, 00:55
Hmm, I hadn't thought of Scheer's performance in that light. Of course, if the High Seas Fleet had never been created, chances are there never would have been a substantial submarine force ................ and few admirals (or generals, as of old) needed to command any force that did exist, so Scheer would likely have been out of a job.
Well, if there had been no HSF, I'd be out of a job now :).
Imagine how different the world would have been, though. The Brits might not have sided against Germany, in which case Germany almost certainly would have won, with all the alternative histories thereunto pertaining.
There's a certain ambivalence towards Scheer I think. Granted, he was superior to Admirals von Ingenohl and von Pohl, and successfully brought the HSF back home after Jutland, but some of his decisions (notably the "battle about-turns"), have attracted a lot of comment.
On 4 July 1916, Scheer wrote the following to Kaiser Bill RE: Jutland. After pointing out the positives of the battle, he said:
With a favorable succession of operations the enemy may be made to suffer severely, although there can be no doubt that even the most successful result from a high seas battle will not compel England to make peace. The disadvantages of our geographical situation as compared with that of the Island Empire and the enemy's vast material superiority cannot be coped with to such a degree as to make us masters of the blockade inflicted on us, or even of the Island Empire itself, not even were all the U-boats to be available for military [as in fleet support] purposes. A victorious end to the war at not too distant a date can only be looked for by the crushing of English economic life through U-boat action against English commerce.
So, even while resting on whatever laurels the HSF won in German popular press at Jutland, Scheer was still against trying again, and still pressing for unrestricted sub warfare. Nevertheless, orders were orders, so out he went again in August, and would have done so again later. I can imagine, however, that if rumors of the above memo had reached the lower decks of the HSF, morale would have taken a big hit, even if the matelots were thinking the same things themselves already.
Well, if there had been no HSF, I'd be out of a job now :).
Imagine how different the world would have been, though. The Brits might not have sided against Germany, in which case Germany almost certainly would have won, with all the alternative histories thereunto pertaining.
On 4 July 1916, Scheer wrote the following to Kaiser Bill RE: Jutland. After pointing out the positives of the battle, he said:
With a favorable succession of operations the enemy may be made to suffer severely, although there can be no doubt that even the most successful result from a high seas battle will not compel England to make peace. The disadvantages of our geographical situation as compared with that of the Island Empire and the enemy's vast material superiority cannot be coped with to such a degree as to make us masters of the blockade inflicted on us, or even of the Island Empire itself, not even were all the U-boats to be available for military [as in fleet support] purposes. A victorious end to the war at not too distant a date can only be looked for by the crushing of English economic life through U-boat action against English commerce.So, even while resting on whatever laurels the HSF won in German popular press at Jutland, Scheer was still against trying again, and still pressing for unrestricted sub warfare. Nevertheless, orders were orders, so out he went again in August, and would have done so again later. I can imagine, however, that if rumors of the above memo had reached the lower decks of the HSF, morale would have taken a big hit, even if the matelots were thinking the same things themselves already.
I just read where the German fleet sank 14 of the British ships at a loss of 10 for the German Navy.
And that the reason they even went out was because of the pressure of the blockaid on Germany. That they where starting to starve, also I read about the german Sub that was made a cargo sub that went to the U.S and loaded with cargo of rubber and things. Not much ,but it brought the morale up for Germany.
But what I did read was that over all the battle went to Germany, as in numbers and a tactical win. I can see where it did have a short lived victory from this.
The U.S started to take the side of Britain because of the sinking of the luxury liner or the Coast of Ireland , if the germans had not done this then most likely the U.S would not have come in on the side of the U.K , or Germany. They would have just set out the war.
But over all the war came down to Wall St. and the banking. Stocks would go up for the side that was seen to win each battle. This part I did not know and this is the first time that I have run into this side of the war. But it does not surprise me that this happened.
Also that the U.K was loaning money to Russia to support the war on that front. But the biggest surprise I had was the German government asking Mexico to attack the U.S and they would get the south part of the U.S in doing so! Now that is a first that I did not know about.
asheshouse
17 Aug 07, 06:19
There's a certain ambivalence towards Scheer I think. Granted, he was superior to Admirals von Ingenohl and von Pohl, and successfully brought the HSF back home after Jutland, but some of his decisions (notably the "battle about-turns"), have attracted a lot of comment.
The battle about turn was a well practised fleet manoeuvre in the HSF and provided a great deal of tactical flexibility if executed successfully. Scheers first about turn was in response to suddenly being confronted with the entire GF deployed in line of battle and only 8 nautical miles to his north. The turn away was superbly executed under heavy fire and contact was successfully broken. What to do then? I am not sure that even Scheers own memoirs can be taken as providing a definitive answer since they were subject to hindsight.
Here are Scheers words (after the event) -- "It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us our action in retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving it to him to decide when he would elect to meet us the next morning. There was but one way of averting this—to force the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo-boats to attack. The success of the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my resolve to make an effort to render assistance to her and at least save the crew." -- All very heroic stuff. Nice touch about "forcing the enemy into a second battle" Perhaps he should have sent Jellicoe an invitation by wireless. I'm sure he would have been too polite to refuse.
25 minutes elapsed between the first turn away and the next battle turn which took them back towards the GF. This turned the fleet back towards the east but he chose to turn to starboard (north) which could only have been intended to close the range when contact was re-established.
I believe that Scheer thought that Jellicoe would have turned in pursuit, possibly in column of divisions or in battle line. If Jellico had done that then Scheers second turn would have brought him out of the smoke and across the head of Jellico's column at huge advantage to the HSF. Jellico would have had to reform back into line under fire and probably at risk of torpedo attack. Having created maximum havoc Scheer may then have turned away again but perhaps leaving a number of GF ships crippled as night fell. Because Jellico did not pursue but instead held on to the east before turning south the situation was reversed. Scheer had his line crossed and had to turn away again, this time in more chaos than on the first occasion. I look on Scheers 2nd turn back towards the GF has a calculated gamble, which might well have come off had he been facing Beatty and not Jellico. Jellico on the otherhand has been severly criticised for not turning in pursuit, but look at the chart plots and work it out for yourself. Although Scheer might have been gambling he still left himself a way out and that is when the third battle turn comes in, part of a tactical strategy comprising calculated risk and contingency plans.
Hinchinbrooke
17 Aug 07, 13:58
The battle about turn was a well practised fleet manoeuvre in the HSF and provided a great deal of tactical flexibility if executed successfully. Scheers first about turn was in response to suddenly being confronted with the entire GF deployed in line of battle and only 8 nautical miles to his north. The turn away was superbly executed under heavy fire and contact was successfully broken. What to do then? I am not sure that even Scheers own memoirs can be taken as providing a definitive answer since they were subject to hindsight.
Here are Scheers words (after the event) -- "It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy followed us our action in retaining the direction taken after turning the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the event of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, leaving it to him to decide when he would elect to meet us the next morning. There was but one way of averting this—to force the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo-boats to attack. The success of the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility of movement. The manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my resolve to make an effort to render assistance to her and at least save the crew." -- All very heroic stuff. Nice touch about "forcing the enemy into a second battle" Perhaps he should have sent Jellicoe an invitation by wireless. I'm sure he would have been too polite to refuse.
25 minutes elapsed between the first turn away and the next battle turn which took them back towards the GF. This turned the fleet back towards the east but he chose to turn to starboard (north) which could only have been intended to close the range when contact was re-established.
I believe that Scheer thought that Jellicoe would have turned in pursuit, possibly in column of divisions or in battle line. If Jellico had done that then Scheers second turn would have brought him out of the smoke and across the head of Jellico's column at huge advantage to the HSF. Jellico would have had to reform back into line under fire and probably at risk of torpedo attack. Having created maximum havoc Scheer may then have turned away again but perhaps leaving a number of GF ships crippled as night fell. Because Jellico did not pursue but instead held on to the east before turning south the situation was reversed. Scheer had his line crossed and had to turn away again, this time in more chaos than on the first occasion. I look on Scheers 2nd turn back towards the GF has a calculated gamble, which might well have come off had he been facing Beatty and not Jellico. Jellico on the otherhand has been severly criticised for not turning in pursuit, but look at the chart plots and work it out for yourself. Although Scheer might have been gambling he still left himself a way out and that is when the third battle turn comes in, part of a tactical strategy comprising calculated risk and contingency plans.
You're right, the Germans were very efficient and effective in their manoeuvering, although some authors are dismissive of Scheer; that the battle turns were a confused response to an admittedly confusing situation. I haven't read Scheer's memoirs, but aren't they somewhat suspect when it comes to the reasoning behind his actions during the battle?
As for Jellicoe and Beatty..................... well, I'm glad Jellicoe was in overall command that day.
Bullethead
17 Aug 07, 22:46
I read somewhere (damn, I wish I could remember the source) that sometime around the end of 1916, some young staff officers got Scheer drunk one night just to ask him why, after successfully extricating himself from the jaws of the GF the 1st time, he stuck his head right back into the noose. According to this story, Scheer said the following:
"What did the Virgin say when she had the baby? 'I don't know, it just happened.'"
Having done a lot of things I regret, and having gotten drunk many times and said things I regret even more, I tend to put some faith in this story :nuts:
I read somewhere (damn, I wish I could remember the source) that sometime around the end of 1916, some young staff officers got Scheer drunk one night just to ask him why, after successfully extricating himself from the jaws of the GF the 1st time, he stuck his head right back into the noose. According to this story, Scheer said the following:
"What did the Virgin say when she had the baby? 'I don't know, it just happened.'"
Having done a lot of things I regret, and having gotten drunk many times and said things I regret even more, I tend to put some faith in this story :nuts:
There is a lot of truth in what was said here.
Hinchinbrooke
18 Aug 07, 19:18
I read somewhere (damn, I wish I could remember the source) that sometime around the end of 1916, some young staff officers got Scheer drunk one night just to ask him why, after successfully extricating himself from the jaws of the GF the 1st time, he stuck his head right back into the noose. According to this story, Scheer said the following:
"What did the Virgin say when she had the baby? 'I don't know, it just happened.'"
Having done a lot of things I regret, and having gotten drunk many times and said things I regret even more, I tend to put some faith in this story :nuts:
:D Hmm!, a drunken Scheer. I'm not sure I would have wanted the pleasure........... or maybe his photos don't do him justice as a potential drinking companion!!
asheshouse
19 Aug 07, 07:57
Not sure that I give much credence to the drunken Scheer story, even if the source can be found. In 1916 Scheer presumably did not have any insights into the details of the GF's actions on the day, other than what appeared in the press. Perhaps he thought that despite his cunning plan he had been outsmarted on the day by Jellicoe, but he's hardly going to admit that to a group of junior staff officers when there was every chance they would face action together again. No -- I cant believe that Scheer didnt have some sort of plan when he decided to turn back east. During the brief run west he was able to tighten up his battleline, which had been a bit strung out when they first made contact. So as they turned east again he was better ready to face action than before provided the tactical situation allowed it. Perhaps he hoped to surprise the GF as it turned in pursuit. Perhaps he was still uncertain whether it was indeed the entire GF he was facing. After all the situation was confused due to failing visibility. Perhaps the turn east was just an exploratory probe to try to clarify the situation before night fell. But he had to do something because to continue running to the west was a recipe for disaster, if not then, then the following day.
Bullethead
19 Aug 07, 15:47
Not sure that I give much credence to the drunken Scheer story, even if the source can be found.
I seem to recall coming across it several times. IIRC, the story originally came from the memoirs of one of the junior officers supposedly involved, and has never been taken that seriously by many historians. Some mention it FWIW but that's it.
OTOH, IMHO it's the best reason available for Scheer's behavior ;).
Perhaps he thought that despite his cunning plan he had been outsmarted on the day by Jellicoe, but he's hardly going to admit that to a group of junior staff officers when there was every chance they would face action together again.
Obviously so. Hence the need to loosen his tongue and cloud his judgment with booze. The story wouldn't be the least bit believable without the booze. In vin est verite', as they say :).
No -- I cant believe that Scheer didnt have some sort of plan when he decided to turn back east.
The reason people debate to this day what Scheer had in mind then is because he was singularly unable to provide a decent explanation. And this wasn't for lack of opportunity. He published AARs, he published analyses, he corresponded with those at the highest levels, and he wrote his memoirs. In each case, he changed his story, because the previous story wasn't satisfatory and he knew that if he was to keep his job and/or be remembered as a great leader, he had to have a good reason for this episode.
This is unlike, for example, Jellicoe's actions. While we might argue that we'd have done things differently, we know very well (in most cases) why Jellicoe did what he did. He gave a reason that was perfectly believable because it was what he'd always said he would do, and usually made sense, and he stuck to his story to the end of his days.
Anyway, at various times after Jutland, Scheer claimed several different justifications for this seemingly stupid action. Such as:
helping Wiesbaden
trying to fight again, but in better order this time
attempting to pass behind the Brits to the north
An important basis for any understanding of Scheer's various excuses is that IIRC, nowhere does he claim ignorance that the entire GF was in front of him. And indeed, he couldn't make that claim. While he was surprised to run into the GF at all, the number of heavy ships firing at him the 1st time, whose flashes were visible on his flagbridge "along the whole horizon", could only have been the vast majority of the GF's BBs. There wasn't any other possible source. I don't think Scheer knew the course or speed of the GF line, and only had a general idea of its range, but there was no doubt what was shooting at him and its general arrangement relative to the HSF. So OTOH, if he tried to claim ingnorance of this, he'd have been way open to criticism for failing to have a firm grasp of the obvious :).
Now, on to his various motives. The 1st is just plain silly--why put the whole HSF at risk of the whole GF for 1 crippled CL? Besides, he'd actually sent some DDs to do the job. The 2nd is even more silly. Why run back into the whole GF again, with their relative T-crossing positions essentially unchanged? Especially because he (and his predecessors) had been trying hard to avoid meeting the whole GF since August 1914.
The 3rd explanation is the best because it basically claims that the move was an honest mistake--he had a good tactical idea but it didn't work. There are several problems, however. First, this isn't the 1st excuse he thought of, which makes it unlikely that this was in his mind at the time. Second, it smacks of him having seen Brit charts after the war and knowing the head of the GF line was turning south off to his east. He doesn't seem to have known which way the GF's line was really going at the time, so couldn't have known that he might have been able to loop around behind it to the north. And third, he would have known at the time that the maneuvers he actually executed would not have succeeded in this objective, assuming this was really his plan. From his previous trip into the jaws of death, he knew the general situation, and thus knew that he had not gone long enough on his SW course after his 1st escape, and/or had not changed course enough to the north after heading back in, to have got around the end of the GF's line.
The subject of Scheer's motives for the 2nd trip into the GF's massed guns was a topic of much contemporary debate within the HSF for the rest of the war. Nobody thought it had been the right thing to do, nobody liked any of the explanations Scheer had offered so far, and nobody could think of a good reason themselves.
That's the context of the story of getting Scheer drunk. In an effort to get the real explanation to a question that had been tormenting them for months, some enterprising young officers supposedly took the opportunity of asking the man himself, once they got him comfortable, relaxed, and well-oiled.
I find this story believable for many reasons. First, like these young officers, I wonder why the Hell it happened. Second, I know of many instances where young officers and enlisted men have liquored up their superiors in an effort to get inside their heads. I've been on both ends of that bottle myself :). And finally, Scheer's answer--that he had no good reason and just screwed up--is the only one that fits the bulk of the facts, including the one that he never mentioned this reason himself :).
So is the story true? Maybe not. Could it have happened? Definitely. But even if this drinking party didn't happen, I still think the story conveys the best explanation of Scheer's 2nd trip to the kill zone, and the one most in the HSF came to believe.
Could it have happened? you bet!
In what I have seen in my life and being in situations like this. Not the same but like. I am here to tell you that it does happen more time than you would want to think.
That is one of the things that bring on the fog of war. And the things that will cause you to win a battle. Or lose.
But yes it happens and more times than not!
Hinchinbrooke
19 Aug 07, 22:03
Interesting that Scheer refused ennoblement after Jutland, while Hipper became von Hipper. Feeling a little guilty perhaps for his performance and the outcome? Or was he less entranced by the caste system of the time?
Bullethead
20 Aug 07, 14:12
Interesting that Scheer refused ennoblement after Jutland, while Hipper became von Hipper. Feeling a little guilty perhaps for his performance and the outcome? Or was he less entranced by the caste system of the time?
I dunno. Maybe this goes back to his personal agenda. Although the German press played up Jutland as a victory for propoganda purposes, behind the scenes in correspondence with the Supreme Warlord and his cronies, Scheer was pouring all the cold water he could on it and still pressing for unrestricted sub warfare. Thus, he probably thought it would be hypocritical to take a peerage from the battle, or maybe would weaken his argument.
asheshouse
21 Aug 07, 05:37
I think we can agree that whatever Scheers intentions were, the end result of his 2nd turn back into the teeth of the Grand Fleet at 7.55pm were not good for the health of the HSF.
So what should he have done? --- Try to avoid hindsight.
Scheers last contact with the GF was at 7.35 when it was sighted, deployed in line about 7 miles to the northeast of Konig at the head of the German battleline, and heading in a southeast direction. In the 20 minutes which had elapsed the GF would have advanced 7 miles, but in which direction?
Scheers only goal must now have been to escape from the trap, and that meant finding a safe route to port. Where was the GF?
From the last sighting it is only reasonable to assume that Jellicoe would do one of two things. Either turn in direct pursuit, or hold his general position to impose the GF between the HSF and its lines of escape. There was only a little over an hour of light left and in any event the visibility was poor. Scheer may have expected the GF light forces to seek to maintain visual contact with him, regardless of the movements of the GF's main battleline. The inability of the GF's light forces to maintain and hold contact and to feed contact reports back to Jellicoe was probably the greatest failing on the British side on the day, and this failing was to continue into the night action.
Scheers choices were to head for Skagerrak to the north for a return east of Denmark, head southwest to the Ems Channel or head southeast to the Horns Reef. Only the Horns Reef offered the opportunity of escape during the hours of darkness. The other routes would have left the HSF open to renewed contact with the GF the following day.
Scheer seems to have decided to run in the Horns Reef direction from 7.35 onwards when the 2nd turn occurred. He had no clear knowledge of the location of the GF and then seems to just blunder into it, but the result of this near disastrous meeting is that he again opens up some space between the fleets in the critical hours before twilight. In a sense - and I'm afraid this is hindsight - he momentarily regains a degree of initiative. The GF reacts to his reappearance and quickly punishes the move, but at the same time the GF is prevented from starting to move west in pursuit, as it would have done if Scheer had not reappeared, and insteads holds on to the south for longer, giving Scheer valuable space in which to manoeuvre during twilight. Had he not created this space then he may well have found the HSF 20 miles further west in the morning and still vulnerable to further action.
All of his actions then until nightfall are a continuous series of probes east, each time parried by the GF which is content to play a blocking game. As night falls Scheers strategy continues as before but now with the benefit of darkness he breaks through.
If, instead of stubbornly heading for the Horns Reef, he headed northeast towards the Skagerrak then it is unlikely that this move would have been undetected and he would not have been sufficiently clear of the GF in the morning to avoid action.
Similar events would have been likely if he had headed for the Ems Channel. The distance to be covered during night was too great and again he would have been chased down in the morning.
So whilst Scheer appears to blunder around, the consistent aim seems to be to break through to the east and head for the Horns Reef. Which he tries repeatedly. A further contact as the HSF heads southeast around 9.30 reinforces this. So he seems to me to have taken about the only action which could be and was successful in extricating the fleet. Whilst we might argue about some of the details his overall strategy of escape seems to have been sound.
Interesting that Scheer refused ennoblement after Jutland, while Hipper became von Hipper. Feeling a little guilty perhaps for his performance and the outcome? Or was he less entranced by the caste system of the time?
Ludendorff also refused to let the Kaiser add "von" before his name. Many authors tend to forget about that.
Bullethead
22 Aug 07, 15:30
I think we can agree that whatever Scheers intentions were, the end result of his 2nd turn back into the teeth of the Grand Fleet at 7.55pm were not good for the health of the HSF.
So what should he have done? --- Try to avoid hindsight.
Is it hindsight to note that Scheer was never able to provide a reasonable explanation of what he was trying to do, despite having many opportunities?
The whole incident reminds me of very stupid things I've seen happen with my own eyes. I've seen a guy break his 2nd hand, and another guy lose a 2nd finger, from demonstrating the mishaps that did for their 1st ones, ISYN. I think Scheer did something analogous ;).
Scheer seems to have decided to run in the Horns Reef direction from 7.35 onwards when the 2nd turn occurred. He had no clear knowledge of the location of the GF and then seems to just blunder into it...
Scheer could not have been heading for Horns Reef when he walked into the GF the 2nd time. He was still going NE when he did this, but Horns Reef is SE of there. If he'd immediately headed for Horns Reef after the 1st brush with death, he'd have been heading SE and the fleets would have engaged on more or less parallel courses, instead of Scheer getting his T crossed again.
I do not believe Scheer decided where to run to until after he'd escaped the 2nd time. While reorganizing after this encounter, he set is night formation, told the DDs to rally at Horns Reef in the morning, and ordered zep recon there, too.
.... but the result of this near disastrous meeting is that he again opens up some space between the fleets in the critical hours before twilight.
The distance really didn't change much. The opposing BBs remained more or less the same distance apart from the moment they spotted each other until it got full dark. The Germans just barely got into visible range both times they got shot at, and didn't go far beyond that distance either time they pulled back.
The only thing that really changed was the bearing. Scheer was essentially south of the Brits when they 1st met. IOW, he was closer to his escape routes than the Brits were, with nothing in his way. But by floundering around like he did, Scheer managed to throw this away and ended up with Jellicoe between him and his base. Thus, he created his own crisis situation here.
Remember, Scheer knew he was facing the whole GF at the 1st meeting. According to all German naval strategy since the beginning of the war, this was a Bad Thing (at least until kleinkrieg had succeeded, which it hadn't yet). Therefore, the only reasonable course of action after the 1st clash would have been for Scheer to run away immediately. And he had a clear escape route at that time.
So why, after the 1st escape, didn't he just scream off back the way he'd come? Or even head SW towards the Ems Channel? Nobody would have faulted him--this, after all, had always been the German plan. But no, he just turned right around and marched back into the meat grinder, in the process closing his own escape route.
This is why nobody's ever been satisfied with the various excuses Scheer offered. None of them provide a valid reason that would make doing what Scheer did a better option than just beating feet after the 1st encounter. But rather than just come out and call Scheer an idiot, historians have worked from the assumption that he HAD to have had something up his sleeve, which for some reason he chose not to share with the world after the fact. So the historians have spent a lot of time, as we're doing now, debating WTF Scheer was thinking, trying to make sense out of it.
I submit that this is a pointless task. I don't think the 2nd run into the GF had anything sensible about it--it was just a major blunder, pure and simple. At the moment of supreme crisis, Scheer's command ability was found wanting. IMHO, Scheer's actions should rank up there with the Charge of the Light Brigade. But pro-German historians don't want to ding their own guy, and pro-Brit historians don't want to diminish his stature because that diminishes the accomplishment of beating him, or makes losing to him look worse. So the mystery remains, artificial though it may be :).
So I'm back to the junior officers getting Scheer drunk. Even if the story itself is false, the message is true--it was a screw-up, not some attempted grand tactical stroke.
asheshouse
22 Aug 07, 15:55
Scheer's actions should rank up there with the Charge of the Light Brigade.
Now. -- I hope you don't want to start a discussion about the merits of the Charge of the Light Brigade? -- I may have to pause to think for a bit.
Hinchinbrooke
22 Aug 07, 19:37
Ah, the Light Brigade. Had my great-great-grandfather been in a light cavalry regiment, he might well have been involved. Fortunately, he was in the heavy cavalry.
Anyway, as to Scheer, while he might have been lacking, that goes also for a number of British admirals. Frankly there was a dearth of leadership all round. The night action is a tale of woe when it comes to initiative (or the lack thereof). A number of near certain sightings of escaping German dreadnoughts, and nary an effort to prevent them......... and a failure to communicate with the C-in-C.
Bullethead
22 Aug 07, 19:58
Now. -- I hope you don't want to start a discussion about the merits of the Charge of the Light Brigade? -- I may have to pause to think for a bit.
Not at all. I was just saying that Scheer's handling of Jutland, from 1st to pretty much last, should be ranked in that tragi-comic list of Great Military Blunders and Pointless Sacrifices that all grogs keep handy. The things that make you say, "WTF were they thinking?!?!?!?" The Light
Brigade is just one. Some others just off the top of my head include:
The Ottomans picking a fight with Tamerlane
Everything the French did at Agincourt
Burnside's Bridge
Elfingstone's handling of the Brit army in the 1st Afghan War
The Prussian Guard's attack on Gravelotte
The Russian fleet returning to PA after Yellow Sea
Scheer committed a bunch of major mistakes at Jutland, each one of which should have destroyed his fleet. But he usually gets pretty light treatment from historians for this, compared to the scorn heaped on a number of Brits. True, some Brits deserve drubbing for letting Scheer get away, but they didn't put Scheer in the bad position to begin with. He did that himself. Here are a couple of these major blunders (besides the 2nd go at the GF), about which there is little or no argument (others are more equivocable):
Taking II Squadron Along:
These ships could contribute nothing of value to a fleet action and slowed the HSF down, endangering the dreadnoughts. Their only role in a fleet action, per Scheer's own standing orders, was a suicide mission to buy time for the dreadnoughts to escape. In the meantime, they were a millstone on the faster ships, making it more likely that the sacrifice of all those thousands of trained sailors would be required.
Chasing Beatty So Far and to the North:
If Beatty'd been out by himself, he wouldn't have run north after meeting Scheer. He'd have run WNW towards home and the eventual arrival of the GF. By going north, Beatty should have tipped Scheer off that Jellicoe was just over the horizon. But Scheer never snapped to that--he was totally fixated on beating up 5BS as they slowly pulled away from him.
Hinchinbrooke
22 Aug 07, 22:24
Yes, the inclusion of the pre-dreadnought squadron was/is a bizarre one. Other than trying to make up numbers with a suicide force, what was Scheer thinking (I've read it was a nostalgic decision, having been commander of the pre-dreadnoughts.......... but when does nostalgia form part of the battle equation?)? Especially as they were so slow (comparatively). Such was the strength of the Royal Navy that the initial big-gun ship, HMS Dreadnought, wasn't even part of the Grand Fleet in 1916. And of course, HMS Emperor of India, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMAS Australia were in dock, so missed the battle.
Bullethead
22 Aug 07, 23:07
Yes, the inclusion of the pre-dreadnought squadron was/is a bizarre one. Other than trying to make up numbers with a suicide force, what was Scheer thinking (I've read it was a nostalgic decision, having been commander of the pre-dreadnoughts.......... but when does nostalgia form part of the battle equation?)?
To be fair, nostalgia has always been a common failing of military leadership. In WW1, why else keep all those cav divisions behind the lines eating oats better spent hauling arty? You can go either way from WW1 in time and find plenty of examples, every time technology changed. To keep things naval, what about the reluctance to give up sailing rigs even after compound engines rendered them superfluous? What about BBs still being considered the basis of fleets even somewhat into WW2?
Since this is getting FAR from the topic of screenshots, how 'bout we move this discussion of admirals to a new thread?
HMSWarspite
27 Aug 07, 07:07
Not having had military combat experience, please take this in the way it it intended (historical discussion/speculation, not really an understanding of combat stresses etc. :shy:).
I have observed some of how people react in stress situations. I have been stressed in RL, at work, and to a lesser extent in wargaming (but see above!). I suspect Scheer was probably suffering from stress and information/emotional overload - not from the direct reports of light forces, but if anything, from lack of it, combined with suddenly having his world view abruptly changed. As was said earlier, he thought he had achieved nirvana - he managed to get the HSF to catch a part of the GF (Beatty, and 5BS), and this is exactly what he had been trying to do for ages. He fixated on the 5BS (the BCs were hauling away and his BCs were not going to be able to stop them), and he could cripple 4 of the QEs - what a prize. Then, as he can almost taste success (Warspite looking bad, if not sunk already, the other 3 being engaged) the horizon suddenly is filled with heavy gun flashes. He has had his world view completely reversed, and he is now in his worst nightmare - the whole GF is right in front, and he has had his T crossed just for good measure! The sensible (unemotional) response is a battle turn away, and leg it for home (as someone said above). No ifs, buts or maybes. Get out! Instead, he turns away, and breaks visibilty towards the west. In the next few mins up to the turn back, I suspect his brain 'freezes', and he is unable to take on board the change from 'huge success' in the offing to 'huge disaster'. It is almost as if (on some primitive level) he cant believe what just happened. Thus he reverses course, probably with no coherent conscious thought pattern to support it, but on the unconscious level, he disregards what just happens, and is trying to restore nirvana. Hence the 2nd T cross.
This would explain his inabilty to come up with even a half plausible story after the event. I have seen similar things happen at work, with several million $ of expensive test equipment, on a test that is going well. Suddenly something unexpected (and dangerous) happens. The response I see most often is a sort of disbelief, and unspoken 'that can't have happened', and a desire to repeat the manoeuvre. I have seen the same crew get into the same situation twice in 10 minutes becasue they don't abandon their current mindset, and really take on board the new data (yes, that device did just overspeed in a dangerous way, and congratulations, you made it do it again!)
Just my amateur 2p worth.:)
Bullethead
28 Aug 07, 10:12
Just my amateur 2p worth.:)
I think you nailed it.
asheshouse
28 Aug 07, 14:20
Just my amateur 2p worth.:)
Yes, I think there is a lot in what you say here.
Scheer had a few minutes to make up his mind and the psychological pressure must have been enormous.
Personal fear of imminent death.
Professional fear of failure and loss of command.
Moral failure of letting down his comrades in arms.
Fear of making an over cautious reaction and letting an opportunity slip by.
As Warspite put it -- Everything he had planned for for so long about to be realised, and then in an instant the illusion is shattered. If he was experiencing psychological trauma at that point then it would hardly be surprising.
Quite true. And this is one of the things that's always puzzled me, as a non-Brit, about the subsequent Jellicoe-Beatty fued.
Good one BH. Always was a Jellicoe fan myself.
BTW... hey. :)
JD
Bullethead
04 Sep 07, 18:15
BTW... hey. :)
KILLBOY POWERHEAD!!!! Damn, it's good to see your type! Hope you and yours are doing well.
Folks, let me introduce JD, a man of strong and usually correct opinions on many things military and civilian, whom I have had the pleasure of knowing for more years than I care to count, even if I've lost touch with him now and again. I'm sure you'll find him an asset in this forum. Just don't get him started on Hood vs. Bismarck :D
JD, I look forward to renewing our acquaitance and also to your criticisms of Jutland, which I'm sure will be well-founded and well-argued.
KILLBOY POWERHEAD!!!! Damn, it's good to see your type! Hope you and yours are doing well.
Wow, I've been using that as a User ID for so long... I had almost forgotten what it stood for. Shows just how long it's been eh?
Anyway, I'm well my friend. I hope you are the same.
Folks, let me introduce JD, a man of strong and usually correct opinions on many things
Heh. Yeah... not so much any more. I've drunk much wine since then.
BTW, I like your tag line ;)
JD
Bullethead
04 Sep 07, 19:47
Wow, I've been using that as a User ID for so long... I had almost forgotten what it stood for. Shows just how long it's been eh?
Well, the Offspring are still rocking, so it can't have been too long. They haven't yet reached the longevity of the Stones or even Aerosmith ;).
Anyway, I'm well my friend. I hope you are the same.
Can't complain too much.
BTW, I like your tag line ;)
Words to live by, my friend :)
Well I am glad to see more people. Welcome
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