CPangracs
15 Aug 06, 16:12
Since we have been talking about communications and modeling them in a game like AATF, and since the release of AATF will see a series of scenarios based on the battle for LZ X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, I thought that the following may be of interest to some of you. The link to the full paper is HERE (http://www.gordon.army.mil/ac/Winter/Winter%2002/books.htm), and excerpt follows:
by David Fiedler
By now, most of us have either read the book We Were Soldiers Once … and Young or have seen the movie staring Mel Gibson. Army Communicator readers understand that the book tells the sad story of how – for a second time after the Battle of the Little Bighorn – the hard-luck 7th U.S. Cavalry was almost completely destroyed again as a fighting formation in 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley of South Vietnam.
Moore’s and Galloway’s book goes into the action in great (almost too much) personal detail and produces an almost minute-to-minute account as to who was doing what on the battlefield. For example, Moore’s detail is so fine that he even describes sharing a C-ration breakfast with his sergeant major before the battle and the efforts of one of his junior officers to make a cup of C-ration hot chocolate during a lull in the fighting. Moore’s emotional description of the heroic deeds of individuals in his command (he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and elements of 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry) goes down to the names, hometowns and ages of the members of his battalion, which can’t fail to bring forth a poignant response from even the hardest professional soldier among us.
To recap the situation from the S-6 perspective, in mid-November 1965, 500 air-cavalry troopers from 1/7 Cavalry under then-LTC Moore’s command were dropped into a small landing zone in the Ia Drang Valley. The operation was to be a classic light-infantry sweep of an area suspected of having an (size unknown) enemy force located in it. In infantry terms, it was supposed to be a “find ‘em, fix ‘em, fight ‘em, destroy ‘em” action. The LZ was identified on operational maps as LZ X-Ray and was near the Chu Pong massif (mountain) that dominates the Ia Drang Valley.
National, theater, corps or 1st Cavalry Division intelligence assets didn’t alert Moore to the fact that the Chu Pong massif was home base for a multi-battalion Viet Cong force that far outnumbered Moore’s battalion, and that this force was looking to do battle with Americans. The enemy objective was to engage 1st Cavalry Division units in battle so their commanders could devise effective tactics against the U.S. Army’s new airmobile-division concepts.
Moore mentions a single radio-direction-finding fix provided by the Army Security Agency that indicated there was enemy in the area, but Moore had no clue as to the size, location and condition of the enemy force and went into LZ X-Ray blind, overconfident and piecemeal. Accordingly, first and foremost this book is the story of an intelligence failure, followed by other failures – including communications failures – resulting in tactical disaster. If anyone knew the real intelligence situation, they apparently didn’t tell Moore, and he didn’t have a clue about what he was facing until his lead elements landed on LZ X-Ray.
It’s important to remember that in 1965 the concept of an airmobile division was a new and radical idea. The division, in spite of its name and mode of transportation, was in fact a light-infantry division (not the heavy armored 1st Cavalry Division of today) that once on the ground fought as light infantry but with heavy helicopter support. As stated in the Gibson movie, the 1st Cavalry’s operational concept was that “we will ride into battle and the UH-1 helicopter will be our horse.”
As a circa-1965 light-infantry division – particularly in the combat battalions like Moore’s 1/7 Cavalry – tactical communications depended almost completely on the widely distributed AN/PRC-25 manpack very-high-frequency radio. The AN/PRC-25 was very similar to today’s Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System radio. The radio weighed about 20 pounds with battery, operated in the 30-75.95 megahertz frequency spectrum, transmitted about 1.5 watts of power and came with both three- and 10-foot vertical whip antennas that gave a transmission distance of three to seven miles. Transmission mode was strictly frequency-modulation voice. Communications distance for the AN/PRC-25 could be extended to up to 20 miles by using the RC-292 ground-plane antenna and its associated 30-foot mast.
While this radio was the state-of-the-art solid-state tactical radio in 1965, it must be noted that, unlike SINCGARS, a critical deficiency of this radio was that it had no communications security – either internal or external with it. It also couldn’t frequency hop. Around this time the AN/PRC-25 was modified into the AN/PRC-77 design that would accept COMSEC devices; however, Moore doesn’t mention having any AN/PRC-77s in his force.
I don’t intend here to go further into battle details other than to say 1/7 Cavalry’s landing on X-Ray triggered a battle that decimated most of three American infantry battalions after a three-day running fight. For people interested in the tragic tactical details, I recommend you read the book, see the movie, view the History Channel special on the battle or go to the LZ X-Ray website. I would like to analyze Moore’s and Galloway’s book from the tactical communicator’s (G-6/S-6) perspective so that hopefully we can avoid making the same serious Signal tactical and technical mistakes 1/7 Cavalry made....
by David Fiedler
By now, most of us have either read the book We Were Soldiers Once … and Young or have seen the movie staring Mel Gibson. Army Communicator readers understand that the book tells the sad story of how – for a second time after the Battle of the Little Bighorn – the hard-luck 7th U.S. Cavalry was almost completely destroyed again as a fighting formation in 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley of South Vietnam.
Moore’s and Galloway’s book goes into the action in great (almost too much) personal detail and produces an almost minute-to-minute account as to who was doing what on the battlefield. For example, Moore’s detail is so fine that he even describes sharing a C-ration breakfast with his sergeant major before the battle and the efforts of one of his junior officers to make a cup of C-ration hot chocolate during a lull in the fighting. Moore’s emotional description of the heroic deeds of individuals in his command (he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and elements of 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry) goes down to the names, hometowns and ages of the members of his battalion, which can’t fail to bring forth a poignant response from even the hardest professional soldier among us.
To recap the situation from the S-6 perspective, in mid-November 1965, 500 air-cavalry troopers from 1/7 Cavalry under then-LTC Moore’s command were dropped into a small landing zone in the Ia Drang Valley. The operation was to be a classic light-infantry sweep of an area suspected of having an (size unknown) enemy force located in it. In infantry terms, it was supposed to be a “find ‘em, fix ‘em, fight ‘em, destroy ‘em” action. The LZ was identified on operational maps as LZ X-Ray and was near the Chu Pong massif (mountain) that dominates the Ia Drang Valley.
National, theater, corps or 1st Cavalry Division intelligence assets didn’t alert Moore to the fact that the Chu Pong massif was home base for a multi-battalion Viet Cong force that far outnumbered Moore’s battalion, and that this force was looking to do battle with Americans. The enemy objective was to engage 1st Cavalry Division units in battle so their commanders could devise effective tactics against the U.S. Army’s new airmobile-division concepts.
Moore mentions a single radio-direction-finding fix provided by the Army Security Agency that indicated there was enemy in the area, but Moore had no clue as to the size, location and condition of the enemy force and went into LZ X-Ray blind, overconfident and piecemeal. Accordingly, first and foremost this book is the story of an intelligence failure, followed by other failures – including communications failures – resulting in tactical disaster. If anyone knew the real intelligence situation, they apparently didn’t tell Moore, and he didn’t have a clue about what he was facing until his lead elements landed on LZ X-Ray.
It’s important to remember that in 1965 the concept of an airmobile division was a new and radical idea. The division, in spite of its name and mode of transportation, was in fact a light-infantry division (not the heavy armored 1st Cavalry Division of today) that once on the ground fought as light infantry but with heavy helicopter support. As stated in the Gibson movie, the 1st Cavalry’s operational concept was that “we will ride into battle and the UH-1 helicopter will be our horse.”
As a circa-1965 light-infantry division – particularly in the combat battalions like Moore’s 1/7 Cavalry – tactical communications depended almost completely on the widely distributed AN/PRC-25 manpack very-high-frequency radio. The AN/PRC-25 was very similar to today’s Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System radio. The radio weighed about 20 pounds with battery, operated in the 30-75.95 megahertz frequency spectrum, transmitted about 1.5 watts of power and came with both three- and 10-foot vertical whip antennas that gave a transmission distance of three to seven miles. Transmission mode was strictly frequency-modulation voice. Communications distance for the AN/PRC-25 could be extended to up to 20 miles by using the RC-292 ground-plane antenna and its associated 30-foot mast.
While this radio was the state-of-the-art solid-state tactical radio in 1965, it must be noted that, unlike SINCGARS, a critical deficiency of this radio was that it had no communications security – either internal or external with it. It also couldn’t frequency hop. Around this time the AN/PRC-25 was modified into the AN/PRC-77 design that would accept COMSEC devices; however, Moore doesn’t mention having any AN/PRC-77s in his force.
I don’t intend here to go further into battle details other than to say 1/7 Cavalry’s landing on X-Ray triggered a battle that decimated most of three American infantry battalions after a three-day running fight. For people interested in the tragic tactical details, I recommend you read the book, see the movie, view the History Channel special on the battle or go to the LZ X-Ray website. I would like to analyze Moore’s and Galloway’s book from the tactical communicator’s (G-6/S-6) perspective so that hopefully we can avoid making the same serious Signal tactical and technical mistakes 1/7 Cavalry made....