View Full Version : ToO: Greece, Chapter: The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka
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This is an example how someone may create a historical scenario from a historical AAR
The point of the historical research is to read the historical AAR and extract useful data concerning the (course of) events.
from http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/18/chapters/06.pdf
Mackay spent the 19th, from 7 .30 until about 4 p .m., at the Domokos
rearguard position, so that he could see for himself the problem facing
Brigadier Lee there. Lee's force had originally included four battalions—
2/4th, 2/8th, 2/6th and 2/7th—a company of the 2/5th, and artillery
and engineers. On the 18th Lee had decided that it was unlikely that he
would be hard pressed by the enemy before the remainder of the New
Zealand and Australian divisions had passed through Lamia . He therefore
ordered the 19th Brigade (2/4th and 2/8th Battalions) to withdraw
to the Thermopylae position, but retained one company of the 2/4th.6
Mackay approved this decision when he arrived at Lee's headquarters on
the morning of the 19th .
That morning it was discovered that a train-load of petrol, ammunition ,
gun-cotton and ammonal was standing at a railway siding two miles north
of Domokos. Lieut-Colonel Walker of the 2/7th decided that so valuable
a cargo should be driven back to Athens, and the ubiquitous Corporal
Taylor, the same who had made up a train at Larisa and carried the battalion
back to Domokos, went forward early in the afternoon with
Corporal Edwards ? and six other volunteers, all Victorian railwaymen,
to drive the train to safety . A squadron of German aircraft saw the steam
rising and circled overhead bombing and machine-gunning the station and
train. Taylor was in the engine alone, with his team lying under cover
awaiting his signal to jump aboard, when the trucks exploded with a
shattering roar and a huge mushroom of smoke rose into the air. The
blast was so powerful that men in the infantry positions two miles away
6 Lee then had two battalions, 2/6 and 2/7 (plus a company of the 2/4), the 2/1 Fd Regt less a battery, a company of the 2/1 MG, and five cruisers of the 3 Royal Tanks, and the British anti -tank battery which had been with Savige Force and had dropped out of that column on reaching Domokos. As already mentioned the 2/6 Bn, plus a company of the 2/5, was in position to the east of the road, the 2/7 and Capt Rolfe's company of the 2/4 on the west .
136
THE THERMOPYLAE LINE
19 Apr
felt the force of it. It thrust the engine violently along the rails, and
thus its power was cushioned . Taylor survived, and, to the astonishment
of those in the pass who had given the railwaymen up for dead, he
arrived back at the battalion, leading his men, his hair singed but otherwise
unharmed .
Late in the afternoon Mackay decided that Lee's force would soon
have done its job—to ensure that the New Zealand and Australian
brigades withdrew through Lamia without interference by German troops .
He therefore ordered Lee to pull out the main part of his force at dusk ,
and himself moved south to his new headquarters beyond Brallos . Lee,
who had understood that he would have to hold the Domokos Pass until
the night of the 21st-22nd, had already sent Captain Luxton out to
ascertain when the New Zealand troops moving along the Volos road would
have passed through Lamia .At dusk Luxton returned with information that the
New Zealanders were clear of Lamia, but that Brigadier Allen did not know the whereabouts of his brigade. Thereupon, at 9 p .m., Lee ordered the main portion of his force to withdraw forthwith, but organised a small rearguard to hold astride the road 10 miles farther south. This was at the southern exit from the range separating Lamia from the plain of Thessaly, whereas Domokos was at the northern exit .
Meanwhile at 7 p .m. the road had been blown in several places. In error some demolitions were made behind positions held by the 2/6th and as a result two
anti-tank guns had to be destroyed and abandoned . Worse still, at 8 p.m. several vehicles appeared on the road forward of the Domokos force and men climbed from them
Night, 20-21 April.
Domokos
5 ARMD
19-20 Apr
THE REARGUARD AT LAMIA
137
and began to repair the demolitions. On Lee's orders the gunners fired
at them until it was discovered that these were trucks loaded with British
engineer and ordnance men and Cypriot pioneers, who had been left
behind. A patrol was sent out to bring them in and to destroy their trucks .
The withdrawal from the Domokos position was completed by 10 .30.
Lee appointed Major Guinn9 to command the new rearguard position
and instructed him to delay the enemy until the last Australian and
New Zealand forces had passed through Lamia . Guinn was not informed
of his role until early in the morning on the 20th, and when he arrived
at the Lamia Pass his little force—a company of the 2/6th, a company
of the 2/7th, a company of the 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion, a detachment
of anti-tank guns, and five tanks—had already been placed in position
in the dark by Lieut-Colonel Wells of the corps staff . l When daylight
came Guinn decided that some of the infantry were too exposed to observation
from the air, and that if he was to avoid air attack and to surprise
the enemy's troops when they appeared, he must conceal his positions.
This was done and troops and guns were well concealed before any
scouting aircraft arrived .
The company of the 2/7th was deployed astride the road and to the
right of it ; the company of the 2/6th on the left and the tanks in a small
copse about a mile forward and a mile to the right of the road . About 11
a.m. a German troop-carrying aircraft landed near the village of Xinia on
flat land about three miles from the Australian positions, and at the same
time vehicles began to move down the slopes from Domokos . Lieutenant
Morris 2 commanding one of the platoons of the 2/7th collected three
N.C.O's and led them downhill- to capture the aircraft . The company
commander, Lieutenant Macfarlane, called to them to come back and
the N.C.O's heard and returned, but Morris went on and eventually him -
self was taken prisoner.
About 2.15 p.m. a group of four German motor-cycles with side-cars
appeared, followed at 500 yards by a fifth cycle . The rearguard had been
so well concealed on the scrubby slopes that several reconnaissance aircraft
which flew low over the pass during the morning and fired into
patches of undergrowth evidently failed to detect any of the positions ;
and the four leading motor-cyclists rode right into the Australian area ,
where all were killed or wounded by a sudden burst of fire . A little later
the fifth motor-cyclist advanced along the road at high speed, saw the
wrecked cycles on the road, made a sharp skid turn and got away . At this
stage the officer commanding the tanks withdrew his tanks from the wood ,
where they had been lying concealed and ready to counter-attack .
Later one tank was moved forward to each of the northernmost knolls
to engage such German tanks as should appear. An armoured car coming
into view was hit by a shell from one of them . A German tank next
138
THE THERMOPYLAE LINE
20 Apr
appeared, was fired on, and made off in reverse . A rain-storm lasting
about half an hour then enabled the Germans to bring forward several
mortars which fired until silenced by the Australian machine-guns . Thus
far all had gone well . The rearguard was concealed and the enemy came
under accurate fire as soon as he appeared across the flat ground at the
foot of the pass . At 4.30 p.m. a message arrived from Lee stating that
all New Zealand and Australian convoys had passed through Lamia ; Guinn
was to decide when he would withdraw .
At 5 o'clock the enemy opened fire with four light guns . Guinn had
given orders that when the enemy opened fire with artillery the rearguard
should withdraw . The tanks began to move out, but one was hit and
abandoned in the fields east of the road. The officer commanding the
company of the 2/6th on the west of the road then ordered his platoons
to withdraw, but told Lieutenant Hayes 3 to remain in position near the
road until Lieutenant McCaffrey' s 4 platoon on the knoll to the left had come
in. The company commander had ordered the infantrymen to hurry ; and
as the men began to move in some haste and confusion up the slopes to
the road, the German mortar crews, hitherto unable to find any definite
target, saw them and bombs began to drop among the hurrying clusters
and amid the machine-guns, which were hot and easily distinguished by
the steam rising from their water jackets . Two cruiser tanks held the road
while the infantrymen withdrew. After some of the infantry had already
embussed Lieutenant Austin's° machine-gunners came out, leaving one gun
to cover the engineer party which was to set off the charges in the road .
Macfarlane's company of the 2/7th on the right had withdrawn in good
order, and when Guinn was told by his officers that all their men had
come in he reported to Lee, who had now arrived. Lee told him to go
back to Vasey's brigade. The last of the trucks then withdrew . °
From Allen's force during the 19th and 20th small parties of the 2/2nd
and 2/3rd Battalions arrived in the Brallos area . Colonel Lamb (2/3rd )
reached divisional headquarters near Gravia at 3 p .m. on the 19th and
reported that he had not seen Allen since early that morning and did not
know where the bulk of his battalion was . On orders from Colonel
Sutherland, Mackay's G.S.O.1, he established at Amfiklia a collecting post
for any more of his men who might come in. Major Edgar,' second-in-
In the withdrawal some parties were missed . Lieutenant Hayes had remained in position until he had seen the orderly withdrawal of McCaffrey's platoon along a route protected from mortar fire. He sent out his platoon, and then himself came out with three others—a weary Bren gunner , Pte P . C . Purves (of Northcote, Vic), Sgt C . H. Jenkins (Thornbury, Vic) and another man who had been in a lookout high on the ridge and had not been warned of the withdrawal. They were marching along the road when an engineer ahead of them shouted a warning . The infantrymen flung themselves to the ground just as a demolition charge exploded in the road 20 yards beyond . Two more explosions followed, so close that Hayes' men were among the falling debris . With his party now increased to six by the addition of three men of the army service corps who had missed their company in the withdrawal from Domokos, Hayes thereupon set out to walk to the Brallos Pass 15 miles away. The demolitions delayed the enemy so successfully that the Australians were able to reach Lamia without mishap at 2 .30 a.m . on the 21st and at 9.30 walked into the 25th New Zealand Battalion's lines whence they returned to their own unit .
18-20 Apr
AFTER PINIOS
139
command of the 2/2nd, had already established a "straggler post" between
Amfiklia and Levadia (whither Blarney's headquarters had moved on the
18th) and during the day 7 officers and 297 men of that unit had collected ,
including Hendry's company and sundry officers and men of the head -
quarters company. Most of the 2/3rd Battalion's vehicles after ploughing
along the tracks east of Larisa during the night made their way to Lamia
either through Volos or by rejoining the main road south of Larisa . By
the 20th the 2/3rd had reached a strength of about 500 .
Several parties of New Zealanders and men of the 2/2nd and 2/3rd
whose vehicles had bogged in the country east of Larisa on the night of
the 18th managed by hard marching over the foothills of Mount Othrys
to reach the New Zealand Division before it finally withdrew from the
Thermopylae position . One party of nine, under Sergeant-Major Le Nevez ,
reached Volos and there bailed up a car and drove to Lamia . Along the
roads followed by these men and by others who escaped to Crete or Turkey ,
the village women, sometimes in tears, gave them food and the men acted
as guides and kept them informed, not always accurately, of the Germans'
progress . Brigadier Allen himself had driven eastward, making for the
Volos road, but went along the dead-end road . There he found fifty or
sixty men . Leaving one of his officers, Lieutenant Hill-Griffiths, 8 with this
party with instructions to keep moving south, he himself drove back to the
main road, skirting Larisa in daylight. Another small party marched and
hitch-hiked for four days and reached Akladi on the north shore of the
Gulf of Lamia. There they seized a boat and, with Germans visible in the
village and the New Zealand artillery firing registering shots overhead ,
they rowed across the gulf and on the 23rd joined the New Zealand
Division.
Meanwhile, in the Thermopylae line, the British force awaited the
German columns.
-END-
Here is another description of this event from the
http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Gree-c7-13.html
The Rearguard at Dhomokos
On the main highway the rearguard was about Dhomokos, the scene of the decisive battle of the Greek-Turkish war of 1897, and an ancient fortress town on the northern edge of the scrub-covered ridges between Pharsala and Lamia. On 17 April Australian units had moved into position. The 2/6 Battalion, with one company of 2/5 Battalion, was on the eastern side of the road and 2/7 Battalion on the western side, both units immediately to the north of the town, with 2/1 Field Regiment in support. In reserve were 2/4 and 2/8 Battalions of 19 Brigade which had withdrawn from the north. On 18 April, when the withdrawal of W Force was well under way, Brigadier Lee ‘decided that it was unlikely that he would be hard pressed by the enemy before the remainder of the New Zealand and Australian divisions had passed through Lamia.’1 The 2/4 Battalion (less one company) and 2/8 Battalion were then sent back to the Australian sector of the Thermopylae line. At the same time he had to be prepared to halt the tanks of the German advanced guard. Captain Sweetzer2 and eight two-pounders of 31 New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery were therefore withdrawn from the stream of traffic and placed in position to cover the crossroads just north of Dhomokos.
On 19 April there were heavy and persistent air attacks3 along the road between Larisa and Lamia, but the Anzac convoys, miles long and closely spaced, were moving steadily southwards to the Brallos Pass or Thermopylae areas. As the rearguard was still expected to hold Dhomokos Pass until the night of 21–22 April, it was strengthened still further by the addition of the five remaining tanks of 3 Royal Tank Regiment. In the late afternoon, however, when it was evident that the last of W Force would reach the new line without any serious interference from the enemy, General Mackay decided that Lee Force could withdraw that very night, 19–20 April. At 7 p.m., therefore, the first demolitions were blown.
An hour later several trucks came south towards Dhomokos and men from them could be seen repairing the highway. Until it was learnt that they were British engineers and Cypriot pioneers, the men were under fire, but eventually a patrol went forward to bring them in and to wreck the trucks. Another problem arose next morning. No instructions had been given to 31 New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery and its two gun crews forward of the demolitions. Consequently Sweetzer, when he discovered that he was isolated, had to destroy his guns and find his own way back. Elsewhere the
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the germans approach thermopylae, 19–21 april 1941
withdrawal which began at 9 p.m. was smoothly executed, the line being clear by 10.30 p.m.
As Lee had already made certain that 6 New Zealand Brigade would soon be through Lamia, his main body went straight back to the Brallos Pass area. But because of the uncertainty about Allen Force and its withdrawal from Tempe, Major H. G. Guinn was left with a small force on the ridges above Lamia to delay the enemy until the last troops had come through from Volos. A company from 2/7 Battalion was astride the road and to the right of it; a 2/6 Battalion company was to the left; the five cruiser tanks were in front of the infantry covering tank country to the west of the road; and Lieutenant Atchison with four armoured cars from C Troop New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment was to the east of the road. In support there was a company from 2/1 Australian Machine Gun Battalion.
No air attacks were made that morning, Sunday 20 April, but about 11 a.m. a large German troop-carrying aircraft landed on the flat country near Xinia, a village some three miles in front of the line. Some Australians started out to capture it but their failure to
– 351 –
hear withdrawal orders led to the officer in command carrying on alone and being captured. Nevertheless, the men of 8 Panzer Reconnaissance Unit, the leading formation of 5 Panzer Division, did not seem to realise that the ridge was held for early that afternoon motor-cycles with side-cars came down the road and were badly shot up. ‘One of our patrols had fallen into an ambush at the northern end of the Furka pass and lost 6 killed ….’1 After that there was a lull, though German infantrymen were occasionally under fire from Australian infantrymen. But at last the German tanks came forward and swung off into the open country to the west of the road. The cruiser tanks then came out of cover, halting at least three of the German tanks and losing one of their own: ‘A thin wisp of smoke climbed from inside it into the twilight sky.’2
The fighting then died down, heavy rain fell and the Germans hastened to bring up their mortars. Half an hour later when the weather cleared they opened fire, but before long the crews and any infantrymen moving below the pass were taking cover from the Australian machine-gun fire. At this stage Lee, having decided that the last of the Australian and New Zealand troops must be through Lamia, advised Guinn that he was free to return. It was then about 5 p.m.
The movement of the infantry from their camouflaged positions soon attracted the attention of the German mortars and light artillery. Some haste and confusion developed and one of the armoured cars when it reached the highway was destroyed by shellfire, but before long the force was clear. Two tanks had held the road, Sergeant Harper3 had brought in one of the anti-tank guns from an exposed position and Second-Lieutenant Hill4 had with great coolness assisted in embussing the infantry and withdrawing the six anti-tank guns.
After the engineers, covered by machine-gun fire, had blown their demolitions along the highway the last of the rearguard withdrew, the armoured cars of the Divisional Cavalry bringing up the rear. Later two of the cruiser tanks which broke down were placed across the road and set on fire, but otherwise the withdrawal through Lamia to the Thermopylae line was completed without further trouble.
These two text describe several historical events that took place during a limited period at a precise location. They also mention some informations about numbers and types of the involved parties. With a cross-reference of some other resources, we may wxtract informations like this following:
Mackay spent the 19th, from 7 .30 until about 4 p .m., at the Domokos
rearguard position, so that he could see for himself the problem facing
Brigadier Lee there. Lee's force had originally included four battalions—
2/4th, 2/8th, 2/6th and 2/7th—a company of the 2/5th, and artillery
and engineers. On the 18th Lee had decided that it was unlikely that he
would be hard pressed by the enemy before the remainder of the New
Zealand and Australian divisions had passed through Lamia . He therefore
ordered the 19th Brigade (2/4th and 2/8th Battalions) to withdraw
to the Thermopylae position, but retained one company of the 2/4th
Anyway, from a first quick look, I think that a couple of quick scenarios could be made for the action that took place in Domokos.
Perhaps, later today, I will continue the analysis of this historical AAR (if anyone else wishes to do it, he is welcomed to do it.:) )
Now let's try to isolate all informations related to numbers, dates, locations, incidents etc....
Date & Location
Mackay spent the 19th, from 7 .30 until about 4 p .m., at the Domokos
rearguard position,
As already mentioned the 2/6 Bn, plus a company of the 2/5, was in position to the east of the road, the 2/7 and Capt Rolfe's company of the 2/4 on the west .
Thereupon, at 9 p .m., Lee ordered the main portion of his force to withdraw forthwith, but organised a small rearguard to hold astride the road 10 miles farther south. This was at the southern exit from the range separating Lamia from the plain of Thessaly, whereas Domokos was at the northern exit .
The withdrawal from the Domokos position was completed by 10 .30.
Lee appointed Major Major Guinn9 to command the new rearguard position and instructed him to delay the enemy until the last Australian and New Zealand forces had passed through Lamia .
Major Guinn - The company of the 2/7th was deployed astride the road and to the right of it ; the company of the 2/6th on the left and the tanks in a small copse about a mile forward and a mile to the right of the road .
Forces involved:
Lee's force had originally included four battalions— 2/4th, 2/8th, 2/6th and 2/7th—a company of the 2/5th, and artillery and engineers.
He therefore ordered the 19th Brigade (2/4th and 2/8th Battalions) to withdraw to the Thermopylae position, but retained one company of the 2/4th
Lee then had two battalions, 2/6 and 2/7 (plus a company of the 2/4), the 2/1 Fd Regt less a battery, a company of the 2/1 MG, and five cruisers of the 3 Royal Tanks, and the British anti -tank battery which had been with Savige Force and had dropped out of that column on reaching Domokos. As already mentioned the 2/6 Bn, plus a company of the 2/5, was in position to the east of the road, the 2/7 and Capt Rolfe's company of the 2/4 on the west .
Guinn was not informed of his role until early in the morning on the 20th, and when he arrived at the Lamia Pass his little force—a company of the 2/6th, a company of the 2/7th, a company of the 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion, a detachment of anti-tank guns, and five tanks—had already been placed in position
in the dark by Lieut-Colonel Wells of the corps staff
Minor Incidents
That morning it was discovered that a train-load of petrol, ammunition ,
gun-cotton and ammonal was standing at a railway siding two miles north
of Domokos. Lieut-Colonel Walker of the 2/7th decided that so valuable
a cargo should be driven back to Athens
At dusk Luxton returned with information that the
New Zealanders were clear of Lamia, but that Brigadier Allen did not know the whereabouts of his brigade.
Meanwhile at 7 p .m. the road had been blown in several places. In error some demolitions were made behind positions held by the 2/6th and as a result two anti-tank guns had to be destroyed and abandoned . Worse still, at 8 p.m. several vehicles appeared on the road forward of the Domokos force and men climbed from them and began to repair the demolitions. On Lee's orders the gunners fired at them until it was discovered that these were trucks loaded with British engineer and ordnance men and Cypriot pioneers, who had been left
behind. A patrol was sent out to bring them in and to destroy their trucks .
When daylight came Guinn decided that some of the infantry were too exposed to observation from the air, and that if he was to avoid air attack and to surprise the enemy's troops when they appeared, he must conceal his positions. This was done and troops and guns were well concealed before any
scouting aircraft arrived .
About 11 a.m. a German troop-carrying aircraft landed near the village of Xinia on flat land about three miles from the Australian positions, and at the same
time vehicles began to move down the slopes from Domokos . Lieutenant
Morris 2 commanding one of the platoons of the 2/7th collected three
N.C.O's and led them downhill- to capture the aircraft . The company
commander, Lieutenant Macfarlane, called to them to come back and
the N.C.O's heard and returned, but Morris went on and eventually him -
self was taken prisoner.
Major Event
About 2.15 p.m. a group of four German motor-cycles with side-cars appeared, followed at 500 yards by a fifth cycle . The rearguard had been so well concealed on the scrubby slopes that several reconnaissance aircraft which flew low over the pass during the morning and fired into patches of undergrowth evidently failed to detect any of the positions ; and the four leading motor-cyclists rode right into the Australian area , where all were killed or wounded by a sudden burst of fire . A little later the fifth motor-cyclist advanced along the road at high speed, saw the wrecked cycles on the road, made a sharp skid turn and got away . At this stage the officer commanding the tanks withdrew his tanks from the wood ,where they had been lying concealed and ready to counter-attack. Later one tank was moved forward to each of the northernmost knolls to engage such German tanks as should appear. An armoured car coming into view was hit by a shell from one of them . A German tank next appeared, was fired on, and made off in reverse . A rain-storm lasting about half an hour then enabled the Germans to bring forward several mortars which fired until silenced by the Australian machine-guns . Thus far all had gone well . The rearguard was concealed and the enemy came under accurate fire as soon as he appeared across the flat ground at the foot of the pass . At 4.30 p.m. a message arrived from Lee stating that all New Zealand and Australian convoys had passed through Lamia ; Guinn was to decide when he would withdraw . At 5 o'clock the enemy opened fire with four light guns . Guinn had given orders that when the enemy opened fire with artillery the rearguard should withdraw . The tanks began to move out, but one was hit and abandoned in the fields east of the road. The officer commanding the company of the 2/6th on the west of the road then ordered his platoons to withdraw, but told Lieutenant Hayes 3 to remain in position near the road until Lieutenant McCaffrey' s 4 platoon on the knoll to the left had come in. The company commander had ordered the infantrymen to hurry ; and as the men began to move in some haste and confusion up the slopes to the road, the German mortar crews, hitherto unable to find any definite target, saw them and bombs began to drop among the hurrying clusters and amid the achine-guns, which were hot and easily distinguished by the steam rising from their water jackets . Two cruiser tanks held the road while the infantrymen withdrew. After some of the infantry had already embussed Lieutenant Austin's° machine-gunners came out, leaving one gun to cover the engineer party which was to set off the charges in the road . Macfarlane's company of the 2/7th on the right had withdrawn in good order, and when Guinn was told by his officers that all their men had come in he reported to Lee, who had now arrived. Lee told him to go back to Vasey's brigade. The last of the trucks then withdrew .
Ok, this is the preliminary analysis from the first text.
Now, I will proceed with the preliminary analysis of the second text and then I will try to find more informations about the involved forces
Lee's force had originally included four battalions— 2/4th, 2/8th, 2/6th and 2/7th—a company of the 2/5th, and artillery and engineers.
and for the German forces 5 Pz Division and the support elements
Date & Location
On the main highway the rearguard was about Dhomokos, the scene of the decisive battle of the Greek-Turkish war of 1897, and an ancient fortress town on the northern edge of the scrub-covered ridges between Pharsala and Lamia. On 17 April Australian units had moved into position. The 2/6 Battalion, with one company of 2/5 Battalion, was on the eastern side of the road and 2/7 Battalion on the western side, both units immediately to the north of the town, with 2/1 Field Regiment in support. In reserve were 2/4 and 2/8 Battalions of 19 Brigade which had withdrawn from the north.
At the same time he had to be prepared to halt the tanks of the German advanced guard. Captain Sweetzer2 and eight two-pounders of 31 New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery were therefore withdrawn from the stream of traffic and placed in position to cover the crossroads just north of Dhomokos.
The withdrawal which began at 9 p.m. was smoothly executed, the line being clear by 10.30 p.m.
Major H. G. Guinn on the ridges above Lamia - A company from 2/7 Battalion was astride the road and to the right of it; a 2/6 Battalion company was to the left; the five cruiser tanks were in front of the infantry covering tank country to the west of the road; and Lieutenant Atchison with four armoured cars from C Troop New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment was to the east of the road. In support there was a company from 2/1 Australian Machine Gun Battalion.
Forces involved
The 2/4 Battalion (less one company) and 2/8 Battalion were then sent back to the Australian sector of the Thermopylae line.
As the rearguard was still expected to hold Dhomokos Pass until the night of 21–22 April, it was strengthened still further by the addition of the five remaining tanks of 3 Royal Tank Regiment.
Nevertheless, the men of 8 Panzer Reconnaissance Unit, the leading formation of 5 Panzer Division, did not seem to realise that the ridge was held
Minor Incidents
On 19 April there were heavy and persistent air attacks3 along the road between Larisa and Lamia, but the Anzac convoys, miles long and closely spaced, were moving steadily southwards to the Brallos Pass or Thermopylae areas.
In the late afternoon, however, when it was evident that the last of W Force would reach the new line without any serious interference from the enemy, General Mackay decided that Lee Force could withdraw that very night, 19–20 April. At 7 p.m., therefore, the first demolitions were blown.
An hour later several trucks came south towards Dhomokos and men from them could be seen repairing the highway. Until it was learnt that they were British engineers and Cypriot pioneers, the men were under fire, but eventually a patrol went forward to bring them in and to wreck the trucks.
Another problem arose next morning. No instructions had been given to 31 New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery and its two gun crews forward of the demolitions. Consequently Sweetzer, when he discovered that he was isolated, had to destroy his guns and find his own way back.
But because of the uncertainty about Allen Force and its withdrawal from Tempe, Major H. G. Guinn was left with a small force on the ridges above Lamia to delay the enemy until the last troops had come through from Volos.
No air attacks were made that morning, Sunday 20 April, but about 11 a.m. a large German troop-carrying aircraft landed on the flat country near Xinia, a village some three miles in front of the line. Some Australians started out to capture it but their failure to hear withdrawal orders led to the officer in command carrying on alone and being captured.
Major event
Nevertheless, the men of 8 Panzer Reconnaissance Unit, the leading formation of 5 Panzer Division, did not seem to realise that the ridge was held for early that afternoon motor-cycles with side-cars came down the road and were badly shot up. ‘One of our patrols had fallen into an ambush at the northern end of the Furka pass and lost 6 killed ….’1 After that there was a lull, though German infantrymen were occasionally under fire from Australian infantrymen. But at last the German tanks came forward and swung off into the open country to the west of the road. The cruiser tanks then came out of cover, halting at least three of the German tanks and losing one of their own: ‘A thin wisp of smoke climbed from inside it into the twilight sky.’2
The fighting then died down, heavy rain fell and the Germans hastened to bring up their mortars. Half an hour later when the weather cleared they opened fire, but before long the crews and any infantrymen moving below the pass were taking cover from the Australian machine-gun fire. At this stage Lee, having decided that the last of the Australian and New Zealand troops must be through Lamia, advised Guinn that he was free to return. It was then about 5 p.m.
The movement of the infantry from their camouflaged positions soon attracted the attention of the German mortars and light artillery. Some haste and confusion developed and one of the armoured cars when it reached the highway was destroyed by shellfire, but before long the force was clear. Two tanks had held the road, Sergeant Harper3 had brought in one of the anti-tank guns from an exposed position and Second-Lieutenant Hill4 had with great coolness assisted in embussing the infantry and withdrawing the six anti-tank guns.
After the engineers, covered by machine-gun fire, had blown their demolitions along the highway the last of the rearguard withdrew, the armoured cars of the Divisional Cavalry bringing up the rear. Later two of the cruiser tanks which broke down were placed across the road and set on fire, but otherwise the withdrawal through Lamia to the Thermopylae line was completed without further trouble.
This was the preliminary analysis of the second text.
The first text was an Aussie text and thew second a Kiwi text.
It is obvious that both text have added useful informations concerning the Domokos battles.
Now, before continuing with the synthesis (preliminary scenario design),
we have to further research the involved units (OOB) from different sources.
I have found another text in
http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Arti-c2-12.html#name-003466-1
which may add something new to this battle:
The Passes of Dhomokos and Fourka
The road south from Pharsala followed foothills for 10 miles and then climbed a steep pass to the town of Dhomokos. From there it led to a flat east of Lake Xinia and then rose again to cross a larger and higher range of hills before Lamia. The hamlet of Fourka in this second range gave its name to the pass just north of Lamia. Rearguard actions were fought at both the Dhomokos and the Fourka Passes.
Lee Force defended Dhomokos and began to take up position on 17 April north of the town: two Australian battalions plus a company and 2/1 Field Regiment. There were no anti-tank guns, and when most of 31 Anti-Tank Battery under Captain Sweetzer76 reached Dhomokos about 7.30 p.m. on the 18th, Brigadier E. A. Lee stopped Sweetzer and told him to get his guns off the road and attend a tactical conference at once. Sweetzer had with him eight 2-pounders and these went into position under heavy air attack. Next day air attacks were almost incessant. The rearguard was expected to stay there until the night 21–22 April; but the Australian Major-General I. G. Mackay decided that there was no need to stay so long and ordered Lee to withdraw after dark on the 19th. Demolitions were blown at 7 p.m. Then the Australian field guns engaged an approaching convoy until it was discovered to be friendly. Lee Force then withdrew; but nobody told Captain Sweetzer. Two of his guns were ahead of the demolition and could not be brought out. Next morning the 31 Battery detachment found itself in sole occupation of the Dhomokos position. The crews of the two isolated guns came back on foot and the whole detachment made off along the road to Lamia.
Lee had left another rearguard at Fourka, however, and this, too, had no anti-tank guns. So Sweetzer's six remaining guns went into action in defence of the Fourka Pass. Here they suffered more than air attack; for the enemy brought up artillery and made liberal use of mortars. Tanks also appeared and were engaged by tanks with Lee Force. As the engagement was warming up word came that all other troops were safely past Lamia and this final rearguard could withdraw. The injudicious dissemination of these orders to men engaged with the enemy (though not, again, to Sweetzer) caused something of a panic as infantry raced to their vehicles. In the midst of the storm the six guns of 33 Battery attracted much fire and could not reply to it. The anti-tankers responded splendidly and two of them were decorated later for what they did here: Lance- Sergeant Harper77 (MM) and Second-Lieutenant Hill78 (MC). One gunner was not decorated but rebuked for indifference to danger that amounted to foolhardiness.79 Harper's citation reads in part that his gun position, owing to the sudden retirement of the infantry and MG platoon, was exposed to accurate observed fire of enemy 5-9-inch infantry guns. In withdrawing his gun L/Sgt Harper showed the utmost coolness and parade precision in giving his orders and seeing them carried out, with the result that his gun and detachment were enabled to get out from what appeared to be an impossible position. On reaching the position of assembly, to which the shelling had switched, this NCO again showed marked coolness in holding his men together in spite of a general panic of infantry and tanks….’
And Hill, according to his citation,
‘supervised the embussing of Australian infantry on such vehicles and tanks as were available under considerable and accurate shelling of the road … and … was largely responsible for the safe withdrawal of the infantry and anti-tank guns and preventing the incipient panic from spreading….’
Both citations actually speak of the Dhomokos Pass; but the Fourka Pass was the scene of the actions for which Hill and Harper were decorated. The anti-tankers were not sorry to leave it. As they passed through Lamia the Stukas were sleeping, but the town still cringed from their blows and fires were alive in many places among the shattered buildings.
Preliminary Analysis of the third text
Date & Location
The road south from Pharsala followed foothills for 10 miles and then climbed a steep pass to the town of Dhomokos. From there it led to a flat east of Lake Xinia and then rose again to cross a larger and higher range of hills before Lamia. The hamlet of Fourka in this second range gave its name to the pass just north of Lamia. Rearguard actions were fought at both the Dhomokos and the Fourka Passes.
Lee Force defended Dhomokos and began to take up position on 17 April north of the town:
Involved forces
two Australian battalions plus a company and 2/1 Field Regiment. There were no anti-tank guns, and when most of 31 Anti-Tank Battery under Captain Sweetzer76 reached Dhomokos about 7.30 p.m. on the 18th, Brigadier E. A. Lee stopped Sweetzer and told him to get his guns off the road and attend a tactical conference at once. Sweetzer had with him eight 2-pounders and these went into position under heavy air attack.
Lee had left another rearguard at Fourka, however, and this, too, had no anti-tank guns. So Sweetzer's six remaining guns went into action in defence of the Fourka Pass.
Here they suffered more than air attack; for the enemy brought up artillery and made liberal use of mortars.
Harper's citation reads in part that his gun position, owing to the sudden retirement of the infantry and MG platoon, was exposed to accurate observed fire of enemy 5-9-inch infantry guns.
Minor Incidents
Demolitions were blown at 7 p.m.
Then the Australian field guns engaged an approaching convoy until it was discovered to be friendly.
Lee Force then withdrew; but nobody told Captain Sweetzer. Two of his guns were ahead of the demolition and could not be brought out.
Harper's citation reads in part that his gun position, owing to the sudden retirement of the infantry and MG platoon, was exposed to accurate observed fire of enemy 5-9-inch infantry guns.
Major Events
As the engagement was warming up word came that all other troops were safely past Lamia and this final rearguard could withdraw. The injudicious dissemination of these orders to men engaged with the enemy (though not, again, to Sweetzer) caused something of a panic as infantry raced to their vehicles. In the midst of the storm the six guns of 33 Battery attracted much fire and could not reply to it. The anti-tankers responded splendidly and two of them were decorated later for what they did here:
From the preliminary analysis of the this third text, we discovered few but useful new details of that battle (especially for the support elements of the enemy force).
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