View Full Version : Where should Lee have fought his "defensive" battle?
Hi Guy's
Is there any idea or terrain evidence out there as to where Lee should have or wanted to fight the AoP?
A lot has been made of the Union Pipe Creek position, but where would have been a good place for Lee to stop or interdict his army for a "defensive" battle.
Anyone have a opinion? What about based on the Campaign Gettysburg Map(s). Is there a location that looks good to move to and force a Union attack?
Lets get this forum rolling!!!!! :cheeky:
KG_RangerBooBoo
01 Mar 05, 17:07
What's this, another CSA fan about to be shown that the Union victory was inevitable and that Lee and Longstreet were overrated! :p
What's this, another CSA fan about to be shown that the Union victory was inevitable and that Lee and Longstreet were overrated! :p
Gee Mark, them sound like fightn' words to me...you're gonna have your hands full if you keep it up!! :cool:
Palantir,
Well, can't sayI've devoted a lot of thought to it, though I will soon as I'll be designing some new scenarios for the game. I'll get back with you... ;)
"Longstreet was Right"
Hey, I meant Longstreet was right that they should not have fought on the Union's terms on day three. Marching into the teeth of the Union defense was- suicide.
Day Three: Lee was over-confident, used tactically unsound judgement and most certainly under appreciated the Union's defenses and "willingness" to fight.
The Union won on the backs of their soldiers and good Generals once they surfaced.
CyberRanger
01 Mar 05, 23:07
"Longstreet was Right"
Hey, I meant Longstreet was right that they should not have fought on the Union's terms on day three. Marching into the teeth of the Union defense was- suicide.Lee's entire invasion was suicide. Seriously, Lee felt the need to be on the offensive but he had no real objective. He's only hope was that the Union Army would totally choke and be eliminated. That just wasn't gonna happen in 63; the Union had many seasoned, experienced leaders and soldiers.
Don Maddox
02 Mar 05, 01:27
Hmmm, I think Lee has to be given a lot of credit in this case. There is much to be said for the argument that the war was only going to be won in the east, although it could be lost in the west (from the standpoint of the Confederacy). I think Lee realized that the whole dynamic of the war was heavily stacked against the South and he knew simply ceding the initiative to the enemy and allowing him to mass his armies and strike at the time and place of his choosing was indeed suicide. Lee understood Napoleon's maxim that a smaller force must use maneuver in order to defeat a larger and better equipped opponent.
Lee clearly understood that if the South was going to have a real chance of bringing the war to some sort of successful conclusion, he was going to need to create his own opportunities. His army was steadily growing weaker due to massive logistical failures and the lack of support for his horses. If he didn't either disperse his force or maneuver it north into the plentiful fields of Pennsylvania, then his army was soon going to become crippled and unable to maneuver at all. That's no option!
Lee's decision to invade was a bold one and did, in fact, achieve considerable success. But several things conspired to deny him victory. First, General Stuart failed to properly screen the army and left General Lee blind for the better part of a week. Many of Lee's decisions must be viewed with the knowledge that he lacked his primary reconnaissance element to scout for him. Also, for some reason that is not entirely clear even today, half of Lee's generals simply failed to perform up to acceptable standards during the battle of Gettysburg. Different historians attach varying levels of blame to the actions (or inactions) of each, but one thing is clear: when Lee most needed them, they faltered.
July 2nd and 3rd are the portions of the battle which are the most controversial. The failure to seize Culp's Hill on July 1st would prove to be a serious mistake that the Army of Northern Virginia would pay for dearly. Lee knew that he had basically destroyed two Federal Corps on July 1st and the upcoming battle would be more or less on equal footing. But Meade forces were still arriving and were worn out from the forced march. Also, Meade had just taken over the command and hadn't even had time to really settle in yet. Lee was most certainly not going to just sit and wait for Meade to consolidate his strength, rest his men, and carefully plan out his next move! He knew that July 1st had created an opportunity to smash Meade's corps as they arrived and drive one back on another, thus creating an opportunity to inflict a catastrophic defeat.
The attack on July 2nd was very nearly a smashing success across Longstreet's entire front. The Federal 11th Corps (badly mauled from the previous day's fighting) was hurriedly yanked from its positions and shifted to meet Longstreet's advance along with help from Hancock's boys. Nevertheless, the 11th Corps was virtually destroyed and the entire middle section of the Federal line simply shattered. Had Hill and Ewell done what they were ordered to do, there is a very high probability that Longstreet's attack would have completely cleaved the Union army in half and created even more havoc than it did. That being said, the Confederates had problems of their own and were simply not able to press their advantage. The result was that July 2nd seriously weakened the Union Army, but it did not drive it from its positions.
But what about July 3rd. This is surely the most infamous day in Confederate history and one of the most written about subjects in all of military history. Was Lee's decision to strike boldly the right one? Obviously it failed, but what other course of action was available to him?
Actually Lee had a full brigade of CAV at his disposal after Stuart left, but HE failed to use it properly. The Brigade (Jones? the name fails me right now) "operated" on the armies northern left flank. Why a full brigade was used here I don't know.
Lee or Ewell could have easily requested patrols be thrown out ahead of the Army from this formation but this was never done. It is just another example of the breakdown of the ANV as it headed north.
The scouting/recon ability was on hand to fill in but Lee just never seemed to consider it. Then again I think Ewell deserves this blame as he needed CAV out front and never asked for any.
KG_RangerBooBoo
02 Mar 05, 18:37
From reading Covington's book I don't think Jones was the guy to be gung-ho about getting intelligence. Apparently Stuart had all the go-getters with him leaving Lee with the guys who weren't exactly the best Reb cavalry commanders to sit astide a horse.
Turkey Creek
02 Mar 05, 21:35
Day two and three didn't have to happen- if Ewell had taken undefended Culps Hill late on July 1 the "Fish Hook" would have been untenable- Meade would have had to retire, probably to the Pipe Creek line- but with his I and XI Corps badly mauled, he would have had 5 effective Corps to defend this long line- also this would have given Stuart time to come up and do what he should have been doing all along, providing intelligence to Lee- and perhaps this would have given Lee an extra day or two to overcome his bout of diarhea which surely had it's influence on Lees decision making process- not saying Lee's invasion was a sure thing but it would have been different
From reading Covington's book I don't think Jones was the guy to be gung-ho about getting intelligence. Apparently Stuart had all the go-getters with him leaving Lee with the guys who weren't exactly the best Reb cavalry commanders to sit astide a horse.
That may very well be the case (Jones), but it does not excuse Lee/Ewell from not using the Cav that Stuart left behind. JEB was smart enough to leave enough recon assets to cover his absence.
It seems that Lee just left it up to his new subordinates to do whatever they thought best with no oversight.
Someone was certainly to blame in not sending (or getting) to the front Cav units to scout the advance of Ewell.
May have to dig out my ACW books again... :love:
Don Maddox
03 Mar 05, 00:44
Day two and three didn't have to happen- if Ewell had taken undefended Culp’s Hill late on July 1 the "Fish Hook" would have been untenable- Meade would have had to retire, probably to the Pipe Creek line- but with his I and XI Corps badly mauled, he would have had 5 effective Corps to defend this long line- also this would have given Stuart time to come up and do what he should have been doing all along, providing intelligence to Lee- and perhaps this would have given Lee an extra day or two to overcome his bout of diarhea which surely had it's influence on Lees decision making process- not saying Lee's invasion was a sure thing but it would have been different
While this is certainly true to an extent, these "what if" scenarios always bleed a little bit. What I mean by that is they account for one thing while ignoring another. In essence, what you are suggesting is that had the Confederates made none of the mistakes they historically made and the Federals still made all the mistakes they did, then things would have turned out differently. No great surprise in that!
The notion that seizing Culp's Hill would have been decisive is predicated on a couple of false assumptions. First, the period in which the hill was either unoccupied or barely defended was a fairly brief window of opportunity, and General Ewell stated to Lee on at least two occasions that he did not believe he could take it without help. Now we can question the validity of his appraisal of the situation, but seizing it would not have been easy in any event. More importantly, what many historians conveniently fail to mention here is that the main part of the battle was not pre-ordained to take place at Gettysburg. During this stage, only two Federal Corps had even arrived let alone deployed. Had Mead's scouts reported to him that 1st and 11th Corps had both been overrun and subsequently destroyed, it is by no means certain that Meade would have even continued to advance along the same route in the same way.
Let's assume Culp's Hill had been seized very early into the fighting on July 1st. Mead's cavalry would have reported a very different situation to the general than what actually happened. If the Confederates would have been securely entrenched in an excellent defensive position with Culp's Hill serving to anchor their left, it is not certain that Meade would have continued to converge on Gettysburg at all. Remember, both armies were still largely in motion at this time and the eventual battle could have taken place at any number of different locations. Seizing Culp's Hill on July 1st would more than likely have completed the unfinished destruction of the vanguard of the Federal army, but it may not have meant much at all beyond that. The people who paint Culp's as decisive are doing so with the full benefit of knowing where the battle did eventually take place.
KG_RangerBooBoo
03 Mar 05, 08:13
That may very well be the case (Jones), but it does not excuse Lee/Ewell from not using the Cav that Stuart left behind. JEB was smart enough to leave enough recon assets to cover his absence.
It seems that Lee just left it up to his new subordinates to do whatever they thought best with no oversight.
Someone was certainly to blame in not sending (or getting) to the front Cav units to scout the advance of Ewell.
May have to dig out my ACW books again... :love:
That was Lee's command style though. He generally laid out a plan and expected his subordinates to carry it out without a lot of supervision after. This can work if you have good commanders in place such as Jackson, Stuart, and Longstreet. If Stuart is there you can expect the job to get done but without Stuart driving Jones he just wasn't up to the task. It is obvious that Ewell wasn't up to the task that Jackson probably would have been.
Are not "What if's" wonderful to ponder? :)
It is true as Don says in everything: every action taken affects everyone that follows.
If Culps Hill had been taken by Ewell then the Battle of Gettysburg would not have followed the path it did historically.
Meade almost assuredly would not have rushed his men forward into that "fishhook" without the benefit of good terrain. Most likely he would have found a defensive position and waited (a day) for Lee to make his next move.
Stuart would be up by then and both armies in force, and who knows then? A game of movement would have begun.
That was Lee's command style though. It is obvious that Ewell wasn't up to the task that Jackson probably would have been.
That is certainly true. Unfortunately for the South he did not get the time to really understand his new Corps Commanders and their style. While good/great Division commanders they dropped a notch when burdened with 3x the command.
Jackson was a forward thinking commander at all levels and as successful as the ANV was on Day ONE what he would have accomplished could have turned the battle into a bigger rout. (day one) But it is what Jackson would have done / planned that would have meant a victory on Day TWO. Even if Meade would have held back Jackson would surely have been aiming to aggressively flank them.
It is not hard to believe that the death of one man (Jackson) influenced the outcome of Lee's Northern Invasion.
Taking nothing away from the Union fighting men who stood toe to toe and defeated Lee. Just the what if's... ;)
What's this, another CSA fan about to be shown that the Union victory was inevitable and that Lee and Longstreet were overrated! :p
(slaps Mark with leather glove) Sir, I demand satisfaction.
KG_RangerBooBoo
07 Mar 05, 13:24
(slaps Mark with leather glove) Sir, I demand satisfaction.
Then name your battlefield Sir and you may attempt to get your satisfaction.
Lee's entire invasion was suicide. Seriously, Lee felt the need to be on the offensive but he had no real objective. He's only hope was that the Union Army would totally choke and be eliminated. That just wasn't gonna happen in 63; the Union had many seasoned, experienced leaders and soldiers.
I would not say it was suicide. The Army of North Virginia fought on well into 1865. :)
I believe Lee had two ideas in mind. Relieve Virginia from the hardship of the war and fight the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil.
I also do not think he expected the Army of the Potomac to position itself as fast and as well as it did.
It must also be remembered that Lee was virtually blind operationally when he was seperated from Stuart's cavalry until the second day of the battle, IIRC.
Lee certainly could have won the battle, so I can't see it being suicide. Sure, Vicksburg was crippling the Confederacy, but a Cannae like battle in the Eastern theater, which is what Lee dreamed of, could have ended the war itself.
I think what crippled Lee and the ANV most was its new organization. Since the death of Jackson, the ANV was organized into 3 weaker Corps as opposed to the 2 Corps which fought at Chancellorsville and all the other great Southern victories earlier in the war commanded by Jackson and Longstreet.
Lee slipped up on day 3 and allowed the Federals to get their revenge for Fredericksburg. There were so many variables which occurred earlier in the battle which could have changed its final outcome. But Gettysburg was winnable for the south and the campaign in the north was certainly not suicidal.
What was suicidal was for the Army of Northern Virginia to fight a defensive war in Virginia while the every other Confederate army was bring defeated and pushed back. Federal gains on the Mississippi and in Eastern Tennessee had to be countered and at this point the Confederacy's only hope of an honorable peace lay in the hands of Lee and his army.
last_cav1971
07 Mar 05, 21:14
The biggest reason the Confederacy failed in the West was Braxton Bragg......while the Confederates faced superior superiors in the West, the Union faced superior superiors in the East.
Does that make sense???? :(
It all boils down to time and resources. It was a war of attrition. The South could not match or even come within 3 or 4 hundred thousand men to fight the North.
It was, however, something that needed to be aired out between the two factions. It showed 'big government' that the people still had a voice and it would be heard.
Mark
Deo Vindice
Salus Per Christum
Then name your battlefield Sir and you may attempt to get your satisfaction.
As soon as I have some time to figure out how this game works, I will....
:)
The biggest reason the Confederacy failed in the West was Braxton Bragg......while the Confederates faced superior superiors in the West, the Union faced superior superiors in the East.
Does that make sense???? :(
It all boils down to time and resources. It was a war of attrition. The South could not match or even come within 3 or 4 hundred thousand men to fight the North.
It was, however, something that needed to be aired out between the two factions. It showed 'big government' that the people still had a voice and it would be heard.
Mark
Deo Vindice
Salus Per Christum
When Davis finally sacked Bragg (or he resigned, whatever) he offered Robert E. Lee command of the Army of Tennessee. Of course, Lee refused. But it is an interesting 'what if' when thinking about how he could have rescued the command and fought Grant and Sherman in North Georgia.
I would assume that Old Peter would take command of the Army of Northern Virginia.
This would be so much easier had Jackson not been killed.
:(
KG_RangerBooBoo
08 Mar 05, 11:55
Bah, Jackson is overrated. He could sure get troops to march but he never met the Union first team. Look at his performance during the Seven Days campaign and you have to wonder if he could have done squat. Longstreet in charge of the AoT and Lee with the ANV is what I think the CSA should have done. Of course given Lee's somewhat hands off command style, he might have suffered more without a top notch corps commander to work with.
CyberRanger
08 Mar 05, 12:44
Bah, Jackson is overrated.
The unspeakable has been spoken! :banana:
Bah, Jackson is overrated. He could sure get troops to march but he never met the Union first team. Look at his performance during the Seven Days campaign and you have to wonder if he could have done squat.
huh, just what was the Union first team that Jackson never met?
I don't think you can call Jackson overrated because of his sluggish work in the Seven Days. I had read that the man was exhausted from an extreme lack of sleep.
Besides, no-one is perfect. Grant, Lee, Sherman, Meade, etc. all made mistakes in the course of the war.
IMHO, Jackson was the finest general of the war. Certainly among the top military minds this country has ever produced.
Longstreet in charge of the AoT and Lee with the ANV is what I think the CSA should have done.
I believe Davis offered the command to Longstreet after Lee turned it down, but he refused as well. Of course, either man would have taken the post if ordered to by the Commander in Chief.
Longstreet would seem like the perfect fit, since he was from Georgia.
Of course given Lee's somewhat hands off command style, he might have suffered more without a top notch corps commander to work with.
I agree, but he probably would have done better than Bragg or Joe Johnston. Wasn't the Army of Tennessee facing three or four Federal armies in East Tennessee/North Georgia? Sherman, Hooker, Thomas commanding an army each is all I can think of off of the top of my head. Maybe the other I was thinking of was Burnside, but he was in Knoxville, IIRC.
oh, neverminid, Hooker commanded a Corps.
last_cav1971
08 Mar 05, 18:00
Longstreet also did an excellent job when he was sent to Chickamauga.
I will have to ignore the remark about Jackson being overrated. :angry:
Mark
Deo Vindice
Salus Per Christum
KG_RangerBooBoo
08 Mar 05, 19:18
Jackson was good, don't get me wrong, I just don't think he walked on water like you Southern fans like to think. He made his reputation against some of the most incompetent generals the Union fielded on his home turf. Yeah, he was short on sleep at the start of the Seven Days campaign but surely he stumbled along enough the first couple days that he should have been okay for the rest of the campaign. He had a good day at Chancellorsville but Stuart spotted the open left flank and Lee devised the attack. I don't doubt that Longstreet could have carried out the same attack, heck any of the better CSA Corps commanders could have probably carried out that attack. Jackson's advantage might have been getting his men there as quick as he did so as to have as much daylight as he did. Just wonder what would have happened if Jackson had faced someone like Sheridan, Hancock, Reynolds, or Sherman in the Valley instead of the likes of Banks and Fremont.
Jackson was good, don't get me wrong, I just don't think he walked on water like you Southern fans like to think. He made his reputation against some of the most incompetent generals the Union fielded on his home turf.
Well, the Union DID invade his home turf, so you can't blame him for defending it.
Also, it wasn't his fault who the Federals chose to lead their armies.
He had a good day at Chancellorsville but Stuart spotted the open left flank
That was Stuarts job. :)
and Lee devised the attack.
Are you so sure about that?
Just wonder what would have happened if Jackson had faced someone like Sheridan, Hancock, Reynolds, or Sherman in the Valley instead of the likes of Banks and Fremont.
It would have been interesting. The same could be said for Grant and Sherman, though, especially in the Mississippi/Vicksburg campaign. And even Grants campaigns against Lee and the ANV which was a shadow of its former self.
KG_RangerBooBoo
09 Mar 05, 12:10
Are you so sure about that?
Well I don't think it was Jackson's idea to split the army and make that long march and attack.
Well I don't think it was Jackson's idea to split the army and make that long march and attack.
http://www.nps.gov/frsp/chist.htm
"Stonewall" Jackson, gladly seizing the initiative that Hooker needlessly surrendered, left the Fredericksburg lines at 3:00 a.m., on May I and arrived at Zoan Church five hours later. There he found two divisions of Confederate infantry, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's and Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws', fortifying a prominent ridge covering the Turnpike and Plank Road. Although his corps had not yet appeared, Jackson ordered Anderson and McLaws to drop their shovels, pick up their rifles, and advance to the attack. See Anderson's and McLaws' Official Reports on the battle.
Jackson's audacity dictated the shape of the Battle of Chancellorsville. When Hooker at last authorized an eastward movement late in the morning of May 1, his troops on the Turnpike and Plank Road ran flush against "Stonewall's", outgunned but aggressive brigades. Union front-line commanders had not expected this kind of resistance. They sent anxious messages to Hooker, who quickly ordered his generals to fall back to the Wilderness and assume a defensive posture. The Federal columns on the River Road marched almost to Bank's Ford without seeing a Rebel. They returned to Chancellorsville fuming, fully realizing the opportunity that had slipped through their fingers. See A. P. Hill's Official Report for Jackson's Corps.
Late in the day, as the blue infantry threw up entrenchments encircling Hooker's Chancellorsville headquarters, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch {click to read an article on Chancellorsville by Couch} approached his superior. As the army's senior corps commander, Couch {click to read Couch's Official Report on the battle} had advocated an offensive strategy and shared his comrades' disappointment with "Fighting Joe's" judgment. "It is all right, Couch," Hooker reassured him, "I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground."
Couch could barely believe his ears. "To hear from his own lip that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man."
Hooker's confidence had faded to caution, but whether he was "whipped" depended upon Lee and Jackson. Those two officers reined up along the Plank Road at its intersection with a byway call the Furnace Road on the evening of May 1. Transforming discarded Federal cracker boxes into camp stools, the generals examined their options.
Confederate scouts verified the Federals' strong positions extending from the Rappahannock River, around Chancellorsville, to the high, open ground at Hazel Grove. This was the bad news. The Southern army could not afford a costly frontal attack against prepared fortifications.
Then, about midnight, Lee's cavalry chief, "Jeb" Stuart, galloped up to the little campfire. The flamboyant Virginian carried thrilling intelligence. The Union right flank was "in the air" -- that is, resting on no natural or artificial obstacle! From that moment on, the generals thought of nothing but how to gain access to Hooker's vulnerable flank. Jackson consulted with staff officers familiar with the area, dispatched his topographical engineer to explore the roads to the west, and tried to snatch a few hours rest at the chilly bivouac.
Before dawn, Lee and Jackson studied a hastily drawn map and decided to undertake one of the biggest gambles in American military history. Jackson's corps, about 30,000 troops, would follow a series of country roads and woods paths to reach the Union right. Lee, with the remaining 14,000 infantry, would occupy a position more than three miles long and divert Hooker's attention during Jackson's dangerous trek. Once in position, "Stonewall" would smash the Federals with his full strength while Lee cooperated as best he could. The Army of Northern Virginia would thus be fractured into three pieces, counting Early's contingent at Fredericksburg, any one of which might be subject to rout or annihilation if the Yankees resumed the offensive. To learn more about the role of McLaws' men on May 2 see a folder for McLaws Trail.
Jackson led his column past the bivouac early on the morning of May 2. He conferred briefly with Lee, then trotted down the Furnace Road with the fire of battle kindled in his eyes. After about one mile, as the Confederates traversed a small clearing, Union scouts perched in treetops at Hazel Grove spotted the marchers. The Federals lobbed artillery shells at Jackson's men and notified Hooker of the enemy movement.
"Fighting Joe" correctly identified Jackson's maneuver as an effort to reach his right flank. He advised the area commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard, to be on the lookout for an attack from the west. As the morning progressed, however, the Union chief grew to believe that Lee was actually withdrawing - the course of events Hooker most preferred. Worries about his right disappeared. Instead, he ordered his Third Corps to harass the tail end of Lee's "retreating" army.
Colorful Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles commanded the Third Corps. He probed cautiously from Hazel Grove toward a local iron manufactory called Catharine Furnace. In mid-afternoon the Federals overwhelmed Jackson's rearguard beyond the furnace along the cut of an unfinished railroad, capturing nearly an entire Georgia regiment. The action at Catharine Furnace, however, eventually attracted some 20,000 Bluecoats onto the scene thus effectively isolating Howard's Eleventh Corps on the right with no nearby support. See Sickles' Official Report on the battle.
Meanwhile the bulk of Jackson's column snaked its way along uncharted trails barely wide enough to accommodate four men abreast. "Stonewall" contributed to Hooker's faith in a Confederate retreat by twice turning away from the Union line - first at Catharine Furnace, then again at the Brock Road. After making the desired impression, Jackson ducked under the Wilderness canopy and continued his march toward Howard's insensible soldiers.
Acting upon a personal reconnaissance recommended by cavalry general Fitzhugh Lee, Jackson kept his column northbound on the Brock Road to the Orange Turnpike where the Confederates would at last be beyond the Union right. The exhausting march, which altogether traversed more, than 12 miles, ended about 3 p.m. when "Old Jack's" warriors began deploying into battle lines astride the Turnpike. Jackson, however, did not authorize an attack for some two hours, providing 11 of his 15 brigades time to take position in the silent forest. The awe-inspiring Confederate front measured nearly two miles across.
Although individual Northern officers and men warned of Jackson's approach, Eleventh Corps headquarters dismissed the reports as frightened exaggerations from alarmists or cowards. Hooker's shortage of cavalry hampered the Federals's ability to penetrate the Wilderness and uncover the Confederate presence with certainty. Only two small regiments and half a New York battery faced west in the direction of Jackson's corps.
Suddenly, a bugle rang out in the afternoon shadows. Bugles everywhere echoed the notes up and down the line. As waves of sweat-soaked soldiers rolled forward, the high defiance of the Rebel Yell pierced the gloomy woods. Jackson's Corps erupted from the trees and sent the astonished Unionists reeling. "Along the road it was pandemonium," recalled a Massachusetts soldier, "and on the side of the road it was chaos." See General Robert Rodes' Official Report on the battle.
Most of Howard's men fought bravely, drawing three additional battle lines across Jackson's path. But the overmatched Federals occupied an untenable position. The screaming gray legions overwhelmed each Union stand and eventually drove the Eleventh Corps completely from the field.
Sunset and the inevitable intermingling of "Stonewall's" brigades compelled Jackson to call a reluctant halt to the advance about 7:15. He summoned Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division to the front and, typically, determined to renew his attack despite the darkness. Jackson hoped to maneuver between Hooker and his escape routes across the rivers and then, with Lee's help, grind the Army of the Potomac into oblivion.
While Hill brought his brigades forward, Jackson rode ahead of his men to reconnoiter. When he attempted to return, a North Carolina regiment mistook his small party for Union cavalry. Two volleys burst forth in the blackness and Jackson tottered in his saddle, suffering from three wounds. Shortly thereafter a Federal shell struck Hill, incapacitating him, and direction of the corps devolved upon Stuart. The cavalryman wisely cancelled "Stonewall's" plans for a night attack. See text for Wounding of Stonewall Jackson Trail.
I dont think either man can claim full credit for the battle. They both made each other so much better. But certainly enough praise can be given to both men for this victory.
cmiller73
11 Mar 05, 14:34
I am really enjoying reading most of the posts regarding 'what if' scenarios in the battle of Gettysburg.
I recently finished an excellent book by Sears (last name of the author - not the store) about the battle called The Battle of Gettysburg.
One fact the book points out is that there were other options presented to the Lee and Davis to invading the north. The most intriguing to me was marching into Kentucky in hopes of luring Grant from the seige of Vicksburg which was also occuring at the same time. The idea was to 'take the battle to the heartland'. Vicksburg could be saved and Grant's army could be defeated in the process because they would be cut off from the rest of the Union Army.
Unfortunately for the South, Lee was gung-ho on invasion and targeting DC in order to hopefully sway public opinion in the North against the war and bring about a quick end to the it. Obviously he was wrong about this.
At any rate, this just wanted to add my two cents in.
last_cav1971
11 Mar 05, 15:24
Welcome...glad you're enjoying the posts.
Lee felt that at this period in the War, he needed to either get foreign intervention (which could have come had Gettysburg not been lost). It was also a tactic to keep the Union army out of the state of VA and the Shenandoah Valley (the Breadbasket of the Confederacy) so that crops could be harvested for the hungering Southern soldiers.
Once more, this makes 3 reasons; If the South would have won Gettysburg, the general impression is that the North would sue for a peace. They were just plain tired of losing battles and dragging out a war. The South, hoping to keep Lincoln out of office again, also hoped for the Democratic party to win the upcoming election. This, in their eyes, would seal the victory for them.
To make a long story short, the South made several bets and lost them all.
Mark
Deo Vindice
Salus Per Christum
vBulletin® v3.7.0, Copyright ©2000-2008, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.